Bien que la réhabilitation n’ait pas à être acquise au moment de la détermination de la peine, l’application du principe d’individualisation au profit du délinquant demeure subordonnée à la preuve d’un véritable processus de réhabilitation, lequel doit s’avérer particulièrement convaincant pour justifier un tempérament aux objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion

R. c. Muongholvilay, 2016 QCCA 232

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[24]        S’il y a lieu de distinguer les deux types de trafiquants, celui qui se présente comme un simple consommateur verra souvent sa criminalité dictée par un besoin irrésistible de consommation d’intoxicants. Cette situation renvoie normalement à l’objectif de réhabilitation, lequel demeure un bon outil de prévention et de protection sociale. La toxicomanie est une cause importante à l’origine de l’activité criminelle en général. Le processus de la détermination de la peine ne peut ignorer cette problématique, alors que le principe de l’individualisation de la peine permet d’y répondre en partie.

[25]        Si le trafic de stupéfiants conduit en théorie à l’infliction de peines sévères qui interpellent les objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion, la Cour n’a pas pour autant indiqué qu’en cette matière le principe de l’individualisation de la peine ne trouvait jamais application[18]. À titre d’exemple, une démarche probante de traitement de la toxicomanie s’attaquant à la source même du passage à l’acte et misant particulièrement sur une prise de conscience des torts causés, tant à l’égard d’une victime particulière qu’à l’égard de la communauté, ne peut être ignorée par le juge chargé d’infliger la peine. En ce sens, des peines axées sur la réhabilitation ou qui tendent à la favoriser ne sont jamais à exclure. Cet énoncé de principe ne tient évidemment pas compte des nombreux facteurs qui complètent le bagage psychosocial du toxicomane. Le juge doit donc s’en remettre à la preuve et évaluer l’ensemble des circonstances. C’est donc dire que le trafiquant-consommateur qui ne fait pas voir de reprise en main ne peut espérer recevoir un traitement moins lourd en raison du fait qu’il est un simple consommateur[19]. La réalité veut qu’il soit aussi un trafiquant.

[26]        La réhabilitation n’a évidemment pas à être acquise au moment de la détermination de la peine. Cependant, la preuve d’un véritable processus de réhabilitation, lequel doit être particulièrement convaincant[20], est dans la présente affaire tout simplement manquante. En l’espèce, l’ensemble des circonstances démontre plutôt qu’il n’y avait pas lieu de considérer l'intimé comme un simple trafiquant-consommateur.

Les objectifs d’exemplarité, de dissuasion et de réprobation peuvent céder le pas au critère de la réadaptation, lorsque ce dernier « fait l’objet d’une démonstration particulièrement convaincante »

Calderon c. R., 2015 QCCA 1573

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[26]        D’autre part, en matière de trafic de drogues dures comme la méthamphétamine[9], et à plus forte raison lorsqu’il est question de production de telles drogues en des quantités astronomiques, la jurisprudence reconnaît que les objectifs d’exemplarité, de dissuasion et de réprobation doivent primer. Lorsque la situation le justifie, une peine plus sévère peut être imposée afin de dissuader d'autres personnes de commettre une pareille infraction[10].

[27]        Il est vrai que les objectifs d’exemplarité, de dissuasion et de réprobation peuvent céder le pas au critère de la réadaptation, lorsque ce dernier « fait l’objet d’une démonstration particulièrement convaincante »[11]. Mais ici, tel n’est pas le cas. Le requérant n’a offert aucune preuve de réhabilitation et aucun rapport présentenciel n’a été préparé. Il a plutôt laissé le soin à son avocate de faire quelques remarques en tirant des inférences non appuyées.

L'appréciation par le juge d'instance de la démonstration convaincante de réhabilitation d'un contrevenant

R. c. Zawahra, 2016 QCCA 871

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[13]        Il ne faut pas, comme semble le proposer l’appelante, y voir un fardeau trop lourd. L’expression est connue et signifie que la preuve doit être probante par opposition à une preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable[4]. Cette appréciation de la preuve appartenait à la juge et la seule question qui subsiste est celle de savoir si elle a manifestement erré lorsqu’elle conclut à une démonstration convaincante de réhabilitation.

