Les principes qui prévalent en matière de dédommagement

Legault c. R., 2008 QCCA 1228 

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[7]               L’ordonnance de dédommagement fait partie du processus de détermination de la peine[2]. Elle émane d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire qui doit être exercé avec circonspection[3].

[8]               En général, une « cour d’appel est assujettie à une norme élevée de retenue à l’égard de la peine imposée par le juge de première instance »[4] et elle ne doit pas « remettre en question la décision du juge qui prononce la peine à moins que celle-ci ne soit manifestement inappropriée » [5].

[9]               L'appelant allègue que l'ordonnance de dédommagement met en péril ses chances de réadaptation et le contraint à demeurer perpétuellement le débiteur d'une obligation qu'il ne pourra jamais exécuter. Le ministère public n’a pas contesté les conclusions de l’appel. Le directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales écrit :

L’intimée reconnaît que le juge de première instance aurait dû tenir compte des ressources financières du délinquant avant de lui imposer une ordonnance de dédommagement selon l’article 738 du Code criminel et ce, tel que nous l’enseigne les arrêts R. c. Fitzgibbon, 1990 CanLII 102 (CSC), [1990] 1 R.C.S. 1005 et R. c. Zelensky, 1978 CanLII 8 (CSC), [1978] 2 R.C.S. 940.

Alors, imposer trois ordonnances de dédommagement – totalisant un montant de 1 174 499,04 $ à un individu de 21 ans sans emploi, sans actif significatif, sans formation particulière et déjà sujet à trois autres ordonnances de même nature dans des dossiers connexes – ne respecte pas la capacité de payer de l’appelant.

Par conséquent, uniquement pour le motif exposé précédemment et en raison des circonstances particulières de ce pourvoi, le ministère public consent au présent appel et à l’annulation des ordonnances selon l’article 738 du Code criminel émises dans le dossier 605-01-005170-067.

[10]           Les principes qui prévalent en matière de dédommagement sont exposés par l'auteur François Dadour[6] :

1.            L’ordonnance de dédommagement doit être rendue avec circonspection ;

2.            Cette ordonnance fait partie intégrante de la détermination de la peine en ce qu’elle participe à la sanction du contrevenant, lie ce dernier au dédommagement de la victime, le prive du fruit de l’infraction qu’il a commise et facilite la remise en état de la victime ;

3.            Le juge d’instance doit considérer l’objectif visé par le créancier du dédommagement, de même que l’existence de procédures civiles ;

4.            L’ordonnance de restitution n’est pas un substitut à ces procédures civiles ;

[...]

9.      Le dédommagement en double peut être évité par le recours aux juridictions civiles ;

10.   L’ordonnance de dédommagement peut être indiquée lorsqu’un jugement civil est inexécutoire suite à la faillite du débiteur.

[11]           L’auteur ajoute :

Il est à noter que le juge d’instance a le pouvoir de rendre une ordonnance de dédommagement pour un montant inférieur aux dommages causés. En effet et en lien avec un commentaire similaire quant au quantum des amendes, il n’est ni souhaitable ni approprié qu’une ordonnance de dédommagement mette en péril les chances de réhabilitation du contrevenant par la destruction de son patrimoine.[7]

[12]           L’auteur Ruby partage le même avis :

A compensation order which would ruin the offender financially, thus impairing chances of rehabilitation, should not be imposed; neither should one be made where compliance would be particularly onerous or impossible, nor where enforcement would be difficult or impossible. The totality principle applies to the whole of the sentence, including the order of restitution.[8]

[13]           La jurisprudence a également établi que le juge qui rend l’ordonnance de dédommagement doit tenir compte des ressources financières de l’accusé[9], même si la capacité ne doit pas toujours être le facteur déterminant.[10] Comme l'explique le juge Doherty, s'exprimant pour la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, dans Taylor[11] :

[5] It has been stated many times that restitution is a discretionary order.  It should only be made with restraint and caution and not only in order to avoid putting the victim through the extra legal expense of going to the civil courts or as a substitute for civil procedure.

[6] As stated by Martin J.A., speaking for this court, in R. v. Scherer (1984), 1984 CanLII 3594 (ON CA), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 30 at 38:

It may be that in some cases it would be inappropriate to make a compensation order in an amount that is unrealistic to think that the accused could ever discharge.

