R. v. Tkachuk, 2001 ABCA 243 (CanLII)
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[33] As to the obligations of counsel wishing to resolve a case by way of guilty plea and a joint submission on sentence, this Court has said that:
i) The facts of the case ought to be fully disclosed so that the sentencing judge is aware of all the circumstances, including the aggravating and mitigating factors.
ii) Where the proposed sentence is not obviously within the accepted range of sentence for that offence, counsel, and particularly Crown counsel, should explain to the court the reasons for departing from a sentence within that range. In R. v. G.W.C., supra, Berger, J.A., illustrated this point by noting that the joint submission may be the result of an evidentiary gap in the Crown’s case, or the absence of an essential witness.
[34] The requirement to inform the sentencing judge of all of the circumstances guiding the joint submission was not intended to be taken as a direction that counsel must reveal their negotiating positions or the substance of their discussions leading to the agreement. These are private negotiations which need not, and normally should not, be disclosed to the court. R. v. Roberts, 2001 ABQB 520 (CanLII), 2001 ABQB 520, [2001] A.J. No. 772.
vendredi 20 avril 2012
jeudi 19 avril 2012
Le calcul de la détention préventive
R. c. Gosselin, 2011 QCCQ 11688 (CanLII)
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[64] Le tribunal ne peut pas se ranger à l'opinion préconisée dans Johnson pour les mêmes motifs évoqués dans d'autres décisions citées précédemment concluant que d'octroyer un crédit d'un jour et demi dans tous les cas de détention provisoire, peu importe les circonstances, serait faire fi de l'intention du législateur.
[65] D'ailleurs, le tribunal ne décèle aucune ambiguïté dans le nouveau texte.
[66] L'ancien article 719(3) du Code se limite à prescrire que le tribunal peut prendre en compte toute période que la personne a passé sous garde par suite de l'infraction. Incidemment, le nouveau paragraphe (3) reprend le même texte; il y ajoute une limite au temps pouvant être alloué pour tenir compte de la période passée en détention provisoire.
[67] La modification au paragraphe (3) et l'addition de quatre nouveaux paragraphes ((3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4)) témoignent d'une intention, non pas d'écarter toute la discrétion judiciaire que la Loi maintient, mais de l'encadrer, d'abord, en limitant le crédit pouvant être alloué par le juge pour tenir compte de la période passée en détention provisoire, et ensuite, en introduisant au procédé de la détermination de ce crédit une rationalisation en ce que le tribunal doit dorénavant motiver toute décision d'allouer du temps pour la période passée sous garde (paragraphe (3.2)), une obligation jusqu'alors inexistante dans le Code.
[68] En outre, le paragraphe (3.3) imposant des inscriptions au dossier du détenu permettra de rendre compte avec le plus d'exactitude possible de la peine véritablement imposée et répondre notamment aux impératifs de transparence et d'intelligibilité auxquels le public est en droit de s'attendre.
[69] Dès lors, et dans tous les cas de détention provisoire, incluant même les situations prévues aux articles 515(9.1) et 524(4) du Code, le temps alloué pour la période passée en détention provisoire ne peut excéder un jour pour chaque jour passé sous garde.
[70] Le paragraphe (3.1) crée une exception. À cet égard, le tribunal ne peut pas davantage se rallier à la décision dans Johnson. La préposition « malgré » connote l'idée d'une concession ou d'un compromis annoncé par le texte auquel elle est liée. Conséquemment, le paragraphe (3.1) qui commence par « malgré le paragraphe (3) », constitue véritablement une exception. Ainsi, « malgré » l'obstacle que représente la règle générale du paragraphe (3), le tribunal peut allouer un crédit d'un jour et demi par jour passé sous garde si les circonstances le justifient. Cependant, sont exclus de cette exception, le cas échéant, les détenus se trouvant dans les situations prévues aux articles 515(9.1) et 524(4) du Code.
[71] Comme il s'agit d'une exception à la règle générale, le détenu a le fardeau de faire une preuve que les circonstances justifient d'accroître le crédit. Il n'existe pas de présomption selon laquelle la période passée en détention provisoire mérite le crédit maximum, en l'occurrence, selon les nouvelles dispositions, d'un jour et demi. La lecture combinée des paragraphes (3) et (3.1) ne permet pas une autre interprétation qui tienne compte de l'intention du législateur.
[72] Quant aux circonstances pouvant justifier d'accroître le crédit, le paragraphe (3.1) n'en excepte aucune. Elles peuvent être tout aussi multiples que variées. Le tribunal rejette la proposition avancée dans Johnson selon laquelle les circonstances ne se rapporteraient qu'à l'aspect quantitatif de la détention provisoire. Le texte lui-même n'appuie pas cette interprétation qui du reste irait à l'encontre des critères dégagés par le droit prétorien admettant depuis longtemps les conditions pénibles de détention provisoire comme étant l'un des facteurs à considérer lorsqu'il s'agit d'établir le crédit auquel a droit le détenu au moment de recevoir sa peine. Rien dans le texte des nouvelles dispositions ne permet de croire que le Parlement entendait rendre ces critères dorénavant obsolètes.
[73] Cela étant, la réduction du crédit alloué pour tenir compte de la détention provisoire se traduira par des peines plus longues. On ne peut pas non plus disconvenir que dans certains cas, les personnes détenues en détention provisoire passeront plus de temps incarcérées que celles libérées en attente du procès. Toutefois, il faut présumer que le législateur connaissait l'éventualité de ces cas de figure à laquelle peut donner lieu le calcul des échéances de la peine aux fins du seuil d'admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle ou de la remise statutaire de peine.
