Les principes de droit applicables à l’analyse d’une requête en séparation de chefs d’accusation aux fins de procès

Takri c. R., 2015 QCCA 690 (CanLII)

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[10]   Les principes de droit applicables à l’analyse d’une requête en séparation de chefs d’accusation aux fins de procès, aux termes de 591 (3) a) C.cr. et relatifs à la norme de contrôle que doit appliquer une cour d’appel à l’égard d’un jugement rendu par un tribunal de première instance en cette matière ont été définis par la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’arrêt Last. Nous en avons récemment rappelé la substance dans l’arrêt Morasse :

[56]         Décider s’il y a lieu de donner suite à une demande de séparation de chefs d’accusation oblige le juge à se demander si les intérêts de la justice l’exigent ou pas : comme l’écrit la juge Deschamps dans Last, « les intérêts de la justice constituent le critère primordial. ». Ces intérêts englobent « le droit de l’accusé d’être jugé en fonction de la preuve admissible contre lui, ainsi que l’intérêt de la société à ce que justice soit rendue d’une manière raisonnablement efficace, compte tenu des coûts. ». Plusieurs facteurs doivent être pris en compte dont le préjudice causé à l’accusé, le lien juridique et factuel entre les chefs d’accusation, la question de savoir si l’accusé entend témoigner à l’égard d’un chef d’accusation, mais pas à l’égard d’un autre, le désir d’éviter la multiplicité des instances, l’utilisation de la preuve de faits similaires au procès et la durée du procès compte tenu de la preuve à produire.

[57]         Au moment d’évaluer l’intention déclarée de l’accusé de témoigner, le juge doit se préoccuper de la capacité de ce dernier à contrôler sa défense et, plus précisément, de son droit de décider s’il témoignera ou non à l’égard de chacun des chefs d’accusation. Cela dit, et bien que l’intention provisoire d’un accusé au sujet de son témoignage mérite qu’on lui accorde un poids important, elle n’est qu’un des facteurs qui doivent être soupesés. En ce sens, une intention déclarée et objectivement justifiable de témoigner à l’égard de certains chefs d’accusation seulement n’est pas nécessairement déterminante, car, comme l’écrit la juge Deschamps dans Last, « [e]lle peut être contrebalancée par d’autres circonstances qui, selon le juge, peuvent empêcher l’accusé de témoigner ou même peser moins lourd dans la balance que des facteurs qui démontrent que les intérêts de la justice exigent la tenue d’une instruction conjointe. ».

[58]         Les liens factuel et juridique entre les chefs d’accusation dont on demande la séparation constituent également un facteur pertinent, notamment lorsque la poursuite entend présenter une preuve de faits similaires : « [d]ans bien des cas, une décision accueillant une preuve de faits similaires favorisera la tenue d’une instruction conjointe car les éléments de preuve relatifs à l’ensemble des événements doivent être produits de toute façon. ».

[59]         Rappelons qu’au moment où il décide de la requête en séparation, le juge n’a pas à décider de l’admissibilité de la preuve de faits similaires dont il doit simplement, à ce stade, évaluer le sérieux.

[60]         Une Cour d’appel doit faire preuve de retenue et de déférence à l’égard de la décision du juge « tant que celui‑ci agit selon les normes judiciaires et que sa décision ne cause aucune injustice ».

[Références omises]

[11]        La prétention de l’appelant voulant que le jugement rendu le 1^er mai 2012 soit, à la fois, contraire aux normes judiciaires applicables et cause d’une injustice dont il serait la victime ne résiste pas à l’analyse.

[12]        La juge détermine correctement les règles et les principes de droit applicables. Elle résume fidèlement les prétentions des parties. Elle analyse l’ensemble des données (facteurs favorables et défavorables à une séparation de procès) selon les enseignements de l’arrêt Last. Elle se préoccupe du risque de préjudice pour l’accusé, le cas échéant, constate qu’il se trouve devant juge seul et note que son contre-interrogatoire pourra être limité, au besoin, s’il choisit de témoigner dans un cas, mais non dans l’autre. Sans se prononcer sur l’admissibilité d’une preuve de faits similaires, mais en relatant la description qu’en fait le Ministère public qui a annoncé vouloir la présenter pour établir un modus operandi de l’accusé et ainsi rehausser la crédibilité des plaignantes, elle retient qu’elle ne peut pas conclure « que cette demande ne serait probablement pas accueillie ». Bref, le tout soupesé, elle conclut qu’il est dans l’intérêt de la justice de refuser la tenue de procès distincts.

