L'omission délibérée par l'accusé d'informer l'acheteur d'un profit caché qu'il tirera de la transaction viole les normes d'honnêteté et constitue une fraude criminelle

R. c. J.E., 1997 CanLII 10605 (QC CA)

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Il me paraît, et je suis d'accord avec le juge de première instance sur ce point, qu'une personne raisonnable ne pouvait voir dans cette phrase autre chose que l'affirmation par l'appelant qu'il avait négocié, pour le groupe, et dans l'intérêt de celui-ci, le prix de l'immeuble en question au meilleur coût ou au moins à un coût qui permettait la réalisation des objectifs fixés, notamment la prise d'une plus-value sur celui-ci.  En d'autres termes, l'appelant se représentait ici en quelque sorte comme le mandataire des investisseurs, tout en leur dissimulant  qu'il avait fait un profit caché de plusieurs centaines de milliers de dollars sur l'achat-revente, profit qui restreignait ou annihilait la perspective d'un profit de capital, profit déjà empoché par l'appelant.   Il les trompe donc sur la valeur réelle de l'immeuble qu'il leur vend, valeur artificiellement gonflée par le profit secret qu'il tire de la double transaction.

 

L'interprétation qu'il donne de ce texte dans son témoignage à l'effet que, puisque c'était lui qui vendait, peu importaient les profits substantiels qu'il faisait sur l'achat secret ne me paraît pas soutenable, eu égard au test de la personne  raisonnable désirant investir.  Il me semble, en effet, que l'investisseur raisonnable, à la lecture du prospectus, était inévitablement amené à conclure que l'appelant avait, par son habileté et ses talents de fin négociateur, effectué pour le compte de ses clients une bonne opération dont tout le profit allait à ces derniers.  Ce d'autant plus que, comme nous l'avons vu, il trouvait son compte et sa compensation financière dans les montants, cette fois-ci, bien déclarés qu'il chargeait à chacun d'entre eux à titre de conseiller en placement.  Les honoraires ainsi perçus ne pouvaient passer pour autre chose qu'une rétribution pour les démarches faites par lui, dans l'intérêt même du groupe.

L'appelant, en outre, ne mentionne pas comme il aurait dû le faire, à mon avis, pour éliminer toute ambiguïté, qu'il avait acquis l'immeuble et qu'il offrait à son tour de le revendre aux investisseurs, ce qui eut permis à ces derniers de connaître ou au moins de soupçonner la possibilité d'un écart substantiel entre le prix d'achat et le prix de revente.

 

Le premier moyen malhonnête me paraît donc être la dissimulation voulue et planifiée de la réalité objective de la transaction.

 

Le second moyen malhonnête réside, à mon avis, dans l'organisation répétée et systématique d'une transaction menée de telle façon que les investisseurs croient acquérir l'immeuble, grâce à la grande expertise de l'appelant, soit à un prix intéressant (je rappelle la phrase du prospectus «Nous avons négocié l'acquisition des immeubles»), soit au prix du marché, soit encore à un juste prix.

 

Ces trois possibilités de prix (l'aubaine, le juste prix, le prix du marché) sont indispensables à la réalisation de l'objectif économique proposé (défiscalisation intéressante, profit de capital).  Or, dès le départ, les dés sont pipés et cette réalisation devient sinon impossible, du moins très difficile, vu le gonflement artificiel de la valeur de l'immeuble.

 

Je suis donc d'avis que la première condition de l'élément matériel existe selon les critères développés dans les arrêts de la Cour suprême précités.

Le fait de ne pas communiquer des faits importants peut constituer un comportement frauduleux si l'accusé est soumis à une obligation de divulgation dû à sa relation avec la victime

R. v. Feddema, 2005 ABCA 236

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[53]           To establish  fraud, the Crown must prove that the accused deprived the public or a person of property, money, valuable security or any service by the use of deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means.  The phrase “other fraudulent means” includes means that are not in the nature of a falsehood or deceit; it encompasses all other means which can properly be stigmatized as dishonest: R. v. Olan, 1978 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175, 5 C.R. (3d) 1 at 5.  As McLachlin J. (as she then was) wrote in R. v. Zlatic, 1993 CanLII 135 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29 at 44-45:

 

Most frauds continue to involve either deceit or falsehood.  As is pointed out in Théroux, [1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5] proof of deceit or falsehood is sufficient to establish the actus reus of fraud; no further proof of dishonest action is needed. However, the third category of “other fraudulent means” has been used to support convictions in a number of situations where deceit or falsehood cannot be shown. These situations include, to date, the use of corporate funds for personal purposes, non-disclosure of important facts, exploiting the weakness of another, unauthorized diversion of funds, and unauthorized arrogation of funds or property:

                                                                                                                              [citations excluded]

 

[54]           A failure to disclose material facts can amount to fraudulent conduct. The Quebec Court of Appeal said in R. v. Émond (1997), 1997 CanLII 10605 (QC CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 275 (leave to appeal to SCC denied) at 284:

 

The falsehood can consist of a positive act, but also sometimes a mere omission, that is to say a situation where, through his silence, an individual hides from the other person a fundamental and essential element. This is what Beverley McLachlin J. called, in R. v. Théroux, ... the “non-disclosure of important facts”.

