Si le mandat prévoit des heures pour effectuer la perquisition, cela ne s'applique à la fouille des données un coup qu'elles sont saisies

R. v. Nurse and Plummer, 2014 ONSC 1779

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[24]           Counsel argues that the warrant only authorized a physical transfer of the phones from the OPP Vault to the OPP ECrimes Unit for an initial visual inspection to determine what could be done with the phones.   Once it was determined that the OPP would not able to conduct an analysis on the password protected phones, a justice would have to be informed that the phones were password protected because it engaged additional privacy interests and a second warrant was required for the RCMP to break through this password and extract the data from these phones.

[34]           Mr. Battigaglia, relies on Hill J.’s comments in R. v. N.N.M.[11], in that case Hill J. was faced with this same problem in the case of a warrant to seize firearms.  The Crown urged the court to apply the doctrine of severability to uphold the warrant but Hill J. refused, citing the decision in Branton.  At para. 335 he held:

I am not inclined to do so for the following reasons.  The court in Branton did not raise the prospect of curing such a facial validity defect by severance. Authorized searchers read the Form 5 warrant not the ITO.  Apparent conferral of searching and seizing authority exceeding what is properly supported by grounds in the ITO improperly risks overly broad conduct at the scene of the search thereby implicating N.N.M.’s s.8 Charter right to be free from search by invalid court orders.[12]

[46]           I adopt the analysis of Paciocco J. in R. v. Barwell[13], which I find persuasive.   In Barwell, the police had seized hard drives as part of an investigation and were holding those items at a police lock-up.   The police sought a warrant to search the hard drives and obtained a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of the computer hard drives from the lock-up.

[47]           The search warrant authorized the police to "between the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., to enter and search for" the computer hard drives "and to bring them before me or some other Justice to be dealt with according to law."   The items were seized during the time frame specified but were not analyzed until the day after the period provided for in the warrant.

[48]           The accused argued that the examination had to be completed within the 15 hour window set out in the warrant, and breached his s. 8 rights.

[49]           Paciocco J. rejected this argument and held that the search and seizure authorized by this warrant occurred properly when the police assumed control over the computer hard drives from the lock up within the period specified for that search and seizure.   He held at para 17-18:

It was not required by the warrant that the forensic examination would take place during that same brief window. The time limits under the search warrant were not, therefore, dishonoured by Detective Thompson when he commenced the forensic search the next day. First, consider the implications of the argument that a forensic search of a seized chattel must be undertaken within the search period specified on the face of the warrant. Imagine, for the sake of the exercise, that the computer had been at Mr. Barwell's home, and that the warrant authorized the search and seizure to occur there. In order to minimize the intrusion Mr. Barwell's private dwelling, the warrant period would necessarily have been brief, to minimize the control the police could exercise over Mr. Barwell's home. The law would have required it, and so the search period on the face of the warrant would have been brief. Would the law, nonetheless require, in such circumstances, that any forensic examination of the computer would have to occur within that same brief search window on the face of the warrant? This would be unrealistic. Forensic examinations take time, and it would be counter-productive to the privacy interest to extend search and seizure periods for long periods of time in order to accommodate forensic examinations.

The flaw in this Charter challenge is that it fails to recognize that the law treats the initial search and seizure and subsequent forensic examinations separately. There are provisions authorizing the initial search and seizure of the item, such as Section 487 of the Criminal Code of Canada, relied upon to secure the warrant in this case. There are other separate and distinct provisions dealing with the detention of items, including detention "for the purposes of any investigation." Specifically, Sections 489(1) and 490 of the Criminal Code of Canada together require that when things have been seized pursuant to a warrant, the police officer shall, as soon as practicable, either bring the seized items before a Justice or file a report identifying the thing being detained and the reason for detention. And the Justice shall order that the thing be released or detained, including for the purposes of investigation. In other words, the search warrant provision deals with the time required for the initial search for an item and with its seizure. The detention provisions address how long the item can be kept for forensic analysis after the search is made for the item and it is seized.[14]

La Poursuite peut faire une copie de la preuve saisie & comment traiter le retard du rapport au juge de paix

R v Eddy, 2016 ABQB 42 

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[42]           More recently, in R v Villaroman, Yamauchi J concluded that no Charter breach can ever flow from the Crown’s conduct in relation to Criminal Code, ss 489.1-490. R v Villaroman has subsequently been adopted in R v Croft, at para 119-127, and R v Balla, 2014 ABQB 127, at para 71-75, 583 AR 79 (Yamauchi J). The Crown correctly observed that the Ontario Court of Appeal, in R v Garcia-Machado, 2015 ONCA 569, has come to the conclusion that is arguably different from R v Villaroman, and that a Charter breach can emerge from ss 489.1-490. I prefer the analysis of Justice Yamauchi in R v Villaroman, and agree that Ms. Eddy’s remedy was to exercise her rights under Criminal Code, s 490(7) and 490(8) to seek return of any seized property. I note that, in fact, she did attempt to challenge the detention of property at a January 24, 2011 Criminal Code, s 490 hearing before Kirby PCJ, so this is not some theoretical right but rather that one she attempted to exercise and that was rejected after judicial consideration.

