Il est adéquat pour un juge d'instance de tirer l'inférence que l'accusé a la mens rea nécessaire à la commission de l'infraction d'entrave à la justice lorsque l'ensemble de la preuve est prise en compte

R v Kaiswatum, 2019 SKCA 7 

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[53]           The sole issue at the trial was whether the Crown had proven the necessary mens rea to make out an attempt to obstruct justice. The Crown conceded it was required to prove Mr. Kaiswatum verbalized a sound with the specific intention to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice, in keeping with the decision of this Court in R v Yazelle, 2012 SKCA 91, 399 Sask R 249 [Yazelle], which explains the mens rea required to prove the offence of obstruction of justice:

[4]        The Crown does not dispute that obstruction is a specific intent offence. While it had initially submitted that, in this case, the mens rea of the offence of obstruction is manifest upon proof of the actus reus of the offence, the Crown agreed in oral argument that the requisite mens rea requires proof of an intention to obstruct justice, not just an intention to do an act which has the effect of obstructing justice (see: R. v. Beaudry; R. v. Abdullah, 2010 MBCA 79, 259 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at paras. 38-39; and R. v. Esau, 2009 SKCA 31, 324 Sask. R. 95). …

(Emphasis added)

[54]           Although it is correct to say there is no direct evidence of Mr. Kaiswatum’s specific intention, there was most certainly indirect evidence, in the totality of the circumstances, from which the trial judge could infer Mr. Kaiswatum’s intention, as he did. These circumstances included the initial inquiry made by Mr. Kaiswatum as to whether the accomplice could see the courtroom, the nature of the sound itself, and the implausible explanation for that sound offered by Mr. Kaiswatum when challenged about it.

[55]           In R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 SCR 1000, the Supreme Court addressed circumstantial evidence and made the following statements:

[35]      At one time, it was said that in circumstantial cases, “conclusions alternative to the guilt of the accused must be rational conclusions based on infer­ences drawn from proven facts”: see R. v. McIver, 1965 CanLII 26 (ON CA), [1965] 2 O.R. 475 (C.A.), at p. 479, aff’d without discussion of this point 1966 CanLII 6 (SCC), [1966] S.C.R. 254. However, that view is no longer accepted. In assessing circumstantial evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to arise from proven facts: R. v. Khela, 2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, at para. 58; see also R. v. Defaveri, 2014 BCCA 370, 361 B.C.A.C. 301, at para. 10; R. v. Bui, 2014 ONCA 614, 14 C.R. (7th) 149, at para. 28. Requir­ing proven facts to support explanations other than guilt wrongly puts an obligation on an accused to prove facts and is contrary to the rule that whether there is a reasonable doubt is assessed by consider­ing all of the evidence. The issue with respect to circumstantial evidence is the range of reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. If there are reasonable inferences other than guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof be­yond a reasonable doubt.

[36]      I agree with the respondent’s position that a reasonable doubt, or theory alternative to guilt, is not rendered “speculative” by the mere fact that it arises from a lack of evidence. As stated by this Court in Lifchus , a reasonable doubt “is a doubt based on reason and common sense which must be logically based upon the evidence or lack of evidence”: para. 30 (emphasis added). A certain gap in the evidence may result in inferences other than guilt. But those inferences must be reasonable given the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense.

[37]      When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and “other reasonable possibilities” which are inconsistent with guilt: R. v. Comba, 1938 CanLII 14 (ON CA), [1938] O.R. 200 (C.A.), at pp. 205 and 211, per Middleton J.A., aff’d 1938 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 396; R. v. Baigent, 2013 BCCA 28, 335 B.C.A.C. 11, at para. 20; R. v. Mitchell, [2008] QCA 394 (AustLII), at para. 35. I agree with the appellant that the Crown thus may need to negative these reasonable possibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might be consistent with the innocence of the accused”: R. v. Bagshaw, 1971 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 2, at p. 8. “Other plausible theories” or “other reasonable possibilities” must be based on logic and experience applied to the evi­dence or the absence of evidence, not on speculation.

[38]      Of course, the line between a “plausible theory” and “speculation” is not always easy to draw. But the basic question is whether the circumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the accused is guilty.