 

 

[55]           The accused must be under some duty to disclose the material facts before inaction or non disclosure will constitute fraud. Such a duty to disclose may exist by reason of the accused’s relationship with the victim of the alleged fraud (see R. v. Émond, supra).  Legislation may create a duty to disclose. The failure to report in breach of such statutory requirements may constitute fraud: R. v. Monkman (1980), 1980 CanLII 3119 (MB KB), 4 Man. R. (2d) 352 (Co. Ct.); R. v. D’amour (2002), 2002 CanLII 45015 (ON CA), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 477 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. L.S.E., 2002 BCSC 615; R. v. Vanderveen, 2002 BCSC 236. 

Le fait qu'un accusé ait pu espérer que la privation n'aurait pas lieu ne constitue pas un moyen de défense

R. v. Emms, 2010 ONCA 817

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[32] The respondent's second argument turns on the definition of fraud. As McLachlin J. pointed out in R. v. Theroux, 1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5, [1993] S.C.J. No. 42 and R. v. Zlatic, 1993 CanLII 135 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29, [1993] S.C.J. No. 43, the fact that an accused may have hoped the deprivation would not take place is no defence. All that the Crown had to prove was that the appellant knew that he was undertaking a prohibited act that could cause deprivation in the sense of depriving the complainants of their property or putting their property at risk. The appellant's dealings with Ms. Earle did not meet the Crown's case. Even if the appellant honestly and reasonably believed that Ms. Earle would make good on the replacement cheque, that would have been sufficient only to pay back part of the loan to Cheques-4-Cash. The replacement cheque would not have been sufficient to cover the complainants' deposits. Further, that money would not support the furniture order to Global, which the appellant had to pay for when the goods were delivered. The appellant conceded that he had used the complainants' deposits, which totalled approximately $15,000, for his own purposes. The appellant had no other source of income and had other very substantial debts.

Il est évident que la définition de la fraude ne laisse aucune place à l'erreur

R. v. Pearson, 2010 ABQB 727

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[12]           It is apparent that there is no room in the definition of fraud for mistake of fact: R. v. Wolsey (2008), 2008 BCCA 159 (CanLII), 233 C.C.C. (3d) 205 B.C.C.A.  Therefore, it would not avail the accused in this case if he said he honestly believed that the bank would cover the cheques he wrote despite the lack of funds because they had done so on virtually every occasion in the past. The actus reus is complete upon the accused voluntarily writing a cheque on an account without funds. That is a falsehood (false representation as to the existence of funds). The issue that remains however, with respect to the actus reus is whether there was in fact insufficient funds at the time the cheques were written. In my view, there were sufficient funds. The accounts involved were regularly and routinely funded by the bank’s allowance of an overdraft.  There were but two criteria relevant to that extension of credit: that any overdraft would be covered by noon on the day it occurred and interest was chargeable on all overdrafts at the rate of 21% per annum. Far from prohibiting the use of overdraft, Ms. Sun actually sanctioned the practice as it was plainly and regularly occurring and she would have had reports of that fact in relation to both accounts virtually every day from October 1997 until February 1999 when she no longer had responsibility for the accounts. In effect, there were funds pre-authorized in each of the accounts subject to the bank’s discretion.  Therefore, the representation by the Defendant, that by writing and depositing a cheque, there were funds in the account to cover the cheque, was accurate. Plainly the representation could prove to be false by noon the next day, but in my view, after all, the bank could, as it had in the past, simply do nothing.  The actus reus requires falsity independent of unpredictable third party intervention. 

L’insouciance est incluse dans l’aveuglement volontaire dans le contexte de la fraude

Huot c. R., 2021 QCCA 1438

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[10]      Compte tenu de la réponse au premier moyen, celui portant sur l’aveuglement volontaire pour établir la mens rea du crime de fraude devient secondaire. Par ailleurs, à la lumière de la jurisprudence applicable, dans le cas de l’infraction de fraude, la Cour suprême a tranché dans Théroux que l’insouciance pouvait être suffisante et qu’il suffisait de déterminer qu’un accusé « […] était conscient que la privation représentait une conséquence probable »[16]. Or, dans Narinesingh[17], la Cour a établi que l’insouciance était incluse dans l’aveuglement volontaire[18]. Ainsi, la mens rea se rattachant à l’élément de malhonnêteté dans l’infraction de fraude peut être démontrée par l’aveuglement volontaire d’un accusé[19].

