Éléments narratifs à portée circonstancielle

R. c. Reyes Reyes, 2022 QCCQ 8692

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[33]        Une partie peut mettre en preuve une déclaration antérieure pour comprendre le récit complet des événements, lorsque cela est vraiment essentiel[21].

[34]        Elle peut également être déclarée admissible comme un simple élément de preuve narratif, pour permettre au juge des faits de comprendre la « cohésion » chronologique du dossier. Elle ne fait alors pas preuve de son contenu et n’a pas de valeur probante^[22].

[35]        L’exception narrative « à portée circonstancielle » permet une utilisation un peu plus large, lorsque les circonstances entourant la déclaration antérieure compatible sont telles que la déclaration aide à évaluer la fiabilité et la crédibilité du témoignage d’un témoin devant le Tribunal^[23].

[36]        Le narratif est ainsi utilisé pour donner un cadre logique à l’histoire, qui permet d’évaluer la sincérité du témoin plutôt que la véracité de ce qu’il dit^[24]. Les circonstances dans lesquelles une déclaration est faite, le moment et le contexte peuvent servir le juge des faits dans l’évaluation de la crédibilité de la plaignante lors de son témoignage à la cour^[25].

[37]        Il faut toutefois garder à l’esprit que l’introduction de cette preuve ne peut servir à tirer des inférences illégales ou servir d’élément d’autocorroboration :

Although the statement was admissible under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, such evidence cannot be used for the prohibited inference that consistency enhances credibility, or the incorrect conclusion that the simple making of a prior consistent statement corroborates in-court testimony[26].

[38]        Le Tribunal est ainsi d’avis que les messages, sans faire preuve de leur contenu, peuvent aider à démontrer la chronologie des faits et expliquer de quelle façon l’agression présumée est dénoncée, sans toutefois établir la véracité de leur contenu, soit qu’il y a effectivement eu agression.

[39]        Le Tribunal peut ainsi considérer le contexte de l’envoi des messages textes par la plaignante à sa voisine dans l’évaluation de sa sincérité sur le déroulement des faits[27].

[40]        Admis uniquement dans un but narratif, sans tirer aucune inférence corroborative quant à la véracité de la version de la plaignante, la valeur probante de cette preuve l’emporte sur son effet préjudiciable.

Une partie peut mettre en preuve une déclaration antérieure pour comprendre le récit complet des événements, lorsque cela est vraiment essentiel ou comme un simple élément de preuve narratif, pour permettre au juge des faits de comprendre la « cohésion » chronologique du dossier

Leboeuf c. R., 2017 QCCA 474

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[19]        Le nombre de fois que la plaignante a dit avoir été agressée n’est pas un élément pertinent quant à la véracité de la déclaration puisque la répétition ne renforce pas la valeur ou la véracité d’un témoignage : R. c. Ellard, 2009 CSC 27 (CanLII), [2009] 2 R.C.S. 19, par. 31, 42, car « même répétée à plusieurs reprises, une déclaration inventée demeure inventée » : R. c. Stirling, 2008 CSC 10 (CanLII), [2008] 1 R.C.S. 272, par. 7.

[20]        L’appelant ne me convainc pas que le juge a utilisé cet élément de la manière interdite. Son jugement se concentre sur la recherche d’indice de fiabilité. Les déclarations antérieures compatibles, ici les dévoilements, s’inscrivent dans le récit des faits et dans les limites indiquées par la Cour suprême du Canada, c’est-à-dire que le narratif est utilisé pour donner un cadre logique à l’histoire, ce qui permet d’évaluer la sincérité du témoin plutôt que la véracité de ce qu’il dit. Le juge ne conclut pas à la culpabilité de l’appelant en accordant trop de poids aux déclarations antérieures : R. c. Dinardo, 2008 CSC 24 (CanLII), [2008] 1 R.C.S. 788, par. 37-40.