[13]        La prétention de l’appelant, énoncée au paragraphe 19 de son mémoire, voulant que ce jugement soit cause d’une injustice à son égard parce que « [l]a juge de première instance a donc entendu les faits relatés par les deux plaignantes et il est vraisemblable que cela ait contaminé son esprit et ait influé sur la condamnation de l’appelant » est dénuée de fondement.

[14]        D’abord : dans le cas d’un procès devant juge seul où il annonce une preuve de faits similaires, que cette preuve soit jugée admissible ou non à l’issue de la preuve présentée par le Ministère public, le juge doit tout entendre, de toute manière, que les chefs d’accusation soient séparés ou qu’ils soient réunis aux fins de procès.

[15]      Ensuite : la juge connaît et rappelle son rôle et ses obligations dans l’hypothèse où, aux fins de rendre jugement, elle doit écarter une preuve entendue jugée inadmissible, faisant siens notamment, à ce sujet, les propos suivants de l’un de ses collègues : « [L]e juge du procès se voit souvent soumettre des éléments de preuve inadmissibles. Le fait d’en avoir pris connaissance ne compromet nullement son impartialité. Au final, il en fera abstraction s’il décide de les écarter. »

[16]      Enfin : la juge a conclu que la preuve de faits similaires était inadmissible et l’analyse à laquelle elle se livre, dans chaque cas, dans son jugement final ne permet pas de soutenir une prétention de contamination.

Référer au témoignage d’une plaignante aux fins d’évaluation de la crédibilité d’un accusé n’est pas une erreur en soi

Takri c. R., 2015 QCCA 690 (CanLII)

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[27]      La juge est bien au fait des enseignements de l’arrêt R. c. W.D. comme le révèlent ses propos en cours de procès, notamment lors de ses échanges avec les avocats au moment des plaidoiries, et le contenu de son jugement du 12 octobre 2012.

[28]      Référer, le cas échéant, au témoignage d’une plaignante aux fins d’évaluation de la crédibilité d’un accusé n’est pas une erreur en soi, comme l’a écrit récemment la juge en chef de la Cour :

Il peut arriver, comme en l'espèce, qu'un jugement comporte des références au témoignage de la plaignante pour les fins d'évaluation de la crédibilité d'un accusé. Cela ne signifie pas que le juge choisit, parmi les deux versions soumises, celle qui lui paraît la plus probable, ce qui constituerait un déplacement et une transformation du fardeau de la preuve et une erreur de droit. En l'espèce, le juge ne faisait que replacer le témoignage de l'appelant dans le contexte de l'ensemble de la preuve, ce qu'il peut, et même, se doit de faire […].

[29]        D’ailleurs, comme le note la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans Hoohing, le faire peut s’avérer nécessaire puisqu’un élément de preuve ne doit pas être examiné en vase clos :

The evidence of any witness, including an accused, may be believable standing on its own, but when other evidence is given that is contradictory, or casts doubt on the accuracy or reliability of the witnesses’ evidence, that evidence may no longer be believable, or in the case of an accused, may no longer raise a reasonable doubt.

[30]      À la lecture du jugement et des transcriptions de l’audience, il est manifeste que la juge de première instance avait pleinement conscience du fardeau de preuve que devait rencontrer la poursuite en l’espèce et qu’elle l’a correctement appliqué. 

[31]      Il ne fait aucun doute que la juge avait l’obligation de motiver.

[32]      Pour se décharger de cette obligation, elle devait révéler aux parties touchées par sa décision pourquoi elle avait été rendue, rendre compte devant le public de l’exercice du pouvoir judiciaire et permettre un examen valable de sa décision en appel. Des motifs qui remplissent ces trois fonctions seront jugés suffisants.

[33]      Il n’est pas requis qu’un juge analyse chaque élément de preuve en détail ni qu’il s’exprime quant à chacun des éléments de contradictions soulevés, car ni l’exhaustivité ni la perfection ne constituent la grille d’analyse à utiliser pour juger de la suffisance des motifs communiqués.