(Underlining in original, italics emphasis added)

[56]           Here, the trial judge found that there was no “possible rational explanation” for the utterance other than Mr. Kaiswatum was intending to obstruct the proceedings and Mr. Kaiswatum’s explanation was a “lie”. Although not referenced, the trial judge expressed this conclusion with an evident eye to the case law just reviewed as to when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

[57]           There is nothing remarkable in a trier of fact drawing an inference that an accused had the necessary mens rea based on the voluntary commission of the actus reus, along with any other circumstances that may be relevant. In R v Abdullah, 2010 MBCA 79, 323 DLR (4th) 275, the court observed as follows:

[51]      The specific intent of attempting to obstruct justice often must be inferred from the conduct of an accused and its surrounding circumstances. This inference is easily made where the conduct at issue is obviously detrimental to the administration of justice. …

Le fait pour un accusé de tenter, par des moyens de corruption, de dissuader la plaignante de témoigner est de l'entrave à la justice

R. c. Morrow, 2021 CSC 21

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[1]               Le juge Moldaver — La Cour, à la majorité, est d’avis de rejeter l’appel, essentiellement pour les motifs exposés par les juges majoritaires de la Cour d’appel, aux par. 16 et 17 de l’arrêt de la cour. Comme l’ont fait remarquer les juges majoritaires, le dossier étaye clairement l’inférence tirée par le juge du procès selon laquelle M. Morrow a tenté, par des moyens de corruption, de dissuader la plaignante de témoigner. Monsieur Morrow savait que des accusations de harcèlement criminel avaient récemment été portées contre lui et qu’il lui était interdit de communiquer avec la plaignante. Malgré cela, il s’est présenté au domicile de cette dernière sans y être invité et a engagé avec elle une longue et pénible discussion au sujet de la procédure à suivre pour retirer les accusations ainsi que des raisons pour lesquelles elle avait porté ces accusations. La plaignante a témoigné que, du fait de cet échange, elle s’était sentie [traduction] « [c]ontrainte de se montrer accommodante » envers M. Morrow afin de l’amener à quitter la maison (d.a., vol. II, p. 30). Peu de temps après, M. Morrow l’a agressée sexuellement, ce qui a exacerbé ses craintes. Sur la base de ce témoignage, il était loisible au juge du procès de conclure que M. Morrow avait l’intention d’exercer de la pression sur la plaignante et, ultimement, de la manipuler pour qu’elle laisse tomber les accusations portées contre lui. Le fait que M. Morrow ait pu également être motivé par le désir de renouer avec la plaignante ne faisait pas obstacle à cette conclusion.

[2]               Il y avait en outre des éléments de preuve contredisant la position de M. Morrow selon laquelle il ne faisait que répondre à une demande de renseignements. La plaignante n’a présenté aucune demande de la sorte à M. Morrow, et elle ne comptait pas sur l’information qu’il a fournie, et n’était pas non plus intéressée à l’obtenir.

[3]               Compte tenu de ces circonstances, et eu égard au fait que les survivants de violence familiale sont particulièrement vulnérables aux actes d’intimidation et de manipulation, le verdict du juge du procès était raisonnable. Il n’y a pas matière à intervention en appel.

Une menace à l'égard d'une victime peut empêcher l'institution de poursuites et détourner le cours de la justice

Couture c. R., 2012 QCCA 243

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[46]        Une menace à l'égard d'une victime peut empêcher l'institution de poursuites et détourner le cours de la justice.  L'expression « le cours de la justice » inclut l'étape de l'enquête donnant lieu à une poursuite judiciaire ou quasi judiciaire[17].

L'entrave à la justice est un crime d'intention spécifique & le fait pour un accusé de demander à un témoin de s'en tenir à la vérité ne constitue pas un crime

Moreau c. La Reine, 2000 CanLII 29884 (QC CA)

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1  L'appelant a été déclaré coupable d'entrave à la justice (art. 139(2) C.cr.) Selon R. c. Charbonneau (1992) 1992 CanLII 2979 (QC CA), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 49 , cette infraction requiert la preuve d'un acte tendant à entraver le cours de la justice (Actus reus) et d'une intention spécifique de ce faire (Mens rea);

2  Le juge du procès a dit ne pas croire l'appelant quand celui-ci affirmait avoir demandé à Madame Elizabeth Gravel de s'en tenir à la vérité; or, la lecture du témoignage même de Madame Gravel (MA, page 141) révèle que celle-ci reconnaissait que l'appelant lui avait expressément dit de ne pas mentir. En somme, les deux témoignages concordaient sur cet élément capital de la preuve du Ministère public. Cette concordance aurait dû soulever un doute raisonnable dans l'esprit du juge, doute dont l'appelant devait bénéficier, quant à la preuve des éléments essentiels de l'infraction reprochée.

