Entre meurtre et homicide involontaire : l'évaluation de l'intention coupable à l'épreuve de l'intoxication extrême

R. v. Odette, 2026 ONSC 760

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[125]      Mr. Odette is charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder. The burden is on the Crown to prove Mr. Odette’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption is only discharged when, and if, the Crown proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown at all times bears the onus of proving the case. The Crown is required to prove the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. I must assess the case on the whole and decide whether, on the basis of all of the evidence, or lack thereof, the Crown has proven the guilt of Mr. Odette beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320.

 

[126]      The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an exacting one. It is more than probable or likely guilt. Indeed, proof beyond a reasonable doubt falls much closer to absolute certainty than it does to proof on a balance of probabilities. Mr. Odette cannot be convicted unless after considering all the evidence or lack of evidence, I am sure that he is guilty of tan offence.

 

[127]      The defence concedes that Mr. Odette unlawfully caused the death of Katie Kainz and that he stabbed Ashley Bernard. The defence submits though that the Crown has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Odette had the requisite intent for murder and attempt murder and submits that Mr. Odette should only be guilty of manslaughter and aggravated assault.

 

[128]      For an unlawful killing to be murder, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Odette either meant to kill the person (Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 229 (a)(i)) or meant to cause the person bodily harm that he knew was likely to kill the person, and was reckless whether the person died or not (Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 229)(a)(ii)). The Crown does not have to prove both routes.

 

[129]      With respect to s. 229(a)(ii), the essential element is that of intending to cause bodily harm of such a grave and serious nature that the accused knew that it was likely to result in the death of the victim. The reckless criterion is considered an afterthought. As explained by Fairburn J.A. in R. v. Zoldi, 2018 ONCA 384, 360 C.C.C. (3d) 476, at para. 40:

 

Once the Crown establishes the principal’s intention to cause such grave and serious bodily harm that he knows it is likely to result in death, recklessness follows as almost a matter of course: R. v. Nygaard, 1989 CanLII 6 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1074, at p. 1088. See also: Cooper, at p. 154-155; Rodgerson, at para. 23, aff’d on other grounds, 2015 SCC 38, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 760; Moo, at para. 63. This is why being “reckless whether death ensues or not” is often referred to as an “afterthought.”

 

[130]      In R. v. Hodgson, 2024 SCC 25, 494 D.L.R. (4th) 501, the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the mens rea requirement for a conviction for murder. The Court stated at paras. 48 and 49:

 

In contrast, “a conviction for murder cannot rest on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective foresight” (R. v. Vaillancourt, 1987 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at p. 654 (emphasis added); R. v. Martineau, 1990 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at p. 646). Murder is distinguished from manslaughter “only by the mental element with respect to the death” (Vaillancourt, at p. 654, quoted in Creighton, at p. 17, per Lamer C.J., concurring). The requisite intent for murder is “an intent to kill or an intent to cause bodily harm that the offender knows is likely to cause death and is reckless as to whether or not death ensues” (R. v. Walle, 2012 SCC 41, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 438, at para. 3).

 

A conviction for murder requires subjective intent because it is an offence that “carries with it the most severe stigma and punishment of any crime in our society” (Martineau, at p. 645). The law requires subjective foresight of death because the criminal liability for murder is of the highest kind and cannot be justified except where the actor possesses a culpable mental state in respect of that result (Martineau, at p. 645, citing R. v. Bernard, 1988 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833). Thus, the harsh stigma and punishment associated with murder is reserved for “those who choose to intentionally cause death or who choose to inflict bodily harm that they know is likely to cause death” (Martineau, at p. 646).

 

[131]      To prove that Mr. Odette committed murder, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either Mr. Odette meant to kill Ms. Kainz or that he meant to cause Ms. Kainz bodily harm that he knew was so serious and dangerous that it would likely kill Ms. Kainz and proceeded despite his knowledge Ms. Kainz would likely die as a result of that bodily harm.

 

[132]      To find Adam Odette guilty of the attempted murder of Ashley Bernard, the Crown must prove: (1) that the accused took some steps towards the commission of the offence beyond mere acts of preparation, and (2) that he had a specific intention to kill. Recklessness does not suffice to establish the mens rea for attempted murder: R. v. B.F., 2025 SCC 41, at para. 69, R. v. Boone, 2019 ONCA 652, at para. 49; and R. v. Ancio, 1984 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 225.