La diligence d'un accusé lors des dernières dans la lutte contre la fraude n’est d’aucune pertinence face à son utilisation de chèques contrefaits et utilisés pour tromper des institutions financières

Hammami c. R., 2013 QCCA 2051

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[6]         En l’espèce, il ne fait pas de doute que les chèques mis en preuve ont été contrefaits, puis utilisés pour tromper des institutions financières. La diligence de ses dernières dans la lutte contre la fraude n’est d’aucune pertinence (Chagnon c. R., 2005 QCCA 335, paragr. 10, autorisation de pourvoi à la C.S.C. rejetée, 20 octobre 2005, [2005] 2 R.C.S. vi). Il ne restait à la poursuite qu’à établir, hors de tout doute raisonnable, l’implication et la connaissance de l’appelant dans le stratagème.

[7]         La preuve offerte par la poursuite, qui consistait outre la preuve documentaire, en les témoignages de quatre employés d’institutions financières, une personne sur le compte de laquelle un chèque frauduleux fut tiré et deux enquêteurs de la Sûreté du Québec, de même que le témoignage de l’appelant, permettaient à la juge du procès de conclure raisonnablement à la participation et à la connaissance de l’accusé. À tout le moins, son insouciance ou aveuglement volontaire à répétition étaient flagrants ce qui était suffisant pour sa condamnation (R. c. Théroux, 1993 CanLII 134 (CSC), [1993] 2 R.C.S. 5, j. McLachlin; R. v. Wolsey, 2008 BCCA 159, paragr. 28 et s., 233 CCC (3d) 205; R. v. Bondok, 2011 ONCA 698).

Le critère d'analyse de ce qu'est la personne raisonnable dans l'appréciation à savoir si un acte malhonnête est susceptible de sanction criminelle

R. v. Faulkner, 2022 ONSC 3074

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[24]            As previously stated, the Crown relies on “other fraudulent means” to prove the fraud allegation in Count. The applicable test for proof of “other fraudulent means” is set out by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in R. v. Theroux, 1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 449.

Actus Reus

 

Relying on the test established in R. v. Olan, 1978 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Theroux that the actus reus of the offence is established by proof of two elements: (1) a dishonest act; and (2) deprivation.

 

(1) Dishonest act

The dishonest act is established by proof of (1) deceit, (2) falsehood or (3) other fraudulent means. The third category of “other fraudulent means” will be determined objectively by “what reasonable people consider to be dishonest dealing”: Theoreux at pp. 16-17. “Other fraudulent means” is a term that covers more ground than either deceit or falsehood. It includes any other means, which are not deceit or falsehood, properly regarded as dishonest according to the standards of reasonable people. Dishonesty with respect to the actus reus is to be measured against the objective standard of what a reasonable person would consider to be dishonest without regard for what the accused actually knew: R. v. Wolsey, 2008 BCCA 159, 233 C.C.C. (3d) 205, at para. 15. In instances under the fraud by deceit or falsehood category, “…all that need be determined is whether the accused, as a matter of fact, represented that a situation was of a certain character, when, in reality, it was not”: Theoreux, at p.17.

 

(2) Deprivation

Deprivation is established by proof of detriment, prejudice, or risk of prejudice to the economic interests of the victim, caused by the dishonest act. The Court in Theoreux also found that “economic loss was not essential to the offence; the imperilling of an economic interest is sufficient even though no actual loss has been suffered”: Theoreux, at p. 16.

 

Mens Rea

 

The mens rea of the offence is based on a subjective standard. It is comprised of two elements: (1) subjective knowledge of the prohibited act; and (2) subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another (which deprivation may consist in knowledge that the victim's pecuniary interests are put at risk): Theoreux, at p. 20. When considering the element of intent in fraud, the principal concern is to determine what knowledge an accused had of the conduct which has been found to be dishonest, and what knowledge or foresight he had of the consequences which amount to the deprivation alleged: R. v. Long, 61 C.C.C. (3d) 156, 1990 CanLII 5405 (BC CA), at para. 35.

 

This proposition has been upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (ONCA) in R. v. Earle, 2021 ONCA 34 at paras. 50-51 when they recited the following as the mens rea of the offence:

…where the court stated “fraud by “other fraudulent means” [as alleged in the present matter] does not require that the accused subjectively appreciate the dishonesty of his or her acts. The accused must knowingly, i.e., subjectively, undertake the conduct which constitutes the dishonest act, and must subjectively appreciate that the consequences of such conduct could be deprivation, in the sense of causing another to lose his or her pecuniary interest in certain property or in placing that interest at risk. 