[74] Par ailleurs, il faut rappeler que le tribunal a bénéficié dans Johnson d'une preuve factuelle sur les effets systémiques des lois régissant l'application des peines sur la longueur de l'incarcération de la personne détenue en détention provisoire. Ce n'est pas le cas en l'instance. Dès lors, doit-on considérer, par exemple, comme un fait notoire, une remise de peine quasi automatiquement accordée à presque toutes les personnes condamnées à l'emprisonnement? Quoi qu'il en soit, et vu l'interprétation du tribunal des paragraphes (3) et (3.1), il n'est pas nécessaire de répondre à cette question.
[75] En application de ce qui précède, le tribunal conclut que le défendeur ne démontre pas des circonstances justifiant de lui accorder un crédit d'un jour et demi par jour passé sous garde.
[76] Sans remettre en cause les conditions difficiles inhérentes à la détention provisoire, le défendeur ne convainc pas que sa situation s'écarte de façon marquée de celle de tout individu privé de sa liberté dans l'attente de son procès. Au-delà de l'isolement dans une cellule 24 heures sur 24, les conditions de détention restent floues. Si la décision d'isoler le défendeur semble être une mesure de protection, on ne sait pas quand elle est prise ni qui la prend ni sur la foi de quel motif exactement. On ne sait pas non plus si le défendeur lui-même demande cette protection, pas plus la période totale passée en isolement compte tenu d'un séjour semble-t-il à l'hôpital. Le défendeur allègue des problèmes de santé mais on ne sait pas en quoi la détention provisoire aurait été pour ce motif plus pénible. On établit pas non plus en quoi consiste le quotidien d'une personne détenue à l'abri de la population carcérale.
[77] En somme, le défendeur peut justifier l'application de la règle générale du crédit d'un jour par jour passé sous garde, ne serait-ce parce qu'il ne bénéficie pas durant cette période de crédits-jours aux fins de la remise statutaire de peine, vu l'article 719(1) du Code, mais il ne convainc pas qu'il ait été assujetti à des conditions si oppressives fondant d'accorder le crédit maximum prévu au paragraphe (3.1)
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[64] Le tribunal ne peut pas se ranger à l'opinion préconisée dans Johnson pour les mêmes motifs évoqués dans d'autres décisions citées précédemment concluant que d'octroyer un crédit d'un jour et demi dans tous les cas de détention provisoire, peu importe les circonstances, serait faire fi de l'intention du législateur.
[65] D'ailleurs, le tribunal ne décèle aucune ambiguïté dans le nouveau texte.
[66] L'ancien article 719(3) du Code se limite à prescrire que le tribunal peut prendre en compte toute période que la personne a passé sous garde par suite de l'infraction. Incidemment, le nouveau paragraphe (3) reprend le même texte; il y ajoute une limite au temps pouvant être alloué pour tenir compte de la période passée en détention provisoire.
[67] La modification au paragraphe (3) et l'addition de quatre nouveaux paragraphes ((3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4)) témoignent d'une intention, non pas d'écarter toute la discrétion judiciaire que la Loi maintient, mais de l'encadrer, d'abord, en limitant le crédit pouvant être alloué par le juge pour tenir compte de la période passée en détention provisoire, et ensuite, en introduisant au procédé de la détermination de ce crédit une rationalisation en ce que le tribunal doit dorénavant motiver toute décision d'allouer du temps pour la période passée sous garde (paragraphe (3.2)), une obligation jusqu'alors inexistante dans le Code.
[68] En outre, le paragraphe (3.3) imposant des inscriptions au dossier du détenu permettra de rendre compte avec le plus d'exactitude possible de la peine véritablement imposée et répondre notamment aux impératifs de transparence et d'intelligibilité auxquels le public est en droit de s'attendre.
[69] Dès lors, et dans tous les cas de détention provisoire, incluant même les situations prévues aux articles 515(9.1) et 524(4) du Code, le temps alloué pour la période passée en détention provisoire ne peut excéder un jour pour chaque jour passé sous garde.
[70] Le paragraphe (3.1) crée une exception. À cet égard, le tribunal ne peut pas davantage se rallier à la décision dans Johnson. La préposition « malgré » connote l'idée d'une concession ou d'un compromis annoncé par le texte auquel elle est liée. Conséquemment, le paragraphe (3.1) qui commence par « malgré le paragraphe (3) », constitue véritablement une exception. Ainsi, « malgré » l'obstacle que représente la règle générale du paragraphe (3), le tribunal peut allouer un crédit d'un jour et demi par jour passé sous garde si les circonstances le justifient. Cependant, sont exclus de cette exception, le cas échéant, les détenus se trouvant dans les situations prévues aux articles 515(9.1) et 524(4) du Code.
[71] Comme il s'agit d'une exception à la règle générale, le détenu a le fardeau de faire une preuve que les circonstances justifient d'accroître le crédit. Il n'existe pas de présomption selon laquelle la période passée en détention provisoire mérite le crédit maximum, en l'occurrence, selon les nouvelles dispositions, d'un jour et demi. La lecture combinée des paragraphes (3) et (3.1) ne permet pas une autre interprétation qui tienne compte de l'intention du législateur.
