[48] Le juge des faits doit grandement porter attention à la première description du suspect fournie par le témoin. Il importe d’en examiner non seulement le contenu, mais aussi la date ou, plus particulièrement, la période de temps s’étant écoulée entre l’événement et cette première identification. Dans l’arrêt Tat, le juge Doherty, j.a. traite de cette question en ces termes :
“ Clearly, the evidence of the prior descriptions given and the prior identifications made by the identifying witness constitute prior consistent statements made by that witness. Generally speaking, evidence that a witness made prior consistent statements is excluded as irrelevant and self-serving. However, where identification evidence is involved, it is the in-court identification of the accused which has little or no probative value standing alone. The probative force of identification evidence is best measured by a consideration of the entire identification process which culminates with an in-court identification: [ … ]. The central importance of the pre-trial identification process in the assessment of the weight to be given to identification evidence is apparent upon a review of cases which have considered the reasonableness of verdicts based upon identification evidence: e.g. see R. v. Miaponoose (1996), 1996 CanLII 1268 (ON CA), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 445 (Ont. C.A.).
If a witness identifies an accused at trial, evidence of previous identifications made and descriptions given is admissible to allow the trier of fact to make an informed determination of the probative value of the purported identification. The trier of fact will consider the entirety of the identification process as revealed by the evidence before deciding what weight should be given to the identification made by the identifying witness. Evidence of the circumstances surrounding any prior identifications and the details of prior descriptions given will be central to that assessment.
Where a witness identifies the accused at trial, evidence of prior identifications made and prior descriptions given by that witness do not have a hearsay purpose. In his influential article, Evidence of Past Identification, supra, Professor Libling explains the admissibility of the out-of-court statements where the witness makes an in-court identification in this way, at pp. 271-72.
There is no hearsay problem with this kind of evidence. It is not admitted to prove the truth of the earlier identification, but to add cogency to the identification performed in court. As a general rule, a witness is not permitted to testify as to his own previous consistent statements because they add nothing to the in-court testimony. But evidence of previous identification strengthens the value of the identification in court by showing that the witness identified the accused before the sharpness of his recollection was dimmed by time. Furthermore it is important, in assessing the weight of the identification in Court, to know whether the identifying witness was able to identify the accused before he was aware that the accused was the person under suspicion by the police. ”[41]
[Nos soulignements]
[49] Plus récemment, la Cour d’appel du Québec confirmait que « les descriptions contemporaines aux événements et la première identification hors cour ont une importance capitale dans l’établissement de la fiabilité objective du témoignage à l’audience ».[42] Cette règle s’explique par le fait que la qualité et la fiabilité d’une description physique s’estompent au fil du temps.[43]
[50] En l’espèce, madame A ne fournit une première description du suspect de race blanche aux policiers qu’une vingtaine de jours après les événements.[44] Elle dépeint alors l’individu comme étant grand[45], c’est-à-dire dépassant « les cinq pieds genre cinq pieds et cinq[46] [ … ] aux alentours de cinq pieds huit[47] » et portant une paire de pantalons[48].
[53] Dans McWilliams Canadian Criminal Evidence, on précise que toute modification ultérieure à une première description doit être appréciée avec beaucoup de circonspection.[53] Cette remarque s’avère particulièrement pertinente dans la présente affaire compte tenu que la première description fournie par madame A n’était pas contemporaine à ses observations et qu’elle diffère de façon importante avec son témoignage quant au linge que portait l’accusé et sa taille réelle, aucune preuve ne démontrant que X aurait grandi entre les mois de septembre 2015 et janvier 2017.[54]
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