Les critères d’admissibilité d’un témoignage d’opinion de reconnaissance d’une personne sur image

R. c. Constant, 2021 QCCQ 12995

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[51]        La jurisprudence reconnaît la capacité d’un témoin ordinaire d’identifier un accusé sur une bande vidéo ou sur une photographie, dans la mesure où ce témoin est mieux placé que le juge des faits pour faire cette démonstration[10].

[52]        Avant qu’un témoin ne puisse être appelé à reconnaître un suspect sur une image en lien avec le crime, le Tribunal doit tenir un voir-dire pour déterminer si, d’une part, le témoin a une familiarité préalable avec le suspect servant comme base à son identification et si, d’autre part, cette familiarité le met véritablement dans une meilleure position que le juge des faits pour identifier l’accusé[11].

[53]        Le juge du droit doit être convaincu, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que la relation du témoin avec l’accusé permet au témoin de fournir des informations pertinentes et autrement indisponibles sur l’identité de cette personne[12].

[54]        À l’étape de l’admissibilité, le Tribunal peut tenir compte des éléments suivants :

•         La durée de la relation entre l’accusé et le témoin;

•         Les circonstances entourant cette relation;

•         Le caractère récent des contacts entre l’accusé et le témoin[13];

•         La fréquence des contacts entre l’accusé et le témoin[14].

[55]        Bien que le critère d’admissibilité ne soit pas particulièrement exigeant, il n’est pas une simple formalité non plus. Une familiarité générale avec le suspect ne suffira pas, car un tel seuil risquerait de faire admettre un éventail trop vaste d’opinions qui seraient non fondées, mais pourtant fermes et imperméables à toute forme d’attaque, tout en donnant une apparence indue de fiabilité[15]. L’opinion du témoin doit plutôt reposer sur une assise solide et elle doit apporter un éclairage utile au juge des faits que ce dernier n’aurait pas en visionnant lui-même la preuve audiovisuelle.

[56]        Selon une jurisprudence constante, une preuve d’opinion de reconnaissance pourra être admise même si le témoin est incapable de décrire avec précision des traits distinctifs appartenant à l’accusé qu’il a pu identifier dans la vidéo[16]. À ce sujet, dans le récent arrêt R. v. Wanihadie, la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta a reconnu que lorsqu’une familiarité claire est établie, « for the purposes of admissibility… nothing more was required than that bare, but principled, recognition of special knowledge »[17]. Dans cette affaire, une agression avait eu lieu dans un centre de détention. Le témoin était un agent correctionnel qui était responsable du secteur de la prison où était survenue l’attaque. Il connaissait les détenus sous sa garde et il avait visionné les images immédiatement après l’incident.

[57]        Il découle du bon sens que plus le témoin connaît étroitement le suspect, moins le Tribunal exigera de sa part qu’il puisse nommer des traits distinctifs. Le lien est inversement proportionnel. Comme le citait avec approbation la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique dans l’arrêt R. v. Field :

Where a witness has but little acquaintanceship with the accused, his or her recognition evidence may be of little value unless the witness can explain its basis in some considerable detail. But at the other end of the spectrum, the bare conclusory recognition evidence of a person long and closely familiar with the accused may have a substantial value, even where the witness does not articulate the particular features or idiosyncrasies that underlie the recognition.

That said, a complete inability to respond to questions about the basis for the opinion may, even in a person long familiar with the subject identified, call into question the value of the opinion[18].

[58]        Ceci dit, la capacité du témoin de nommer des particularités physiques au soutien de son identification sera certes pertinente à la valeur probante de la preuve en dernière analyse[19].

[59]        De l’avis du Tribunal, la qualité de la vidéo, la clarté des images et leur impact sur la fiabilité de l’opinion du témoin relèvent plutôt de l’analyse finale du juge des faits quant à la valeur probante ultime de la preuve. Ainsi, ces questions ne sont pas pertinentes au stade de l’admissibilité. En l’espèce, les deux parties ont référé à ce critère lors de leurs représentations, citant le paragraphe 17 de l’arrêt Boutarene de notre Cour d’appel. Or, avec égards et contrairement aux parties, je suis d’avis que cet extrait porte sur une question différente, soit l’évaluation de l’identification au fond. Une lecture des motifs dans leur ensemble révèle que la question de l’admissibilité Leaney est déjà tranchée au paragraphe 15 de la décision. Les paragraphes subséquents portent plutôt sur l’appréciation finale de la bande vidéo par la juge de première instance.

