La détermination de la peine et la durée de l'interdiction de conduire

R. v. Bansal, 2017 BCCA 93 (CanLII)

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[28]        In taking the position at the sentencing hearing that the driving prohibitions on each charge would start immediately, Crown counsel relied on R. v.Johnson (1996), 1996 CanLII 3148 (BC CA), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (B.C.C.A.).  In that case, this Court, in dealing with a differently worded version of s. 259(2) of the Criminal Code, held that a driving prohibition commences on the date of sentencing.  The provisions considered in Johnson read:

Where an offender is convicted or discharged under section 730 of an offence under section 220, 221, 236, 249, 250, 251 or 252, subsection 255(2) or (3) or this section committed by means of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft or of railway equipment, the court that sentences the offender may, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place, or from operating a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment, as the case may be,

(a)     during any period that the court considers proper, if the offender is liable to imprisonment for life in respect to that offence;

(b)     during any period not exceeding ten years, if the offender is liable to imprisonment for more than five years but less than life in respect of that offence; and

(c)     during any period not exceeding three years in any other case.

[29]        In coming to the conclusion in Johnson that a driving prohibition commences on the date of sentencing, this Court preferred the reasoning in R. v. Laycock (1989), 1989 CanLII 7240 (ON CA), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (Ont. C.A.), to that in R. v. Atkinson (1989), 16 M.V.R. (2d) 4 (Alta. C.A.).  In Atkinson it was held that when a driving prohibition is imposed together with a term of imprisonment, the prohibition does not begin to run until the offender is released from jail.  R. v. Antle (1993), 47 M.V.R. (2d) 274 (Nfld. C.A.), R. v. Dalkeith-Mackie, 2003 MBCA 144 (CanLII), 44 M.V.R. (4th) 9, and R. v. Stone, 1004 YKCA 11, 2004 YKCA 11 (CanLII), 187 C.C.C. (3d) 438, are in accord with the views expressed in Johnson and Laycock.

[30]        In Laycock, Mr. Justice Goodman discussed the problems that could arise if a driving prohibition did not take effect until the expiration of an offender’s custodial sentence (at 74):

If a sentencing judge ordered that the period of prohibition commence upon the expiration of the sentence of the offender, the danger exists that the offender might not be prohibited from driving during the times he may have been released on parole.

If a sentencing judge endeavoured to overcome these difficulties by specifying the exact date of commencement of the period of prohibition, he would be engaged in a guessing game as to the date of the offender’s release.  I make these comments with the knowledge that in all likelihood the operator’s permit of the offender would have been automatically suspended by reason of provisions of provincial legislation for periods which may or may not, however, coincide with the period of prohibition imposed under the Code.

[31]        Those concerns were echoed by Madam Justice Ryan in Johnson:

[55]      As the Laycock decision points out, the real problem, given the operation of unescorted temporary absences, day parole, full parole, and statutory release under what is now the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, is that keeping track of a prisoner’s “release date”, and thus the date the prohibition begins and ends, would be next to impossible.  Enforcement would be unmanageable.  For the sake of certainty and fairness to both the offender and the community, s. 259(2) should be interpreted as providing that the prohibition order take effect on the date it is imposed.

[32]        The current version of s. 259(2) came into force in 2008.  In R. v. Parent, 2013 BCCA 429 (CanLII), 51 M.V.R. (6th) 64, Mr. Justice Groberman said the following with respect to s. 259(2)(a.1) and the addition of the words “plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment”:

[16]      The result of this amendment is that, while driving prohibitions still take effect immediately upon being imposed, the length of the prohibition is measured from the completion of the sentence of imprisonment. …

[33]        I turn now to Lacasse, which is cited in E.G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada, 2d ed., loose-leaf, updated to release 133 (February 2017) (Aurora: Canada Law Book) at §18:3750, for the proposition that driving prohibitions under s. 259(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code“commence at the end of the period of imprisonment, not on the date of sentencing” (emphasis in original).  However, as I will explain, Lacasse accepts that an offender sentenced to imprisonment and a driving prohibition is prohibited not only for the period of court-imposed prohibition but also during the term of imprisonment set out in the warrant of committal.

L’interdiction de conduire doit tenir compte de la durée de l’interdiction préalable au prononcé de la peine

Méthot c. R., 2016 QCCA 736 (CanLII)

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[30]        Quant à l’interdiction de conduire, l’intimée concède, et elle a raison eu égard à l’arrêt de la Cour suprême dans Lacasse, que la juge a commis une erreur de droit en imposant une interdiction de conduire « à compter de ce jour ». Une telle ordonnance doit débuter au terme de la période d’incarcération et non à la date du prononcé de la peine. Vu cette erreur, nous devons exercer notre discrétion pour imposer une période d’interdiction de conduire.