[72] Quant aux circonstances pouvant justifier d'accroître le crédit, le paragraphe (3.1) n'en excepte aucune. Elles peuvent être tout aussi multiples que variées. Le tribunal rejette la proposition avancée dans Johnson selon laquelle les circonstances ne se rapporteraient qu'à l'aspect quantitatif de la détention provisoire. Le texte lui-même n'appuie pas cette interprétation qui du reste irait à l'encontre des critères dégagés par le droit prétorien admettant depuis longtemps les conditions pénibles de détention provisoire comme étant l'un des facteurs à considérer lorsqu'il s'agit d'établir le crédit auquel a droit le détenu au moment de recevoir sa peine. Rien dans le texte des nouvelles dispositions ne permet de croire que le Parlement entendait rendre ces critères dorénavant obsolètes.
[73] Cela étant, la réduction du crédit alloué pour tenir compte de la détention provisoire se traduira par des peines plus longues. On ne peut pas non plus disconvenir que dans certains cas, les personnes détenues en détention provisoire passeront plus de temps incarcérées que celles libérées en attente du procès. Toutefois, il faut présumer que le législateur connaissait l'éventualité de ces cas de figure à laquelle peut donner lieu le calcul des échéances de la peine aux fins du seuil d'admissibilité à la libération conditionnelle ou de la remise statutaire de peine.
[74] Par ailleurs, il faut rappeler que le tribunal a bénéficié dans Johnson d'une preuve factuelle sur les effets systémiques des lois régissant l'application des peines sur la longueur de l'incarcération de la personne détenue en détention provisoire. Ce n'est pas le cas en l'instance. Dès lors, doit-on considérer, par exemple, comme un fait notoire, une remise de peine quasi automatiquement accordée à presque toutes les personnes condamnées à l'emprisonnement? Quoi qu'il en soit, et vu l'interprétation du tribunal des paragraphes (3) et (3.1), il n'est pas nécessaire de répondre à cette question.
[75] En application de ce qui précède, le tribunal conclut que le défendeur ne démontre pas des circonstances justifiant de lui accorder un crédit d'un jour et demi par jour passé sous garde.
[76] Sans remettre en cause les conditions difficiles inhérentes à la détention provisoire, le défendeur ne convainc pas que sa situation s'écarte de façon marquée de celle de tout individu privé de sa liberté dans l'attente de son procès. Au-delà de l'isolement dans une cellule 24 heures sur 24, les conditions de détention restent floues. Si la décision d'isoler le défendeur semble être une mesure de protection, on ne sait pas quand elle est prise ni qui la prend ni sur la foi de quel motif exactement. On ne sait pas non plus si le défendeur lui-même demande cette protection, pas plus la période totale passée en isolement compte tenu d'un séjour semble-t-il à l'hôpital. Le défendeur allègue des problèmes de santé mais on ne sait pas en quoi la détention provisoire aurait été pour ce motif plus pénible. On établit pas non plus en quoi consiste le quotidien d'une personne détenue à l'abri de la population carcérale.
[77] En somme, le défendeur peut justifier l'application de la règle générale du crédit d'un jour par jour passé sous garde, ne serait-ce parce qu'il ne bénéficie pas durant cette période de crédits-jours aux fins de la remise statutaire de peine, vu l'article 719(1) du Code, mais il ne convainc pas qu'il ait été assujetti à des conditions si oppressives fondant d'accorder le crédit maximum prévu au paragraphe (3.1)
Comment computer la détention prévention pour une inculpation post-22 février 2010
R. v. Morris, 2011 ONSC 5206 (CanLII)
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[22] The parties agree that the applicable provisions are sections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code. These provisions, which came into force on February 22, 2010, allow enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to a maximum of 1.5:1 provided that (i) “the circumstances justify it”, and (ii) the person was not detained for reasons under s. 515(9.1) or under subsections 524(4) or (8):
[31] In my view, it is clear from a reading of ss. 719(3) and (3.1) that the general rule is that credit be given “up to 1:1”. Enhanced credit of 1.5:1 pursuant to subsection (3.1) is the exception. The general rule is articulated first and the exception follows. I am unable to accept Mr. Rippell’s argument that, in effect, the norm should be enhanced credit whenever the offender has served pre-sentence time.
[32] There is no ambiguity, in my view, that would justify such a departure from the clear wording of the statute. There is also no basis, or indeed justification, for this court to interpret this provision on the assumption that Parliament was not aware of the effect this provision would have on actual time served. Law-makers are presumed to enact legislation for a particular purpose, with consequences of which they are not only aware, but also, of which they approve as the means to achieving a particular end: to which the parties referred, addresses the principle that:
A second dimension endorsed by the modern principle [of statutory interpretation] is legislative intent. All texts, indeed all utterances, are made for a reason…. In at p. 2 the case of legislation, the law-maker wants to communicate the law that it intended to enact because that law, as set out in the provisions of a statute or regulation, is the means chosen by the law-maker to achieve a set of desired goals. Law-abiding readers (including those who administer or enforce the legislation and those who resolve disputes) try to identify the intended goals of the legislation and the means devised to achieve those goals, so that they can act accordingly. [Emphasis added.] (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008), at p. 2. ).
[33] In this case, it is clear that Parliament would have known that enacting s. 719(3) using the language it chose to use would have the effect of restricting judges from giving any greater credit than one day for each day served in pre-trial custody. Parliament must have intended that enacting such a restriction would increase actual time served when compared to the previous, common practice of giving 2:1 credit, as a mandatory limit on time credited could have no other consequence but increasing the total time served.
[34] Similarly, Parliament would have known that by enacting subsection (3.1) using the phrase “despite subsection (3)”, that it would create an exception, and not a replacement, to subsection (3) “if the circumstances justify it”. Parliament would not have created an exception that was meant, in practice, to displace the very rule it created in the previous subsection.