[7] In his reasons, the trial judge said:

The only possible way to complete that part of his rehabilitation is through penal consequences.  Because of the magnitude of the crime, the duration of the crime, there is no other way to compensate the victims other than his family, then by a penitentiary term [emphasis added].

[8] He then ordered restitution. The restitution order appears to have been added as an afterthought to permit the victim to avoid the costs of a civil action.  The Crown had not asked for a restitution order.

[9] The relevant factors and objectives to the imposition of a restitution order have been discussed by this court in R. v. Devgan (1999), 1999 CanLII 2412 (ON CA), 136 C.C.C. (3d) 238 and R. v. Biegus (1999), 1999 CanLII 3815 (ON CA), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 245.  An order for restitution must also bear some reality to the circumstances of the appellant and must be directly associated with the sentence imposed as the public reprobation of the offence.  In the circumstances of this case, the overriding factor is the means of the appellant.  There is no ability, as noted by the trial judge, to pay even the most minute part of this staggering amount, with no expiry date.  It would kill all hope for the appellant for the future and it would likely impair his chances of rehabilitation.  The order is clearly excessive and futile and the trial judge erred in that regard.

[10 ]It remains open to the victim to take proceedings in the civil court, if so advised.

[Nous soulignons]

 

[14]           En conclusion, une ordonnance de dédommagement doit être rendue avec pondération et circonspection afin de remplir les objectifs et principes de la détermination de la peine soit, plus particulièrement, la réparation des torts, la conscience de la responsabilité, la dénonciation et la dissuasion. Cette ordonnance ne constitue pas le substitut à un recours civil.  Lorsque la capacité de payer est absente, comme en l’espèce, il est déraisonnable de rendre une ordonnance de dédommagement de plus d’un million de dollars. Il importe de souligner que   l’ordonnance de dédommagement survie à la libération d’un failli[12].  En l'espèce, le montant du dédommagement est si excessif que le délinquant ne pourra jamais l'acquitter, ce qui met en péril le principe de réinsertion sociale.

L'ordonnance de dédommagement s'inscrit dans le cadre de l'imposition d'une peine proportionnelle et les principes généraux de détermination de la peine

R. v. Castro, 2010 ONCA 718 

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[21] Section 738(1)(a) governs the making of restitution orders when money has been taken. It gives the court discretion to order the offender to make restitution by paying the victim "an amount not exceeding the replacement value of the property as of the date the order is imposed, less the value of any part of the property that is returned . . . where the amount is readily ascertainable".

[22] A restitution order forms part of a sentence. In accordance with general sentencing principles, a restitution order is entitled to deference and an appellate court will only interfere with the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion on the basis of error in principle or if the order is excessive or inadequate: see R. v. Devgan (1999), 1999 CanLII 2412 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 161, [1999] O.J. No. 1825, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 238 (C.A.), at para. 28. [See Note 2 below] [page616]

[23] A restitution order should not be made as a mechanical afterthought to a sentence of imprisonment: R. v. Siemens, 1999 CanLII 18651 (MB CA), [1999] M.J. No. 285, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (C.A.), at para. 10. Care must be taken not to simply add a restitution order to a sentence of imprisonment which, in itself, is a fit punishment for the crime, as this can amount to excessive punishment and offend the totality principle.

[24] The starting point for any discussion of the objectives and factors that inform a judge's exercise of discretion in making a restitution order is the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Zelensky, 1978 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940, [1978] S.C.J. No. 48. While the decision deals with predecessor legislation, [See Note 3 below] the decision of Laskin C.J.C. nevertheless serves as a blueprint for the considerations to be taken into account in making a restitution order under s. 738(1). These considerations were summarized by Labrosse J.A. in Devgan, at para. 26, as part of a non-exhaustive list:

