[17] A guilty plea has both a procedural and an evidentiary aspect. When an accused pleads guilty, the plea constitutes a formal admission to the essential legal ingredients of the offence: R. v. Gardiner, 1982 CanLII 30 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368. In effect, an accused admits to the offence. As well, by pleading guilty, the accused effectively consents to a conviction being entered without the necessity of a trial and waives the attendant procedural safeguards: Adgey v. The Queen, 1973 CanLII 37 (SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 426; Korponay v. Canada, 1982 CanLII 12 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41; R. v. Richard, 1996 CanLII 185 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 525.
[18] Acceptance of a guilty plea brings an end to the trial process with obvious prejudicial consequences to the accused. Therefore, a court is not bound to accept such a plea, but must exercise its discretion in deciding whether or not to accept the plea. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment...”: Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 at 757 (1970).
[19] This Court pointed out in R. v. Senior (1996), 1996 ABCA 71 (CanLII), 181 A.R. 1; aff’d, 1997 CanLII 348 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 288, that the Criminal Code, in various sections, recognizes a three‑step process:
(1) the entry of a guilty plea
(2) the acceptance of the plea, and
(3) the recording of the conviction.
As an example, s. 730(1) of the Code reads in part:
Where an accused ... pleads guilty to or is found guilty of an offence, ... the court before which the accused appears may, ... instead of convicting the accused, by order direct that the accused be discharged absolutely or on the conditions prescribed in a probation order...
In Senior, this Court pointed out at 158:
The language clearly distinguishes between the plea, the finding of guilt, and the act of convicting the accused. Under the provisions of this section, the fact that a judge accepts a plea of guilty or finds an accused guilty does not automatically result in a conviction. A conviction requires both the adjudication of guilt and the act of sentencing the accused to something other than a discharge.
[20] A trial judge adjudicates on guilt when satisfied that the conditions necessary for a guilty plea are present, namely, the accused knows and understands the nature of the offence with which he or she is charged and knows the effects of a guilty plea: R. v. Brosseau, 1968 CanLII 59 (SCC), [1969] S.C.R. 181.
[21] Where there is any reason to doubt that the accused understands what he or she is doing, the trial judge must inquire to ascertain the accused’s understanding. The extent of the inquiry will vary with the seriousness of the charge to which the accused is pleading. An illustration of the care exercised in a case where the accused pleaded guilty to murder at a time when the imposition of the death sentence was obligatory, is furnished by the case of Rex v. Bliss, 1936 CanLII 316 (ON SC), [1937] 1 D.L.R. 1.
[22] The extent of the duty of inquiry resting on a judge before whom a plea of guilty is offered is discussed in R. v. Johnson and Creanza, 1945 CanLII 273 (BC CA), [1945] 4 D.L.R. 75, and in Rex v. Hand (No. 1), 1946 CanLII 244 (BC CA), [1946] 3 D.L.R. 128, both decisions of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia. In Hand (No. 1), Bird J.A., as he then was, speaking for the Court said at 389:
[A] plea of guilty ought not to be accepted unless the Judge or Magistrate is sufficiently informed in open Court of the facts upon which the accused pleads guilty, to provide assurance that the accused understands the offence to which his plea relates.
[23] The duty, however, does not require the judge to make inquiry in every case. As the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held in Brosseau and Adgey, where the accused is represented by counsel and tenders a plea of guilty, the trial judge before accepting it is not bound, as a matter of law, to interrogate the accused. Where the accused has had the benefit of advice from experienced criminal defence counsel and an opportunity to consider that advice, the court is entitled to presume the accused’s plea was validly made: R. v. Wally, [1985] Y.J. No. 60 (C.A.); also, R. v. Newman (1993), 1993 CanLII 8592 (ON CA), 12 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.).
[24] The discretion exercised by the trial judge when accepting a guilty plea is one which “if exercised judicially, will not be lightly interfered with” per Cartwright J. (as he then was) in Thibodeou v. The Queen, 1955 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1955] S.C.R. 646 at 654; also Adgey at 430. Additionally, restricting the circumstances in which a guilty plea will be interfered with promotes the gravity, finality and integrity of the process.
[25] There are practical and valid policy considerations why a court should not allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn except in exceptional circumstances. Both the accused and the state benefit when an accused pleads guilty. For the accused, additional charges may be withdrawn or a reduced sentence recommended. A guilty plea is treated as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Because no trial is required, judicial resources and resources in the Crown prosecutor’s office are saved. Appeals are limited and duplication of proceedings is avoided. Those values were recognized in Housen v. Nikolaisen 2002 SCC 30, although in the context of a civil case. These benefits are lost and delay results if an appeal from a guilty plea is allowed.
[26] The importance of a conviction on the basis of a guilty plea is more than an administrative convenience. It also promotes the values inherent in the criminal trial process. As the American Bar Association stated in Standards for Criminal Justice, 2d ed. vol. 3 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1980) 1982 Supp. at 14.5:
Even if more prosecutors, judges and defence counsel were available and trial of all cases possible, conviction without trial would continue to be a necessary and proper part of the administration of criminal justice. Indeed, the limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defence has grounds for contesting the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption of innocence. The frequency of conviction without trial, therefore, not only permits the achievement of legitimate objectives in cases where pleas of guilty are entered, but also enhances the quality of justice in other cases as well.
[27] Where the guilty plea results in a miscarriage of justice the plea should be permitted to be withdrawn or set aside. A miscarriage of justice may be found when a guilty plea was not valid or when the accused suffered prejudice as a result of the plea.
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