Des questions quant à la validité de l'émission d'un subpoena ne permettent pas au justiciable de se soustraire de la justice de son propre chef

R. v. Hussein, 2019 ONCA 230

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[7]         We do not agree with Mr. Abdul-Hussein. Mr. Abdul-Hussein’s wilful act of evading a subpoena and failing to appear as a witness at a murder trial where he had material evidence to give had a tendency to obstruct the course of justice: R. v. Houle, 2016 MBCA 121 at para. 6. The actus reus of the offence is made out without the inquiry into the validity of the subpoena.

[8]         Such inquiry would violate the general rule that collateral attacks – being attacks on an order “made in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation or nullification of the order” – are impermissible: R. v. Bird, 2019 SCC 7, at para. 21. As Moldaver J. observed in Bird, at para. 22,

[T]he rule against collateral attacks on court orders has been consistently applied in criminal proceedings where the charge involves an alleged breach of a court order…. The citizens’ safeguard is in seeking to have illegal orders set aside through the legal process, not in disobeying them.

As Moldaver J. explained at para. 24, it violates the rule of law and the repute of the administration of justice to permit those presented with court orders to disobey them rather than to bring a challenge to their validity.

[9]         The decisions relied upon by Mr. Abdul-Hussein, R. v. Oliveira, 2009 ONCA 219, 243 C.C.C. (3d) 217, and R. v. Molina, 2008 ONCA 212, 231 C.C.C. (3d) 193, do not assist him. He asserts that those cases stand for the proposition that when the validity of a court order is an element of the offence, the collateral challenge bar does not apply. That is incorrect. Instead, those cases hold that it is not a collateral attack to defend against a charge of failing to comply with an order by relying on the failure of authorities to comply with statutory procedural protections associated with the order. Oliveira involved non-compliance with the requirement in Criminal Code, s. 505, that after issuing a promise to appear, authorities must lay the related information “as soon as practicable”. Molina involved non-compliance with the requirement in Criminal Code, s. 260(1)(c), that an offender subject to a driving prohibition must be notified of the offence of failing to comply with that prohibition. Neither case involved challenges to the validity of the underlying orders themselves.

[10]      Nor, in our view, is this a case where an exception to the general rule should be recognized. If Mr. Abdul-Hussein had concerns about the validity of the subpoena, he had an effective means to challenge the court order by applying to quash the subpoena.

[11]      Indeed, as the Crown pointed out, it is not contested that Mr. Abdul-Hussein had material evidence to give. Had he successfully challenged the subpoena before trial in this case, a new subpoena would have issued. In our view, it would turn the rationale for the rule against collateral attacks on its head to recognize an exception that would leave those who disobey orders in a better position than those who bring proper challenges.

La preuve circonstancielle peut démontrer l'intention spécifique d'un accusé de commettre une entrave à la justice

R v Kaiswatum, 2019 SKCA 7

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[53]           The sole issue at the trial was whether the Crown had proven the necessary mens rea to make out an attempt to obstruct justice. The Crown conceded it was required to prove Mr. Kaiswatum verbalized a sound with the specific intention to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice, in keeping with the decision of this Court in R v Yazelle, 2012 SKCA 91, 399 Sask R 249 [Yazelle], which explains the mens rea required to prove the offence of obstruction of justice:

[4]        The Crown does not dispute that obstruction is a specific intent offence. While it had initially submitted that, in this case, the mens rea of the offence of obstruction is manifest upon proof of the actus reus of the offence, the Crown agreed in oral argument that the requisite mens rea requires proof of an intention to obstruct justice, not just an intention to do an act which has the effect of obstructing justice (see: R. v. Beaudry; R. v. Abdullah, 2010 MBCA 79, 259 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at paras. 38-39; and R. v. Esau, 2009 SKCA 31, 324 Sask. R. 95). …

(Emphasis added)

[54]           Although it is correct to say there is no direct evidence of Mr. Kaiswatum’s specific intention, there was most certainly indirect evidence, in the totality of the circumstances, from which the trial judge could infer Mr. Kaiswatum’s intention, as he did. These circumstances included the initial inquiry made by Mr. Kaiswatum as to whether the accomplice could see the courtroom, the nature of the sound itself, and the implausible explanation for that sound offered by Mr. Kaiswatum when challenged about it.