[34]      Comme l’écrit la juge en chef McLachlin dans l’arrêt R.E.M. :

49. Bien qu’il soit utile que le juge tente d’expo­ser clairement les motifs qui l’ont amené à croire un témoin plutôt qu’un autre, en général ou sur un point en particulier, il demeure que cet exercice n’est pas nécessairement purement intellectuel et peut impli­quer des facteurs difficiles à énoncer. […] Bref, l’appréciation de la crédibilité est un exercice dif­ficile et délicat qui ne se prête  pas toujours à une énonciation complète et précise.

50. Ce qu’on entend par des motifs suffisants concernant la crédibilité peut se déduire de l’ar­rêt Dinardo, dans lequel la juge Charron a statué que les conclusions sur la crédibilité doivent être tirées au regard des autres éléments de preuve (par. 23). Il faut peut-être pour cela que la preuve contradictoire soit à tout le moins mentionnée. Cependant, comme l’arrêt Dinardo le dit claire­ment, ce qui compte, c’est qu’il ressorte des motifs que le juge a saisi l’essentiel de la question en litige. […]

51. [L]e niveau de détails requis pour expliquer les conclusions relatives à la crédibilité peut aussi varier selon la preuve versée au dossier et la dynamique du procès. Il se peut que les facteurs en faveur ou en défaveur de la crédibilité ressortent clairement du dossier. En pareil cas, les motifs du juge du procès ne peu­vent être jugés déficients simplement parce qu’il ne les a pas énumérés.

57. Les cours d’appel doivent se poser la question cruciale formulée dans l’arrêt Sheppard : les motifs du juge du procès, considérés dans le contexte de la preuve versée au dossier, des questions en litige telles qu’elles sont ressorties au procès et des obser­vations des avocats, privent-ils l’appelant du droit à un véritable examen en appel? Pour procéder à un véritable examen en appel, la cour doit pouvoir discerner le fondement de la déclaration de culpa­bilité. Les conclusions essentielles sur la crédi­bilité doivent avoir été tirées, et les questions de droit fondamentales doivent avoir été résolues. Si la cour d’appel arrive à la conclusion que, compte tenu de l’ensemble du dossier, le juge du procès n’a pas tranché sur le fond les questions essentiel­les en litige (comme ce fut le cas dans Sheppard et Dinardo), elle peut alors, mais seulement alors, conclure que la déficience des motifs constitue une erreur de droit.

Si une partie veut contredire ou attaquer la crédibilité d’un témoin, elle doit donner à ce témoin l’opportunité de donner sa version des choses

Takri c. R., 2015 QCCA 690 (CanLII)

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[18]      L’appelant est mal fondé de reprocher à la juge de ne pas avoir utilisé des photographies représentant le [...] à Montréal, prises près de huit ans après les faits, aux fins d’évaluer négativement la crédibilité de la plaignante Y ou la fiabilité de ses propos.

[19]      La juge ne les a pas rejetées du dossier; elle n’en a que contrôlé l’usage dans le contexte de son évaluation de la crédibilité de la plaignante Y, eu égard à l’ensemble des circonstances.

[20]      Un principe affirmé depuis 1893, dans l’arrêt Browne c. Dunn de la House of Lords, requiert qu’une partie qui veut contredire ou attaquer la crédibilité d’un témoin soit tenue de donner à ce témoin l’opportunité de donner sa version des choses. Ici, l’appelant ne l’a pas fait ni lors du contre-interrogatoire de la plaignante ni par la suite à l’occasion d’une demande à cette fin, au besoin, après qu’il eut introduit en preuve ces photographies.

[21]      L’appelant plaide que la plaignante Y a été contre-interrogée sur l’état des lieux où se seraient produits les événements et que cela suffit : de la sorte, soutient-il, elle a eu l’occasion de donner sa version. Il a tort, car la preuve au dossier ne permet aucunement d’affirmer, bien au contraire, que les événements se sont déroulés au [...] à Montréal.