[35] The defence position that 1.5:1 is to be the default would leave only (i) the absolute bars and (ii) the judicial discretion to reduce credit below 1.5:1 where, traditionally, judges have refused to grant enhanced credit (such as where the accused has unduly lengthened his or her pre-sentence custody by manipulating the justice system).
[36] In effect, the defence interpretation would read out the sub-clause in the first line of subsection (3.1): “if the circumstances justify it”. It would also make subsection (3) redundant. Neither of these consequences is consistent with the basic presumption that language in a statute has meaning.
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[22] The parties agree that the applicable provisions are sections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code. These provisions, which came into force on February 22, 2010, allow enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody to a maximum of 1.5:1 provided that (i) “the circumstances justify it”, and (ii) the person was not detained for reasons under s. 515(9.1) or under subsections 524(4) or (8):
[31] In my view, it is clear from a reading of ss. 719(3) and (3.1) that the general rule is that credit be given “up to 1:1”. Enhanced credit of 1.5:1 pursuant to subsection (3.1) is the exception. The general rule is articulated first and the exception follows. I am unable to accept Mr. Rippell’s argument that, in effect, the norm should be enhanced credit whenever the offender has served pre-sentence time.
[32] There is no ambiguity, in my view, that would justify such a departure from the clear wording of the statute. There is also no basis, or indeed justification, for this court to interpret this provision on the assumption that Parliament was not aware of the effect this provision would have on actual time served. Law-makers are presumed to enact legislation for a particular purpose, with consequences of which they are not only aware, but also, of which they approve as the means to achieving a particular end: to which the parties referred, addresses the principle that:
A second dimension endorsed by the modern principle [of statutory interpretation] is legislative intent. All texts, indeed all utterances, are made for a reason…. In at p. 2 the case of legislation, the law-maker wants to communicate the law that it intended to enact because that law, as set out in the provisions of a statute or regulation, is the means chosen by the law-maker to achieve a set of desired goals. Law-abiding readers (including those who administer or enforce the legislation and those who resolve disputes) try to identify the intended goals of the legislation and the means devised to achieve those goals, so that they can act accordingly. [Emphasis added.] (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008), at p. 2. ).
[33] In this case, it is clear that Parliament would have known that enacting s. 719(3) using the language it chose to use would have the effect of restricting judges from giving any greater credit than one day for each day served in pre-trial custody. Parliament must have intended that enacting such a restriction would increase actual time served when compared to the previous, common practice of giving 2:1 credit, as a mandatory limit on time credited could have no other consequence but increasing the total time served.
[34] Similarly, Parliament would have known that by enacting subsection (3.1) using the phrase “despite subsection (3)”, that it would create an exception, and not a replacement, to subsection (3) “if the circumstances justify it”. Parliament would not have created an exception that was meant, in practice, to displace the very rule it created in the previous subsection.
[35] The defence position that 1.5:1 is to be the default would leave only (i) the absolute bars and (ii) the judicial discretion to reduce credit below 1.5:1 where, traditionally, judges have refused to grant enhanced credit (such as where the accused has unduly lengthened his or her pre-sentence custody by manipulating the justice system).
[36] In effect, the defence interpretation would read out the sub-clause in the first line of subsection (3.1): “if the circumstances justify it”. It would also make subsection (3) redundant. Neither of these consequences is consistent with the basic presumption that language in a statute has meaning.
mercredi 18 avril 2012
La probabilité fondée sur la crédibilité et les motifs raisonnables
R. c. Tse, 2012 CSC 16 (CanLII)
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[33] La croyance fondée sur des « motifs raisonnables » comporte à la fois un élément subjectif et un élément objectif. L’agent doit croire subjectivement en l’existence de motifs justifiant les mesures prises, et ces motifs doivent être objectivement raisonnables dans les circonstances. L’équilibre constitutionnel entre l’attente raisonnable en matière de vie privée et les besoins légitimes de l’État de déceler et de prévenir le crime appelle une norme objective — la probabilité fondée sur la crédibilité : Hunter c. Southam, p. 166‑168; R. c. Kang‑Brown, 2008 CSC 18 (CanLII), 2008 CSC 18, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 456, par. 75 à 79).
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[33] La croyance fondée sur des « motifs raisonnables » comporte à la fois un élément subjectif et un élément objectif. L’agent doit croire subjectivement en l’existence de motifs justifiant les mesures prises, et ces motifs doivent être objectivement raisonnables dans les circonstances. L’équilibre constitutionnel entre l’attente raisonnable en matière de vie privée et les besoins légitimes de l’État de déceler et de prévenir le crime appelle une norme objective — la probabilité fondée sur la crédibilité : Hunter c. Southam, p. 166‑168; R. c. Kang‑Brown, 2008 CSC 18 (CanLII), 2008 CSC 18, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 456, par. 75 à 79).
La norme de de présomption de constitutionnalité qui s’applique aux fouilles, perquisitions et saisies en droit criminel est l’autorisation judiciaire préalable
R. c. Tse, 2012 CSC 16 (CanLII)
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[16] Notre Cour a décidé dans l’arrêt de principe Hunter c. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (CSC), [1984] 2 R.C.S. 145, qu’une fouille sans mandat est présumée abusive. La norme de de présomption de constitutionnalité qui s’applique aux fouilles, perquisitions et saisies en droit criminel est l’autorisation judiciaire préalable : un arbitre neutre et impartial agissant d’une manière judiciaire doit décider au préalable que la fouille, la perquisition ou la saisie est justifiée par des motifs raisonnables, établis sous serment (p. 160 à 162, 167 et 168). Voici ce que dit le juge Dickson à la p. 161 :
Je reconnais qu’il n’est peut‑être pas raisonnable dans tous les cas d’insister sur l’autorisation préalable aux fins de valider des atteintes du gouvernement aux expectatives des particuliers en matière de vie privée. Néanmoins, je suis d’avis de conclure qu’une telle autorisation, lorsqu’elle peut être obtenue, est une condition préalable de la validité d’une fouille, d’une perquisition et d’une saisie.
