Le cadre légal quant à l'appréciation de la raisonnabilité des délais, notamment ceux imputables à la défense

R. v. Larose, 2024 ONSC 3652

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[14]           A useful summary of the Jordan Framework was provided by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Coulter [1], which I will set out at length:

A. The New Framework Summarized

34 Calculate the total delay, which is the period from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (Jordan, at para. 47).

 

35 Subtract defence delay from the total delay, which results in the “Net Delay” (Jordan, at para. 66).

36 Compare the Net Delay to the presumptive ceiling (Jordan, at para. 66).

 

37 If the Net Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable.  To rebut the presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances (Jordan, para. 47).  If it cannot rebut the presumption, a stay will follow (Jordan, para. 47). In general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories:  discrete events and particularly complex cases (Jordan, para. 71).

 

38 Subtract delay caused by discrete events from the Net Delay (leaving the “remaining Delay”) for the purpose of determining whether the presumptive ceiling has been reached (Jordan, para. 75).

 

39 If the Remaining Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the court must consider whether the case was particularly complex such that the time the case has taken is justified and the delay is reasonable (Jordan, at para. 80).

 

40 If the Remaining Delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable (Jordan, para. 48).

 

41 The new framework, including the presumptive ceiling, applies to cases already in the system when Jordan was released (the “Transitional Cases”) (Jordan, para. 96).

 

B. Key Elements in the New Framework

           

            (1) Defence Delay

 

42 Defence delay has two components: (1) that arising from defence waiver, and (2) delay caused solely by the conduct of the defence (“defence-caused delay”) (Jordan, paras. 61 and 63).

 

43 Waiver can be explicit or implicit but, in either case, it must be clear and unequivocal. The accused must have full knowledge of his or her rights, as well as the effect waiver will have on those rights (Jordan, para. 61).

 

44 Defence-caused delay is comprised of situations where the acts of the defence either directly caused the delay or are shown to be a deliberate and calculated tactic employed to delay the trial.  Frivolous applications and requests are the most straightforward examples of defence delay (Jordan, para. 63).  Where the court and the Crown are ready to proceed but the defence is not, the defence will have directly caused the delay (Jordan, para. 64).

 

            (2) Exceptional Circumstances

 

45 If the Net Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness based on the presence of exceptional circumstances.

 

46 Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in that: (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable; and (2) Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from the circumstances once they arise.  Such circumstances need not be rare or entirely uncommon (Jordan, para. 69).

 

47 An exceptional circumstance is the only basis upon which the Crown can discharge its burden to justify a Net Delay that exceeds the ceiling.  The seriousness or gravity of the offence cannot be relied on.  Nor can chronic institutional delay or the absence of prejudice to the accused (Jordan, para. 81).

 

48 The list of exceptional circumstances is not closed but, in general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases (Jordan, para. 71).

 

            (a) Discrete Events

 

49 An illustration of a discrete event that will generally qualify is a medical or family emergency on the part of the accused, important witnesses, counsel or the trial judge (Jordan, at para. 72).

 

50 The period of delay caused by any discrete event must be subtracted from the Net Delay for the purpose of determining whether the presumptive ceiling has been reached.  However, any portion of the delay caused by a discrete event that the Crown or system could reasonably have mitigated may not be subtracted (Jordan, para. 75).

 

            (b) Particularly Complex Cases

 

51 Particularly complex cases are cases that, because of the nature of the evidence or issues (or both), require an inordinate amount of trial preparation time such that the delay is justified (Jordan, para. 77).  The seriousness or gravity of the offence cannot be relied on to establish that the case is particularly complex (Jordan, para. 81).

 

52 Where the trial judge finds that the case was particularly complex such that the time the case has taken is justified, the delay is reasonable, and no stay will issue.  No further analysis is required (Jordan, para. 80).

 

            (3) Remaining Delay is Below the Presumptive Ceiling

 

53 If the Remaining Delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable (Jordan, para. 48).  To do so, the defence must establish two things: (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings (“defence initiative”); and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.  Absent both of these two factors, the s. 11(b) application must fail (Jordan, para. 82).