[22]      Dans R. v. Verney, le juge Finlayson de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario résume la raison d‘être du principe ainsi : « […] Browne v. Dunnis a rule of fairness that prevents the "ambush" of a witness by not giving him an opportunity to state his position with respect to later evidence which contradicts him on an essential matter. »

[23]      Comme l’énoncent les juges Major et Fish pour la Cour suprême dans R. c. Lyttle, et bien que la règle de Browne v. Dunn n’a pas un caractère absolu, « [l]a mesure dans laquelle elle est appliquée est une décision qui relève du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge du procès, eu égard à toutes les circonstances de l’affaire. »

[24]      Alors « qu’aucune des photographies n’ont été exhibées à Y pour voir si elle reconnaissait les lieux comme étant les lieux où elle avait été », comme l’écrit la juge, que le [...] à Montréal se trouve au sud du boulevard [...] alors que la plaignante affirme s’être rendue au nord de ce boulevard et que le témoignage de l’accusé est pour le moins flou et variable quant à ses diverses adresses au fil des ans et quant à sa rencontre avec la plaignante Y au cours de laquelle il reconnait, par ailleurs, avoir eu des relations sexuelles, l’appelant ne réussit pas à établir que la décision de la juge d’appliquer le principe de Browne c. Dunn constitue un exercice de discrétion susceptible de justifier une intervention de notre part.

La transcription d'un document électronique est-elle constitutionnellement requise?

R. v. Burns, 2010 SKPC 6 (CanLII)

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[10]     In R. v. Bidyk, Judge Whelan of this Court dealt with a disclosure application that included a request for a typed copy of a police officer’s notes, the handwritten version provided being illegible.  Finding that “...it is reasonable that where the notes are illegible the defence receive a typed or legible copy of these notes”, she determined that refusal to provide such disclosure in that case was a breach of s. 7 of the Charter.  Judge Whelan specifically noted that her decision addressed police officer’s notes only, leaving it up to “... another court on another occasion to decide whether transcription would be required of other documents included in Crown disclosure”

[11]    In R. v. Bigge, a case decided in 2004, Mr. Justice Foley of the Court of Queen’s Bench was faced with a defence argument that reasonable disclosure on the facts of that case, in which  reference had been made to information stored electronically on 115 compact discs, required that hard copies of the information be provided to the defence.  The Court held that the Crown was obliged to provide a hard copy of some of the information, part of the argument being that disclosure in electronic format was not “reasonable disclosure required in the circumstances of the case”.  Mr. Justice Foley reiterated the principle that:

... it is not to be overlooked that the investigation results were achieved at public expense to ensure that the ends of justice are met.  Thus where the method of investigation and sources of information may assist individuals to defend themselves, the principle of broad disclosure will prevail save for the narrow exceptions noted above. 

Those exceptions referred to information that is irrelevant, privileged, or protected by informant privilege. 

[12]     Finally, in R. v. Anderson, the defence sought disclosure in a “useable format”.  The accused was faced with a 24 count indictment involving allegations surrounding the sale of controlled substances.  Dealing with that specific issue of a useable format, Mr. Justice Mills of the Court of Queen’s Bench noted that defence counsel was provided with “...all documents involved in this prosecution by way of electronic data stored on a hard drive”, which included some 30,000 to 40,000 pages of disclosure, and in addition to that, 275 audio files, 50 video files, and a large number of photographs.  The disclosure was assembled by resort to a task-based system that was the same one as the Crown used in preparation for trial but the Court found it was “not organized to be specifically helpful to the defence but would provide the defence with custom access to a particular area of interest to them”.  It is clear from reading the decision that there was a significant amount of technical expertise, skill and sophistication needed by the defence team to access the data, and although defence counsel certainly had that capability, and a Crown witness was available for the defence to assist them in understanding and utilising the Crown system, navigation through the material would be so cumbersome as to be virtually impossible.  Citing the concept of trial fairness, the defence sought “the same documents in the same format to be utilized by police and Crown during the investigation and at trial, and police officers’ notes in hard copy arranged by officer and date”. 

[13]     In reviewing the application and noting the position of each Crown and defence, Mr. Justice Mills stated at paragraph 11 that: 

... it would seem logical that the starting point for any defence preparation would be the actual evidence to be utilized by the Crown at trial.  That allows the defence to assess their ability to challenge that evidence in order to discredit it and to assess the evidence to determine if, on an evidentiary basis, it would be wise for the defence to call contradictory or exculpatory evidence. 

Looking at all the factors of that case, including the number of police officers involved in the investigation which led to the issuance of the search warrant, a potential attack upon the validity of that warrant being virtually certain, Mr. Justice Mills ordered that certain notes of the 75 officers be provided in hard copy, and in chronological order.