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[16] Notre Cour a décidé dans l’arrêt de principe Hunter c. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (CSC), [1984] 2 R.C.S. 145, qu’une fouille sans mandat est présumée abusive. La norme de de présomption de constitutionnalité qui s’applique aux fouilles, perquisitions et saisies en droit criminel est l’autorisation judiciaire préalable : un arbitre neutre et impartial agissant d’une manière judiciaire doit décider au préalable que la fouille, la perquisition ou la saisie est justifiée par des motifs raisonnables, établis sous serment (p. 160 à 162, 167 et 168). Voici ce que dit le juge Dickson à la p. 161 :
Je reconnais qu’il n’est peut‑être pas raisonnable dans tous les cas d’insister sur l’autorisation préalable aux fins de valider des atteintes du gouvernement aux expectatives des particuliers en matière de vie privée. Néanmoins, je suis d’avis de conclure qu’une telle autorisation, lorsqu’elle peut être obtenue, est une condition préalable de la validité d’une fouille, d’une perquisition et d’une saisie.
mardi 17 avril 2012
Le document en possession de l'accusé - revue exhaustive de la jurisprudence sur cette question
R. v. Cunsolo, 2011 ONSC 1349 (CanLII)
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[257] A person has possession of a thing, in fact and law, when he or she has it in his or her physical custody with a power of control over the thing, coupled with knowledge of the thing’s existence and nature: Criminal Code, s. 4(3)(a).
[258] It is common for the prosecution to prove possession by circumstantial evidence. Possession “is a question of fact capable of proof by inference”: R. v. Caccamo (1975), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (S.C.C.), at p. 273.
[259] The ‘documents in possession’ doctrine “is purely a creature of the common law” and “provides one of most frequently used methods of admitting documents into evidence”: J.D. Ewart, Documentary Evidence (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1984), at p. 232.
[260] The most widely accepted articulation of the documents in possession doctrine is found in Phipson on Evidence (15th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2000), at p. 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognized, adopted or acted upon them. [footnotes omitted; emphasis in original]
This passage, repeated from prior Phipson editions, has received wide-spread approval: (références omises)
[261] In British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch, 1995 CanLII 142 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47, the Supreme Court mentioned two aspects of the doctrine in the context of its discussion on compulsion and s. 7 of the Charter:
In some cases, the production of documents from the possession of a person may have communicative aspects. Possession of a document may permit an inference of knowledge of the contents of the document. See R. v. Container Materials Ltd., [1940] 4 D.L.R. 293 (Ont. S.C.). Furthermore, if the party in possession has recognized, adopted or acted on the document an admission of acceptance of its contents as true may be inferred. See R. v. Famous Players, [1932] O.R. 307 (S.C.).
[262] Once possession of a document is established, even in the absence of evidence of the accused possessor having recognized, adopted or acted on the document, a trier of fact may circumstantially infer from the possession itself that the accused had knowledge and involvement in the subject matter or transactions described therein. In R. v. Morris 1983 CanLII 28 (SCC), (1984), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), at p. 99, the court stated:
In my view, an inference could be drawn from the unexplained presence of the newspaper clipping among the possessions of the appellant, that he had an interest in and had informed himself on the question of sources of supply of heroin, necessarily a subject of vital interest to one concerned with the importing of the narcotic.
. . .
Depending on the view of the trier of fact and the existence of other evidence, an inference could possibly have been drawn or could have been supported to the effect that preparatory steps in respect of importing narcotics had been taken or were contemplated.
The evidence of the newspaper clipping is similar in nature to the cheque forms of certain banks and the list of banks found in possession of the accused and admitted in evidence on a charge of fraudulently endorsing and cashing a cheque in R. v. Gaich (1956), 24 C.R. 196 (Ont. C.A.), or the list of burgled premises found upon one of the accused which was admitted in evidence on a charge of unlawful possession of house-breaking implements in R. v. Hannam, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 340 (N.B.C.A.) Other cases which have dealt with this issue are: (références omises).
[263] A Crown appeal succeeded in R. v. Turlon, supra, against an acquittal for possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. When Turlon was arrested, his briefcase was opened. The receptacle contained a sealed envelope (containing the “Palmer” letter) and a document written by Turlon. On appeal, the court stated at pp. 188-190:
When the envelope was opened, it was found to contain a letter addressed “Dear Maureen” and signed by “Wesley Stubbs”. In the letter the writer states:
So I give Loxley 2 lb weight of herb 1 lb is for you and the other lb is for me.
So I’m asking you kindly to take the list from Loxley with the things and set me up and set yourself also. I have seen for myself that Loxley had a very slow attempt, if you don’t push him he will not get along with the things. So I am asking you...and I ask him to get a delko plant and a T.V. and a power cut saw. The kind of herb that I give Loxley to give you is the best type and you can get $2,000 a lab weight for it.