[55]           In R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 SCR 1000, the Supreme Court addressed circumstantial evidence and made the following statements:

[35]      At one time, it was said that in circumstantial cases, “conclusions alternative to the guilt of the accused must be rational conclusions based on infer­ences drawn from proven facts”: see R. v. McIver, 1965 CanLII 26 (ON CA), [1965] 2 O.R. 475 (C.A.), at p. 479, aff’d without discussion of this point 1966 CanLII 6 (SCC), [1966] S.C.R. 254. However, that view is no longer accepted. In assessing circumstantial evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to arise from proven facts: R. v. Khela, 2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, at para. 58; see also R. v. Defaveri, 2014 BCCA 370, 361 B.C.A.C. 301, at para. 10; R. v. Bui, 2014 ONCA 614, 14 C.R. (7th) 149, at para. 28. Requir­ing proven facts to support explanations other than guilt wrongly puts an obligation on an accused to prove facts and is contrary to the rule that whether there is a reasonable doubt is assessed by consider­ing all of the evidence. The issue with respect to circumstantial evidence is the range of reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. If there are reasonable inferences other than guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof be­yond a reasonable doubt.

[36]      I agree with the respondent’s position that a reasonable doubt, or theory alternative to guilt, is not rendered “speculative” by the mere fact that it arises from a lack of evidence. As stated by this Court in Lifchus , a reasonable doubt “is a doubt based on reason and common sense which must be logically based upon the evidence or lack of evidence”: para. 30 (emphasis added). A certain gap in the evidence may result in inferences other than guilt. But those inferences must be reasonable given the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense.

[37]      When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and “other reasonable possibilities” which are inconsistent with guilt: R. v. Comba, 1938 CanLII 14 (ON CA), [1938] O.R. 200 (C.A.), at pp. 205 and 211, per Middleton J.A., aff’d 1938 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 396; R. v. Baigent, 2013 BCCA 28, 335 B.C.A.C. 11, at para. 20; R. v. Mitchell, [2008] QCA 394 (AustLII), at para. 35. I agree with the appellant that the Crown thus may need to negative these reasonable possibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might be consistent with the innocence of the accused”: R. v. Bagshaw, 1971 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 2, at p. 8. “Other plausible theories” or “other reasonable possibilities” must be based on logic and experience applied to the evi­dence or the absence of evidence, not on speculation.

[38]      Of course, the line between a “plausible theory” and “speculation” is not always easy to draw. But the basic question is whether the circumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the accused is guilty.

(Underlining in original, italics emphasis added)

[56]           Here, the trial judge found that there was no “possible rational explanation” for the utterance other than Mr. Kaiswatum was intending to obstruct the proceedings and Mr. Kaiswatum’s explanation was a “lie”. Although not referenced, the trial judge expressed this conclusion with an evident eye to the case law just reviewed as to when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

[57]           There is nothing remarkable in a trier of fact drawing an inference that an accused had the necessary mens rea based on the voluntary commission of the actus reus, along with any other circumstances that may be relevant. In R v Abdullah, 2010 MBCA 79, 323 DLR (4th) 275, the court observed as follows:

[51]      The specific intent of attempting to obstruct justice often must be inferred from the conduct of an accused and its surrounding circumstances. This inference is easily made where the conduct at issue is obviously detrimental to the administration of justice. …

[58]           The trial judge rejected, as not credible, Mr. Kaiswatum’s explanation for the noise he made and then, in the totality of the surrounding circumstances, found Mr. Kaiswatum had the intent to obstruct justice. There is no basis, within the strictures of R.P., to interfere with the trial judge’s decision in this regard. I therefore dismiss Mr. Kaiswatum’s appeal from his conviction for attempting to obstruct justice.

Le fait d'avoir posé un acte entravant la justice dans un autre but est un moyen de défense valable

R. v. Robinson, 2012 BCSC 430

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[22]           The mens rea requires specific intent so that an accused must in fact have intended to act in a way tending to obstruct justice (R. v. Hawkins, 2002 BCCA 3 at para. 5, 48 C.R. (5th) 21). It is a defence if the act was done for another purpose (R. v. Hearn (1989), 1989 CanLII 3938 (NL CA), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 376 (Nfld. C.A.) aff’d 1989 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1180). It is not enough if Robinson’s actions were accidental or the result of mistake or a simple error in judgment (Watson at para. 17). Robinson must have known that what he was doing when he told Swallow that he took two shots of vodka post-accident would obstruct or interfere with the investigation of his impairment and that he intended that it would do so.