[14]        Dans R. c. Lacasse, la Cour suprême rappelait l’importance de la déférence que les cours d’appel accordent aux tribunaux de première instance en matière de détermination de la peine :

[11] Notre Cour a maintes fois rappelé l’importance d’accorder une grande latitude au juge qui prononce la peine. Comme celui-ci a notamment l’avantage d’entendre et de voir les témoins, il est le mieux placé pour déterminer, eu égard aux circonstances, la peine juste et appropriée conformément aux objectifs et aux principes énoncés au Code criminel à cet égard. Le seul fait qu’un juge s’écarte de la fourchette de peines appropriée ne justifie pas l’intervention d’une cour d’appel. Au final, sauf dans les cas où le juge qui fixe la peine commet une erreur de droit ou une erreur de principe ayant une incidence sur la détermination de cette peine, une cour d’appel ne peut la modifier que si cette peine est manifestement non indiquée.[5]

[Notre soulignement]

[15]        La Cour d’appel ne peut donc pas substituer son appréciation à celle du juge de première instance sur la question de ce qui constitue une démarche convaincante de réhabilitation, à moins d’une erreur de l’ordre de ce qui est décrit par la Cour suprême dans R. c. Lacasse. La Cour d’appel de Colombie-Britannique, dans R. c. Preston (Sullivan), rappelle ce principe dans le contexte de l’appréciation de la réhabilitation :

I do not believe it is the function of this court to make such value judgments. If there is no evidence to support a trial judge's conclusion that a reasonable possibility of rehabilitation exists, this court would clearly have a duty to intervene. However, in the absence of such clear and unmistakable error on the part of the trial judge, based on the evidence as it was before the court at the time of sentencing, I am of the view that this court should not quickly or lightly interfere with the discretion of a trial judge by substituting its own view on such delicate matters as the sincerity of offender's desire to change for the better, or the likelihood of that desire becoming a reality. Trial judges ought to be encouraged in appropriate cases, to take an enlightened and progressive approach to the difficult task of sentencing. That objective will not be achieved if such initiatives are too easily disturbed.[6]

[Notre soulignement]

[16]        Les propos suivants de R. c. Lacasse s’appliquent donc ici :

[58]  Il se présentera toujours des situations qui requerront l’infliction d’une peine à l’extérieur d’une fourchette particulière, car si l’harmonisation des peines est en soi un objectif souhaitable, on ne peut faire abstraction du fait que chaque crime est commis dans des circonstances uniques, par un délinquant au profil unique. La détermination d’une peine juste et appropriée est une opération éminemment individualisée qui ne se limite pas à un calcul purement mathématique. Elle fait appel à une panoplie de facteurs dont les contours sont difficiles à cerner avec précision. C’est la raison pour laquelle il peut arriver qu’une peine qui déroge à première vue à une fourchette donnée, et qui pourrait même n’avoir jamais été infligée par le passé pour un crime semblable, ne soit pas pour autant manifestement non indiquée. Encore une fois, tout dépend de la gravité de l’infraction, du degré de responsabilité du délinquant et des circonstances particulières de chaque cas. […][7]

[Notre soulignement]

[17]        La juge explique les raisons pour lesquelles elle a choisi d’imposer une peine clémente. Elle souhaite donner la chance à l’intimé de se sortir de ses « patterns » à la suite de la thérapie qu’il a suivie avec succès et qui l’a mené à cesser de consommer des drogues dures après 30 ans de consommation et de criminalité. Elle ne veut pas saper ses chances de réhabilitation en prenant une décision qui le mènera à perdre son logement et le peu de biens qu’il possède. Elle accepte que la réhabilitation est possible, malgré une vie passée dans la criminalité.

[18]        Notre système de droit accepte cette proposition. Dans R. c. Ruel, la Cour rappelle que « même face à une infraction grave et à une jurisprudence constante dictant des peines sévères, la réhabilitation garde tout son sens devant un individu démontrant les capacités d’une reprise en main »[8].  Cette proposition prend appui sur ce qu’écrivait juge LeBel dans R. c. Lafrance :

L'individualisation de la sentence demeure un principe fondamental dans le système canadien de détermination de la peine. Elle provoque sans doute bien des critiques, parfois au nom de la disparité des sentences, critiques à l'occasion formulées dans l'ignorance à peu près totale des particularités de chaque cas. Ce principe conserve une telle importance que l'imposition de sentences abstraites, standardisées, ignorante des facteurs individuels, peut constituer une erreur de droit[9].

