Légitime défense au domicile : un moyen de défense qui admet l’erreur de fait et l’imprécision de la force sans jamais imposer le devoir de fuir

R. v. Cunha, 2016 ONCA 491

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[5]         On March 11, 2013, the Citizen’s Arrest and Self-Defence Act, S.C. 2012, c. 9, came into force, repealing the former ss. 34 to 37 of the Criminal Code and replacing them with a new s. 34 self-defence provision. At trial, the parties did not have the benefit of this court’s decision in R. v. Bengy, 2015 ONCA 397, 325 C.C.C. (3d) 22, in which this court held that the new Criminal Code provisions regarding self-defence do not apply retrospectively. However, the parties submit, and I agree, there is no relevant difference, for the purposes of this case, between the old provisions and the new. 

[6]         At para. 28 of Bengy, Hourigan J.A. set out the elements of self-defence:

The test for self-defence was, therefore, simplified into three basic requirements, applicable to all cases:

Reasonable belief (34(1)(a)): the accused must reasonably believe that force or threat of force is being used against him or someone else;

Defensive purpose (34(1)(b)): the subjective purpose for responding to the threat must be to protect oneself or others; and

Reasonable response (34(c)): the act committed must be objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

[7]         As for the objective element of the defence, it is accepted that in considering the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of defensive force, the court must be alive to the fact that people in stressful and dangerous situations do not have time for subtle reflection, as this court noted in R. v. Mohamed, 2014 ONCA 442, 310 C.C.C. (3d) 123, at para. 29:

As Professor Paciocco notes at p. 36:

The law's readiness to justify "mistaken self-defence" recognizes that those in peril, or even in situations of perceived peril, do not have time for full reflection and that errors in interpretation and judgment will be made.

In a similar vein, Martin J.A. commented in R. v. Baxter (1975), 1975 CanLII 1510 (ON CA), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 96, at p. 111, that

in deciding whether the force used by the accused was more than was necessary in self-defence under both s. 34(1) and (2), the jury must bear in mind that a person defending himself against an attack, reasonably apprehended, cannot be expected to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of necessary defensive action.

[8]         It is well established that self-defence can be invoked on the basis of reasonable mistakes of fact, including whether the putative assailant was armed.   As this court noted in R. v. Currie 2002 CanLII 44973 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 2101, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 190 (C.A.), at para. 43:

The Supreme Court of Canada in Cinous [2002 SCC 29] confirmed the principle established in R. v. Pétel, 1994 CanLII 133 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3 that the existence of an actual assault is not a prerequisite for a defence under s. 34(2). The question that the jury must ask itself is not whether the accused was unlawfully attacked, but whether he reasonably believed in the circumstances that he was being unlawfully attacked. The question for the trial judge on the threshold evidential test is whether there is evidence upon which a jury acting reasonably could conclude that the accused reasonably believed he was about to be attacked and that this belief was reasonable in the circumstances.

[9]         It is also the law that a person who is defending himself, and other occupants of his house, is not obliged to retreat in the face of danger. In R. v. Forde, 2011 ONCA 592, 277 C.C.C. (3d) 1, this court considered the issue of retreat at some length, and concluded at para. 55: “a jury is not entitled to consider whether an accused could have retreated from his or her own home in the face of an attack (or threatened attack) by an assailant in assessing the elements of self-defence.”

Les composantes de la défense d’excuse raisonnable prévue à l’art. 320.15 C. cr

Bouzergan c. R., 2025 QCCS 1089

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[11]         La défense d’excuse raisonnable prévue à l’art. 320.15 C. cr. a trois composantes qui doivent toutes être prouvées par l’accusé selon la prépondérance des probabilités[3] :

11.1.   Dans un premier temps : L’accusé doit convaincre le juge du procès que l’excuse qu’il invoque a un fondement factuel[4] ;

11.2.   Dans un deuxième temps : L’accusé doit démontrer que l’excuse qu’il invoque a réellement motivé son refus d’obtempérer. Autrement, il n’y a logiquement aucune raison de lui permettre de s’en prévaloir ;

11.3.   Dans un troisième temps : L’accusé doit convaincre le juge du procès que son excuse était objectivement raisonnable, en ce sens qu’il aurait été raisonnable pour une personne placée dans les mêmes circonstances que l’accusé de refuser d’obtempérer à l’ordre du policier.

[12]        Il est donc erroné de qualifier la défense d’excuse raisonnable de purement objective. Il est plus juste d’affirmer qu’elle traduit des considérations à la fois subjectives et objectives.

Ce n’est pas parce qu'un accusé déclare ne pas avoir eu pour but la commission d’une infraction criminelle que ce vœu constitue une preuve contraire justifiant un acquittement en matière d'introduction par effraction

R. c. Lévesque, 2022 QCCA 510

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[42]      L’introduction par effraction dans un dessein criminel requiert l’intention spécifique de l’accusé de commettre ce crime[21]. Or, cette infraction jouit d’une présomption quant à la mens rea. La preuve de l’introduction dans un endroit par effraction suffit pour constituer la preuve que cette introduction a lieu avec l’intention d’y commettre un acte criminel (art. 348(2) a) C.cr.).