[43]           This is the first basis on which I reject Ms. Eddy’s arguments concerning the allegedly illegal retention of seized evidence.

b.         Ms. Eddy Cannot Deny Crown Possession of Copies of the Disputed Evidence

[44]           A second independent basis on which I reject Ms. Eddy’s argument concerning unlawful detention of her materials is that the Criminal Code, s 489.1-490 procedures operationally distinguish between ‘informational’ (such as documents and computer records) and ‘material’ (such as a bloody knife, money, or contraband drugs) evidence. This is not stated explicitly in the Criminal Code, but rather is a conclusion that emerges by implication from Criminal Code, ss 490(13)-490(14), which, I note, applies to documents only:

490(13) The Attorney General, the prosecutor or the peace officer or other person having custody of a document seized may, before bringing it before a justice or complying with an order that the document be returned, forfeited or otherwise dealt with under subsection (1), (9) or (11), make or cause to be made, and may retain, a copy of the document.

(14) Every copy made under subsection (13) that is certified as a true copy by the Attorney General, the person who made the copy or the person in whose presence the copy was made is admissible in evidence and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, has the same probative force as the original document would have if it had been proved in the ordinary way. [Emphasis added.]

[45]           The effect of these provisions is that, even if Ms. Eddy’s document-based evidence was returned via the s 490 procedures, the Crown is both entitled to make and keep copies, and those copies are deemed as having the same effect as originals. This makes plain Parliament’s intention when it comes to the return of seized documents - s 490 is not intended to deny access by the Crown to the information seized, but rather to provide a mechanism so that materials (in this case documents) that are no longer directly necessary (as originals) may be returned to their owners.

[46]           I conclude the same is true for both ‘hardcopy’ and ‘electronic’ data. This conclusion collapses Ms. Eddy’s arguments that a s 8 Charter breach may result from the Crown’s continued holding of seized information beyond what is permitted under Criminal Code, ss 489.1-490. At most Ms. Eddy could obtain return of the original electronic and physical documents. She could never demand return or destruction of copies. If lawfully seized, those are permanently in Charter-compliant custody of the Crown.

[47]           I am not the first Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench justice to evaluate this issue. Dea J in R v Cartier, at para 18, concluded:

Section 490 is clear. Its purpose is to ensure that what was seized be returned if further detention is not allowed. By allowing copies to be made (s. 490(13)) and in giving those copies the probative force of the originals (s. 490(14)) the section advances its aim of allowing a return of the "things seized" without emasculating legitimate police investigation of crime. [Emphasis added.]

He subsequently concluded that Criminal Code, ss 490(13-14) are Charter compliant by how they permit the Crown to retain copies of seized documents: para 24.

[48]           Justice Dea’s conclusion was subsequently followed in: Bleet v Canada (Attorney General), R v Black at paras 20-21, R v Bromley, and Lemare Lake Logging Ltd v British Columbia (Minister of Forests and Range), at para 33. As well, ‘downstream’ use of Crown copies was permitted in R v Ritter, 2004 ABQB 332, 359 AR 89 (Hillier J).

[49]           This is a second independent basis on which I reject Ms. Eddy’s  489.1-490 arguments. Once informational evidence (electronic or hardcopy) was obtained with a valid search warrant Ms. Eddy has no Charter right to interfere with the Crown’s possession or use of copies of that evidence. Even if she had been entitled to return of the original informational evidence, taken from her residence, Ms. Eddy could not have stymied the Crown’s ability to use copies of the seized information as a basis for searches, further investigation, or in its impending criminal trial.

[50]           I note this explains why the analysis in R v Garcia-Machado does not apply to Ms. Eddy’s argument. The seizure in R v Garcia-Machado is of a very different kind: a sample of blood, rather than documentation. It could not be ‘copied’. With seized material, like blood, the Crown may be obliged ‘to either use it or lose it’ (a material item), but that is not the issue here.

c.         Failure to Prove Reports Were Late

[51]           Third, I agree with the Crown that the requirement in Criminal Code, s 489.1 that a report to a justice be made “as soon as is practicable” cannot be a fixed, simple seven day deadline such as what Ms. Eddy has proposed. Instead, it is what is “practicable”, a contextual question.