 

[133]      As summarized by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Collins, 2023 ONCA 394, at para. 54: “It has long been settled law in Canada that the mens rea for attempted murder is a specific intention to kill: see The Queen v. Ancio, 1984 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 225, at pp. 250-251; and R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36, at para. 36.” The reckless route in s. 229(a)(ii)is not an available pathway to a conviction for attempted murder. As stated by the Court of Appeal in Boone at para. 57, in the context of attempted murder:

 

Recklessness is not, however, to be equated with intention based on a belief in the virtual certainty that the consequences will flow: Buzzanga, at p. 384. The mens rea required for attempted murder is not satisfied by recklessness as to the consequence. A person who appreciates that his acts may, or probably will, lead to the victim's death is not guilty of attempted murder unless killing his victim was his purpose: Ancio, at pp. 248-51.

 

[134]      There is evidence that Mr. Odette consumed drugs and alcohol prior to the killing. An accused who was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and thus in a state of advanced intoxication may not have had the requisite intent to commit murder. As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 523, at para 49:

 

Second, there is what we might call “advanced” intoxication. This occurs where there is intoxication to the point where the accused lacks specific intent, to the extent of an impairment of the accused’s foresight of the consequences of his or her act sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the requisite mens rea. The Court in Robinson noted that this will most often be the degree of intoxication the jury will grapple with in murder trials:

 

▪  In most murder cases, the focus for the trier of fact will be on the foreseeability prong of s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, that is, on determining whether the accused foresaw that his or her actions were likely to cause the death of the victim. For example, consider the case where an accused and another individual engage in a fight outside a bar. During the fight, the accused pins the other individual to the ground and delivers a kick to the head, which kills that person. In that type of a case, the jury will likely struggle, assuming they reject any self-defence or provocation claim, with the question of whether that accused foresaw that his or her actions would likely cause the death of the other individual. [emphasis added]

 

[135]      The British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Crossley, 2025 BCCA 224, at para. 33 explained the inquiry that must be conducted:

 

Instead, the focus of the “advanced” intoxication inquiry is the overall impact of intoxication on the accused's state of mind at the time of the offence, as borne out by the entirety of the evidence. In the murder context, evidence of “advanced” intoxication is evidence that reasonably supports a finding that intoxication impaired the accused’s “...foresight of the consequences of [their] act sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the requisite mens rea”: Daley at para. 41. In other words, it is evidence that reasonably raises a doubt as to whether the accused intended to kill the victim or meant to cause the victim bodily harm that the accused knew was likely to cause their death and was reckless as to whether death ensued.

 

L'évaluation de la défense d'intoxication avancée exige une analyse contextuelle globale du comportement, de la mémoire et des preuves pour déterminer si l'accusé possédait l'intention spécifique de tuer

R v Matchatis, 2020 ABCA 435

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[26]           Determining whether an accused’s level of intoxication rises to the level of impairing an accused’s foresight of the consequences of their acts is a highly factual and contextual exercise. While expert evidence is not a prerequisite to a defence of advanced intoxication as it is with intoxication akin to automatism, it is nonetheless common: R v Arjun, 2015 BCCA 273 at para 39, leave to appeal ref’d [2015] SCCA No 324. Expert evidence as to the accused’s blood alcohol level when the crime was committed, and the impact the accused’s blood alcohol level would have on their cognition, can provide important context in which to assess the accused’s actions. For her part, Dr. Massey provided only an assumption based on the evidence of Phyllis and Matchatis, that “If you did a blood alcohol reading on him, I’m pretty sure he’d be really high.”

[27]           Other relevant factors include the mannerisms of the accused (slurring, staggering, glossy eyes); ability to recall details of the day and the events in question; and ability to act responsively or to carry out purposeful actions before the commission of the offence. Further, an accused’s post-offence conduct may be considered to discredit a defence, like advanced intoxication, relating to whether an accused formed the requisite intent: R v Jaw, 2009 SCC 42, [2009] 3 SCR 26 at para 40.

[28]           Absent expert evidence on this issue, the trial judge was left with generic evidence as to Matchatis’ level of impairment. Indisputably, the evidence suggests Matchatis had been drinking all day and was intoxicated. The trial judge recounted that Tyler placed his father’s intoxication that evening at 9 on a scale from 1 to 10, and Phyllis’ evidence that he was “just about blacked out drunk” but generally can function even when drunk and it takes a lot of alcohol for him to pass out. Phyllis said Matchatis was a seasoned drinker who, after a period of abstinence, had been drinking regularly for over a year; he could handle his liquor, particularly beer.