 

54 Stays beneath the presumptive ceiling should be granted only in clear cases (Jordan, para. 83).

           

[15]           The courts have elaborated on defence delay.  In Jordan, the Supreme Court said:

60 Application of this framework, as under the Morin framework, begins with calculating the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial.  Once that is determined, delay attributable to the defence must be subtracted.  The defence should not be allowed to benefit from its own delay-causing conduct.  As Sopinka J. wrote in Morin: “The purpose of s. 11(b) is to expedite trials and minimize prejudice and not to avoid trials on the merits” (p. 802).

 

61 Defence delay has two components.  The first is delay waived by the defence (Askov, at pp. 1228-29; Morin, at pp. 790-91).  Waiver can be explicit or implicit, but in either case, it must be clear and [page 662] unequivocal.  The accused must have full knowledge of his or her rights, as well as the effect waiver will have on those rights.  However, as in the past, “[i]n considering the issue of ‘waiver’ in the context of s. 11(b), it must be remembered that it is not the right itself which is being waived, but merely the inclusion of specific periods in the overall assessment of reasonableness” (R. v. Conway, 1989 CanLII 66 (SCC), [1989 1 S.C.R. 1659, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., at p. 1686).

…

 

63 The second component of defence delay is delay caused solely by the conduct of the defence.  This kind of defence delay comprises “those situations where the accused’s acts either directly caused the delay … or the acts of the accused are shown to be a deliberate and calculated tactic employed to delay the trial” (Askov, at pp. 1227-28).  Deliberate and calculated defence tactics aimed at causing delay, which include frivolous applications and requests, are the most straightforward examples of defence delay.  Trial judges should generally dismiss such applications and requests the moment it becomes apparent they are frivolous.

 

64 As another example, the defence will have directly caused the delay if the court and the Crown are ready to proceed, but the defence is not.  The period of delay resulting from that unavailability will be attributed to the defence.  However, periods of time during which the court and the Crown are unavailable will not constitute defence delay, even if defence counsel is also unavailable.  This should discourage unnecessary inquiries into defence counsel availability at each appearance.  Beyond defence [page 663] unavailability, it will of course be open to trial judges to find that other defence actions or conduct have caused delay (see, e.g., R. v. Elliott (2003), 2003 CanLII 24447 (ON CA), 114 C.R.R. (2d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 175-82.

 

65 To be clear, defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence delay.  For example, the defence must be allowed preparation time, even where the court and the Crown are ready to proceed.  In addition, defence applications and requests that are not frivolous will also generally not count against the defence.  We have already accounted for procedural requirements in setting the ceiling.  And such a deduction would run contrary to the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.  While this is by no means an exact science, first instance judges are uniquely positioned to gauge the legitimacy of defence actions.

 

[16]           The Supreme Court acknowledged, as it had said in R. v. Godin[2], s. 11(b) does not require defence counsel to hold themselves in a state of perpetual availability[3].

[17]           The Supreme Court in R. v. Cody expanded on its comments in Jordan about the second component of defence delay and, in particular, the concept of legitimacy in defence actions:

28 In broad terms, the second component is concerned with defence conduct and is intended to prevent the defence from benefitting from “its own delay-causing action or inaction” (Jordan, at para. 113).  …

 

30 The only deductible defence delay under this component is, therefore, that which: (1) is solely or directly caused by the accused person; and (2) flows from defence action that is illegitimate insomuch as it is not taken to respond to the charges.  …

 

31 The determination of whether defence conduct is legitimate is “by no means an exact science” and is something that “first instance judges are uniquely positioned to gauge” (Jordan, at para. 65).  It is highly discretionary, and appellate courts must show a correspondingly high level of deference thereto.  While trial judges should take care to not second-guess steps taken by defence for the purposes of responding to the charges, they must not be reticent about finding defence action to be illegitimate where it is appropriate to do so.