[43]      Cette présomption permet d’inférer chez l’auteur de l’introduction par effraction que, ce faisant, il poursuit un but illégitime. Toutefois, cette présomption peut être réfutée par une « preuve contraire »[22].

[46]      Ce n’est pas parce que l’intimé déclare ne pas avoir eu pour but la commission d’une infraction criminelle que ce vœu constitue une preuve contraire. Qu’il n’y ait eu aucun cri, menace, ni haussement de ton de sa part et de celle de ses comparses n’y change rien, tout comme c’est le cas pour la remise des fleurs et d’un trophée satirique aux employés de Vice. Ces constats n’ont nullement pour effet de neutraliser la preuve de l’intention de l’intimé de poser volontairement les gestes qui allaient porter atteinte à la jouissance ou à l’exploitation légitime du local de Vice, et ce, même si ces conséquences découlaient de son insouciance[23].

[47]      En somme, que l’intimé ait eu l’intention de commettre un acte criminel avec le moins de heurts possible ne permet pas de conclure autrement qu’il agissait tout de même avec l’intention de le commettre.

[48]      La poursuivante devait donc prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable l’introduction de l’intimé dans un endroit par effraction, ce qu’elle a démontré à l’aide des présomptions de l’article 350b)(i) et (ii) C.cr. Selon le même fardeau, elle devait aussi prouver l’intention de l’intimé de commettre cette infraction dans un dessein criminel, charge dont elle s’est également acquittée grâce à la présomption de l’article 348(2)a) C.cr.

[49]      La preuve contraire quant à elle devait tendre à soulever un doute raisonnable sur l’intention de l’intimé. Or, ce dernier n’a jamais nié avoir agi dans l’intention de poser les gestes qui se sont révélés être de la nature d’un véritable méfait. Les préparatifs préalables à la commission de l’infraction mis en place avec soin par l’intimé, tels que constatés par la juge[24], témoignent éloquemment de cette intention spécifique, et ce, abstraction faite de la preuve des faits subséquents survenus lors de cette introduction par effraction.

[50]      J’estime donc que l’intimé aurait dû être déclaré coupable de l’accusation d’introduction en un endroit par effraction avec l’intention d’y commettre un acte criminel, et que son témoignage, même cru, ne comporte aucun aspect de nature à constituer une preuve contraire au sens de l’article 348(2)a) C.cr.

La défense d'erreur de fait & de consentement implicite en matière de voies de fait

R. v. Bennett, 2006 CanLII 31012 (NL PC)

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THE ELEMENT OF CONSENT IN THE OFFENCE OF ASSAULT

[37]  When an accused person is charged with the offence of assault, the Crown must prove that the complainant did not consent to being touched.  This is a subjective test (see Ewanchuk, at paragraphs 25 to 30).  The Crown must also prove that the accused knew that there was a lack of consent or was reckless or wilfully blind to its absence (see R. v. Williams, 2003 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, at paragraphs 22 and 36).

MISTAKE OF FACT

[38]  If the Crown can prove a lack of consent, the accused may still argue that he or she had an honest, but mistaken belief that the person touched was consenting.  In Ewanchuk, the nature of this defence was described as follows (at paragraphs 43 and 44):

The accused may challenge the Crown's evidence of mens rea by asserting an honest but mistaken belief in consent.  The nature of this defence was described in Pappajohn v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 at p. 148, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481, 111 D.L.R. (3d) 1, by Dickson J. (as he then was) (dissenting in the result): Mistake is a defence . . . where it prevents an accused from having the mens rea which the law requires for the very crime with which he is charged.  Mistake of fact is more accurately seen as a negation of guilty intention than as the affirmation of a positive defence.  It avails an accused who acts innocently, pursuant to a flawed perception of the facts, and nonetheless commits the actus reus of the offence.  Mistake is a defence though, in the sense that it is raised as an issue by an accused. The Crown is rarely possessed of knowledge of the subjective factors which may have caused an accused to entertain a belief in a fallacious set of facts.

The defence of mistake is simply a denial of mens rea. It does not impose any burden of proof upon the accused (see R. v. Robertson, 1987 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 918 at p. 936, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 321), and it is not necessary for the accused to testify in order to raise the issue…

[39]  In determining if an accused person had an honest belief that consent existed, section 265(4) of the Criminal Code indicates the Court must consider the “presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief”:

Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented to the conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused’s belief, to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief.

[40]  Finally, to constitute an honest mistake, the accused's belief cannot be a reckless or willfully blind one (Ewanchuk, at paragraph 65).

WHAT IS IMPLIED CONSENT?