[32]           A trial judge must weigh and consider all of the evidence of intoxication in a contextual manner to determine whether the accused’s intoxication crossed the line from mere loss of inhibition, impaired judgment and increased bravado to the point where they are left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the intoxication was severe enough that its effect might have impaired the accused’s foresight of the consequences of their actions. In our view, the trial judge did just that. Matchatis’ actions both before and after the shooting, together with his detailed recall of the events, evinced a sense of awareness. We defer to his ultimate finding that the nature of this homicide was consistent with an intention to kill the deceased.

La défense d'intoxication extrême pour nier l'intention de meurtre requiert de prouver l'incapacité de prévoir les conséquences de ses actes, laquelle s'évalue selon plusieurs facteurs factuels et comportementaux clés

R. v. Rogers, 2024 NSCA 100

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[56]         An accused may raise a reasonable doubt about their intent for murder through evidence of advanced intoxication. Where death is the consequence of the accused’s acts, the accused would have to establish a particularly advanced degree of intoxication to successfully avail himself of this defence. The inquiry is whether the accused’s ability to foresee the consequences of his actions was affected by intoxication.[22]

[57]         Factors that may be relevant in assessing advanced intoxication include:

1.                 The amount and type of intoxicant consumed;

2.                 Evidence of the accused’s ability to communicate, process information, and/or problem-solve;

3.                 Evidence of the accused’s fine and gross motor coordination skills and ability to perform divided-attention tasks;

4.                 Observations of the accused’s demeanour at or around the time of the offence;

5.                 Witnesses’ lay opinions of the accused’s level of intoxication;

6.                 Evidence of goal-oriented or rational behaviour by the accused;

7.                 Expert evidence linking the accused’s intoxication to the accused’s ability to foresee the consequences of his actions.[23]

En droit criminel, s'appuyer sur un avis juridique erroné ne constitue pas une défense valable pour échapper à sa responsabilité

Gingras c. R., 2022 QCCA 1546

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[12]      Toujours sur le verdict, l’appelant plaide avoir été privé de son droit à une défense pleine et entière en raison d’un jugement rendu par le juge avant la présentation de sa défense[12]. En effet, l’appelant avait annoncé vouloir faire entendre deux avocats experts en affaires municipales en vue d’établir qu’il a agi conformément à des avis juridiques pour justifier ses gestes. Ce moyen de défense étant apparent et clairement anticipé, le ministère public a présenté une demande visant à restreindre la portée de cette preuve, fondé sur le principe que l’erreur de droit ne constitue pas une défense à une accusation criminelle, codifié à l’article 19 du Code criminel.

[13]      Après analyse du droit applicable, le juge conclut que l’appelant ne peut mettre en preuve devant le jury des avis juridiques obtenus « afin de justifier ses faits et gestes et soutenir un moyen de défense sans enfreindre la règle édictée par l’article 19 » du Code criminel[13]. Le juge n’a pas non plus permis la preuve que l’appelant a suivi des conseils juridiques, puisque ceci reviendrait à faire indirectement ce qu’il ne peut faire directement, c’est-à-dire présenter une défense qui n’est pas juridiquement permise. Cependant, il a autorisé l’appelant à faire une certaine preuve, à savoir :

[28] Le Tribunal permettra néanmoins à l’accusé de se référer à l’obtention d’avis juridiques à titre de narration des événements pour permettre au jury d’évaluer sa conduite en fonction du fait qu’il a ou non obtenu un avis juridique, afin d’apprécier sa conduite eu égard à l’ensemble des circonstances, notamment le quatrième élément constitutif de l’infraction [c’est-à-dire un écart grave et marqué par rapport aux normes que serait censé observer quiconque occuperait le poste de confiance de l’accusé].^[14]

[14]      Lors de l’argumentaire sur cette question en première instance, l’avocat de l’appelant a louvoyé, affirmant qu’il n’entendait pas, en fin de compte, mettre en preuve des opinions juridiques, mais simplement que l’appelant a consulté une firme d’avocats, qu’il a obtenu une opinion et qu’il a pris des actions. Or, dans son témoignage, l’appelant ne s’est pas prévalu de l’ouverture faite par le juge de faire référence à l’obtention d’avis juridique à titre narratif. Le juge avait également gardé une porte ouverte à revisiter son jugement si la situation le justifiait. L’appelant n’a pas soulevé de nouveau cette question.