[60]        Sur ce sujet, je partage l’avis de la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique dans l’arrêt R. v. Field, qui confirme que la qualité de l’enregistrement est seulement pertinente à l’analyse de la valeur probante au fond et non pas à la question de l’admissibilité[20].

Le voir-dire relatif à l'identification de l'accusé sur enregistrement vidéo est l'occasion pour explorer la relation préexistante entre ce dernier et le témoin

R v Wanihadie, 2021 ABCA 173 

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[9]               In Leaney, McLachlin J, as she then was, writing for the majority, concluded that the “judge erred in not determining as a preliminary matter the qualification of [the witness] before receiving his evidence...”: Leaney at p 413. While it is arguably open to interpretation whether this implicitly signalled the need for a voir dire, the concurring opinion of Lamer J, as he then was, at p 404, and the dissenting opinion of Wilson J at p 411, were explicit that a voir dire should have been held. The majority of the jurisprudence following Leaney confirms that a voir dire should be held to determine the question of threshold admissibility: R v Field, 2018 BCCA 253 at para 34; R v Berhe, 2012 ONCA 716 at para 24 [Berhe]. We endorse this reading of Leaney.

[10]           Absent an express waiver or consent among the parties, when the Crown seeks to tender evidence from witnesses who purport to identify the accused by viewing videotapes, without any firsthand knowledge or direct observations of the offence, a voir dire should be held. To this end, it is unfortunate that neither the Crown nor defence counsel requested a voir dire to determine the threshold admissibility of the corrections officers’ evidence, and that this issue was not flagged in the pre-trial conference.

[11]           The fundamental purpose of a voir dire is to determine the admissibility of disputed evidence. This is distinct from assessing the merits of the case on consideration of all of the admissible evidence: Erven v The Queen, 1978 CanLII 19 (SCC), [1979] 1 SCR 926, 92 DLR (3d) 507 at p 931. A voir dire is the forum to explore the length of the prior relationship between the witness and the accused, the circumstances of the prior relationship and the recency of the contact between the witness and the accused prior to the incident recorded: R v Anderson, 2005 BCSC 1346 at para 25; R v Knife, 2011 SKQB 443 at paras 8-10 [Knife]. This is to determine whether the recognition witness is indeed “a helpful witness who is in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused”: Knife at para 9. It permits the accused to test the proposed recognition evidence without limitations or evidentiary constraints and ensures the integrity of the trial process. The trial judge erred in this regard.

Les paramètres que doit respecter un juge lorsqu'il envisage de soulever d'office qu'il existe potentiellement une violation de la Charte

R. v. Youngpine, 2009 ABCA 89 

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[12]           It is true that judges in Canada have not only an adjudicative role, but also a role as defender of the Constitution: Re Therrien, 2001 SCC 35, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 108 . That said, there are limits as to how far a judge should go in raising, on his or her own motion, an issue potentially involving the defence of constitutional rights. Our system of law remains an adversarial one and where defence counsel advises that neither defence counsel nor the client wish to pursue a constitutional issue on which there is conflicting legal authority, it is not for a judge to impose on the offender his or her desire to address and determine that issue.

 

[13]           Judges must be cautious in usurping counsel’s role especially where the judge has raised the issue squarely, and both defence counsel and client have nevertheless declined to pursue it. There are reasons for this caution. It is precisely because judges play a key role in deciding whether the state has breached an individual’s constitutional rights that judges must not descend improperly into the arena: Therrien, supra, at para. 111. When judges are highly interventionist in pursuing an issue, they run the risk that a reasonable and informed member of the public will view their approach as one of “have opinion; need case”.

