Sans autre élément, le fait qu'un accusé ait été la dernière personne vue avec la victime lorsque celle-ci a été vue vivante pour la dernière fois ne suffit pas à établir la culpabilité de l'accusé dans le cadre d'une accusation de meurtre

R. v. Boucher, 2022 ONCA 40

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[155]   The first has to do with the value of evidence that an accused was the last person seen with the deceased when the deceased was last seen alive in proving the accused’s guilt for killing the deceased.

[156]   Without more, evidence that an accused was the last person seen with the deceased when the deceased was last seen alive, is not sufficient to establish the accused’s guilt on a charge of murdering the deceased: R. v. Stevens (1984), 1984 CanLII 3481 (ON CA), 11 C.C.C. (3d) 518 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 534, leave to appeal refused, 15 W.C.B. 157. However, the probative value of this evidence varies with the circumstances in which the accused and deceased were last seen together. As for example, in a case of child murder where the accused and deceased child were last seen together in a motor vehicle of the deceased, who was a stranger to the child, a short distance from where the body of the child was found: Stevens, at p. 535. Evidence of the accused after-the-fact conduct may also be important in enhancing the cogency of the last living sighting evidence: Stevens, at p. 533.

[157]   The second has to do with a factor we may consider in assessing the merits of the appellant’s allegations of unreasonableness in the verdict rendered. We are entitled to consider the appellant’s failure to testify in the face of the circumstantial case arrayed against him, thus his failure to provide the basis for an alternative inference inconsistent with guilt: R. v. George-Nurse, 2018 ONCA 515, 362 C.C.C. (3d) 76, at para. 33, aff’d 2019 SCC 12.

Dans une affaire où la preuve de l'occasion est accompagnée d'autres éléments de preuve incriminants, une occasion qui n'exclut pas tout à fait une autre possibilité peut suffire pour conclure à la culpabilité

R. v. Johnson, 2004 NSCA 91

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[53]         I will deal first with the appellant’s submission that evidence of motive and opportunity, unless it is exclusive opportunity, is not enough to sustain a conviction.  The appellant relies upon R. v. Ferainz, 1962 CanLII 884 (ON CA), [1962] O.W.N. 40, 37 C.R. 37 (Ont. C.A.) which was followed in R. v. Yebes (1987), 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 417.  However, his submission is based on an incomplete reading of Yebes.  After citing passages from Ferianz and other case authority, the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Yebes at p. 432:

 

It may then be concluded that where it is shown that a crime has been committed and the incriminating evidence against the accused is primarily evidence of opportunity, the guilt of the accused is not the only rational inference which can be drawn unless the accused had exclusive opportunity. In a case, however, where evidence of opportunity is accompanied by other inculpatory evidence, something less than exclusive opportunity may suffice. This was the view expressed by Lacourciere J.A. in R. v. Monteleone (1982), 1982 CanLII 2162 (ON CA), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 489 at p. 493, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 243 at p. 247, 38 O.R. (2d) 651 (Ont. C.A.), where he said: "It is not mandatory for the prosecution to prove that the respondent had the exclusive opportunity in a case where other inculpatory circumstances are proved." It is also supported by further comments of Martin J.A. in R. v. Stevens (1984), 1984 CanLII 3481 (ON CA), 11 C.C.C. (3d) 518 at p. 534 et seq., and see, as well, Imrich v. The Queen (1977), 1977 CanLII 27 (SCC), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 143 at p. 147, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 243 at pp. 247-8, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 622 at p. 627, per Ritchie J.  (Emphasis added)

 

 

This court relied upon those reasons in R. v. Francis, [1994] N.S.J. No. 14 (N.S.C.A.) for the proposition that where evidence of opportunity is accompanied by other inculpatory evidence, something less than exclusive opportunity may suffice.

Comment apprécier une preuve d'ADN, notamment en raison du risque de son transfert

R. v. Doan, 2013 BCCA 123

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[28]        Observing that the judge’s only findings concerning the DNA evidence and the possibility of contamination are those mentioned at his paras. 405 and 406, set out above, Mr. Doan contends that the trial judge did not explicitly consider the evidence of Dr. Waye. However, as we have said, on our reading of Dr. Waye’s examination, we do not agree he opined that it was “likely” the DNA on all three pieces of duct tape came there by secondary transference. Indeed, his evidence was replete with conditional statements and was framed in the hypothetical.

[29]        Nor can one say the judge did not appreciate the tenor of Dr. Waye’s evidence, for the judge’s own questioning of Dr. Waye indicates he was very much alive to this issue. In the end result, however, the judge’s reasons on this point indicate that he simply did not agree with the hypothesis put by defence counsel.