In Zelensky, Laskin C.J. identified certain objectives and factors that relate to the application of s. 725(1). These considerations have been expanded upon in subsequent cases. Below, I have consolidated these objectives and factors, all of which are relevant to the issue of what constitutes a proper exercise of discretion for the purpose of s. 725(1). 1. An order for compensation should be made with restraint and caution; 2. The concept of compensation is essential to the sentencing process:
(i) it emphasizes the sanction imposed upon the offender;
(ii) it makes the accused responsible for making restitution to the victim;
(iii) it prevents the accused from profiting from crime; and [page617]
(iv) it provides a convenient, rapid and inexpensive means of recovery for the victim; 3. A sentencing judge should consider:
(i) the purpose of the aggrieved person in invoking s. 725(1);
(ii) whether civil proceedings have been initiated and are being pursued; and
(iii) the means of the offender. 4. A compensation order should not be used as a substitute for civil proceedings. Parliament did not intend that compensation orders would displace the civil remedies necessary to ensure full compensation to victims. 5. A compensation order is not the appropriate mechanism to unravel involved commercial transactions; 6. A compensation order should not be granted when it would require the criminal court to interpret written documents to determine the amount of money sought through the order. The loss should be capable of ready calculation. 7. A compensation order should not be granted if the effect of provincial legislation would have to be considered in order to determine what order should be made; 8. Any serious contest on legal or factual issues should signal a denial of recourse to an order; 9. Double recovery can be prevented by the jurisdiction of the civil courts to require proper accounting of all sums recovered; and 10. A compensation order may be appropriate where a related civil judgment has been rendered unenforceable as a result of bankruptcy.

[26] In general, the omission of a judge to give consideration to a relevant factor gives rise to reviewable error. Thus, the omission of a sentencing judge to give any consideration to the relevant factor of the offender's ability to repay the amount of money taken is an error. A restitution order is not intended to undermine the prospects for rehabilitation of the offender: see, e.g., R. v. Ali, 1997 CanLII 2655 (BC CA), [1997] B.C.J. No. 2516, 98 B.C.A.C. 239 (C.A.); [page618] R. v. Biegus, 1999 CanLII 3815 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 4963, 141 C.C.C. (3d) 245 (C.A.), at paras. 15 and 22; and R. c. Ford, 2002 CanLII 34585 (QC CQ), [2002] J.Q. no 4751, 2 C.R. (6th) 348 (C.Q. crim. & pén.).

[27] Reviewing courts have, however, consistently held that no single factor is itself determinative of whether a compensation order should be granted and that the weight to be given to individual considerations will depend on the circumstances of each case. Those circumstances include two considerations I wish to emphasize: the nature of the offence and, when money has been taken, what has happened to the money.

[28] Insofar as the nature of the offence is concerned, in cases involving breach of trust, the paramount consideration is the claims of the victims: Fitzgibbon, at pp. 1014-15 S.C.R. Ability to pay is not the predominant factor. Indeed, where the circumstances of the offence are particularly egregious, such as where a breach of trust is involved, a restitution order may be made even where there does not appear to be any likelihood of repayment: R. v. Yates, 2002 BCCA 583 (CanLII), [2002] B.C.J. No. 2415, 169 C.C.C. (3d) 506 (C.A.), at paras. 12 and 17.

[29] The decisions in Ali, Biegus and Ford do not involve a breach of trust. [See Note 4 below] By contrast, Fitzgibbon involved an undischarged bankrupt lawyer who acknowledged the amounts he owed. He was ordered to pay compensation to the Law Society of Upper Canada's Compensation Fund and to reimburse a client for the amount by which the client's losses exceeded the maximum allowable claim from the Compensation Fund. Cory J., writing on behalf of the court, stated, at pp. 1014-15 S.C.R.:

[The appellant] used his position to defraud the very persons who had every reason to trust and rely upon him. The fraudulent acts of a lawyer directed against his own clients warranted the imposition of a compensation order even though the lawyer's means at the time of sentencing were minimal. The claims of the victims of the fraudulent acts should be paramount. (Emphasis added)

[30] In imposing a sentence where the offender has used his or her position to commit a breach of trust, the primary considerations are the protection of the public, general deterrence and the repudiation of the conduct of which the offender was found guilty. Relevant factors include the length of time over which the conduct took place, whether the offence was a sophisticated and well-planned scheme, the amount involved [page619] and, most importantly, the impact of the offender's conduct on the victims. The secondary considerations are specific deterrence, rehabilitation and any mitigating circumstances such as a plea of guilty or co-operation with the authorities (in tracing the funds): Scherer, per Martin J.A., at para. 34.

