R v Okimaw, 2016 ABCA 246
[85] R v Ominayak, 2007 ABQB 442 at para 237, 443 AR 1 says that:
The factors in assessing moral blameworthiness include: (1) the nature and quality of the acts themselves; (2) the circumstances in which they occurred; (3) the motivation behind them; (4) the method by which they were committed; and (5) the offender’s state of mind in committing the offences, namely whether they were at the lower or higher end of mens rea in terms of planning and deliberation as well as foresight of harm.
In assessing the first factor, the quantity and quality of the stabbing actions are rightly implicated in the sentencing judge’s finding of a high degree of moral blameworthiness. But, on a fair assessment of this case on the remainder of the Ominayak factors, the specific facts must operate to reduce, or ameliorate, the high level of moral blameworthiness. Okimaw acted on impulse, not through premeditation. He did not create the situation. Rather, he reacted in an excessive and legally unacceptable way. That he did not, or could not, control the situation in a more pro-social way goes directly to his state of mind: he was fearful of being outnumbered, and afraid of being attacked and hurt again. His actions and reactions were the product of a lifetime of cultural, social, and economic strife. We must not lose sight of the fact that despite his history of personal adversity and his seriously troubled background, this is the first time in Okimaw’s 27 years that he was convicted of a violent offence.
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