[14]     Cases I have reviewed respecting disclosure often deal with a tension between electronic format, in increasing use by the Crown, and a corresponding need, and a reasonable one in my view, of the defence to have disclosure in a useable format.  The above-referred to cases certainly leave open the possibility that, in appropriate cases, disclosure in a different format that the Crown chooses to utilize can be ordered.  I find, however, that this is not such a case.

[15]      The cases referred to in this decision generally have, as a common element, the fact that the disclosure being sought actually exists in a form not yet provided to the defence, or in a form that is not useable in a practical sense by the defence, as opposed to the situation in this case, in which the defence asks the Crown to create something new, something that in no way can be said to be held by the Crown.  In my view, what the defence is essentially asking for here is that the Crown go beyond its duty to disclose what is both in its possession, and in a useable format, and produce something more convenient to the defence, something that can just as easily be created by the defence.  

[16]     I have to agree with Ms. Pannell’s characterization of this application as dealing with the form of disclosure, as opposed to the fact of disclosure.  There is no suggestion that the Crown is refusing to deliver up, either by way of neglect, or the artifice of claiming irrelevancy or privilege,  information that they have.  What they are refusing to do in this case is to do things that they are not required to do.  If the defence wishes access to a transcript, the defence can make it as easily as the Crown can.

[17]   As for the form of disclosure being requested, I note as well that what is under discussion here as a “transcript” is by no means an official transcript as contemplated by Part II of The Evidence Act, primarily ss. 28 through 32, which deal with provision of certified transcripts of court proceedings.  Rather, what would be provided would be a police officer or secretary’s interpretation of what that individual believes the individual being recorded says, which would be of questionable evidentiary value compared to the actual recording.

[18]     As well, whereas I can agree that it may be quicker to browse through a transcript, that transcript is certainly not the best evidence.  The transcript is far less accurate; one misses the nuances of the individuals’ body language, the mood and demeanour of the various participants in the statement process, and the surrounding circumstances of the statement itself.

[19]     Although it might be more familiar a process to cross-examine a witness based on a transcript, the reality is that one could not cross-examine on the requested transcript in any event.  Further, s. 10 of the Canada Evidence Act specifically sets out a process in which a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made in writing “... recorded on audiotape or videotape or otherwise... ”.  The process might be more unwieldy than cross-examining a witness based upon an official transcript; however, the process is certainly available as an option.

[20]     In conclusion, the application is dismissed.

Un haut degré de littératie informatique n'est pas requis pour lire un DVD

R. v. Broomfield, 2010 NLTD 202 (CanLII)

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[11]         The Applicant’s counsel suggested that the Applicant has challenges regarding his computer literacy and access to computer equipment, and therefore a disclosure of an electronic disc (without typed transcript) is not sufficient. There was no evidence on this point. In the absence of any evidence, the submission is rejected.  A high level of computer literacy is not required to play a DVD. Most households have DVD players. Even if the Applicant’s home did not have a DVD player, there are public facilities available in every urban centre in this Province (including Happy Valley-Goose Bay) where members of the public can access DVD players.

Le devoir de la poursuite de fournir un inventaire déclarant les renseignements non divulgués en sa possession

R. v. Pereira, 2007 BCSC 1533 (CanLII)

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[57]           The Crown must make the defence aware of the existence and nature of the information which it refuses to disclose in order for the defence to be in a position to seek a review:  see R. v. Petten (1993), 1993 CanLII 7763 (NL CA), 110 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 84, 81 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (Nfld. C.A.).  In O’Connor at para. 139; R. v. Barbosa (1994), 1994 CanLII 7549 (ON SC), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 131 at 136, 24 W.C.B. (2d) 453(Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); and R. v. Laporte (1993), 1993 CanLII 9145 (SK CA), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 343 at 350, 113 Sask.R. 34 (Sask. C.A.) [Laportecited to C.C.C.], the court suggests that the Crown should produce a written itemized inventory of the information in its possession and identify those it intends to disclose or has disclosed and those which it does not intend to disclose.  The latter should be accompanied by a statement of the basis upon which the Crown seeks to withhold disclosure.