[30]        For convenience, we repeat the judge’s findings of fact on this point:

[405]   ... The existence of her DNA on Exhibit 369 where it was found and that of Xiao Cheng on Exhibit 213 cannot be explained in any way other than that she and he were bound at the same time, unless I were to accept that the DNA of both was transferred there from other DNA-bearing sources.

[406]   While the accused sought to have me reach that conclusion, I am satisfied that to do so would be to elevate scientific theories of the possibility of transfer to a likelihood of occurrence that is not in keeping with either common sense or the totality of the evidence in this case, including the existence of the many “zap straps” in the garbage as well as the pieces of plastic sheeting.

                                                                                    [Emphasis added.]

[31]        On our reading, the judge just did not accept the theory of accidental transference. It is well known, as we have stated in Mr. Tse’s appeal, that we must give deference to the trial judge’s factual conclusions. We may only interfere with a finding of fact such as this one when the judge has made a palpable and overriding error: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235. The preceding discussion illustrates that he did not make such an error. There was a body of evidence that amply supported his conclusion that the DNA on the tape came directly from the donor and not by accidental transference. Accordingly, we see no basis to interfere with the judge’s factual conclusions.

[32]        Mr. Doan and Mr. Soux also contend that the trial judge erred by expecting the defence to prove the likelihood of accidental transference of DNA onto the duct tape. He says the judge’s reasoning, at paras. 405–407, replicated above, required the accused to prove a likelihood of occurrence that was inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.

[33]        We do not agree. It appears to us that the judge considered the alternative explanation that the DNA was deposited by accidental or secondary transference to the duct tape in the pattern found by the forensic examiners, because that was the theory posited by the defence. He then concluded that accidental transference was improbable. His conclusion on the theory advanced by the defence does not demonstrate a reversal of the burden of proof.

[34]        We would not accede to the submission the judge impermissibly reversed the onus of proof.

[35]        Mr. Doan and Mr. Soux also contend that the judge failed to consider or properly weigh the evidence of Dr. Waye and failed to give sufficient, or any, reasons for rejecting his evidence. This submission relies upon an over-reading of Dr. Waye’s evidence, in our view. While Dr. Waye did proffer the single statement that transference from a toothbrush was “likely”, a review of all his evidence reveals his view of the conditional nature of the possibility of secondary transference to all three pieces of DNA-bearing duct tape in the patterns found by forensic examiners. On balance, his entire evidence can only be seen as equivocal, and not diametrically opposed to that of Ms. Saul.

[36]        As discussed already, regardless of the risk of transference, the trial judge resolved the issue of transference on the basis that two pieces of duct tape contained, in total, four deposits of Ms. Pan’s DNA, and one piece contained three deposits of Mr. Cheng’s DNA. He considered too speculative the possibility of accidental transference of DNA in the precise pattern that is entirely consistent with the complainants’ evidence of having had their mouths taped. That was a finding of fact that was available to him on the evidence, and which, indeed, commends itself to us. It cannot be said that the judge erred in so finding.

[37]        Nor do we agree the judge was required to deal more explicitly with the testimony of Dr. Waye, or to state that he preferred the evidence of Ms. Saul to that of Dr. Waye. On our reading of the reasons for judgment, the judge was alert to the competing theories. He decided that the defence theory of accidental transference was speculative. There was no need for him to explain in greater detail than he did, his reason for rejecting a theory he said was speculative.

[38]        It follows we see no basis to interfere with the judge’s conclusion that the DNA found on pieces of duct tape came directly from the complainants. For this reason, and the reasons given in the other appeals, we find no basis upon which to interfere with the convictions of Mr. Doan for confinement with intent to ransom of Ms. Pan, Mr. Li and Mr. Cheng, and extortion of the three complainants.

Il ne fait aucun doute que le fait d'utiliser une procédure pénale dans le seul but de recouvrer une dette civile constitue un abus de procédure

R. v. Wolf, 2008 ONCA 352

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[2]               In support of his conviction appeal, the appellant argues that the purpose of the criminal proceedings against him was the collection of a civil debt owed to the victims of his fraudulent conduct, with the result that the proceedings were an abuse of process. 

[3]               In particular, the appellant submits that, in the course of discussions concerning restitution, it was made clear to him that the real goal of the prosecution was recovery or collection of the debt owed to the complainants and that payment would bring an end to the prosecution.  He says that the involved Crown counsel surrendered their obligations and breached their duties as Crown Attorneys by acting, in effect, as counsel for the complainants in attempting to obtain the highest monetary recovery possible from the appellant on account of the value of the services fraudulently obtained by him. 