Les juges ont le devoir, dans certaines circonstances, de soulever d’office une transgression de la Charte et ils doivent le faire lorsqu’il existe une preuve solide prima facie de violation d’un droit garanti par la Charte

R. v. Travers, 2001 NSCA 71

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32)      In my view, the evidence at trial was more than sufficient to alert the trial judge that he should raise the question of the admissibility of evidence in light of possible Charter infringement.  The trial judge should have conducted an inquiry into whether there had been any violation of the appellant’s Charter rights.  At that time, after hearing submissions from the appellant and the Crown, the judge could have considered any argument by the Crown based on exigent circumstances. If he found any infringement of rights, he should have then determined whether the evidence obtained pursuant to it, namely the clock radio, should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

 

33)      I recognize that trial judges have generally considered it improper to raise Charter issues when the parties before them did not do so.  See, for example, R. v. Kane [Mistrial], [1998] N.S.J. No. 557 (S.C.) at §14. This is hardly surprising as they have been found to have erred when they did so, not only where the accused was represented by counsel but also where the accused was self-represented.  For illustrations of the latter circumstance, see R. v. Sheppard, [1990] N.J. No. 76 (S.C.) and R. v. Sveinson, [1990] M.J. No. 671 (Q.B.).  

 

34)      However, I am of the view that the appropriate approach is that in R. v. Arbour (1990), 4 C.R.R. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.) which held that, in certain circumstances, trial judges have a duty to raise Charter issues on their own motion.  The appellant there had testified at trial that the police had refused to let him call a lawyer before they questioned him and obtained his statement.  If true, his evidence indicated a clear infringement of his rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter.  There was no evidence to indicate that he had waived those rights and no inquiry had been made regarding any such infringement and, if any found, whether his statement would still be admissible notwithstanding s. 24(2) of the Charter.  At p. 372 of Arbour, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:

 

We are of the view that once there was admissible uncontradicted evidence before the court, indicating that there had been an infringement of the appellant’s rights under s.10(b) of the Charter it was incumbent on the trial judge to enter upon an inquiry to ascertain whether such an infringement had occurred.  This was not done.  Accordingly, the statement should not have been admitted in evidence or, having been admitted, should not have been considered as evidence in the circumstances.

 

It allowed the appeal under several grounds including the improper admission of the appellant’s statement, quashed the convictions, and directed a new trial.

 

35)      The appellant in Arbour was represented by counsel.  I suggest that the principle enunciated in that case is equally applicable, if not more so, to proceedings involving a self-represented litigant who is unfamiliar with the law.

 

36)      The approach taken in Arbour is not confined to Ontario.  In the case under appeal in R. v. Fraillon (1991), 1990 CanLII 2828 (QC CA), 62 C.C.C. (3d) 474 (Que. C.A.), the trial judge on his own motion had entered a stay of fraud proceedings on the basis that the accused was not able to make full answer and defence due to delay in laying charges.  At p. 476, the Quebec Court of Appeal stated:

 

Generally, it is open to the judge to point out to the parties that, in his mission to do justice, he is troubled by a point in the facts or in the law which neither one raised. This is especially the case where it is a right recognized by the Charter. But again, he must point it out to the parties and give them all the time necessary to completely argue the question before he rules on it. Here the parties to their great astonishment learned during the rendering of judgment that it was based, and based solely, on a question that the judge had only raised and resolved proprio motu.  (Emphasis added)

 

37)     In R. v. Boire et. al. (1991), 1991 CanLII 2805 (QC CA), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 216, one of the issues considered by the Quebec Court of Appeal was whether, in the absence of a formal application, a court of appeal is entitled to itself raise the violation of a Charter right.  At p. 223, Brossard, J.A. commented that, considering that the Charter constitutes the most fundamental law in respect of human rights and in particular of accused in penal matters, he found it difficult to see how it could be argued that a court would not be entitled, in certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, to itself consider its provisions when confronted with a flagrant violation of the Charter.  He continued by quoting Ewaschuk, J. who wrote in R. v. Boron (1983), 1983 CanLII 1606 (ON SC), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 25 at pp. 32-3, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 36 C.R. (3d) 329 (Ont. H.C.):

 

...Trial judge raising the issue

 

...a penal prosecution is based on the adversary system which requires party presentation of evidence and not active participation by a trial judge. Active participation often bespeaks the taking of sides, i.e., the appearance of partiality, which should be most assiduously avoided. Assuming the goal of a penal prosecution is to do justice to both accused and Crown, justice is best achieved by the non-involvement of the trial judge in the presentation of evidence or the raising of legal issues. However, to do justice in the particular case, judicial intervention, rare though it should be, may be warranted in penal proceedings.