[15]      De toute manière, le jugement sur cette question n’est pas attaquable. L’erreur de droit n’est pas une défense en droit criminel. Un accusé ne peut espérer échapper à sa responsabilité criminelle en invoquant qu’il s’est enquis de la légalité de ses actes et a agi conformément à un avis juridique qui s’est avéré erroné[15]. L’un des fondements de cette règle est la préservation de l’intégrité de l’administration judiciaire, en évitant que des citoyens tentent de se draper d’une immunité à l’encontre de poursuites criminelles par l’obtention d’opinions juridiques favorables à leur thèse[16].

Le simple fait de ne pas se souvenir des événements ne constitue pas une défense admissible puisque cela ne permet pas, en soi, de conclure que l’accusé n’a pas formé l’intention requise

Di Iorio c. R., 2007 QCCA 100

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[74]           Comme le souligne la juge, la question portait sur une question de fait, puisque la théorie du «blackout» renvoie nécessairement à la question de la preuve ou de l’absence de preuve de l’intention.  Par ailleurs, le terme «blackout» peut lui-même être source de confusion.  En effet, d’une part, il est reconnu que le simple fait de ne pas se souvenir des événements ne constitue pas une défense admissible puisque cela ne permet pas, en soi, de conclure que l’accusé n’a pas formé l’intention requise.  L’amnésie en rapport avec les événements n’est pas un facteur déterminant pour établir la capacité de discernement et la seule absence de souvenir n’est pas un moyen de défense autonome : R. c. Chartrand, 1975 CanLII 188 (CSC), [1977] 1 R.C.S. 314.  Par conséquent, si le «blackout» signifie simplement que l’appelant ne se souvient pas avoir posé les gestes, il ne peut s’agir d’une défense.  D’autre part, si cette défense renvoie à un geste automatique au point de nier l’aspect volontaire de l’actus reus, il s’agirait d’une défense d’automatisme, auquel cas une preuve par expert serait requise : R. c. Stone, précité.  Or, aucun expert n’a été entendu sur la question.

La défense de plaisanterie n'invalide pas l'intention de voler lorsqu'il y a privation du bien

Bogner v. The Queen, 1975 CanLII 2458 (QC CA

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Reste à savoir si l'infraction de vol a été commise. On peut trouver dans la preuve chacun des éléments de l'infraction: la chaise a été prise frauduleusement et sans apparence de droit, en ce sens que l'enlèvement a été fait intentionnellement, sous l'effet d'aucune erreur ou croyance d'un état de faits pou­vant le justifier, mais le groupe se rendait bien compte que la chose ainsi prise était la propriété de l'hôtelier; la chaise a été déplacée avec l'intention d'en priver temporairement son propriétaire. Tel que le mentionne l'art. 283, la prise d'une chose peut être entachée de fraude même si elle a lieu ouverte­ment ou sans tentative de dissimulation. 

En défense, l'appelant prétend qu'il s'agissait d'une plais­anterie organisée par un groupe d'amis, en somme qu'il y aurait absence de mens rea. Je ne puis partager cette opinion. La mens rea est l'intention de poser les actes constituant les éléments de l'actus reus ou l'insouciance déréglée envers ces actes. L'existence en soi d'un état d'esprit malhonnête en général, en plus d'une intention qui s'adresse aux éléments de l'infraction, n'est pas requise bien que sa constatation révé­lera sûrement la présence de la mens rea; mais en loi celle-ci s'arrête au facteur mental requis pour l'infraction particulière en question, donc pour chacun de ses éléments. Celui qui a posé volontairement les actes qui constituent les éléments d'un vol s'en rend coupable si sa seule défense est que son mobile était une plaisanterie. Bien sûr que la gravité de l'infraction en devient considérablement atténuée et que le tribunal pourra la considérer comme une infraction de droit strict au niveau de la sentence, mais je ne vois pas comment l'acquittement lui-même peut alors se justifier.