 

32 Defence conduct encompasses both substance and procedure – the decision to take a step, as well as the manner in which it is conducted, may attract scrutiny.  To determine whether defence action is legitimately taken to respond to the charges, the circumstances surrounding the action or conduct may therefore be considered.  …

 

33 As well, inaction may amount to defence conduct that is not legitimate (Jordan, at paras. 113 and 121).  Illegitimacy may extend to omissions as well as acts (see, for example in another context, R. v. Dixon, 1998 CanLII 805 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244, at para. 37).

Ce que constitue un acte intermédiaire au sens du lien de causalité

R. v. Berto, 2021 ONCA 839 

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[47]      An intervening act is an event independent of the accused’s conduct, that severs the chain of factual causation: Romano, at para. 34. This generally occurs in one of two situations: when either (a) the independent intervening act is not reasonably foreseeable, and/or (b) the intervening act is an independent cause that is significant enough to sever the chain of causation between the accused’s act and the consequence: Romano, at para. 35, citing R. v. Malkowski, 2015 ONCA 887, at para. 14.

[48]      As the Supreme Court held in R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 30, at para. 49, the question is “whether the intervening act is a response to the acts of the accused. In other words, did the act of the accused merely set the scene, allowing other circumstances to (coincidentally) intervene, or did the act of the accused trigger or provoke the action of the intervening party?”

Comment déterminer si l'erreur alléguée par un accusé porte sur une question de fait ou de droit?

R. c. Ledoux, 2017 QCCA 1041

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[39]   L’article 19 du Code criminel prévoit :

19. L’ignorance de la loi chez une personne qui commet une infraction n’excuse pas la perpétration de l’infraction.

19. Ignorance of the law by a person who commits an offence is not an excuse for committing that offence.

[40]   Comme l’explique si bien le professeur Hugues Parent dans son Traité de droit criminel, Tome I — L’imputabilité, 4e éd., Montréal, Thémis, 2015, par. 503 :

Si une erreur de fait implique « une représentation inexacte de la réalité matérielle » (soit que l’individu croit à l’existence de faits inexistants ou à l’inexistence de faits existants), l’erreur de droit suppose, pour sa part, une mauvaise interprétation de sa signification au point de vue juridique (soit que l’individu ignore la règle de droit ou se méprend sur son contenu, sa portée ou son application).

[41]   Cet énoncé est conforme au droit. La Cour suprême, dans l’arrêt R. c. Molis, 1980 CanLII 8 (CSC), [1980] 2 R.C.S. 356, 362 tranche :

… Parliament has by the clear and unequivocal language of s. 19 chosen not to make any distinction between ignorance of the existence of the law and that as to its meaning, scope or application. Parliament has also clearly expressed the will that s. 19 of the Criminal Code be a bar to any such defence…

[42]   Le professeur Don Stuart dans son traité Canadian Criminal Law, Fifth Edition, Thomson-Carswell, 2007, p. 366-371 (ci-après: « Stuart »), reprend la même idée, illustrant le caractère parfois limite de la distinction entre erreur de droit et erreur de fait. Pour illustrer la démarcation, il rapporte les propos de Glainville Williams dans Criminal Law (the General Part), 2^nd Ed., Stevens & Sons, 1961 qui avance que l’erreur de fait est reliée au sens de la personne, tandis que l’erreur de droit est celle qui découle de sa pensée.

[43]   Une lecture des savants auteurs fait immédiatement ressortir que l’erreur de droit ou de fait et le droit criminel suivent une dynamique qui n’est ni claire ni simple. Aussi, une fois le principe clairement affirmé, ça se complique.