[4]               At its core, therefore, the appellant’s contention is that Crown counsel improperly used the power of their office and the spectre of criminal prosecution to enforce the complainants’ demands for restitution.  We reject this argument. 

[5]               There is no dispute that it is an abuse of process to use criminal proceedings for the sole purpose of collecting a civil debt.  In this context, Crown counsel on this appeal responsibly acknowledged that the language of certain of the e-mail communications between the Crown counsel involved in the appellant’s case was ill-advised.  We agree.

[6]               Crown counsel also argues, however, that this is not one of those exceptional cases in which the jurisdiction of this court to prevent an abuse of process should be exercised by allowing the appeal and staying the charges against the appellant.  Again, we agree.

[7]               In our view, on this record, the appellant has failed to meet the high threshold required for a stay of criminal proceedings based on alleged abuse of process.  We are far from satisfied that the sole purpose for the conduct of the criminal proceedings against the appellant was to effect collection of the civil debt owed by him to the complainants, thereby invoking the criminal justice process to realize a civil remedy.

[8]               The fresh evidence tendered on appeal by both parties indicates that Crown counsel assigned to the appellant’s case concluded that the charges were appropriate and that a reasonable prospect of conviction existed. 

[9]               In addition, and importantly, the Crown counsel involved in the challenged resolution discussions testified that while he sought the complainants’ views regarding restitution, he did so in the course of assessing the public interest in determining whether to end or continue the prosecution and in the knowledge that the complainants’ views would not determine the course of the proceedings. He stated that it was his opinion, having regard to the public interest, that resolving the case on the basis of restitution in the proposed amount of $14,000 was not inappropriate, even though that quantum was less than what he viewed as the full value of the appellant’s fraud and the preferred restitutionary amount of $17,000.

[10]         Finally, there is no evidentiary support on this record for the appellant’s very serious claim that Crown counsel threatened the appellant – implicitly or otherwise – with continued prosecution and jail if the appellant failed to increase the amount of restitution that he was prepared to pay.

[11]         In all these circumstances, we conclude that the record does not demonstrate any improper purpose behind the criminal proceedings or in the conduct of Crown counsel involved in those proceedings.  To the contrary, there was clear evidence in support of the allegations of the commission of a criminal offence by the appellant, the sufficiency of which he acknowledges.  A coincident effort to realize recovery of the debt owed to the complainants through the mechanism of restitution does not render the criminal proceedings an abuse of process.

Une instruction telle que « ne vous inquiétez pas, faites simplement ce qu'on vous dit » peut, selon les circonstances, éveiller des soupçons plutôt que les dissiper

R. v. Bisram, 2011 ONSC 3913

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[277]       An instruction, “[d]on’t worry, just do as you are told” may, depending on the circumstances, raise not dispel suspicions: R. v. Niemi (2006), 2006 CanLII 13949 (ON CA), 208 C.C.C. 119 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 78.  Where a person has real suspicion causing him or her to see the need for an inquiry, and inquiry is made, there may, depending on the factual context, arise an issue as to whether real suspicions remained with a failure to make yet further inquiries.  In R. v. Lagace (2004), 2003 CanLII 30886 (ON CA), 181 C.C.C. (3d) 12 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 27-9, the court stated :

Counsel for the appellant also argues that as a matter of law, the doctrine of wilful

blindness could not operate against the appellant because he made an inquiry after his

suspicion was aroused.

 

I disagree.  Culpability on the basis of wilful blindness rests on a finding of deliberate

ignorance.  An accused who suspects that property is stolen but declines to make the

inquiries that will confirm that suspicion, preferring instead to remain ignorant is culpable. 

Where an accused makes some inquiry, the question remains whether that accused

harboured real suspicions after that inquiry and refrained from making further inquiries

because she preferred to remain ignorant of the truth.  Where some inquiry is made, the

nature of that inquiry will be an important consideration in determining whether the

accused remained suspicious and chose to refrain from further inquiry because she

preferred to remain deliberately ignorant of the truth.  For example, a finding that an

accused took all reasonable steps to determine the truth would be inconsistent with the

conclusion that the accused was wilfully blind:  R. v. Mara, 1997 CanLII 363 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 630 at para.

51

 

I, of course, do not suggest that there is any onus on the accused to demonstrate that all

reasonable steps were taken.  In any case where the Crown relies on the doctrine of

wilful blindness and some inquiry has been made, the trier of fact will have to decide

whether the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that despite that inquiry the

accused remained suspicious and refrained from making any further inquiry because she

preferred to remain ignorant of the truth.