Les exceptions à la règle d’exclusion des déclarations antérieures compatibles telles que décrites par la Cour d'appel du Québec

Marandiuc Mihai c. R., 2022 QCCA 1753

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[22]      Les déclarations antérieures compatibles sont en principe inadmissibles. En effet, une déclaration antérieure compatible est d’une force probante limitée[14]. L’effet préjudiciable d’une telle preuve, surtout devant jury, justifie une règle générale d’exclusion[15]. Un juge ou jury ne devrait pas pouvoir tirer l’inférence qu’une déclaration est d’une véracité accrue ou se trouve corroborée pour la simple raison qu’elle a été répétée plusieurs fois[16]. Il s’agit d’un raisonnement circulaire prohibé.

[23]      Plusieurs exceptions à la règle d’exclusion ont été cependant reconnues[17]. L’une de ces exceptions est la possibilité d’admettre une déclaration antérieure compatible afin de compléter la trame factuelle pour que le juge ou le jury puisse adéquatement évaluer la crédibilité ou la fiabilité d’un témoin lorsque sont soulevées des incohérences entre différentes versions données d’un même événement[18].

[24]      En somme, il s’agit d’une question d’équité envers le témoin dont la crédibilité ou la fiabilité pourrait se voir jugée défavorablement fondée sur un portrait incomplet de ses verbalisations[19]. L’objectif n’est pas de tenter de rehausser la crédibilité d’un témoin, mais plutôt de contextualiser ses affirmations[20].

[25]      Le but de cette preuve doit être identifié par la partie qui cherche à l’introduire[21]. Si l’introduction de la déclaration antérieure vise un objectif lié à l’évaluation de la crédibilité ou la fiabilité d’un témoin, la pertinence de la déclaration antérieure en lien avec cette question devra être démontrée[22]. En fin d’analyse, le juge considérera si les bénéfices de la preuve excèdent ses effets préjudiciables[23]. L’admissibilité d’une telle preuve demeurera l’exception[24]. Aussi, une déclaration antérieure compatible ne sera généralement pas admise pour faire preuve de son contenu[25].

[26]      Le juge de première instance était conscient des difficultés relatives aux déclarations antérieures compatibles. Il a correctement identifié les principes juridiques applicables. Il permet au ministère public de réinterroger le témoin Koly-Cherif sur sa deuxième déclaration aux policiers, non pas pour faire preuve de son contenu, mais en vue d’établir qu’elle a été faite pour que le juge puisse adéquatement évaluer la crédibilité et la fiabilité du témoignage. Le juge indique :

[…] le Tribunal ne présumera pas que le témoin est plus susceptible de dire la vérité parce qu’il a déjà fait la même déclaration; la déclaration antérieure ne sera pas non plus considérée pour la véracité de son contenu. Cependant, elle sera considérée en évaluant l’impact sur la crédibilité du témoin de la prétendue contradiction entre son témoignage et sa déclaration écrite aux policiers, faite au poste de police quelques minutes après les incidents.^[26]

[27]      Cette approche prudente et mesurée est conforme au droit. Le réinterrogatoire du ministère public ne portait pas atteinte à l’équité du procès, mais visait simplement à assurer le traitement équitable du témoin. Notons qu’il s’agissait d’un procès devant juge seul, ce qui minimisait grandement tout risque de préjudice.

Les déclarations antérieures compatibles sont en principe inadmissibles, mais il existe 3 exceptions permettant leur admissibilité

R. v. Khan, 2017 ONCA 114

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[25] Prior consistent statements are presumptively inadmissible because they lack probative value: R. v. Stirling, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 272, [2008] S.C.J. No. 10, 2008 SCC 10, at paras. 5-7. The fact that someone said the same thing on a prior occasion to what he/she has said in court is, generally speaking, not probative of whether the witness is offering truthful testimony in court. It would be self-serving to allow a witness to buttress his or her own testimony with her own prior statements.