 

38)     I do not suggest that the merest intimation of a possible Charter infringement will found a duty upon a trial judge to enter immediately upon an inquiry where none of the parties before him has raised this argument.  However, and without attempting to fully delineate the point at which the duty arises, where there is strong evidence of a prima facie case of breach of a Charter right relevant to the proceeding, a judge has a responsibility to raise the issue, invite submissions and, if appropriate, to conduct an exclusionary hearing in order to protect the integrity of the judicial process.

 

39)     The evidence before the trial judge in this case warranted his intervention.  It came from the police officers themselves, was uncontroverted, and suggested that the police may have deliberately disregarded the appellant’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter in entering and searching his dwelling and in seizing the clock radio which was entered into evidence at trial.  The judge erred in law when he proceeded without entering into an inquiry as to the possibility of breach of constitutional rights.  The summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law when he upheld the verdict of the trial judge in these circumstances.

 

40)     In my view, the curative provisions of s. 686 (1)(b)(iii) are not applicable in this case.  It cannot be said that there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the error of law had not occurred:  R. v. Charlebois, 2000 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 674.  As indicated in the trial judge’s reasons, the demonstrative evidence placed before the court by the playing of the clock radio in open court clearly had an impact but its extent cannot be assessed from the record before us.

Comment apprécier la fouille accessoire à l'arrestation d'une clé USB?

R. v. Balendra, 2019 ONCA 68

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[35]      I agree with the appellant that it is clear, since the decision of this Court in R. v. Tuduce, 2014 ONCA 547, 314 C.C.C. (3d) 429, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the USB key found in his pocket.

[37]      In Tuduce, at paras. 71-75, Gillese J.A. considered the privacy interests implicated in USB keys found in a person’s possession:

First, a USB key can store a significant amount of data. USB keys commonly hold anywhere from one to ten gigabytes of data, and USB keys with a storage capacity of over one terabyte exist. It seems likely that their storage capacities will only increase over time.

Second, data can be left on a USB key without a user’s knowledge. This data includes information about the date and time a file was created or modified and information about the user who created or modified that file.

Third, a user does not have complete control over which files an investigator will be able to find on a USB key. Data can be salvaged from a USB key through forensic analysis even after a user has deleted or “saved over” it.

It is true that a USB key is not a home computer or a cell phone. Thus, it may not always contain personal information, like a list of contacts, the contents of past communications, and information about an individual’s web searching habits.

On the other hand, however, a person’s personal USB key arguably engages more serious privacy interests than a work computer. The two key reasons why individuals have a somewhat diminished reasonable expectation of privacy in a work computer are that a work computer is not actually owned by the employee who uses it, and the employee’s use of the work computer is often subject to terms and conditions imposed by the employer: R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at paras. 49-52 and 92. Neither of these considerations apply to personal digital storage devices like USB key.

[38]      Here, the USB key was found in the appellant’s pocket. That fact, combined with the potential personal contents of such a device, is sufficient to establish that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the USB key: R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 56. It is not necessary for the purposes of this appeal to define the level or intensity of that interest relative to other such devices with any further precision.

(2)         Was the search of the USB key reasonable?

[39]      Having found that the appellant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the USB key, I turn now to the question of whether Sgt. Humber’s search of the key on the evening of the appellant’s arrest was reasonable as a search incident to arrest.

[40]      The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the law applicable to the scope of searches incident to arrest in the context of cell phones in R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621. Cromwell J., writing for the majority, wrote of the need to recognize, on the one hand, the high potential invasion of privacy inherent in the search of a cell phone, and, on the other, the importance that cell phones may play with respect to law enforcement objectives. At para. 83, Cromwell J. set out four conditions with which a search of a cell phone incident to arrest should comply in order to be lawful:

1.            The arrest itself must be lawful;

2.            The search must be “truly” incidental to arrest, and have a valid law enforcement purpose in (a) protecting the police, the accused or the public; (b) preserving evidence; or (c) discovering evidence, including locating additional suspects, in situations in which the investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest;

3.            The nature and extent of the search must be tailored to the purpose of the search; and

4.            The police must take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device and how it was searched.

[41]      The three valid law enforcement purposes identified by Cromwell J. are drawn from the Supreme Court’s previous decisions in Cloutier v. Langlois, 1990 CanLII 122 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, and R. v. Caslake, 1998 CanLII 838 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51. In Caslake, the Court clarified, with respect to the “discovering evidence” purpose, that “if the justification for the search is to find evidence, there must be some reasonable prospect of securing evidence of the offence for which the accused is being arrested”: at para. 22 (emphasis in original).