[31] In Sherer, some of the victims had lost most or all of their life savings as a result of the offender's breach of trust. While Martin J.A. reduced the sentence of imprisonment from nine years to seven years, he upheld the compensation order in the amount of $2,173,164.21 to the persons aggrieved. [See Note 5 below] Restitution in that case recognized the victims' needs and at the same time underlined the larger social interest in the imposition of a sanction related to the crime.

[32] Whether or not a breach of trust has occurred, the impact of the crime on the victim is an important factor. In Biegus, the appellant was one of several co-accused convicted of bank theft. The ringleader, Hornett, worked for Intercon Security and as a result had access to the combinations of ATM machines in various Royal Bank branches. Biegus was brought in by Hornett and participated with him in seven thefts. After Biegus pleaded guilty, he co-operated fully with the police and returned $14,000 of the cash. He received a sentence of two years less a day in jail and was ordered to make restitution of the remaining amount stolen in the seven thefts with Hornett, namely, $638,534. The sentencing judge recognized that Biegus did not have the ability to pay this amount but did not say why this fact was irrelevant in imposing the order for restitution. On appeal, the court held that the sentencing judge erred in not addressing this factor and also erred by failing to take into account the potentia lly unfair effect to Biegus of the restitution orders already made against [page620] two other co- accused. The court did not say that Biegus engaged in any breach of trust. The restitution order was excessive and prevented Biegus's rehabilitation. The court noted that the bank's insurer had already repaid the bank $453,387.70. Furthermore, the bank could be in a position to recover a portion of its losses from Hornett. Therefore, the court reduced the amount of restitution to $264,000, the amount Biegus acknowledged he received from the robbery. Where the victim is a large institution, or is likely to have insurance for the amount of the loss, the impact on the victim will obviously be much less than in situations where disabled or elderly persons have lost their ability to earn income and to replace the money taken.

[33] This brings me to a discussion of the second consideration I wish to emphasize, namely, evidence as to what has happened to the money that was taken illegally and how this evidence factors into a determination of the ability to pay. [See Note 6 below]

[34] Ability to pay must take into consideration what disclosure has been made respecting where the money is or has gone. Depriving the offender of the fruits of his crime is one of the overarching goals of making a restitution order: see Working Paper 5: Restitution of the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), cited with approval by Laskin C.J.C. in Zelensky, at pp. 952-53. In cases of theft, robbery, fraud, breach of trust or the like, I see no reason why the court should accept an offender's bald assertion that he or she has no ability to make restitution because the money "is gone" when no evidence is proffered in support of this assertion. When the victims can clearly establish that "the replacement value of the property" under s. 738(1)(a) is the amount of money taken, surely it is the offender asserting that he or she has no ability to make restitution who is in the best position to provide transparency concerning what has happened to that m oney. A bald assertion that the money is gone should be given no weight. Similarly, when the location of the money illegally obtained by the offender is unknown, the sentencing judge is entitled to take that fact [page621] into account with respect to ability to pay in making a restitution order: see, e.g., R. v. Williams, [2007] O.J. No. 1604, 2007 CanLII 13949 (S.C.J.), per Hill J., at para. 41.

[35] To summarize, a restitution order is simply part of the determination of an overall fit sentence, and general sentencing principles apply. While consideration of the offender's ability to pay and the impact of a restitution order on an offender's rehabilitation are factors to be considered, the weight to be given to these factors will vary depending on the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. When the offence involves a breach of trust, a primary consideration is the effect on the victim; rehabilitation is a secondary consideration. Furthermore, consideration of the ability to pay includes the ability to make payment from the money taken as a source of restitution.

L'impostion d'une peine de pénitencier n'empêche pas un juge d'ordonner un dédommagement

R. v. Hooyer, 2016 ONCA 44

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[32] The argument that a jail sentence of two years less a day is so long as to render the restitution order either futile or unduly punitive has no merit.