[52]           Some alleged crimes are simple. Others are not. Eddy’s proposed scheme isolates the s 489.1 process from the reality of law enforcement investigation. A search warrant of a mail parcel that discovers cocaine is a comparatively simple investigation to report. A short deadline would then be “practicable”. The discovery of a complex crime scene with much potential evidence and many seizures will require more “practicable” time to generate a report. Similarly, I conclude that the character of an investigation and the workload of the investigators is relevant. It would be absurd that a criminal could argue that a seizure of a firearm used in a crime was not reported on a “practicable” timeline because the investigator who seized that firearm was involved in an active investigation of a dangerous wanted criminal. Sometimes law enforcement time is better spent outside an office, rather than in it, filling forms. If Parliament had meant “as soon as possible” it would have said so. “Practicable” necessitates context.

[53]           That was the conclusion of the Paciocco J in R v Butters, 2014 ONCJ 228, 311 CCC (3d) 516, affirmed 2015 ONCA 783. The issue at trial was whether court determination of a s 489.1 report was illegally delayed required evidence from the officer who prepared the s 489.1 report to evaluate ‘practibility’. The Court concluded intent was irrelevant. What mattered was the facts about the matter, and that included the schedule of the investigator and that a proper report requires time “... to complete the analysis of the evidence before the reports could be completed.”: para 57.

[54]           I note that in R v Butters “analysis” of the seized property was necessary before a proper report could be generated. This makes sense. Ms. Eddy’s claim that simple possession starts the timeline to generate a s 489.1 report is wrong - and that is only logical because it is very important that the content of the report to justice meaningfully inform on what was seized. For example, a report that disclosed the seizure of an unknown white powder tells the court little. A seizure of cocaine, identified after the time for analysis, is different matter entirely.

[55]           Since Ms. Eddy has the onus to establish whether or not a s 489.1 report was made “as soon as practicable”, and since she has not provided evidence of the CRA investigators workloads, schedules, or information on the complexity of what was seized, I conclude she did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that any s 489.1 report was not made “as soon as practicable”. While I do not find that she has a s 8 Charter right in any case, the fact that she has not established a factual foundation for her argument is another reason I reject her proposed Charter breach claim.

[112]      The most favourable case cited by Ms. Eddy on this point, R v Garcia-Machado, provides no benefit for two reasons. First, I, along with other Alberta court authorities, have rejected its reasoning. Second, R v Garcia-Machado concludes a Charter breach may occur where a Crown agent fails to report to a justice as required by Criminal Code, s 489.1, or in other words this addresses the initial seizure of property stage of the evidence collection process. That is different from the s 490 breach alleged by Ms. Eddy.

Les principes juridiques relatifs à la communication de la preuve qui est volumineuse

R. v. Piaskowski et al, 2007 MBQB 68

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[84]         Having had a chance to review the voluminous materials filed in this matter I conclude the following principles apply:

1.     What constitutes disclosure in a particular case depends on the facts of the case and the circumstances of the accused. 

2.     The Crown’s disclosure obligation requires that it must make known to an accused all relevant materials in its possession or under its control.

3.     The Crown has an obligation and a reviewable discretion to determine what is relevant, and counsel for the Crown may rely on the advice and opinion of investigators in determining relevancy in the case where materials are voluminous. 

4.     The Crown must disclose materials in a manner which the accused can reasonably access. 

5.     Where an accused is represented by counsel; electronic disclosure is not objectionable merely because of counsel’s lack of computer skills unless it can be shown that access to the materials would be beyond the competence of the average reasonably skilled person. 

6.     Where the Crown wishes to make electronic disclosure as opposed to paper disclosure, the Crown has a further obligation to assist counsel lacking familiarity with the software utilized, and an unrepresented accused who bona fide has limited or no computer skills with reasonable access to materials that form part of the disclosure.  This further obligation may range from training on the use of the software through the provision of computer equipment and may include the obligation to provide paper copies of all disclosure.  This would depend on the circumstances of each case. 

7.     Electronic disclosure must permit counsel to be able to print copies of the documents and images in a readable manner so as to be able to communicate effectively with his or her client. 

8.     The expense to the Crown of providing hardcopies of the documents is a factor the court can take into account in determining whether electronic disclosure is reasonable, but it cannot trump the accused’s right to a fair trial. 

