Moreau c. R., 2017 QCCA 1285
[18] Il est en effet bien reconnu que le principe de parité doit être pris en compte dans l’établissement de la peine, tel que le souligne la Cour d’appel du Manitoba dans R. v. Christie[8] :
[40] Parity is a principle which must be taken into account in any sentence, and particularly where the offence was a joint venture. There will, of course, be cases where the circumstances of the co-accused are sufficiently different to warrant significantly different sentences, such as where one co-accused has a lengthy related criminal record or played a much greater role in the commission of the offence. However, as noted by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. Chisholm (1985), 1985 CanLII 3587 (NS CA), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 518 (at p. 529):
Sentencing is, of course, an inexact science involving a blend of many factors with aims that often conflict, and competing interests that can not always be harmonized. Generally speaking, however, a court should try to make its sentence conform with that imposed on a co-accused for the same offence by some other court. The reason, of course, is more than just to achieve equality of treatment. Similar sentences under such circumstances avoid bitterness and resentment that otherwise might be harboured by the recipient of the more severe sentence – such feelings or sentiments can lessen the chances of rehabilitation. Sentences imposed upon a co-accused that appear to be totally inadequate or excessive should be ignored. The point simply is that if all the relevant circumstances are similar the sentence imposed upon an accused and his co-accused should be the same.
[41] In considering whether sentences are disparate, regard should be had both to the length and type of sentence imposed. It is necessary to consider the conditions imposed on a conditional sentence and to measure its severity against a custodial sentence. For example, conditions which permit generous exceptions to a house arrest or a curfew are generally more lenient than incarceration. Christie’s circumstances, serving a conditional sentence, contrast sharply with those of his co-accused, who are now residing in penitentiaries. Christie’s accomplices can be offered no explanation or justification for this. Moreover, it is the administration of justice itself that suffers when the public expresses cynicism about the fairness and integrity of the sentencing process.
[42] Complete uniformity in sentencing is an impossible goal; moreover, it is undesirable. Sentences based solely on the nature of the offence, which do not take into account appropriate circumstances surrounding the offence and the offender, will weaken respect for the administration of justice as much as widely disparate sentences.
[43] What we must strive for is an approach to sentencing whereby sentences for similar offences committed by similar offenders in similar circumstances are understandable when viewed together, particularly in cases involving joint ventures. This can only be achieved through the use of guideline sentences and a willingness of appellate courts to intervene to minimize disparity when it occurs. Christie’s conditional sentence of two years less one day, versus his co-accused sentences of two or more years in a federal penitentiary, is an extremely disparate sentence.
[Soulignement ajouté]
[19] Le principe de parité exige d’ailleurs que « toute disparité entre les sanctions imposées à différents délinquants soit justifiée »[9]. Comme le signale avec raison la Cour d’appel de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador dans R. v. Kane[10] : « […] an unjustified disparity among sentences imposed on co-conspirators may not only be viewed by the offenders and others as unjust, but such disparity may also tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute ».