L’absence de risque de récidive est incompatible avec l'imposition d'une ordonnance en vertu de l’article 380.2 (1) C.cr. pour une période de dix (10) ans

Dagenais c. R., 2019 QCCA 5

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[77]        Par ailleurs, en l’absence à toutes fins utiles de risques de récidive, que le juge qualifie de « faibles à inexistants »[56], nous sommes également d’avis qu’il y a lieu de casser l’ordonnance prononcée par le juge en vertu de l’article 380.2 (1) C.cr. selon laquelle il interdisait à l’appelant « pour une période de dix (10) ans, incluant sa période d’emprisonnement, de chercher, d’accepter ou de garder un emploi ou un travail bénévole dans le cadre duquel il exercerait un pouvoir sur des biens meubles[57], de l’argent ou les valeurs d’autrui[58] ».

L'appréciation des conséquences indirectes quant à la famille du contrevenant lors de la détermination de la peine

R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830

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[41]   The appellant next argues that the sentencing judge overlooked the family separation consequences that imprisoning him would cause to both him and his family. I agree. The sentencing judge did not address these consequences, which the law required him to prevent and mitigate as much as possible. These reasons provide guidance on how to address these consequences in cases where, as here, the victim of the crime is not a family member of the defendant.

[42]   As recognized in R. v. Spencer (2004), 2004 CanLII 5550 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 47 (C.A.), at para. 46, leave to appeal refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 4, it is an unfortunate reality that sentencing defendants to prison often harms their families. Family members are deprived of the defendant’s love and care and suffer the emotional pain of separation. They must often assume the added burdens of the breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities that the defendant formerly performed. Further, they may suffer financial hardship, educational deprivation, and even the loss of the family residence. See R. v. Nikkanen (1999), 1999 CanLII 7339 (ON CA), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 423 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 14-15, leave to appeal refused, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 624; R. c. G.G., 2023 QCCA 305, 87 C.R. (7th) 383, at paras. 24, 33, 37 and 53. As well, being unable to care and provide for their families increases the severity of incarceration for defendants. See R. v. Collins, 2011 ONCA 182, 104 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 41.

[43]   The courts have been careful not to let these consequences overwhelm the other principles of sentencing. See R. v. Dent, 2023 ONCA 460, 167 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 124. As emphasized in Spencer, these consequences are not an excuse to overlook the harm that the defendant’s criminal conduct caused victims of crime, or the importance of protecting those victims and society, or the need for denunciation and deterrence. See at paras. 46-47. Likewise, family separation may have a reduced impact on the sentence if its effects on defendants and their families are less strong. See R. v. L.C., 2022 ONCA 863, 421 C.C.C. (3d) 227, at paras. 21 and 25; Dent, at para. 125. Further, these consequences cannot justify imposing a disproportionate sentence. See L.C., at para. 24. Thus, this court has sometimes imposed or affirmed significant prison sentences to respect the other principles of sentencing even after accounting for family separation consequences, as in Spencer, L.C., and Dent.

[44]   But as Spencer ruled, sentencing judges must “preserve the family as much as possible” within these limits. As that case explained, if incarceration is necessary, sentencing judges must give serious and sufficient consideration to family separation consequences in “determining the length of [the] prison term.” See at para. 47. That same careful consideration is also needed when determining whether to incarcerate the defendant. See R. v. Nguyen (1998), 1998 CanLII 6126 (BC CA), 113 B.C.A.C. 56, at paras. 5-6.

[45]   Thus, depending on the facts, family separation consequences may justify a sentence adjustment – even a significant one – or a departure from the range. See L.C., at para. 21; Collins, at paras. 39-43; and R. v. Forsythe, [1976] O.J. No. 1026 (C.A.), at paras. 5-6. This is true even for grave offences that require deterrence and denunciation, as in Spencer, where the court considered that the defendant had “much to offer her children” in setting the sentence.[5] See at paras. 48-49; see also R. v. Wellington (1999), 1999 CanLII 3054 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 534 (C.A.), at pp. 538-540; Collins, at paras. 41-42. Failure to consider these consequences is an error in principle that usually impacts the sentence and justifies appellate intervention. See R. v. Simoes, 2014 ONCA 144, at para. 14; Nguyen, at para. 6.