La défense d'intoxication vue par la Cour d'appel de Colombie-Britannique

R. v. Crossley, 2025 BCCA 224

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[31]      In R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that a person who is not “so intoxicated as to lack [any] capacity” to form intent, may nonetheless raise a reasonable doubt on the Crown’s proof of a specific intent by arguing that intoxication impacted their ability to exercise that capacity: at para. 40, emphasis added.

[32]      Daley made it clear that with a specific intent offence (including murder), the defence of intoxication will not succeed on evidence of “mild” intoxication: at para. 41. This is because “mild” intoxication will generally cause a person’s “inhibitions and socially acceptable behaviour” to be relaxed but will not negate specific intent: at para. 41. Instead, a successful intoxication defence requires evidence of “advanced” intoxication: Daley at para. 41.

[33]      What does that mean? Daley did not specify the kind of evidence necessary to meet this threshold or identify specific indicia of impairment that must be present for the defence to succeed. Instead, the focus of the “advanced” intoxication inquiry is the overall impact of intoxication on the accused’s state of mind at the time of the offence, as borne out by the entirety of the evidence. In the murder context, evidence of “advanced” intoxication is evidence that reasonably supports a finding that intoxication impaired the accused’s “… foresight of the consequences of [their] act sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the requisite mens rea”: Daley at para. 41. In other words, it is evidence that reasonably raises a doubt as to whether the accused intended to kill the victim or meant to cause the victim bodily harm that the accused knew was likely to cause their death and was reckless as to whether death ensued.

[34]      As a practical matter, whether the evidence of intoxication in a particular case will be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the intent for murder will vary with the circumstances: Daley at para. 42, citing R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683 at para. 52, 1996 CanLII 233. See also R. v. Sundman, 2021 BCCA 53 at para. 103, aff’d 2022 SCC 31; R. v. Arjun, 2015 BCCA 273 at para. 5, leave to appeal ref’d [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 324; R. v. Florence, 2014 BCCA 288 at para. 22. This is an individualized inquiry.

[35]      For example, in a case where the accused is alleged to have killed someone by pointing a loaded shotgun directly at their head and pulling the trigger, the evidence of intoxication will likely “have to establish a particularly advanced degree of intoxication” before it will be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the intent for murder because death will have been such an obviously foreseeable consequence of the unlawful act: Daley at para. 42, emphasis added. In a different case, where the natural and probable consequences of the unlawful act that causes death may not be as clear, “advanced” intoxication of a lesser degree may suffice to raise a reasonable doubt. It is generally the case that the “… more severe the injuries and the more force required to inflict them, the stronger the inference will be that the accused [including an intoxicated accused] intended to kill the victim or cause the victim bodily harm knowing it was likely to cause death …”: R. v. So, 2024 BCCA 101 at para. 91, citing R. v. Rodgerson, 2015 SCC 38 at paras. 20, 55.

[36]      Deciding whether evidence of intoxication reasonably supports the defence is determined case-by-case. What is critical in the murder context is that whatever the evidence might consist of, it must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether intoxication by drugs or alcohol impaired the accused’s foresight of the consequences of their actions: Daley at para. 41. As aptly articulated by this Court in R. v. Ruff, 2019 BCCA 412, the evidence must be sufficient to “reduce” the accused’s “appreciation of the consequences of [their] actions, at the time of the act”: at para. 21.

[37]      In making this assessment, the trier of fact may consider: the nature of the act(s) that caused death; the manner in which those acts were committed; the quantity of alcohol or drugs consumed before the offence; whether the accused was displaying impairment at the time of the offence and to what extent; evidence of purposive behaviour before, during, and after the offence; and any expert evidence that may be adduced specific to intoxication, including its likely effect on the accused’s ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions: Sundman at para. 108. This is not a closed list. There may be other types of evidence relevant to the assessment. Again, as explained in R. v. Matchatis, 2020 ABCA 435, “[d]etermining whether an accused’s level of intoxication rises to the level of impairing an accused’s foresight of the consequences of their acts is a highly factual and contextual exercise”: at paras. 26–27. The trier of fact:

[32]        … must weigh and consider all of the evidence of intoxication in a contextual manner to determine whether the accused’s intoxication crossed the line from mere loss of inhibition, impaired judgment and increased bravado to the point where they are left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the intoxication was severe enough that its effect might have impaired the accused’s foresight of the consequences of their actions.

[Matchatis, emphasis added.]

See also R. v. Rogers, 2024 NSCA 100 at paras. 56–57.