In the briefcase there was also found a handwritten list prepared by the respondent. The items set out on that list were as follows:
1) 2 Honda 500 watt Delco 2) 2 Colour T.V. 20” 3) Tape Dec with Cassette 4) Set Up Camera 5) Sanda 6) Battry Charger 7) Moter Saw with blate for board and three
It will be seen that this list contains items referred to in the Miss Palmer letter.
. . .
Knowledge of the contents of the letter was not a condition precedent to evidentiary value of the letter. Possession of the letter was evidence of knowledge or complicity in the scheme of drug importation and distribution. On the other hand, the respondent’s denial that he knew the letter was in his briefcase was evidence to the contrary. The possession of the letter and the denial by the respondent were both part of the evidence as a whole to be considered by the jury.
It would also be open to the jury to accept the list prepared by the respondent as a form of adoption of the letter. In other words, the jury might conclude that the list prepared by the respondent reflected the items that were being sought in the letter. If the jury accepted this list as a recognition or adoption of the Miss Palmer letter, then the letter could be received as an admission to prove the truth of its contents.
The Miss Palmer letter and the list prepared by the respondent were important pieces of evidence.
[264] In R. v. Gaich (1956), 116 C.C.C. 34 (Ont. C.A.), a fraud prosecution, the Crown led evidence of the seizure of documents from Gaich’s truck at the time of his arrest including various cheque forms from the Royal Bank of Canada, a cheque with an endorsement, counter-cheques of the Bank of Nova Scotia, a cheque book on the Province of Ontario Savings office at Brantford, Ontario, and a sheet of paper on which was written a list of banks. The accused’s appeal against conviction was dismissed with the court stating, at p. 39:
Under the circumstances the Court cannot see that it was irrelevant to the issue that several of such documents necessary and essential to such an illegal enterprise were found on the person and property of the appellant.
[265] In a different case, in two searches of the home of an accused, the police seized items alleged to be instruments for house-breaking. The accused was convicted at trial. On appeal (R. v. Gilson, [1965] 2 O.R. 505 (C.A.), at pp. 506, 513) the court rejected the appellant’s submission that the prosecution ought not to have been allowed to lead certain documentary evidence also uncovered in the search:
In front of the house, between the road and sidewalk, an old Monarch car was parked on the boulevard. A search of the vehicle disclosed in the hub cap discs two separate sheets of paper and a single piece of paper which contained a list of motels in the Niagara Falls area indicating the kind of security devices each of the motels had.
. . .
As to the third point, the lists of motels would be some evidence, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the finding of the lists...
[266] In the Container Materials Ltd. case, a prosecution for conspiracy in restraint of trade, the Crown introduced a quantity of documentation including books of account, correspondence, official minutes, executed agreements and cheques. The trial judge stated at pp. 130, 131-2:
...documents in his possession are receivable against him...
. . .
...all of these documents are receivable in evidence as against the party from whose possession they come, as having been found in the possession of that particular accused and therefore it is presumed that that accused had a knowledge of the contents thereof.
. . .
These copies and letters having come from the possession of the accused parties, present, in my opinion, a very much more reliable type of evidence than if viva voce evidence of some witness who had been present by chance and had overheard conversations between the accused or their proper representative, had been produced by the Crown. Such latter type of evidence would undoubtedly be received, although subject to the frailties of human recollection and transmission. A fortiori, this correspondence which I consider to be fully and sufficiently authenticated, should be received.
[267] In a conspiracy to commit fraud case, the prosecution adduced evidence of documents seized from the business premises of the accused: R. v. Smart and Young (1931), 55 C.C.C. 310 (Ont. C.A.). At pp. 312-3, Latchord C.J. stated:
It was strongly urged that the books of account, records and other documents of the appellants did not constitute evidence against them. These documents were seized by the Crown on the business premises of the accused in January, 1930, when they were in use as formal records of the transactions of the businesses of the accused as they had been throughout 1928 and 1929, and, at the date of seizure carried on.
. . .
What was relied on was that the books and papers being in the custody of the accused, and made use of by them for their own purposes and in the conduct of their businesses, are prima facie evidence as against the accused of the methods, systems and devices of which they continuously availed themselves in their own speculations, and in their transactions with their customers and with other brokers.
"All papers found in the possession of a man are, prima facie , evidence against him, if the contents of them have application to the subject under consideration:" per Eyre, L.C.J., in Rex v. Horne Tooke , 25 How. St. Tr. 120.
[268] In R. v. Russell (1920), 33 C.C.C. 1 (Man. C.A.), at p. 6, the court observed:
Writings found in a man's hands are prima facie evidence against him. It will be inferred that he knows their contents and has acted upon them.
[269] In her reasons for judgment in the Drakes fraud trial, Epstein J. (as she then was) observed at paras. 78-80:
Are the documents admissible for the truth of their contents on the basis that the applicants recognized, adopted them or acted on them?
Since this third element requires an assessment of whether the document has been recognized in some fashion, the documents found at Dean Park must be examined separately to determine whether they are admissible for the truth of their contents.
In his text on Documentary Evidence in Canada (Carswell: 1984), J. Douglas Ewart gives in depth consideration to the uses to which documents in evidence can be put irrespective of whether they have been adopted. He concludes that documents in possession are admissible to prove such things as knowledge of their contents, involvement in a conspiracy, connection with the transactions to which they relate, membership in an organization, design in the sense of intention, and interest in activities described in the document.
[270] It is, or course, not possible to exhaustively delineate the type of circumstances which will amount to recognition, adoption or acting on documents.