[58]           The Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosure, and Resolution Discussions(Toronto: Ontario Queen’s Printer, 1993) issued by the Ministry of the Attorney General in Ontario contains a number of general recommendations with respect to disclosure.  At 206-208 of the Report, Recommendation 16 and the subsequent commentary state:

16. Crown counsel shall advise the defence of any decision made not to disclose information in his or her possession that should otherwise be disclosed, and the importance of that information.  Crown counsel shall also advise the defence of the specific nature of the information in his or her possession which is not disclosed, unless disclosure of the nature of the information withheld would reveal the identity of an informer, jeopardize anyone’s safety or security or subject them to harassment, compromise an ongoing investigation, or reveal police investigative techniques.  Upon request, Crown counsel shall take any other steps reasonably necessary to facilitate a review by the trial judge or any decision not to disclose. [emphasis in original]

Commentary

Crown counsel must specify the nature of the material in his or her possession that is withheld on the ground of relevance only.  This paragraph does not require Crown counsel to review the entire police investigative file as a matter of course, but rather addresses information in counsel’s possession... Identifying the nature of the material withheld does not require detailed summaries of that material, as this is impractical, particularly in cases with voluminous irrelevant material.  Further, requiring a detailed summary may undermine the discretion to withhold.  A description of the type of material withheld will suffice.

[59]           Some of the suggestions made in this recommendation would seem to have been adopted in R. v. Siemens (F.) (1998), 1998 ABCA 1 (CanLII), 209 A.R. 375, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 552 (Alta. C.A.) [Siemens cited to A.R.].  As in the case at bar, the Crown was concerned about disclosing third party intercepts in Siemens.  The trial judge ordered the Crown to listen to all the wiretap tapes (estimated to take eight 40-hour work weeks) and to advise the court, among other things, whether each conversation was clearly irrelevant.  The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the Crown was not required to undertake such an onerous task.  In allowing the Crown’s appeal from a judicial stay of proceedings from the Crown’s refusal to undertake this task, the court stated at paras. 30-32:

While it is clear that Crown counsel has ultimate responsibility for decisions regarding relevance and disclosure of evidence in the possession of the Crown, that in our view does not include a requirement that Crown counsel personally examine and catalogue every item of evidence, every statement, every document, etc., that has been gathered by the police in the course of investigation, or which may be held by other state agencies, to fulfil his or her duty to the accused and the court.

We recognize that the imposition of such a duty on Crown counsel would create an impossible situation in many cases, such as the present.  It is not only in wiretap cases that the Crown must rely on other agencies to make determinations as to relevance of information and provide the Crown with summaries of information which is gathered in the course of an investigation.  Police conduct searches, and decide what evidence is to be seized.  They provide descriptions of the physical evidence, not the item of evidence itself. In commercial cases, police officers and other staff inspect large volumes of documents and provide resumes to the Crown.  They interview witnesses and provide statements, notes or will say outlines. If the current ruling of the trial judge stands and Crown counsel may only make disclosure decisions based on personal inspection and knowledge of all evidence, the system will grind to a halt.  All searches, witness interviews and investigations will have to be conducted by Crown lawyers so that they, from their own personal knowledge, can say that all relevant evidence has been disclosed.

We see no need for Crown counsel to personally spend days or weeks listening to lengthy tapes, or inspecting documents and other evidence to fulfil the duty of disclosure.  Crown counsel is entitled to rely on information provided to him or her by police officers and other staff members regarding the content of documents, especially those considered to have no relevance to proceedings.  While the law regarding disclosure deals with obligations of the Crown and speaks of breaches of ethical duties for failure to disclose relevant materials, nothing which we have found in the authorities requires that the burden of examining and cataloguing evidence be assumed by a Crown lawyer.

La divulgation électronique de la preuve

R. v. Pereira, 2007 BCSC 1533 (CanLII)

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[60]           Crown counsel submits that the main issue to be decided on this voir dire is whether I should interfere with the Crown’s exercise of its discretion with respect to the manner of disclosure.  I will therefore discuss some of the law with respect to the manner of disclosure.

[61]           In a very helpful analysis, Sinclair J. summarizes the law of electronic disclosure in R. v. Piaskowski, 2007 MBQB 68 (CanLII), [2007] 5 W.W.R. 323 at paras. 21-28:

There are cases which have held that electronic disclosure is an acceptable form of disclosure while others have held otherwise. The general principle, as will be seen, seems to be that electronic disclosure is not per se objectionable so long as the accused can reasonably access the electronic materials. The principle arises from the cases of R. v. Therrien, 2005 BCSC 592 (CanLII), 2005 BCSC 592 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Greer, 2006 BCSC 1894 (CanLII), 2006 BCSC 1894 (B.C.S.C.); and R. c. Cazzetta [R. c. Cazzetta, 1998 Carswell-Que 4537 (Que. S.C.)] (October 26, 1998), (Que. S.C., Crim. Div.) [unreported].