[26] As Watt J.A. noted in C. (M.), at para. 59, citing Paciocco, at p. 184, prior consistent statements are an amalgam of two elements -- the hearsay element and the declaration element. The hearsay rule takes care of the hearsay element. The prior consistent statement rules generally exclude the declaration [page528] element. Where admissible, the declaration element is proof that a statement was made, and allows a trier of fact to derive appropriate inferences from the fact and context in which the statement was made: Paciocco, at p. 184.

[27] The common law recognizes a number of exceptions to the basic rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible. When a prior consistent statement is admissible pursuant to one of these exceptions, it is admissible for limited purposes, and those purposes differ among exceptions.

[28] For example, where a prior consistent statement is admitted to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, it is admitted solely to provide a direct response to the suggestion that the witness concocted allegations after a triggering event. The statement is not admitted for the truth of its contents, but only to show that the details were not added after the point in time suggested by opposing counsel.

[29] Other recognized exceptions include admitting prior consistent statements as pure narrative evidence, and narrative as circumstantial evidence: Paciocco, at p. 182.

[30] As pure narrative, prior consistent statements carry no weight because they are tendered simply to give the background to explain how the complaint came to be before the court. This court described the pure narrative exception in R. v. F. (J.E.) (1993), 1993 CanLII 3384 (ON CA), 16 O.R. (3d) 1, [1993] O.J. No. 2589 (C.A.), as allowing the decision maker to understand the "chronological cohesion" of the case. The statement is not used to prove the truth of its contents, nor are there any inferences arising that would make the case of one person more compelling than that of another. It is merely an aid in understanding the case as a whole.

[31] But sometimes the circumstances surrounding the making of the prior consistent statement are such that the statement assists in assessing the reliability and credibility of a witness' in-court testimony, giving prior consistent statements admitted as "narrative" a more substantive use: R. v. Dinardo, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, [2008] S.C.J. No. 24, 2008 SCC 24, at para. 39; R. v. Evans, 1993 CanLII 102 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 629, [1993] S.C.J. No. 30, at para. 32. This is referred to as narrative as circumstantial evidence.

[32] In R. v. C. (G.), 2006 CanLII 18984 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 2245, 2006 CarswellOnt 3413 (C.A.), at para. 22, Rouleau J.A. identified the limited way in which prior consistent statements can be used to assist the trier of fact in assessing the cogency, and therefore the reliability and credibility, of a witness:

In cases involving sexual assault of young children, the courts recognize the difficulty in the victim providing a full account of events. In appropriate [page529] cases, the way the complaint comes forth can, by adding or detracting from the logical cogency of the child's evidence, be a useful tool in assisting the trial judge in the assessment of the child's truthfulness.

[33] While Rouleau J.A. was discussing the use of prior consistent statements to assess the reliability and credibility of young children, there is no reason why the principle should be so restricted. In the appropriate case, prior consistent statements can be useful tools in assisting a trial judge in the assessment of the truthfulness or reliability of the declarant, whatever their age: C. (M.), at para. 66; R. v. Curto, [2008] O.J. No. 889, 2008 ONCA 161, 230 C.C.C. (3d) 145, at para. 37.

[34] As this court noted in Curto, at para. 34, it will not always be necessary to know why or how the case came to the attention of the police; however, the fact that a statement was made, and the context in which the statement is made, can be probative and help in assessing a witness' credibility.

[35] The line between the permissible and impermissible uses of prior consistent statements is a fine one, as noted by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Dinardo, the prior consistent statements of an intellectually disabled complainant were, at trial, used to corroborate her in-court testimony. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in using the complainant's prior consistent statements to corroborate her evidence that the crime had been committed. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed and highlighted the distinction between the permissible and impermissible use of prior consistent statements. Charron J. stated, at para. 37:

In some circumstances, prior consistent statements may be admissible as part of the narrative. Once admitted, the statements may be used for the limited purpose of helping the trier of fact to understand how the complainant's story was initially disclosed. The challenge is to distinguish between "using narrative evidence for the impermissible purpose of aeconfirm[ing] the truthfulness of the sworn allegation'" and "using narrative evidence for the permissible purpose of showing the fact and timing of a complaint, which may then assist the trier of fact in the assessment of the truthfulness or credibility".

