Lepage c. R., 2013 QCCA 122
[32] La lutte contre le crime n’est pas forcément chose simple, surtout lorsqu'il s’agit de concilier efficacité du travail policier et droits fondamentaux des individus. Le cas à l’étude en est un exemple frappant.
[33] En 1993, conscient des limites inhérentes au mandat de perquisition traditionnel prévu à l’article 487 C.cr., le législateur fédéral a décidé de doter les forces policières de pouvoirs d’enquête plus étendus. Il a alors promulgué l’article 487.01 donnant ainsi naissance au mandat dit général.
[34] Sous la plume du juge MacPherson, la Cour d’appel d’Ontario[4] s’est livrée à une analyse des principales différences séparant le mandat général du mandat de perquisition traditionnel. Je n’entends pas reprendre un exercice avec lequel je suis en parfait accord et me contenterai donc d'un simple rappel en citant quelques passages que j'estime particulièrement éclairants:
[24] There are significant differences between the investigative powers described in s. 487 and those set out in s. 487.01. Unlike s. 487, s. 487.01 is not limited to searches of "a building, receptacle or place". There are no spatial limitations on s. 487.01. Nor is it limited to any particular investigative technique or procedure. Apart from a prohibition against interference with the bodily integrity of a person (s. 487.01(2)), there are no express limits on the investigative methods that may be authorized.
[25] Section 487.01 fundamentally alters the traditional search warrant paradigm. Instead of legislation permitting judicial authorization of a specific investigative method (search and seizure) where certain statutory conditions are met, s. 487.01 speaks to any situation in which the police seek judicial authority to do something that, absent that authority, would constitute a breach of s. 8 of the Charter. Section 487.01 ensures that the determination of whether the police will be allowed to use a specific investigative means (not involving interference with bodily integrity) in any given case will be decided by balancing the state interest in law enforcement and the individual interest in privacy. The state will not be denied access to investigative methods that are constitutionally justified because the relevant statute does not contemplate the specific investigative means that the police seek to use.
[26] Section 487.01 recognizes that Parliament cannot anticipate or imagine all investigative means or techniques that are or will become available to the police. Section 487.01 focuses not on authorizing specific techniques, at least where there is no interference with bodily integrity, but rather on whether the public interest in authorizing the specific investigative technique in issue is sufficiently strong in the circumstances to [page761] overcome an individual's constitutional right not to be subject to an unreasonable search or seizure.
[27] Despite the many differences between the traditional search warrant power in s. 487 and the general warrant power in s. 487.01, their essential structures are the same. Both require that the police obtain judicial authorization based on sworn evidence before engaging in investigative procedures that interfere with an individual's s. 8 rights. Both sections set out statutory prerequisites that must be satisfied before the authorization can be is-sued. Broadly speaking, those prerequisites are used to determine when the public interest in the investigation of crime is sufficiently strong to supersede an individual's s. 8 rights. While the criteria are not identical, they serve the same purpose.
[35] Le paragraphe 487.01 (1) prévoit trois exigences fondamentales qui conditionnent le pouvoir d’un juge de décerner un mandat général :
487.01 (1) […]
a) si le juge est convaincu, à la suite d’une dénonciation par écrit faite sous serment, qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une infraction à la présente loi ou à toute autre loi fédérale a été ou sera commise et que des renseignements relatifs à l’infraction seront obtenus grâce à une telle utilisation ou à l’accomplissement d’un tel acte;
b) s’il est convaincu que la délivrance du mandat servirait au mieux l’administration de la justice;
c) s’il n’y a aucune disposition dans la présente loi ou toute autre loi fédérale qui prévoie un mandat, une autorisation ou une ordonnance permettant une telle utilisation ou l’accomplissement d’un tel acte.
[36] Dans le cas à l’étude, la première de ces exigences pose à elle seule problème dans la mesure où, comme le soulignent les auteurs Fontana et Keeshan, les motifs raisonnables doivent nécessairement surpasser le niveau du simple soupçon[5] :
The requirement for consideration by a provincial or superior court judge reflects the expanded intrustive powers given police with the granting of general warrant. However, to authorize a general warrant, the granting judge must find that the standard of proof is one of reasonable probability, a standard more than a flimsy suspicion, but less than the civil test of balance of probabilities and much lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The granting judge must be satisfied that there are reasonnable grounds to believe that information will, could or may be obtained. Absolute certainty is not necessary: R. v. Brand.
[47] Je rappelle ici que le juge chargé de la révision ne doit pas seulement considérer l’information portée à la connaissance du juge qui décerne le mandat; il doit aussi tenir compte des précisions que la preuve révèle.
[48] Dans la Reine c. Ha[7], précité, la Cour d’appel d’Ontario constatait la concordance entre les paramètres de révision des mandats de perquisition et ceux concernant la révision des mandats généraux :
[29] Nor does the appellant contest that the trial judge applied the proper test for reviewing the general search warrant issued by Fraser J., namely, whether there was some evidence, as amplified on the review, that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have been granted: see R. v. Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (CSC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, [1990] S.C.J. No. 115, at p. 1452 S.C.R.; R. v. Araujo, 2000 CSC 65 (CanLII), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, [2000] S.C.J. No. 65, at p. 1017 S.C.R.; R. v. Grant, 1999 CanLII 3694 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 327, 132 C.C.C. (3d) 531 (C.A.), at para. 17.
[49] Un peu plus tard, sous la plume du juge Fish[8], la majorité de la Cour suprême précisait le rôle d’un juge chargé de la révision d’un mandat. Il s’agissait dans cette affaire de la révision d’un mandat de perquisition traditionnel, mais comme je viens de le mentionner, les règles applicables sont les mêmes dans les deux cas :
39. Under the Charter, before a search can be conducted, the police must provide "reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the search" (Hunter v. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (CSC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 168). These distinct and cumulative requirements together form part of the "minimum standard consistent with s. 8 of the Charter for authorizing search and seizure" (p. 168.)
40. In reviewing the sufficiency of a warrant application, however, "the test is whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued" (R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 54 (emphasis in original)). The question is not whether the reviewing court would itself have issued the warrant, but whether there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice of the peace to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place.
41. The reviewing court does not undertake its review solely on the basis of the ITO as it was presented to the justice of the peace. Rather, "the reviewing court must exclude erroneous information" included in the original ITO (Araujo, at para. 58). Furthermore, the re-viewing court may have reference to "amplification" evidence — that is, additional evidence presented at the voir dire to correct minor errors in the ITO — so long as this additional evidence corrects good faith errors of the police in preparing the ITO, rather than deliberate attempts to mislead the authorizing justice.
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