In R. v. Therrien, supra, the British Columbia Supreme Court found that the Crown disclosure obligation included the requirement to provide disclosure to an accused which he can reasonably access. The court held that the fact that some electronic disclosure may have to be converted ultimately to hardcopy does not mean that electronic disclosure has not been meaningful.

Recently in R. v. Greer, supra, the British Columbia Supreme Court again had to determine if the Crown could meet its disclosure obligation by providing electronic copies of documents as opposed to paper copies. The court referred to the case of R. v. Barges, [2005] O.J. No. 4137 (Ont. S.C.J.), in holding that so long as the disclosure is reasonably accessible the court should not interfere with the Crown’s discretion as to how it is organized. The choice between electronic and paper disclosure was one that the court found the Crown had the right to exercise so long as the accused could reasonably access the material to make full answer and defence.

In the 1993 Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosure and Resolution Discussions (“the Martin Report”), the report’s authors stated at pp. 191, 192:

As a practical matter, the Committee recognizes that disclosure in writing is usually the most efficient method of according an accused his or her constitutional rights.  The detailed recommendations that follow speak, for the most part, of providing copies of relevant material.  Most information relevant to any particular prosecution is accumulated in some written form, and, therefore, can be readily photocopied and provided.  Written disclosure, with a record kept of what documents have been disclosed, can also greatly reduce the potential for later misunderstandings about what has and has not been disclosed.  Written disclosure is also convenient for both parties.  Defence counsel can review the material in a convenient fashion and, wherever necessary, do so in consultation with the client; Crown counsel can review the same material conveniently, confident that no disclosure issue with respect to the information contained in that material will arise at trial.

While the Committee recognizes that, as a practical matter, disclosure will, in most cases, be accomplished in writing, there is, in the Committee’s view, no inflexible constitutional obligation to provide disclosure in this manner.  As a constitutional requirement, “disclosure” retains its plain and ordinary meaning:  it is not necessarily synonymous with providing copies. ...

The Martin Report refers to a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Collier, [1992] O.J. No. 2411 (Ont. C.A.), where the court held as follows:

... Proper disclosure of the reports did not necessitate providing copies of the reports, particularly in the absence of any suggestion that copies were requested ....The Crown could fulfill its obligation to disclose all material in the reports without actually providing copies to the defence. In so holding, we do not suggest that defence counsel would not be entitled to copies of the actual reports if requested, .... We mean only that non-disclosure cannot be equated with a failure to provide copies of the actual reports.

In R. c. Cazzetta, Côté J. said at p. 5:

In my opinion there is no set method of disclosure, and it would not be appropriate to hold that the duty must be discharged in any particular form. ...

Cases dealing with electronic disclosure where courts have held that the electronic disclosure offered by the Crown does not meet the Crown’s disclosure obligation imposed by the Charter include R. v. Obront (1998), 39 W.C.B. (3d) 340, [1998 CarswellOnt 6424 (Ont. Prov. Div.)], R. v. Cheung, 2000 ABPC 86 (CanLII), [2000] A.J. No. 704 (Alta. Prov. Ct.), R. v. Cassidy, [2001] O.J. No. 5669 (Ont. S.C.J.), R. v. Hallstone Products Ltd., 1999 CanLII 15107 (ON SC), [1999] O.J. No. 4308 (Ont. S.C.J.), and R. v. Blencowe, 1997 CanLII 12287 (ON SC), [1997] O.J. No. 3619, 35 O.R. (3d) 536, 46 C.R.R. (2d) 175, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 529, 9 C.R. (5^th) 320 (Ont. Gen. Div.), R. v. Bigge, 2004 SKQB 500 (CanLII), [2004] S.J. No. 856 (Sask. Q.B.), R. v. Jarvie, [2003] O.J. No. 5570 (Ont. S.C.J.), R. v. Chow, 2001 BCSC 845 (CanLII), [2001] B.C.J. No. 2938 (B.C.S.C.), and R. v. Jonsson, 2000 SKQB 377 (CanLII), [2000] S.J. No. 571 (Sask. Q.B.).