Lien vers la décision
[257] A person has possession of a thing, in fact and law, when he or she has it in his or her physical custody with a power of control over the thing, coupled with knowledge of the thing’s existence and nature: Criminal Code, s. 4(3)(a).
[258] It is common for the prosecution to prove possession by circumstantial evidence. Possession “is a question of fact capable of proof by inference”: R. v. Caccamo (1975), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (S.C.C.), at p. 273.
[259] The ‘documents in possession’ doctrine “is purely a creature of the common law” and “provides one of most frequently used methods of admitting documents into evidence”: J.D. Ewart, Documentary Evidence (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1984), at p. 232.
[260] The most widely accepted articulation of the documents in possession doctrine is found in Phipson on Evidence (15th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2000), at p. 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognized, adopted or acted upon them. [footnotes omitted; emphasis in original]
This passage, repeated from prior Phipson editions, has received wide-spread approval: (références omises)
[261] In British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch, 1995 CanLII 142 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47, the Supreme Court mentioned two aspects of the doctrine in the context of its discussion on compulsion and s. 7 of the Charter:
In some cases, the production of documents from the possession of a person may have communicative aspects. Possession of a document may permit an inference of knowledge of the contents of the document. See R. v. Container Materials Ltd., [1940] 4 D.L.R. 293 (Ont. S.C.). Furthermore, if the party in possession has recognized, adopted or acted on the document an admission of acceptance of its contents as true may be inferred. See R. v. Famous Players, [1932] O.R. 307 (S.C.).
[262] Once possession of a document is established, even in the absence of evidence of the accused possessor having recognized, adopted or acted on the document, a trier of fact may circumstantially infer from the possession itself that the accused had knowledge and involvement in the subject matter or transactions described therein. In R. v. Morris 1983 CanLII 28 (SCC), (1984), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), at p. 99, the court stated:
In my view, an inference could be drawn from the unexplained presence of the newspaper clipping among the possessions of the appellant, that he had an interest in and had informed himself on the question of sources of supply of heroin, necessarily a subject of vital interest to one concerned with the importing of the narcotic.
. . .
Depending on the view of the trier of fact and the existence of other evidence, an inference could possibly have been drawn or could have been supported to the effect that preparatory steps in respect of importing narcotics had been taken or were contemplated.
The evidence of the newspaper clipping is similar in nature to the cheque forms of certain banks and the list of banks found in possession of the accused and admitted in evidence on a charge of fraudulently endorsing and cashing a cheque in R. v. Gaich (1956), 24 C.R. 196 (Ont. C.A.), or the list of burgled premises found upon one of the accused which was admitted in evidence on a charge of unlawful possession of house-breaking implements in R. v. Hannam, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 340 (N.B.C.A.) Other cases which have dealt with this issue are: (références omises).
[263] A Crown appeal succeeded in R. v. Turlon, supra, against an acquittal for possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. When Turlon was arrested, his briefcase was opened. The receptacle contained a sealed envelope (containing the “Palmer” letter) and a document written by Turlon. On appeal, the court stated at pp. 188-190:
When the envelope was opened, it was found to contain a letter addressed “Dear Maureen” and signed by “Wesley Stubbs”. In the letter the writer states:
So I give Loxley 2 lb weight of herb 1 lb is for you and the other lb is for me.
So I’m asking you kindly to take the list from Loxley with the things and set me up and set yourself also. I have seen for myself that Loxley had a very slow attempt, if you don’t push him he will not get along with the things. So I am asking you...and I ask him to get a delko plant and a T.V. and a power cut saw. The kind of herb that I give Loxley to give you is the best type and you can get $2,000 a lab weight for it.
In the briefcase there was also found a handwritten list prepared by the respondent. The items set out on that list were as follows:
1) 2 Honda 500 watt Delco 2) 2 Colour T.V. 20” 3) Tape Dec with Cassette 4) Set Up Camera 5) Sanda 6) Battry Charger 7) Moter Saw with blate for board and three
It will be seen that this list contains items referred to in the Miss Palmer letter.
. . .
Knowledge of the contents of the letter was not a condition precedent to evidentiary value of the letter. Possession of the letter was evidence of knowledge or complicity in the scheme of drug importation and distribution. On the other hand, the respondent’s denial that he knew the letter was in his briefcase was evidence to the contrary. The possession of the letter and the denial by the respondent were both part of the evidence as a whole to be considered by the jury.
It would also be open to the jury to accept the list prepared by the respondent as a form of adoption of the letter. In other words, the jury might conclude that the list prepared by the respondent reflected the items that were being sought in the letter. If the jury accepted this list as a recognition or adoption of the Miss Palmer letter, then the letter could be received as an admission to prove the truth of its contents.
The Miss Palmer letter and the list prepared by the respondent were important pieces of evidence.
[264] In R. v. Gaich (1956), 116 C.C.C. 34 (Ont. C.A.), a fraud prosecution, the Crown led evidence of the seizure of documents from Gaich’s truck at the time of his arrest including various cheque forms from the Royal Bank of Canada, a cheque with an endorsement, counter-cheques of the Bank of Nova Scotia, a cheque book on the Province of Ontario Savings office at Brantford, Ontario, and a sheet of paper on which was written a list of banks. The accused’s appeal against conviction was dismissed with the court stating, at p. 39:
Under the circumstances the Court cannot see that it was irrelevant to the issue that several of such documents necessary and essential to such an illegal enterprise were found on the person and property of the appellant.