(Emphasis added; citations omitted)

[36] Charron J. cited this court's decision in C. (G.), in which Rouleau J.A. stated, at para. 20:

. . . the evidence of prior complaint cannot be used as a form of self-corroboration to prove that the incident in fact occurred. It cannot be used as evidence of the truth of its contents. However, the evidence can "be supportive of the central allegation in the sense of creating a logical framework for its presentation . . . and can be used in assessing the truthfulness of the complainant. [page530]

[37] In this case, while the trial judge did not expressly refer to the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception, it is clear from his reasons that it was through this lens that he considered the admissibility of the complainant's statement. The trial judge stated [see 2015 ONSC 7187 (CanLII), [2015] O.J. No. 6200, at para. 13]:

Having touched on the issue of an allegation of fabrication by the defence, I would also admit the statement as a prior statement of [the complainant] as relevant and capable of assisting the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue and the credibility of [the complainant], it having been put squarely in issue that she fabricated her evidence.

Such admission has the capacity to impact positively, where admission of the statement directly addresses the allegation of fabrication, as but one factor to be taken into account as part of the larger assessment of credibility.

[38] The summary conviction appeal judge addressed the admissibility of the statement as a prior consistent statement very briefly, stating, at para. 14:

In Khan, the court does address circumstances in which a prior consistent statement may be admissible; however, these relate to cases involving child complainants and the evidentiary challenges associated with their testimony.

[39] The summary conviction appeal judge also failed to address the basis upon which the trial judge admitted the statement as a prior consistent statement, which, in large part, drove the court's ultimate conclusion that the statement was misused. In particular, and as noted above, in some cases a prior statement has independent cogency, and is not used merely to support the testimony of the witness by duplication. A prior consistent statement can be used not to corroborate the evidence of the witness, but to provide the surrounding circumstances and context to evaluate the credibility and reliability of the witness' in-court testimony: F. (J.E.), at para. 89.

[40] It is the "declaration part" of the prior consistent statement that is relevant and leads to permissible circumstantial inferences. Given the circumstances in which the complainant made her statement in this case, the trial judge did not err in admitting the statement under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the prior consistent statement rule.

D. Use of the statement

[41] Although the statement was admissible under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, such evidence cannot be used for the prohibited inference that consistency enhances credibility, or the incorrect conclusion that the simple making of a prior [page531] consistent statement corroborates in-court testimony: Paciocco, at p. 199.

[42] The summary conviction appeal judge concluded that the trial judge had used the prior consistent statement in this impermissible way, stating, at para. 15:

The trial judge used the prior consistent statement for the truth of its contents. This is highlighted where he states that it showed "the consistency of her complaint" and "it assisted the court in determining the overall credibility in a positive way." The trial judge appears to have relied on the prior consistent statement as a foundational pillar for his decision. The use of the prior consistent statement in this way illustrates the reasons why a prior consistent statement is presumptively inadmissible. Just because a witness says the same thing twice does not mean that she is more likely to be telling the truth. The trial judge made an error in the treatment of an important piece of evidence which appears to have informed his conclusion.

[43] In my view, taking the reasons as a whole, the trial judge used the prior consistent statement for the permissible purpose of evaluating the context in which the initial complaint arose, in particular the fact and timing of the complaint, and the spontaneous nature in which it came out, in order to assist him in assessing the truthfulness of the complainant's in-court testimony. While some of the trial judge's language was not ideal, his phraseology must be put in context. In referring to the "consistency of her complaint", the trial judge stated:

[The statement's] spontaneity and the context in which it was made, are capable of, and do support her credibility and the consistency of her complaint. In short, the court finds her evidence credible.

In the court's view, the spontaneity of that statement is compelling, and also assists the court in determining the overall credibility of [the complainant], and impacts upon her credibility in a positive way.

