[27] He cites Kerr v R, 2004 SCC 44, [2004] 2 SCR 371, 322 NR 91. It contains a few dicta in concurring minority decisions there, but they do little to assist the present appellant. They merely state that
(a) not all violence is necessarily a breach of the public peace in this context,
(b) intending reasonably to have handy a weapon as reasonable defence against an anticipated imminent unavoidable attack is not keeping the weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and
(c) actual violence is relevant evidence as to the purpose for the possession, but is not conclusive proof.
[28] Assuming for the sake of argument that those propositions are all law in Canada, they do not conflict with the conviction here. Necessary self-defence (as in the Kerr case) is not illegal, and indeed is expressly sanctioned by the Criminal Code. But “suicide by cop” is neither. There is no suggestion of self-defence here.
[29] Trying to induce the police to kill oneself is patently dangerous to everyone within range of all weapons (those of the suicidal person and those of the police). For example, rifles can wound or kill well beyond a distance of a mile. And their bullets can miss their target, or pass right through it. The whole “suicide by cop” scenario is calculated to be very stressful, mentally and physically, to all in the vicinity. It is the very opposite of any notion of “the public peace”.
[30] The person seeking to die can achieve his goal only by threatening to shoot his weapon at or in the vicinity of the police. That puts them into physical danger.
[31] If a constable actually does shoot the suicidal person, at the very least the constable will undergo lengthy accusations, investigations, criticisms, and possible suspension from work. That is very stressful to any normal person. What is more, the experience of shooting to death a fellow human being, whatever the circumstances, must be very upsetting to the great majority of persons.
[32] The Kerr case points out that the “public peace” is a state of order or the normal condition of society. It is not a physical thing. It can be broken without spilling blood or even breaking windows. Whatever it encompasses, it is inconsistent with the “suicide by cop” scenario.
[33] We realize that this charge of possession requires proof of the purpose for which the weapon was possessed at the relevant time, and that what was done with it later is not the same question. The police, knowing the appellant was armed, instructed him to come out unarmed. Instead the appellant decided to bring his shotgun out of his residence onto the road, and engage in an interaction with the police. That itself constitutes possession for a purpose dangerous to the public peace. The police did not ambush him. He knew very well that they were nearby, and he came out in the wake of a telephone discussion with the police.
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