[44]   L’arrêt R. c. Prue; R. c. Baril, 1979 CanLII 227 (CSC), [1979] 2 R.C.S. 547 est un arrêt important. La Cour était saisie d’une infraction criminalisant le seul fait de violer une interdiction de conduire imposée par la loi provinciale. La Cour décide que cette dernière interdiction de conduire « provinciale » devenait un « fait » dans l’économie du droit criminel et, par conséquent, son ignorance offrait une défense d’erreur de fait. Quelques années plus tard, la Cour qualifie une telle méprise, dans un contexte similaire, d’erreur de droit : R. c. MacDougall, 1982 CanLII 212 (CSC), [1982] 2 R.C.S. 605, ce qui fait dire à l’auteur Stuart que la logique n’est pas toujours au rendez-vous, les deux arrêts étant selon lui irréconciliables : Stuart, p. 370.

[45]   L’analogie avec la présente affaire tient à ce que l’erreur de l’intimé porterait sur le concept d’interception de communication privée dans un contexte de droit du travail. Le raisonnement veut que l’erreur portant sur un concept étranger au droit criminel devienne un fait en rapport avec ce dernier et donne donc ouverture à l’erreur de fait.

[46]   Ce raisonnement est reconnu en doctrine, mais il est critiqué lorsqu’il excède les cas où une défense d’apparence de droit est prévue par la loi : voir Stuart, p. 353. À titre d’exemple, et en simplifiant, un vol n’est consommé que si un bien est pris sans apparence de droit : art. 322 C.cr., de sorte qu’une personne peut se tromper sur son « droit » de posséder cette chose : R. c. Lilly, 1983 CanLII 153 (CSC), [1983] 1 R.C.S. 794.

[47]   Cela dit, le droit évolue et tente de se raffiner, voire d’atténuer l’affirmation péremptoire de l’article 19 C.cr. Dans R. c. Klundert, 2004 CanLII 21268 (C.A.O.) (ci-après: « Klundert »), le juge Doherty conclut qu’une erreur de droit peut parfois nier la mens rea lorsque la perpétration de l’infraction exige la démonstration que l’accusé a agi dans le but d’atteindre un objectif spécifique ("in relation to the achievement of a purpose"). Se référant à R. c. Docherty, 1989 CanLII 45 (CSC), [1989] 2 R.C.S. 941, le juge Doherty explique que l’utilisation du mot « wilfullly » (en français, « volontairement ») peut signifier l’atteinte de l’objectif décrit dans la loi. Il écrit, dans l’arrêt Klundert, au par. 44 : « [w]hile the word “wilfully” refers to a culpable mental state, the exact meaning of the word will depend on the context in which it is used…».

Le fait qu'un suspect ait une expectative de vie privée sur une clé USB n'enclenche pas l'article 8 de la Charte en l'absence d'une action étatique

R v King, 2021 ABCA 271

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[8]               As pointed out in R. v Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649 at para. 34, 352 CCC (3d) 525:

34  I have considerable difficulty with the submission that s. 8 is engaged if the police look at information in which an accused has a legitimate privacy interest, even if that information is brought to the police by an independent third party acting on its own initiative. On that approach, s. 8 would be engaged if a “whistleblower” took confidential documents belonging to her employer to the police to demonstrate the employer’s criminal activity. Must the police refuse to look at the documents to avoid violating the employer’s s. 8 rights? As Duarte teaches, it is one thing to say that Canadian values dictate that the state’s power to decide when and how it will intrude upon personal privacy must be carefully circumscribed, and quite another to say that an individual’s private information is cloaked in the protection of s. 8 no matter how that information comes to the police.

Some may view Ms. Liu’s conduct in accessing the appellant’s electronic devices as being unethical or an invasion of privacy, but her conduct did not engage his Charter rights. She was not a state agent. She was “legally entitled to inform the police of [her] discovery of contraband”: R. v Cole, 2012 SCC 53 at para. 73, [2012] 3 SCR 34. The police can presumptively look at most evidence provided to them without breaching s. 8.