En matière d'aveuglement volontaire, la question n'est pas de savoir si un accusé aurait dû être suspicieux, mais plutôt s'il l'a été

R. v. Laronde, 2010 BCCA 430

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[31]           Wilful blindness is not based on an objective standard. As was stated by the Quebec Court of Appeal in R. v. Comtois Barbeau (1996), 1996 CanLII 6391 (QC CA), 50 C.R. (4^th) 357 at para. 85: 

The test was not whether the appellant “should” have known or should “normally” have known from the suspicious circumstances that her husband was probably involved in a conspiracy to import cocaine. The question was whether the circumstances were such that she, herself, was, in fact suspicious that this was the case but deliberately refrained from making inquiries so that she could remain in ignorance as to the truth.

[32]           The question is not whether the accused should have been suspicious but whether the accused was in fact suspicious. (R. v Malfara, 2006 CanLII 17318 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 2069). As Doherty J.A. said in R v Duong, (1998), 1998 CanLII 7124 (ON CA), 39 O.R. (3d) 161 at 169:

Liability turns on the decision not to inquire once real suspicions arise and not on the hypothetical result of inquiries which were never made. Where an accused chooses to make no inquiries preferring to remain deliberately ignorant speculation as to what the accused would have learned had he chosen to make the necessary inquiries is irrelevant to the determination of the blameworthiness of the accused’s state of mind.

L'omission délibérée par l'accusé d'informer l'acheteur d'un profit caché qu'il tirera de la transaction viole les normes d'honnêteté et constitue une fraude criminelle

R. c. J.E., 1997 CanLII 10605 (QC CA)

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Il me paraît, et je suis d'accord avec le juge de première instance sur ce point, qu'une personne raisonnable ne pouvait voir dans cette phrase autre chose que l'affirmation par l'appelant qu'il avait négocié, pour le groupe, et dans l'intérêt de celui-ci, le prix de l'immeuble en question au meilleur coût ou au moins à un coût qui permettait la réalisation des objectifs fixés, notamment la prise d'une plus-value sur celui-ci.  En d'autres termes, l'appelant se représentait ici en quelque sorte comme le mandataire des investisseurs, tout en leur dissimulant  qu'il avait fait un profit caché de plusieurs centaines de milliers de dollars sur l'achat-revente, profit qui restreignait ou annihilait la perspective d'un profit de capital, profit déjà empoché par l'appelant.   Il les trompe donc sur la valeur réelle de l'immeuble qu'il leur vend, valeur artificiellement gonflée par le profit secret qu'il tire de la double transaction.

 

L'interprétation qu'il donne de ce texte dans son témoignage à l'effet que, puisque c'était lui qui vendait, peu importaient les profits substantiels qu'il faisait sur l'achat secret ne me paraît pas soutenable, eu égard au test de la personne  raisonnable désirant investir.  Il me semble, en effet, que l'investisseur raisonnable, à la lecture du prospectus, était inévitablement amené à conclure que l'appelant avait, par son habileté et ses talents de fin négociateur, effectué pour le compte de ses clients une bonne opération dont tout le profit allait à ces derniers.  Ce d'autant plus que, comme nous l'avons vu, il trouvait son compte et sa compensation financière dans les montants, cette fois-ci, bien déclarés qu'il chargeait à chacun d'entre eux à titre de conseiller en placement.  Les honoraires ainsi perçus ne pouvaient passer pour autre chose qu'une rétribution pour les démarches faites par lui, dans l'intérêt même du groupe.

L'appelant, en outre, ne mentionne pas comme il aurait dû le faire, à mon avis, pour éliminer toute ambiguïté, qu'il avait acquis l'immeuble et qu'il offrait à son tour de le revendre aux investisseurs, ce qui eut permis à ces derniers de connaître ou au moins de soupçonner la possibilité d'un écart substantiel entre le prix d'achat et le prix de revente.

 

Le premier moyen malhonnête me paraît donc être la dissimulation voulue et planifiée de la réalité objective de la transaction.

 

Le second moyen malhonnête réside, à mon avis, dans l'organisation répétée et systématique d'une transaction menée de telle façon que les investisseurs croient acquérir l'immeuble, grâce à la grande expertise de l'appelant, soit à un prix intéressant (je rappelle la phrase du prospectus «Nous avons négocié l'acquisition des immeubles»), soit au prix du marché, soit encore à un juste prix.

 

Ces trois possibilités de prix (l'aubaine, le juste prix, le prix du marché) sont indispensables à la réalisation de l'objectif économique proposé (défiscalisation intéressante, profit de capital).  Or, dès le départ, les dés sont pipés et cette réalisation devient sinon impossible, du moins très difficile, vu le gonflement artificiel de la valeur de l'immeuble.

 

Je suis donc d'avis que la première condition de l'élément matériel existe selon les critères développés dans les arrêts de la Cour suprême précités.