In R. v. Obront, supra, the judge directed the Crown to provide hardcopies of all of the electronic disclosure and made the following comments:

¶87 . . . The general attitude of the defence counsel is to this effect: Primarily, they received electronic disclosure, or electronic reproductions of the original documents, of which some have some working knowledge, of which other[s] admittedly have no working knowledge as to how to reproduce these electronic productions in order that they can not only satisfy themselves and educate themselves as to the Crown’s position, but to generally discuss the matters with their respective clients to obtain instructions and directions from their clients as to whether or not admissions can be made, or as to defences that they may have in regards to these documents, or as to information so they can generally cross-examine the witnesses that may be called by the Crown.  To put defence counsel in such a position that they would have to either retrain, or to have their clients assume inordinate expense to have someone else reproduce all these documents would be unfair.  I am going to order that the Crown produce, as they have in the past, the documents that have been seized in this matter and upon which they are going to be depending on in the prosecution of this matter as against all the accused.

[62]           In R. v. Oszenaris, 2007 NLTD 126 (CanLII), [2007] N.J. No. 236 (QL) (Nfld. S.C.), Dunn J. conducted a thorough review of the law and pointed out that disclosure materials must be made available in a manner so that the defence may conduct a meaningful examination of them.

[63]           Beard J. stated in Grant that disclosure need not be provided in a perfect manner, but it needs to be done fairly in order for the accused to make full answer and defence.  She stated at paras. 42-43:

…In the case of voice recordings or videotapes, it can include providing transcripts, summaries or copies of the recordings, or by making the originals available at a central location.  In the case of documents, it can be by providing copies, summaries, an index, or by making the originals available.  Part of the discretion of the crown in providing disclosure, subject to review by the courts, is to determine how it is to be done, keeping in mind expense to the crown, the time required to prepare summaries, copies, transcripts, etc., public interest concerns and privacy interests.  Determining what constitutes full disclosure is a balancing act between the rights of the accused, the rights of others affected by the proceeding and the need for a workable criminal justice system.  This balancing was described by McLachlin J., in O’Connor as follows:

“[192]  Discovery on criminal cases must always be a compromise.  On the one hand stands the accused’s right to a fair trial.  On the other stands a variety of contrary considerations.  One of these contrary considerations is the protection of privacy of third parties who find themselves, through no fault of their own, caught up in the criminal process.  Another is the increase in the length and complexity of trials which exhaustive discovery proceedings may introduce.  Both impact adversely and heavily on the public.

“[193]  The task before us on this appeal is to devise a test for the production of records held by third parties which preserves the right of an accused to a fair trial while respecting individual and public interest in privacy and the efficient administration of justice.  The key to achieving this lies in recognition that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees not the fairest of all possible trials, but rather a trial which is fundamentally fair.  ...  What constitutes a fair trial takes into account not only the perspective of the accused, but the practical limits of the system of justice and the lawful interests of others involved in the process, like complainants and the agencies which assist them in dealing with the trauma they may have suffered.  Perfection in justice is as chimeric as perfection in any other social agency.  What the law demands is not perfect justice, but fundamentally fair justice.

“[194]  Perfect justice in the eyes of the accused might suggest that an accused person should be shown every scintilla of information which might possibly be useful to his defence.  From the accused’s perspective, the catalogue would include not only information touching on the events at issue, but anything that might conceivably be used in cross-examination to discredit or shake a Crown witness.  When other perspectives are considered, however, the picture changes.  The need for a system of justice which is workable, affordable and expeditious; the danger of diverting the jury from the true issues; and the privacy interests of those who find themselves caught up in the justice system - all these point to a more realistic standard of disclosure consistent with fundamental fairness.  That, and nothing more, is what the law requires.”

As is succinctly noted in R. v. Chow (K.C.S) et al., 2001 BCSC 483 (CanLII), [2001] B.C.T.C. 483, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2938 (S.C.), there is a need to balance the duty to disclose and the difficulties associated therewith, particularly in a trial involving a large amount of disclosure.  Therefore, while the disclosure does not have to be perfect, at the end of the day it does have to be fair and sufficient for the accused to make full answer and defence while at the same time balancing the duty to disclose and the difficulties associated with providing that disclosure, particularly in a trial involving a large amount of disclosure.