Peine de 3 ans d'emprisonnement pour une possession de 1.2 kilo de cocaïne et 800 grammes de métamphétamine à des fins de trafic

R. v. Walters, 2025 ONCA 629

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[1]         The appellant pled guilty to two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking involving almost 1.2 kilograms of cocaine and over 800 grams of methamphetamine. He also admitted to being in possession of other drugs and drug paraphernalia, all located during the execution of a search warrant at his condominium and related storage locker. Ammunition and $124,600 in cash were also found in those locations.

[2]         The parties did not have a joint position on sentence and so went into the sentencing hearing open, the Crown asking for a six-year sentence and the defence a two-year-less-a-day conditional sentence order. The trial judge imposed a three-year sentence. This is an appeal from that disposition.

[3]         The appellant argues that the trial judge erroneously relied on other offences to position the appellant’s level of involvement in the crimes. The appellant maintains that it was not open to the trial judge to consider, among other things, the seized cash, cocaine press, ammunition, and other drugs to determine his level of involvement. The appellant says that the trial judge was precluded from doing so because the trial Crown failed to prove those other offences.

[4]         Respectfully, we see matters differently.

[5]         It was the trial judge’s responsibility to grapple with the appellant’s level of involvement in the crimes he pled guilty to. The facts relied upon by the trial judge formed part of the agreed statement of facts. It was open to the trial judge to resort to those facts to determine the appellant’s level of involvement. Bearing in mind the serious offences involved, the trial judge determined that only a penitentiary sentence would be appropriate in this case.

[6]         With that said, the trial judge also carefully took into account the multiple mitigating factors at work. In the end she imposed a fit sentence, one that she described as necessary considering all of the circumstances. We see no error in her approach.

[7]         We would note, though, as did the trial judge, that the appellant has expressed genuine remorse for his crimes and seems to be well on the path toward rehabilitation, something that we commend him for and that the correctional authorities will undoubtedly take into account.

[8]         While leave to appeal sentence is granted, the appeal is dismissed.

Peine de 42 mois d'emprisonnement pour une possession de 450 grammes de cocaïne à des fins de trafic

R. v. Parker, 2025 ONCA 636

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[1]         The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of 450 grams of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking. He was subsequently sentenced to 42 months imprisonment, less 6 months Downes credit, less 12 days credit for presentence custody.[1]

[2]         The appellant alleges the trial judge made various errors in principle that render the sentence unfit. Without accepting that there were errors in principle, we are satisfied that the sentence imposed was entirely fit, and that the Downes credit given fell within the broad range of discretion afforded to the trial judge.

[3]         Leave to appeal sentence is granted, but the sentence appeal is dismissed.

Les principes de détermination de la peine quant à l'infraction de possession de pornographie juvénile vus par la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario

R. v. Elias, 2026 ONCA 112

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[18]      The proliferation and easy availability of child sexual abuse and exploitation material is “a pervasive social problem that affects the global community and its children”: R. v. Inksetter, 2018 ONCA 474, 141 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 22. A person who possesses such material is sexually abusing children. As canvassed at length by Tulloch C.J.O. in Pike, at paras. 143-157, possession of child sexual abuse and exploitation material harms children by treating them as “voiceless, absent” objects, and by invading their privacy. Collecting this material increases the market for its production: Pike, at para. 151. The children depicted in child sexual abuse and exploitation material suffer emotional harm during its creation, and they are re-victimized each time the images are viewed: Pike, at para. 149. The sharing of this material endlessly perpetuates the sexual abuse, normalizes it, and may incite the commission of other sexual offences against children: Pike, at paras. 151-152, 157. Chief Justice Tulloch’s description of the harms caused by the possession of child sexual abuse and exploitation material was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Senneville, 2025 SCC 33, at para. 31.