[46]   Courts follow this approach to protect both the defendant’s family members and society. While defendants and not the courts are to be blamed for the adverse consequences that those family members may suffer (R. c. Gauthier (1994), 64 Q.A.C. 306 (C.A.), at para. 30), those family members are still innocent. They do not deserve to suffer for the defendant’s crimes. And as explained in Spencer, the restraint principle, which Parliament has directed courts to apply, requires courts to prevent and mitigate these adverse consequences as much as possible. See at para. 47; see also Criminal Code, ss. 718.2(d)-(e); Proulx, at paras. 16-17. This benefits society because families are its foundational fabric. See R. v. Clayton (1982), 1982 CanLII 3860 (ON CA), 69 C.C.C. (2d) 81 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 83. Our society depends on families to raise and nurture children, transmit knowledge, skills, and values from generation to generation, and provide love, care, emotional, economic, and social support to their members. See Moge v. Moge, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at p. 848. Courts thus try to minimize the impact of sentencing on defendants’ families because, as Spencer recognized, interfering with this foundational social institution, even for just reasons, can endanger community safety and society’s well-being. See at para. 47.

[47]   Courts also take this approach to account for Parliament’s direction to foster rehabilitation and consider mitigating factors and collateral consequences. See Criminal Code, ss. 718(d), 718.2(a)-(b); R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739, at paras. 11-12. Caring and providing for family members is a mitigating factor that shows good character and can increase rehabilitative prospects. See R. v. Ali, 2022 ONCA 736, 164 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 41-42. Further, the pain of being unable to care and provide for family members while incarcerated is a collateral consequence that increases the severity of incarceration and can jeopardize rehabilitation. See L.C., at paras. 23-24; R. v. Szola (1977), 1977 CanLII 2041 (ON CA), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 572 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 574-575. Courts must thus assess “all the relevant circumstances,” including the mitigating role of caring and providing for family members and family separation collateral consequences, to determine a proportionate sentence. See R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 496, at para. 46 (emphasis in original); see also R. v. Bascoe, 2023 ONCJ 206, at para. 36. They cannot determine a proportionate sentence without considering family separation consequences.

[48]   The sentencing judge overlooked these principles. While he considered the family support the appellant received, he did not address the care and financial support that the appellant gave to his two ailing parents and three younger siblings or the adverse consequences of separating the appellant and his family. He thus did not “preserve the family as much as possible.” This error in principle impacted the sentence because the consequences that he overlooked help “determin[e] the length of [the] prison term.” See Spencer, at para. 47.

[49]   The Crown’s first two counterarguments fail. It first argues that the family separation consequences were irrelevant because the appellant’s parents and siblings were not his dependents. This submission is wrong because Parliament has not restricted these consequences to dependency situations and has instead directed courts to consider all the circumstances. See Suter, at para. 48; Criminal Code, ss. 718.2(a), (d)-(e). Next, the Crown argues that the consequences are the foreseeable result of the appellant’s crimes. While this argument might carry more weight if the appellant alone bore the consequences (Suter, at paras. 49-50), it fails here because, as the evidence before the sentencing judge showed, they also impact the appellant’s innocent family members. The fresh evidence confirms this. The appellant’s incarceration caused his family to lose their apartment, his father to return to a job that worsened his abdominal pain, his mother to suffer depression, and his younger sister to interrupt her studies to support the family.[6] They do not deserve to suffer these adverse consequences just because the appellant should have foreseen that his actions would cause them. Courts must mitigate those consequences to the extent possible.

[50]   The Crown finally argues that the sentencing judge could not prevent or mitigate the family separation consequences because he determined that a lower sentence would be unfit. This submission’s starting point is partially correct. The sentencing judge could not prevent these consequences entirely because the gravity of the appellant’s crimes required a penitentiary sentence. But the argument fails because it overlooks that family separation consequences help “determin[e] the length of a prison term,” even for grave crimes. See Spencer, at para. 47. Thus, this court has sometimes adjusted the length of prison terms to mitigate these consequences. See Collins, at paras. 39-43; Forsythe, at paras. 5-6. The sentencing judge had to consider whether that was possible here. See Spencer, at para. 47. And because the appellant’s caregiving and providing role and the family separation consequences bore on the proportionality principle, the sentencing judge could not determine that a lower sentence would be unfit without first considering those factors.