[265] In a different case, in two searches of the home of an accused, the police seized items alleged to be instruments for house-breaking. The accused was convicted at trial. On appeal (R. v. Gilson, [1965] 2 O.R. 505 (C.A.), at pp. 506, 513) the court rejected the appellant’s submission that the prosecution ought not to have been allowed to lead certain documentary evidence also uncovered in the search:
In front of the house, between the road and sidewalk, an old Monarch car was parked on the boulevard. A search of the vehicle disclosed in the hub cap discs two separate sheets of paper and a single piece of paper which contained a list of motels in the Niagara Falls area indicating the kind of security devices each of the motels had.
. . .
As to the third point, the lists of motels would be some evidence, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the finding of the lists...
[266] In the Container Materials Ltd. case, a prosecution for conspiracy in restraint of trade, the Crown introduced a quantity of documentation including books of account, correspondence, official minutes, executed agreements and cheques. The trial judge stated at pp. 130, 131-2:
...documents in his possession are receivable against him...
. . .
...all of these documents are receivable in evidence as against the party from whose possession they come, as having been found in the possession of that particular accused and therefore it is presumed that that accused had a knowledge of the contents thereof.
. . .
These copies and letters having come from the possession of the accused parties, present, in my opinion, a very much more reliable type of evidence than if viva voce evidence of some witness who had been present by chance and had overheard conversations between the accused or their proper representative, had been produced by the Crown. Such latter type of evidence would undoubtedly be received, although subject to the frailties of human recollection and transmission. A fortiori, this correspondence which I consider to be fully and sufficiently authenticated, should be received.
[267] In a conspiracy to commit fraud case, the prosecution adduced evidence of documents seized from the business premises of the accused: R. v. Smart and Young (1931), 55 C.C.C. 310 (Ont. C.A.). At pp. 312-3, Latchord C.J. stated:
It was strongly urged that the books of account, records and other documents of the appellants did not constitute evidence against them. These documents were seized by the Crown on the business premises of the accused in January, 1930, when they were in use as formal records of the transactions of the businesses of the accused as they had been throughout 1928 and 1929, and, at the date of seizure carried on.
. . .
What was relied on was that the books and papers being in the custody of the accused, and made use of by them for their own purposes and in the conduct of their businesses, are prima facie evidence as against the accused of the methods, systems and devices of which they continuously availed themselves in their own speculations, and in their transactions with their customers and with other brokers.
"All papers found in the possession of a man are, prima facie , evidence against him, if the contents of them have application to the subject under consideration:" per Eyre, L.C.J., in Rex v. Horne Tooke , 25 How. St. Tr. 120.
[268] In R. v. Russell (1920), 33 C.C.C. 1 (Man. C.A.), at p. 6, the court observed:
Writings found in a man's hands are prima facie evidence against him. It will be inferred that he knows their contents and has acted upon them.
[269] In her reasons for judgment in the Drakes fraud trial, Epstein J. (as she then was) observed at paras. 78-80:
Are the documents admissible for the truth of their contents on the basis that the applicants recognized, adopted them or acted on them?
Since this third element requires an assessment of whether the document has been recognized in some fashion, the documents found at Dean Park must be examined separately to determine whether they are admissible for the truth of their contents.
In his text on Documentary Evidence in Canada (Carswell: 1984), J. Douglas Ewart gives in depth consideration to the uses to which documents in evidence can be put irrespective of whether they have been adopted. He concludes that documents in possession are admissible to prove such things as knowledge of their contents, involvement in a conspiracy, connection with the transactions to which they relate, membership in an organization, design in the sense of intention, and interest in activities described in the document.
[270] It is, or course, not possible to exhaustively delineate the type of circumstances which will amount to recognition, adoption or acting on documents.
Le document trouvé en possession de l'accusé VS son admissibilité
R. v. Wood, 2001 NSCA 38 (CanLII)
Lien vers la décision
[32] A frequently cited description of this doctrine is from M.N. Howard et al. (eds.) Phipson on Evidence (15th, 2000) at § 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognised, adopted or acted upon them. So, as we have seen, documents which a party has caused to be made or knowingly used as true in a judicial proceeding to prove a particular fact, are admissible against him in subsequent proceedings to prove the same fact, even on behalf of strangers. Documents furnished by persons specifically referred to for information are evidence against the referrer; though a mere general reference will not have this effect. (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original)
[33] There are three elements of the doctrine. First, it must be shown that the document was actually or constructively in the possession of the accused. Second, if such possession is established, the document will be admissible to show the accused’s knowledge of its contents, his connection with and state of mind with respect to the transaction to which it relates. Third, if it is established that the accused has recognized, adopted or acted on the document, it becomes admissible for the truth of its contents under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. The first and third of these elements are most relevant for the purposes of this appeal.
Lien vers la décision
[32] A frequently cited description of this doctrine is from M.N. Howard et al. (eds.) Phipson on Evidence (15th, 2000) at § 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognised, adopted or acted upon them. So, as we have seen, documents which a party has caused to be made or knowingly used as true in a judicial proceeding to prove a particular fact, are admissible against him in subsequent proceedings to prove the same fact, even on behalf of strangers. Documents furnished by persons specifically referred to for information are evidence against the referrer; though a mere general reference will not have this effect. (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original)
[33] There are three elements of the doctrine. First, it must be shown that the document was actually or constructively in the possession of the accused. Second, if such possession is established, the document will be admissible to show the accused’s knowledge of its contents, his connection with and state of mind with respect to the transaction to which it relates. Third, if it is established that the accused has recognized, adopted or acted on the document, it becomes admissible for the truth of its contents under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. The first and third of these elements are most relevant for the purposes of this appeal.
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