[19]      In sentencing offenders for the sexual abuse of children, including possession of CSAEM, courts must prioritize denunciation and deterrence: s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code; Inksetter, at para. 16; and Pike, at para. 159. The court’s focus must be on the children abused in the making, distribution, and viewing of these materials: Pike, at para. 160. In particular, courts must recognize and give effect to (1) the inherent wrongfulness of the offences; (2) the potential harm to children that flows from the offences; and (3) the actual harm that children suffer as a result of the offences: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 76.

[20]      In Pike, this court clarified some of the aggravating factors that should be considered in sentencing an offender for possession of child sexual abuse and exploitation materials. I will return to these factors later in these reasons.

[21]      Courts cannot minimize the harms caused by the offender by focusing unduly on their personal circumstances and giving priority to the sentencing objectives of rehabilitation and deterrence. The latter includes both specific and general deterrence; as a result, deterrence may weigh in favour of incarceration even if there is no significant risk that the offender will reoffend. Sentencing objectives such as rehabilitation may be given significant weight, but not priority or equivalency to deterrence and denunciation: R. v. Lis, 2020 ONCA 551, 152 O.R. (3d) 125, at paras. 47-48, 53; Friesen, at paras. 101-104.

The sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to recognize aggravating factors

[22]      A sentencing judge has a wide latitude in determining a fit sentence: R. v. Grant, 2016 ONCA 639, 342 C.C.C. (3d) 514, at para. 162. This court may intervene only if the sentencing judge made an error of law or an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence, or imposed a sentence that was demonstrably unfit: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 11.

[23]      In this case, the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to recognize significant aggravating factors, and this had an impact on the sentence imposed.

[24]      First, although he recognized that the size and depravity of Mr. Elias’ collection were relevant to sentencing, the sentencing judge failed to identify the nature of the collection and the number of children victimized as distinct and further aggravating factors.

[25]      In considering the gravity of the offence of possession of CSAEM, a court must consider whether the contents of a collection depict real children: Pike, at para. 169. Here, the images and videos described on the record featured real children and toddlers as opposed to drawings or computer-generated avatars. Mr. Elias agreed that these images and videos were representative of the collection. His possession of recordings depicting the abuse of real children increases his moral blameworthiness.

[26]      The number of child sexual abuse victims depicted in an offender’s collection is also a distinct aggravating factor. Offenders who victimize more children should expect to receive “significantly higher sentences”: Friesen, at para. 133, cited in Pike, at para. 167. Given the size of Mr. Elias’ collection, thousands of children were victimized in its creation, and re-victimized by the sharing and re-viewing of their abuse. This is an even more aggravating factor than the size of the collection: Pike, at para. 167.

[27]      Second, the sentencing judge failed to recognize the duration of time during which Mr. Elias collected the CSAEM and the frequency of his engagement with it as aggravating factors. Evidence that an offender has amassed a collection over time and that they interact with it regularly increases their moral blameworthiness because it shows “their conduct is entrenched and increase[es] the number of times they victimize the depicted children”: Pike, at para. 170.

[28]      The sentencing judge’s reasoning on this issue was as follows:

Respectfully, I disagree with the Crown that this Court can reasonably find as aggravating factors that it took Elias “several years” to compile his collection of child pornography and/or that he viewed the child pornography “very frequently”...

There is nothing in the agreed statement of facts that would support either one of those alleged aggravating factors.

At its highest, the evidence as a whole suggests that Elias watched the child pornography approximately once per week and first stumbled upon online child pornography sometime after he started using a specific computer application in 2017 (page 3 of Dr. Gojer’s report marked Exhibit 4).

These alleged aggravating factors not being agreed to by the offender, Elias is entitled to proof of them beyond a reasonable doubt. R. v. Richardson, 1992 CanLII 7710 (ON CA). I find that the evidence falls short of that standard of proof in this case, on these two points.

[29]      In my view, the sentencing judge’s rejection of these two aggravating factors reflects a misapprehension of the evidence.

[32]      The huge size of the collection and its presence on three different devices, acknowledged in the agreed statement of facts, are features consistent with these admissions.