[44] The trial judge properly placed the prior consistent statement on the scale in assessing the credibility of the complainant's in-court testimony by considering the circumstances in which she made her initial complaint to Constable Flint. To this extent, the prior consistent statement does add to the credibility of the complainant's in-court testimony and had probative value beyond mere repetition. It was evidence of the sequence and timing of events and the emotional state of the complainant at the time of the utterance, and assisted the trial judge in evaluating the credibility of the complainant's in-court testimony. The trial judge's use of the prior consistent statement was proper.

Il est impossible de purger un emprisonnement dans la collectivité à l'extérieur du Canada

R. v. Laffin, 2018 QCCA 904

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[22]        There is not much case law directly on this question and the parties submitted none. There is, however, the case of R. v. Goett, 2012 ABCA 215, from the Court of Appeal of Alberta, apparently known to counsel for the respondent but surprisingly not mentioned in her appeal book. In Goett, the appellant sought to serve a CSO in Texas after pleading guilty to federal income tax offences. Goett, a 71-year old resident of Alberta at the time of the offences, had moved to the United States permanently, apparently seeking treatment for serious medical issues.

[23]        In Goett, the Court wrote at paragraph 14:

[14]      The sentencing judge correctly concluded that an Alberta court has no jurisdiction to order that a conditional sentence be served in Texas. The conditional sentence and Criminal Code procedures which govern it are completely statutory: R v Bailey, 2012 ABCA 165, [2012] AJ No 550. The Criminal Code speaks at length about territorial jurisdiction. It also defines those courts which are empowered under the Code. No foreign court is so identified. Sections 742.5 (1) and (1.1) provide for transfers of conditional sentence orders from one province or territory to another only where the Crown consents. There is no similar provision for the transfer of a conditional sentence to any other jurisdiction. Accordingly, there is no statutory authority to enable a Canadian court to ask a foreign court to administer a sentence imposed in Canada.

[My emphasis]

[24]        I agree. Contrary to the respondent, I fail to see how that finding would have been different if Mr. Goett had arranged to be supervised in Texas. I would add that a CSO requires an efficient method of bringing the offender before the court if he does not comply with the conditions of the order. In the context of an offender being abroad, it is difficult to imagine how this may be achieved other than by relying on the offender to surrender. One must not forget that, though it may result in an order that the offender serve a portion of the unexpired sentence in custody, a breach of a CSO condition is not an offence: s. 742.6 Cr.C. and consequently, extradition is not possible. Moreover, hearings on CSO breaches should be held promptly. Community safety and the administration of the sentence themselves give the matter a sense of urgency: see s. 742.6(10)(11)(13)(14) Cr.C.

[25]        I also rely on this passage from R. v. Greco, (2001) 2001 CanLII 8608 (ON CA), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 146 (C.A. Ont.), at paragraph 14:

[14]      For example, if a probationer commits a breach of the order while abroad and fails or refuses to voluntarily return to Canada, then, absent a right of extradition or some other co-operative arrangement with the foreign state, Canada would likely be powerless to bring the offender to justice. Likewise, if the “offensive conduct” abroad is conduct that the probationer is required to engage in or refrain from under the laws of the foreign state, prosecution in Canada could well constitute an affront to the requirements of inter-national comity and result in our courts declining jurisdiction.

[Internal reference omitted]

[26]        In Greco, it seems that Moldaver J.A. leaves open the possibility of a co‑operative arrangement with a foreign state, something that the Alberta Court of Appeal does not discuss in Goett. I do not need, however, to resolve the issue here because, firstly, there is no evidence of an agreement between Canada and the United States relating to the enforcement of a Canadian CSO and, secondly, it remains “that the principle of the sovereign equality of states generally prohibits extraterritorial application of domestic law”:  R. v. Cook, 1998 CanLII 802 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, at para. 26.  Further, given that no offence is committed by a breach of a CSO condition, Canada is even more powerless to bring the offender to justice.

[27]        In sum, absent a statutory authority to enable a Canadian court to ask a foreign court to administer a sentence imposed in Canada and seeing no possibility of enforcement of the CSO, I would allow the appeal and set aside the illegal sentences.