[31]        Dans Lacasse, la Cour suprême a établi que l’interdiction de conduire doit tenir compte de la durée de l’interdiction préalable au prononcé de la peine et être raisonnable et appropriée aux termes de l’article 259 (3.3)b) C.cr..

[32]        Les parties suggèrent une interdiction de conduire de deux ans, ce qui est raisonnable dans les circonstances de la présente affaire.

[33]        Dans Lacasse, la Cour suprême a corrigé une erreur de même nature en effectuant une opération mathématique par laquelle elle a soustrait la durée de l’emprisonnement de celle de l’interdiction de conduire. Une telle approche mène cependant à un résultat incongru dans la présente cause, puisque la période d’interdiction de conduire sera réduite à zéro et deviendra en conséquence sans effet. De toute évidence, ceci n’était pas la solution souhaitée par la juge, pas plus qu’elle ne l’est par notre Cour. Il ne s’agit pas, non plus, de la solution suggérée par les deux parties.

[34]        La période de deux ans après l’incarcération s’harmonise avec les interdictions au terme de l’incarcération imposées en semblables circonstances. En fait, il tombe dans la partie inférieure de la fourchette qui varie entre 2 et 5 ans dans des arrêts prononcés par cette cour. Cette clémence peut se justifier dans ce dossier vu les efforts de réhabilitation du requérant de son alcoolisme, constatés par la juge et dont fait état le rapport présentenciel. Ce dernier conclut à un risque faible de récidive même si la conjointe actuelle du requérant exhibe une surconsommation d’alcool.

LES ATTENTES DE LA COUR D’APPEL EN CE QUI A TRAIT AU JUGEMENT ORAL

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Tiré de : http://courdappelduquebec.ca/fileadmin/Fichiers_client/Informations_generales/Allocutions_de_la_Juge_en_chef/Presentations__articles__ouvrages_-_juges/Les_attentes_de_la_Cour_dappel__04-02-2016_.pdf

4 février 2016
Programme de formation à la Cour du Québec
Présentation par : Guy Gagnon et Lorne Giroux, juges à la Cour d’appel

La fourchette des peines imposées pour l'infraction de possession d’une arme prohibée chargée

R. c. Green, 2016 QCCA 379 (CanLII)

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[22]      Le juge a considéré l’ensemble des circonstances. La jurisprudence révèle d’ailleurs que la fourchette des peines imposées pour des infractions commises dans des circonstances similaires est de 18 mois à 3 ans. Les décisions imposant une peine de 3 ans révèlent généralement des circonstances plus graves que celles présentes ici. Comme le souligne la Cour suprême, il n’appartient pas à la Cour de substituer son appréciation à celle du premier juge pour imposer une peine de quelques mois plus sévère :

[…] La différence de six mois entre la peine infligée par le juge de première instance et celle qui, de l'avis de la Cour d'appel, aurait dû l'être selon la catégorie de peines qu'elle a retenue ne constitue pas un écart marqué qui l'autorisait à intervenir. De surcroît, bien qu'elle s'écarte quelque peu des peines prévues par la catégorie considérée par la Cour d'appel comme étant la plus appropriée, la peine infligée en première instance s'inscrit dans la fourchette globale établie par les tribunaux au Québec et se situe nettement à l'intérieur du barème de celles infligées ailleurs au pays pour des infractions semblables. 

L'absence de remords n'est pas une circonstance aggravante

R. v Keats, 2018 NSCA 16 (CanLII)

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[46]         Both Crown and respondent counsel noted that the judge’s reference to a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor could be viewed as a potential further error. Except in unusual and exceptional circumstances, where an offender has plead not guilty, a lack of remorse is not to be considered an aggravating factor (see R. v. Hawkins, 2011 NSCA 7 (CanLII) ¶ 33).  In Hawkins, Justice Beveridge referred to R. v. Valentini (1999), 1999 CanLII 1885 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 178 (Ont. C.A.) where the court said:

In my view, a court must be very careful in treating lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance. A sincere expression of remorse can be an important mitigating factor and can reduce the sentence that might otherwise be imposed. Lack of remorse is not, ordinarily, an aggravating circumstance. It should only be considered aggravating in very unusual circumstances such as where the accused’s attitude toward the crime demonstrates a substantial likelihood of future dangerousness. Even then the trial judge must be careful not to increase the sentence beyond what is proportionate having regard to the circumstances of the particular offence.