[9]               The appellant relies on R. v Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 SCR 608, which was concerned primarily with “standing” and particularly with when an expectation of privacy attaches to communications between two people. Here there was no communication between people, but there was also no dispute that the appellant had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his electronic devices. The key difference, however, was that in Marakah, the searches were conducted by the state; in this case, it was a private citizen (Ms. Liu) who accessed the information. The Majority stated:

50  On the first scenario, the victim, his or her parents, or other intelligence alerts the police to the existence of offensive or threatening text messages on a device. Assuming that s. 8 is engaged when police access text messages volunteered by a third party (see R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649, at paras. 21-35), a breach can be avoided if the police obtain a warrant prior to accessing the text messages. As stated in Cole, "[t]he school board was ... legally entitled to inform the police of its discovery of contraband on the laptop" and "[t]his would doubtless have permitted the police to obtain a warrant to search the computer for the contraband" (para. 73). Similarly, victims of cyber abuse are legally entitled to inform the police, which will typically permit the police to obtain a warrant. The police officers will be aware that they should not look at the text messages in question prior to obtaining a warrant. On this scenario, there is no breach of s. 8 and the text messages will be received in evidence. (Emphasis added)

This passage, if anything, supports the position of the Crown in this appeal, because it assumes that there must be some state action before a Charter breach can occur. Further, in Marakah, the unreasonableness of the search was conceded if the appellant was found to have standing.

[10]           The decision in R. v Reeves, 2018 SCC 56, [2018] 3 SCR 531 is also distinguishable. In that case, the police took possession of a computer that was jointly owned by the accused and his spouse and four months later obtained a warrant to access it. It was the seizure of the computer without a warrant, and the resulting loss of control of the personal information contained on it, that was found to be unreasonable. In the present appeal, the police did not take anything that belonged to the appellant. Ms. Liu told them about information she had observed and provided her own copy of part of what she had seen.

[11]           Reeves did not resolve the issue presented by this appeal. The Majority wrote:

46  The Crown also argues that rejecting its approach will prevent victims of crime who have received threatening or harassing text messages from showing them to the police. However, the issue of whether s. 8 of the Charter is engaged when a private citizen offers information or an item to the police in which another person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy does not arise in this case (see Marakah, at para. 50; Dyment, at p. 432; R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649, 352 C.C.C. (3d) 525, at paras. 21-35). Indeed, Gravelle did not bring the computer to the police, but rather signed a consent form authorizing them to take it. (She testified that she signed the form because she did not think she had a choice.) The issue of whether s. 8 is engaged when a citizen voluntarily brings an item to the police remains for another day. This case deals squarely with the taking of a computer by the state. (Emphasis added)

Neither Reeves nor Marakah express any doubt about Orlandis-Habsburgo.

[12]           The reason that the police viewed the USB flash drive was to confirm that it contained child pornography as reported by Ms. Liu. It is acknowledged that the appellant had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his laptop: R. v Vu, 2013 SCC 60 at paras. 40-43, [2013] 3 SCR 657. The state, however, never intruded into his laptop or his privacy. Ms. Liu looked at the contents of the laptop and captured some of its contents, but she was not a state agent. The mere fact that the appellant had an expectation of privacy does not engage s. 8, and the absence of state action at that stage is dispositive. If the police had done what Ms. Liu did, there would have been a s. 8 breach, but they did no more than receive a report from a citizen who said she had found evidence of a crime. Their viewing of her USB flash drive may have been state action, but receiving reports of a crime does not engage the appellant’s s. 8 rights.

Le droit n’indique toujours pas avec certitude si la réception de ces messages par les policiers constitue une fouille qui met en jeu l’art. 8 de la Chart

R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649

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[34]      I have considerable difficulty with the submission that s. 8 is engaged if the police look at information in which an accused has a legitimate privacy interest, even if that information is brought to the police by an independent third party acting on its own initiative.  On that approach, s. 8 would be engaged if a “whistleblower” took confidential documents belonging to her employer to the police to demonstrate the employer’s criminal activity.  Must the police refuse to look at the documents to avoid violating the employer’s s. 8 rights?  As Duarte teaches, it is one thing to say that Canadian values dictate that the state’s power to decide when and how it will intrude upon personal privacy must be carefully circumscribed, and quite another to say that an individual’s private information is cloaked in the protection of s. 8 no matter how that information comes to the police.