9.     If the cost of producing hardcopies of the electronic documents interferes with the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence, the court can order the Crown to provide hardcopies of electronic disclosure at Crown expense. 

Le compte d'honoraire de l'avocat est présumé être privilégié & l'exception du crime

Maranda c. Richer, 2003 CSC 67

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33                              En droit, lorsqu’il s’agit d’autoriser une perquisition dans un cabinet d’avocats, le fait même du montant des honoraires doit être considéré comme un élément d’information protégé, en règle générale, par le privilège avocat-client.  Sans pour autant entraîner la création d’une catégorie nouvelle d’informations privilégiées, une telle présomption apportera une précision nécessaire aux méthodes de mise en application du privilège avocat-client, qui se situe dans les privilèges génériques, comme on se le rappellera.  En raison des difficultés inhérentes à l’appréciation de la neutralité des informations contenues dans les comptes d’avocats et de l’importance des valeurs constitutionnelles que mettrait en danger leur communication, la reconnaissance d’une présomption voulant que ces informations se situent prima facie dans la catégorie privilégiée assure mieux la réalisation des objectifs de ce privilège établi de longue date.  Elle respecte aussi cette volonté de réduire au minimum les atteintes au privilège avocat-client, que notre Cour exprimait encore récemment avec force dans l’arrêt McClure, précité, par. 4-5.

34                              Ainsi, lorsque le ministère public estimera que la communication de cette information ne porterait aucune atteinte à la confidentialité de la relation, il lui appartiendra de l’alléguer de manière suffisante dans sa demande d’autorisation d’un mandat de saisie et de perquisition.  Le juge devra s’en assurer par un examen attentif de la demande, sous réserve de la révision éventuelle de sa décision.  Par ailleurs, certaines informations demeureront accessibles à partir d’autres sources, comme la banque du client qui conserverait les chèques ou documents constatant le paiement de comptes d’honoraires.  En principe, toutefois, on ne pourra forcer l’avocat à fournir cette information dans une enquête ou lors de la présentation de la preuve contre son client.  Dans le présent dossier, le ministère public n’a ni allégué ni démontré que la communication du montant des comptes d’honoraires de M^e Maranda ne porterait pas atteinte au privilège qui protégeait sa relation professionnelle avec M. Charron.  Ces informations devaient alors demeurer confidentielles comme l’a décidé le premier juge.

 

3.     L’exception de crime

35                              Comme dernier motif pour justifier la communication du montant des honoraires et débours de l’avocat dans ce dossier, la Cour d’appel a invoqué l’application de l’exception de crime.  Ce motif surprend et n’aurait pas dû être soulevé en appel.  Le dénonciateur n’avait pas allégué cette exception. Le ministère public ne l’a pas plaidée en Cour supérieure.  Contrairement à l’opinion de la Cour d’appel, il est difficile de trouver dans l’affidavit soumis par le dénonciateur au soutien de la demande d’autorisation, les éléments d’information justifiant l’application de cette exception.  Pour y parvenir, il faudrait conclure que cette exception s’applique dès qu’un avocat est consulté par un client au sujet d’une infraction du même type que celle visée par les dispositions de l’art. 462.31 C. cr., relatives à des biens dits infractionnels.  En l’espèce, l’affidavit ne prétend certes pas que M^e Maranda aurait été lié de quelque manière aux actes dont on voulait accuser son client.

36                              La jurisprudence reconnaît l’existence de cette exception (voir Amadzadegan-Shamirzadi c. Polak, 1991 CanLII 3002 (QC CA), [1991] R.J.Q. 1839 (C.A.)).  Son régime juridique, tant au stade d’une mesure d’enquête comme une perquisition qu’au procès, mériterait un examen attentif.  Celui-ci ne se justifierait pas dans le présent dossier où il suffit de constater que les allégations et faits nécessaires pour y recourir faisaient défaut.  Sur ce point, donc, aussi, le pourvoi est bien fondé.

37                              Malgré les circonstances dans lesquelles le juge de première instance a décidé de demeurer saisi de cette affaire, ses conclusions me paraissent conformes à l’orientation générale de la jurisprudence de notre Cour.  Celle-ci demeure soucieuse de protéger le secret professionnel de l’avocat, qui joue un rôle fondamental dans la conduite de la justice pénale.  La confidentialité des rapports entre l’avocat et son client demeure essentielle à la conduite de la justice pénale et à la protection des droits constitutionnels des accusés.  Il importe d’éviter que le cabinet de l’avocat, tenu conformément à des normes déontologiques strictes, devienne un dépôt d’archives au service de la poursuite.