Un tribunal peut envisager d’ordonner des peines consécutives lorsque les infractions ne découlent pas des mêmes faits / fourchette des peines pour les infractions de à des infractions de contacts sexuels et d’incitation à des contacts sexuels

Kubala c. R., 2017 QCCA 882 (CanLII)

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[11]      Le paragraphe 718.3(4) C.cr. prévoit qu’un tribunal peut envisager d’ordonner des peines consécutives lorsque les infractions ne découlent pas des mêmes faits.

[12]      Dans R. c. Guerrero Silva, la Cour précise «  [...] qu’en principe les crimes constituant des transactions criminelles distinctes entraînent, sous réserve du principe de la totalité, des peines consécutives. [...] ».

[13]      Lorsque les infractions sont commises à différents moments contre différentes victimes, les peines seront généralement consécutives. Il en est ainsi car décider autrement équivaudrait à ne pas tenir compte du mal fait à certaines victimes et à ne pas imposer de peine quant aux crimes commis à leur endroit.

[14]      Compte tenu du nombre de victimes et de la période durant laquelle le requérant a sévi, force est de constater que le juge n’a pas erré en imposant des peines consécutives.

[15]      La question est donc de déterminer si dans sa totalité, la peine globale est excessive.

[16]      Pour ce qui est des facteurs atténuants, le juge tient compte du plaidoyer de culpabilité, de l’absence d’antécédents judiciaires, du fait que le requérant est disponible à se connaître davantage (ce qui ressort de l’expertise du Dr Morissette) et à mieux comprendre ce qu’il a fait. Le juge a aussi noté l’admission de l’intimée et retenu que le requérant présente un risque de récidive de modéré à faible.

[17]      Il tient aussi compte des facteurs aggravants, à savoir les mauvais traitements envers les enfants, l’abus de pouvoir, de confiance et d’autorité, le nombre de victimes, leur âge, la répétition des gestes posés sur elles et les conséquences pour elles, l’incitation au secret, la longue période, l’absence de volonté à coopérer avec une supervision possible, la difficulté à saisir l’importance des séquelles chez les victimes et le fait d’avoir récidivé après avoir été averti par le père d’une plaignante.

[18]      Le requérant ne démontre pas que le juge ait erré en s’appuyant sur divers jugements dont R. c. Cloutier et R. c. Dufour, deux jugements qui font une revue exhaustive de la jurisprudence portant sur la peine en semblable matière.

[19]      De fait, dans R. c. Perron, relativement à des infractions de contacts sexuels et d’incitation à des contacts sexuels la Cour retient la fourchette suivante :

[18]      Pour ces deux crimes, la fourchette applicable en jurisprudence est très large : les peines se situent entre 3 et 48 mois.

[19]      En 2008, pour des infractions majoritairement commises avant que le législateur n’impose une peine minimale, notre Cour déclarait que les peines imposées en matière de contacts sexuels variaient entre 9 et 36 mois.

[Renvois omis]

[20]      Pour ce qui est des infractions d’ordre sexuel commises par des adultes en position d’autorité contre des enfants ou des adolescents, la Cour précise que « la fourchette se situe plutôt entre 4 ans et 6 ans »

En présence de la même preuve, du même matériel, pour la même période temporelle, la peine se doit d'être concurrente

R. v Keough, 2012 ABCA 14 (CanLII)

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[22]           Notwithstanding the submissions of the Crown, the trial judge imposed consecutive sentences for the two possession of child pornography charges. He summed up his reasoning as follows:

172      The two offences occurred over a year apart, and involved different complainants. The Offender’s ‘accomplices’ were also different in each case. I therefore conclude that though the two offences are very similar in that both involved the Offender coming into possession of a private use material that involved a teenage girl, these were two separate transactions. I will later in the judgment comment on the application of the ‘totality principle’, and whether those sentences should be decreased on that basis.  

Earlier in his reasons (at paras. 50-3) the trial judge had concluded, after discussing the relevant case law, that concurrent sentences were not appropriate for convictions arising out of separate transactions, involving separate victims.

[23]           The two possession of child pornography charges were very similarly worded:

1.         On or about the 5th day of September, 2008, at or near Athabasca, in the province of Alberta, did have in his possession child pornography, of S.C. contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

. . .

5.         On or about the 5th day of September, 2008 A.D., at or near Athabasca, in the province of Alberta, did have in his possession child pornography, of J.W. contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The wording of the two counts is identical, except for the identification (by initials) of the person depicted in the images.

[24]           It can be seen from the wording of the two counts that the trial judge was in error in concluding that the “two offences occurred over a year apart”. Both counts contain the same offence date, namely September 5th. It is on that date that the appellant was found in possession of the materials, and that is the foundation of the offences. It is true that the evidence revealed that the recordings were made over a year apart, but the appellant had been acquitted of the charges of making pornography. The trial judge was similarly in error in stating that the appellant had “different accomplices” for the two charges; while different male partners were involved in making the recordings, the appellant’s “possession” of the materials on September 5th did not involve any accomplices.