La mens rea requise pour commettre l’infraction d’entrave à la justice nécessite la preuve d’une intention d’entraver la justice qui va au-delà de l’intention de poser un geste qui a pour effet d’entraver la justice. Il n’est pas suffisant de démontrer que l’accusé a fait quelque chose ou a omis de faire quelque chose qui a pu avoir un effet sur le cours de la justice

R v Nelson, 2016 SKCA 127

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[2]               It is not in dispute s. 139(2) establishes a specific intent offence. Before one can be found guilty of obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accused acted specifically to obstruct justice. A simple error of judgment or an inadequate exercise of discretion does not constitute the requisite mens rea for the criminal offence of obstructing justice (R v Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5 at para 52, [2007] 1 SCR 190). This Court has repeatedly held the mens rea for obstruction of justice involves proof of an intention to obstruct justice beyond just an intention to do an act which has the effect of obstructing justice (see: R v Ross, 2013 SKCA 45 at para 35, 414 Sask R 108; R v Yazelle, 2012 SKCA 91 at para 4, 399 Sask R 249). It is not sufficient that the accused did something or failed to do something which may have some effect on the course of justice. The accused must have wilfully committed an action or inaction which had a tendency to obstruct or pervert the course of justice and must have intended to obstruct or pervert the course of justice in behaving in this way (see: R v Easu, 2009 SKCA 31 at para 48, 324 Sask R 95 and R v Alsager, 2016 SKCA 91 at paras 45-57).

L'entrave à la justice en lien avec de prêter serment avant de rendre témoignage

R. v. Abdullah (G.) et al, 2010 MBCA 79

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38               When a person does not fulfill their duty to testify there can be consequences.  Often it is a citation or charge for contempt of court, as was the case in Lamer, Henry, Ayres, Neuburger and Jacob.  While a finding of contempt followed by a sentencing is the usual consequence, it is not the only one.  A person who is obliged to testify, but refuses to be sworn or affirmed to give evidence, can also be charged with obstruction of justice pursuant to s. 139(2) of the Code, as was the case here.  In such event, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offence (the actus reus and the mens rea), which were explained by Charron J. in Beaudry (at para. 52):

 

….  To sum up, the actus reus of the offence will be established only if the act tended to defeat or obstruct the course of justice ….  With respect to mens rea, it is not in dispute that this is a specific intent offence ….  The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did in fact intend to act in a way tending to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice.  ....

 

 

39               Being a specific intent offence, the accused must not only intend to act in a way that tends to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice, but he must specifically intend to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by his acts.  See Beaudry, Charron J.’s reasons at paras. 54, 74, and Fish J.’s reasons at para. 85.  What this means is that the acts in question must have been done with the purpose of perverting or obstructing the course of justice (R. v. May (1984), 1984 CanLII 3489 (ON CA), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Graham (1985), 1985 CanLII 3644 (ON CA), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 210 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d 1988 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 214, and R. v. Hoggarth (1956), 1956 CanLII 515 (BC CA), 119 C.C.C. 234 (B.C.C.A.)) or with knowledge or awareness that the acts in question would or might lead to a perversion or obstruction of justice (R. v. Guess, 2000 BCCA 547, 148 C.C.C. (3d) 321, leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 628 (QL)).

40               Intention is not to be confused with motive.  Motive is the reason why someone does something.  It is possible to have a specific intention for doing an act that is different from the motive for that same act.  If a person robs a bank to pay for medical treatment, the intention would be to commit the offence of robbery, while the payment of the medical expenses would be the motive.  Motive is not an element that the Crown must prove, so it is important to differentiate between the required intention, which forms a part of the offence that the Crown must prove, and motive, which does not.  In this case, the accused stated that they did not want to testify because of safety concerns for their families and because they did not want to be branded as rats within their gang.  These are both clearly motives.  The accused also offered, as a reason for not testifying, that they did not want to lie and that the videotaped statements were false.  I will deal with this later.

41               Intention should also not be confused with desiring or wanting a particular outcome.  A person can intend a particular outcome, in the sense that he or she knows or foresees it, even if he or she does not want or desire that it occur.  This is stated as follows by Martin J.A. in R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 1979 CanLII 1927 (ON CA), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 at 384-85 (Ont. C.A.), and adopted by Hall J.A., with the concurrence of the rest of the court, in Guess (at para. 30):

… [A]s a general rule, a person who foresees that a consequence is certain or substantially certain to result from an act which he does in order to achieve some other purpose, intends that consequence.  The actor’s foresight of the certainty or moral certainty of the consequence resulting from his conduct compels a conclusion that if he, none the less, acted so as to produce it, then he decided to bring it about (albeit regretfully), in order to achieve his ultimate purpose.  His intention encompasses the means as well as to his ultimate objective.

 

42               In Beaudry, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a police officer for obstructing justice where the issue at trial focussed on whether the police officer’s exercise of discretion in not laying a charge against a fellow officer raised a reasonable doubt about his intent to obstruct justice.  Charron J. explained that when an accused’s exercise of discretion is at issue (at para. 52):

 

….  [a] simple error of judgment will not be enough.  An accused who acted in good faith, but whose conduct cannot be characterized as a legitimate exercise of the discretion, has not committed the criminal offence of obstructing justice.