[42]      This restrictive approach to the “discovering evidence” purpose was affirmed by Cromwell J. in Fearon, though he added three additional restrictions in the context of cell phone searches. First, where the purpose of the search is to discover evidence, it will only be lawful if the investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest. The rationale for this restriction is that it strikes the proper balance between law enforcement objectives and privacy interests, in light of the nature and vast range of personal information that a cell phone might hold. Second, where a search is conducted for any valid purpose, both the nature and extent of the search must be tailored to that purpose. Finally, officers must take detailed notes of what they have examined on a cell phone, in order to help them focus their search and to permit effective after-the-fact judicial review. See R. v. Tsekouras, 2017 ONCA 290, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 349, at paras. 89-94.

[44]       With respect, I agree with the appellant that the trial judge erred on this point. It is clear from Caslake and Fearon that the requirement that the search be “truly incidental” to the charge for which an accused has been arrested is to be strictly interpreted. At para. 76 of Fearon, Cromwell J., having stated that the requirement that the search of a cell phone be truly incidental to arrest should be “strictly applied”, continued:

…it is not enough that a cell phone search in general terms is truly incidental to the arrest. Both the nature and the extent of the search performed on the cell phone must be truly incidental to the particular arrest for the particular offence. [Emphasis added.]

[46]      The test for determining whether a search is incidental to arrest has both a subjective and an objective component. While Sgt. Humber subjectively believed his look at the USB key was incident to the appellant’s arrest, this belief was not objectively reasonable because the officer was not looking for information relating to the stolen van charge but rather to the investigation that was superseding it with respect to which no charges had yet been laid. Put another way, he was not (subjectively) aware that the initial arrest did not (objectively) authorize him to look at the USB key in order to find evidence of impersonation or fraud.

[47]      This is very similar to the facts in Caslake. In that case, the officer would objectively have had a lawful basis for a search incident to arrest that led to the discovery of a nine-pound bag of marijuana in the appellant’s car. However, subjectively, the officer had not been searching for evidence incident to the arrest, but rather was doing so in compliance with an RCMP policy requiring that the contents of an impounded car be inventoried. As a result, the Supreme Court found that the search did not fall within the bounds of a search incident to arrest, although it admitted the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.

[49]      In short, I find that the first search of the USB key was not objectively reasonable because it was not conducted to find evidence of the particular offences for which the appellant had been arrested. Had it been related to those offences, the search would still not be justified because the investigation would not have been stymied or significantly hampered absent the search incident to arrest. 

[50]      The fact that the search was not objectively incidental to arrest is sufficient to address its reasonableness on those grounds. However, I disagree with the appellant’s argument that the search could not have been valid because it was conducted a number of hours after his arrest. While there are temporal limits to a search incident to arrest, there is no “firm deadline” that defines this limit. Rather, as Lamer C.J. stated in Caslake, at para. 24:

As a general rule, searches that are truly incidental to arrest will usually occur within a reasonable period of time after that arrest. A substantial delay does not mean that the search is automatically unlawful, but it may cause the court to draw an inference that the search is not sufficiently connected to the arrest.

[51]      Here, Sgt. Humber inserted the USB key into a computer later during the same day, and during the same shift. This was within a reasonable period of time after the arrest. There was no problem with the temporal nexus to the arrest in itself in the circumstances of this case.

[52]      I would also not attach great weight in the circumstances of this case to Sgt. Humber’s failure to take detailed notes when he first looked at the contents of the USB key on March 13. He spent about 10-30 minutes looking at it and determined that it contained a long list of credit card numbers, a driver’s licence template, and the image of a driver’s license with a photograph of an unidentified person. In these circumstances, the need for detailed notes does not appear to be as strong as was the case of the cell phone at issue in Fearon. Cell phones frequently have many apps and icons, and one may see a great deal of categories of information whose contents range across a wide number of subjects. In this case, the USB key contents were narrower in range and it is clear that while Sgt. Humber did not take notes, he remembered the nature of what he saw.