[25]           The trial judge’s description of the two teenagers shown in the recordings is problematic. It is true that there are different teenagers in the different images, and they are also clearly “victims” of the child pornography. But they are not fully “different complainants” as that term is used in the case law on consecutive sentencing. They are individually mentioned in the two counts, primarily to identify more precisely the material underlying the charge. Where the charge is “possession” the offence is made out whether or not different persons are depicted in different images. For example, 10 images of child pornography involving the same child could support 10 different charges.

[26]           It is common in pornography cases for the accused to be found in possession of hundreds, and even thousands of images. Theoretically, the Crown could lay a separate charge for each image, but the thousands of convictions that would result would not justify consecutive sentences. The act of possession occurs on a particular date, at a particular time, and the number of images (as well as the content of the images) is generally dealt with as an aggravating factor in sentencing.

[27]           In practice, the Crown lays one charge of possession for the multiple images, and argues that a greater number of images warrants a higher sentence. Indeed, during this trial the Crown applied to collapse the two possession counts into one. That application was dismissed, but during sentencing counsel for the Crown stated:

The Crown:     Yes. Yeah. And to address that point, sir, you’ll recall I fell on my sword and said I had made a mistake on the indictment and wanted to have one global count of child pornography.

The Court:      Yes.

The Crown:     And ‑‑ and whether we did four and a half or four and a half consecutive for the two that are here today, my range is a global range of six to nine months. It can be one sentence, concurrent one to the other. That ‑‑ that’s  fair. (AR p. 17, l. 27-36)

The Crown argued the appellant was somehow estopped by his successful resistance of the application to join the two counts, and could not now argue that they were not separate transactions. No such estoppel arises. This particular component of this appeal does however demonstrate that the Crown’s recommendation of concurrent sentences was based in principle. The trial judge’s reasoning why the two counts could not be collapsed into one foreshadowed the subsequent error in characterizing them during sentencing as unrelated transactions.

[28]           The case law shows that the courts consistently impose a single sentence for the single act of possession of pornography, even when thousands of images are involved: see for example, R. v Gauthier, 2008 ABCA 39 (CanLII), 425 AR 267 (over 2,000 images); R. v Peterson, 2006 ABPC 177 (CanLII), 402 AR 372 (over 7,000 images). It is considerations of that nature that likely were behind the Crown’s position that concurrent sentences were appropriate here.  By analogy, if the accused was found with 6 spitballs of cocaine in separate pockets, and the Crown chose to lay 6 separate charges of possession of cocaine, it would still not be appropriate to impose consecutive sentences. Ten convictions for break and enters in the same day would result in 10 sentences, but while the global sentence must reflect the number of events, it would still not be appropriate to impose consecutive sentences without regard to the total. As the Crown pointed out in this case, it did not make any difference if there were two nine-month concurrent sentences, or two consecutive 4.5 months sentences.

[29]           The trial judge’s treatment of the two possession offences as separate transactions arose from his analysis that the recordings were “private use materials”, and were legal when made. They only became illegal when they came into the possession of the appellant, and accordingly he concluded that the “moment of illegality” was at the time of transfer. Correspondingly, that was when the appellant’s possession commenced. But the appellant was not convicted of “making” the pornography under s. 163.1(2), either in the sense of him making the physical recordings, or in the sense that he “made them illegal” by taking possession of them. Specifically, he was never charged with or convicted of “transferring” the pornographic materials, which is a separate offence of “transmitting or distributing” pornography under s. 163.1(3). The appellant was charged only with “possession” under s. 163.1(4), not “making” or “transmitting”. He was only charged with possession on one fixed day, and all of his “possession” on that day was a single transaction.

[30]           In this case the Crown chose to lay a separate charge for each set of images of each of the teenagers. (There were in fact multiple images of each of them.) The Crown was entitled to proceed in this fashion, and likely did so because there were companion charges of “making” pornography for each of the “possession” charges. The trial judge, however, mis-characterized the latter charges. He essentially sentenced the appellant for a crime of which he was neither charged nor convicted.

[31]           As noted, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to impose consecutive sentences. However, the mis-characterization of the two offences by the trial judge reflects an error of principle, calling for appellate intervention. On the offence date the appellant was found in possession of a number of images of child pornography. While separate charges were laid, all of his “possession” was closely related, and the sentences should have been based on them being very closely related transactions. The Crown’s submission for concurrent sentences was reasonable, and should have been accepted.