[33]      The omission in the agreed statement of facts of a reference to the date when Mr. Elias began collecting the images and videos and how frequently he viewed them is not determinative. The aggravating factors are proved based on Mr. Elias’ admissions to third parties, the reliability of which were not in question.

[34]      Finally, Mr. Elias’ engagement in the child pornography subculture is an aggravating factor that the sentencing judge should have considered.

[35]      Mr. Elias was not a passive viewer of child sexual abuse and exploitation material. His IP address was flagged to the police after he uploaded a pornographic video featuring a prepubescent girl to his account and shared it in a Kik chat using an alias. He told Dr. Gojer that he “collected videos that others sent him.” He did not dispute that he, in turn, sent CSAEM to “someone he met online.” As the sentencing judge noted, Mr. Elias’ collection included images that he himself had taken, surreptitiously, of the buttocks of girls.

[36]      As observed in Pike, at para. 170, citing R. v. D.G.F., 2010 ONCA 27, 98 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 25, active participation in the child pornography subculture is aggravating. By “reinforcing the offending behaviour of people who possess child pornography and encouraging them to graduate to even more serious offending, it increases the risk to children”: Pike, at para. 170. This risk was actualized when Mr. Elias began generating his own images and sending material to others.

[37]      The sentencing judge’s failure to consider these additional significant aggravating factors necessarily had an impact both on his determination that a sentence under two years was appropriate and that a conditional sentence was proportionate and fit.

The sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to prioritize denunciation and deterrence

[38]      As Tulloch C.J.O. explained in para. 160 of Pike:

Courts can give significant weight to the personal circumstances and mitigating factors of people who possess child pornography, and to sentencing objectives such as rehabilitation. But it is all too easy for those considerations, which focus on the people being sentenced, to overshadow the wrongs and harms they inflict because their victims are all too often invisible.… That is why courts can neither prioritize other objectives to the same degree as or higher than denunciation and deterrence, nor use the personal circumstances and mitigating factors of people who possess child pornography to avoid grappling with the wrongs and harms they cause. [Citations omitted.]

[39]      Although the sentencing judge acknowledged that denunciation and deterrence were primary sentencing goals, he did not give them priority. He instead focused on the offender and his circumstances. This was an error in principle.

[40]      The sentencing judge’s reasons are not child-centered. They do not give primary consideration to the children victimized by Mr. Elias’ offence and the nature of the harm they suffered. After a brief description of some of the images and videos in Mr. Elias’ collection, the reasons shift in focus to a lengthy review of Mr. Elias’ personal circumstances, his mental health, the collateral consequences of his criminal charge and conviction, his rehabilitative potential, and the negative impacts of a custodial sentence on him and his father.

[43]      The danger of minimizing the active role played by a possessor of CSAEM in wrongdoing was again highlighted in Pike, at para. 164. Chief Justice Tulloch cautioned that:

Possession [of child pornography] is deliberate, not accidental or passive. This crime is “‘committed specifically by choice[s]’” to break down the legal barriers against sexually exploiting children by acquiring and maintaining the material and expanding their collection. Courts thus should not recast people who possess child pornography as victims of its easy availability. Likewise, while courts can consider mental illnesses that contribute to people’s decisions to possess child pornography, they should not assume that psychiatric conditions like pedophilia compel those people to possess child pornography. Both forms of minimization wrongly excuse people who possess child pornography from responsibility for their choices and undermine Parliament’s prioritization of deterrence and denunciation. [Citations omitted.]

[44]      The sentencing judge minimized Mr. Elias’ moral culpability in this way, even though Mr. Elias amassed a collection of almost 23,000 images and 741 videos of child sexual abuse and exploitation over four to five years, during which time he viewed it and masturbated to it weekly, engaged with others in the CSAEM subculture, took videos of children in public, and shared child sexual abuse and exploitation material with others on the internet.

[45]      This is not to suggest that an offender’s personal circumstances are irrelevant or that mental health issues cannot be found to reduce an offender’s moral culpability. As Friesen and Pike hammer home, however, the court must center its analysis on the harms flowing to the child victims of the offence and the moral culpability inherent in the possession of child sexual abuse and exploitation material.