 

This same point was also held in R. v. Eizenga, 2011 ONCA 113, at para. 81:

[A] subjective intent to mislead is not an essential element of the offence of fraud. Instead, all that is required is subjective knowledge of the prohibited act, and that the act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another

 

THE INTERPRETATION OF “REASONABLE PERSON”

 

[25]            Although the standard of a reasonable person may vary depending on the charge one is facing, a common theme emerges where the analysis, of the “reasonable person”, reveals some basic characteristics that they possess. A reasonable person is one who is “reasonable, informed, practical and realistic”, someone who “considers the matter in some detail” and is “dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances of the case”: see R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 484, per Cory J; R. v. Collins, 1987 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 265, per Lamer J.

[26]           In the context of fraud charges, conduct that would lead a reasonable person to conclude the conduct is deceitful or dishonest includes:

• Silence or omission as such that would mislead a “reasonable person”: R. c. E. (J.) (1997), 1997 CanLII 10605 (QC CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 275 (C.A. Que.), at paragraphs 29-3;
• Where a reasonable person would find the defendant’s conduct to be deceitful. Examples of other fraudulent means include exploiting weaknesses of victims, personal use of corporate money and unauthorized diversion of funds: R. v. Drakes, 2006 CanLII 730 (ON SC), 2006 CarswellOnt 1585, [2006] O.J. No. 129, [2006] O.T.C. 24, [2006] C.C.S. No. 3920 (WL), and;
• Conduct which reasonable decent persons would consider dishonest and unscrupulous: R. v. Zlatic, 1993 CanLII 135 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 466

 

[27]           With this information in mind, questions to consider are:

•         Would the reasonable person stigmatize what was done as dishonest?: R v Iyer, 2020 ABCA 439;

•         Would ordinary, decent people feel this conduct is discreditable as being clearly at odds with straightforward or honourable dealings?: R. v. Olan, 1978 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175;

Une insouciance ou un aveuglement volontaire à répétition qui sont flagrants est suffisant pour qu'il y ait condamnation pour fraude

R. v. Wolsey, 2008 BCCA 159

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[22]           The trial judge did not follow the majority opinion in Théroux and Zlatic that the actus reus is to be determined entirely on the objective facts.  This was an error in law.

(iii) Wilful Blindness or Recklessness

[28]           The Crown alleges that the trial judge failed to consider whether wilful blindness or recklessness applied to the mens rea of fraud.  Wilful blindness is the equivalent of actual knowledge.  It arises where an accused “shut his eyes because he knew or strongly suspected that looking would fix him with knowledge” of the facts rendering his conduct culpable: R. v. Jorgensen, 1995 CanLII 85 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55 at para.103, 129 D.L.R. (4th) 510.  Recklessness “is found in the attitude of [an accused] who, aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk”: Sansregret v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570 at para.16, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 577.

[29]           The Crown relies on Taggart J.A.’s obiter remark in Long, supra, that the concepts of wilful blindness and recklessness can be used to establish the mens rea of fraud; Taggart J.A. wrote at 166:

[A]pplying the standards of the average person acting reasonably in similar circumstances it might be decided the conduct of the accused was dishonest.  But it may be that the accused did not have knowledge of some matters which, when taken together with other conduct, leads to the conclusion the conduct was dishonest.  The lack of knowledge of some matters by the accused may lead to the conclusion the accused did not have the intention required to be present in association with dishonest conduct in order that fraud may exist.  In this connection the concepts of recklessness and wilful blindness may have important roles to play.

[30]           Counsel for Mr. Wolsey submits that Théroux took a narrower view of the use that could be made of recklessness to establish the mens rea of fraud.  While recklessness will satisfy the mens rea requirement in relation to deprivation, only knowledge (including wilful blindness) will satisfy the mens rea requirement relating to dishonesty.  This submission is based on the comment of McLachlin J. in Théroux that recklessness as to consequences might also attract criminal responsibility as she wrote at 20:

I have spoken of knowledge of the consequences of the fraudulent act.  There appears to be no reason, however, why recklessness as to consequences might not also attract criminal responsibility.  Recklessness presupposes knowledge of the likelihood of the prohibited consequences.  It is established when it is shown that the accused, with such knowledge, commits acts which may bring about these prohibited consequences, while being reckless as to whether or not they ensue.

[31]           I do not agree with the respondent’s submission that Théroux restricts the concept of recklessness to the deprivation element of the mens rea of fraud.  She was not addressing specifically the question of whether recklessness could apply to the mens rea requirement relating to the dishonest conduct itself.  When this passage from Théroux is taken in the context of her earlier comment, that “[t]ypically, mens rea is concerned with the consequences of the prohibited actus reus”, it seems likely her remarks regarding recklessness were directed more broadly at the entire concept of the mens rea required to prove fraud.  I also disagree with the respondent’s submission that the Supreme Court of Canada’s desire to avoid criminalizing conduct that is better left to civil sanction provides a logical basis for restricting the concept of recklessness to the mens rea of deprivation only.