[41]  As has been seen, the mere touching of another person without their consent can constitute an assault.  The manner in which the offence of assault has been defined in Canada is such that it does not require proof of any level of harm having occurred or having been intended.  The Crown does not have to prove any intent beyond the intent to touch another person without their consent.  Hostility is not a component of the Canadian definition of assault.[5]  As a result, the present definition of assault in Canadian law has the potential to criminalize very trivial behaviour.[6]  This potential harshness is tempered by allowing for contact to occur, without criminal liability, when it occurs between individuals in situations in which the existence of consent is implied.[7]  This aspect of the law of assault was explained by Smith and Hogan, in the context of their examination of the concept of violence in the common law offence of battery, as follows:

Violence here includes the smallest degree of personal contact – a mere touching without consent is enough.  But there is an implied consent to that degree of contact which is necessary or customary in everyday usage.  In Tuberville v. Savage it was said that it is no assault to strike another on the hand, arm or breast in ordinary discourse.  Touching another to attract his attention is not a battery even if, as in Coward v. Baddeley, P has already told D to go away and mind his own business…[8]

 

[42]   Fletcher describes implied consent as an inevitable component of “group living”:

It is difficult to argue that touching per se is incriminating.  In some societies, all forms of human contact might be regarded as trespassing on the domain of another, but we regularly accept a gentle hand on the shoulder as both the price and the benefit of group living.  Sexual

 

 

contact is obviously different…[9]

 

[43]  In Collins v Wilcock, [1984] 3 All ER 374 (Q.B.), it was pointed out, at page 378, that it “has long been established that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery.”  It was said that this principle is based upon the premise that “every person’s body is inviolate.”  As regards the doctrine of implied consent, the Court suggested that rather than attempting to label certain contact as falling within the scope of such a doctrine it is preferable to view such contact as examples of a “general exception” to the requirement for explicit consent (at page 378): 

…Generally speaking, consent is a defence to a battery; and most of the physical contacts of ordinary life are not actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so expose themselves to the risk of bodily contact.  So nobody can complain of the jostling which is inevitable from his presence in, for example, a supermarket, an underground station or a busy street; nor can a person who attends a party complain if his hand is seized in friendship, or even if his back is (within reason) slapped (see Tuberville v. Savage (1669), 1 Mod Rep 3, 86 ER 684).  Although such cases are regarded as examples of implied consent, it is more common nowadays to treat them as falling within a general exception embracing all physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life....

 

…In each case, the test must be whether the physical contact so persisted in has in the circumstances gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct; and the answer to that question will depend on the facts of the particular case.

 

[44]  In applying the doctrine of implied consent, its inherent limitations must be clearly recognized.  We exist in a society in which personal choice as regards the type and manner of contact we have with other people is virtually sacrosanct.  In R. v. Ogg-Moss, 1984 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 173, for instance, it was held that one “of the key rights in our society is the individual's right to be free from unconsented invasions on his or her physical security or dignity and it is a central purpose of the criminal law to protect members of society from such invasions.”  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ewanchuk pointed out that the right to “physical integrity is a fundamental principle” which the “criminalization of assault” seeks to protect and assert:

…Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both physical and psychological, of every individual.  Having control over who touches one's body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity and autonomy.  The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code expresses society's determination to protect the security of the person from any non-consensual contact or threats of force.  The common law has recognized for centuries that the individual's right to physical integrity is a fundamental principle, "every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it in any the slightest manner": see Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th ed. (1770), Book III, at p. 120.  It follows that any intentional but unwanted touching is criminal.[10]

[45]  Though most of us accept that a certain degree of contact with other people will occur in our everyday lives, we expect such contact or touching to be limited, contextually appropriate and consistent with the rationale for our consent to it being implied.  As pointed out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. E.(A.) (2000), 2000 CanLII 16823 (ON CA), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paragraph 33, implied consent, is “a creature of public policy” and thus, it must “be strictly limited to conduct which is consistent with the purpose and rationale underlying the policy basis for the consent…Otherwise, the positive social value of deemed consent loses its rationale.”[11]  As a result, for the doctrine of implied consent to operate, the touching must fall within the scope of the type of touching which our customary norms of social interaction deem to be consensual.  This is an objective standard (see R. v. Cey (1989), 1989 CanLII 283 (SK CA), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Sask. C.A.), at page 490).

Le droit applicable à la preuve de mauvais caractère de la victime administré par l'accusé

R. c. Boudreau-Chartrand, 2023 QCCS 3926

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[31]               En principe, un accusé ne peut chercher à démontrer le « mauvais caractère » de la victime puisque cette preuve n’est généralement pas pertinente quant à la question de savoir s’il a commis ou non l’infraction qui lui est reprochée[7].

[32]               Cependant, une preuve de mauvais caractère de la victime peut devenir pertinente. Par exemple, elle peut répondre à la preuve narrative de la poursuite qui cherche, par exemple, à établir un climat conjugal détérioré pour offrir un contexte au crime, sans que cela ne soit pas un blanc-seing à l’accusé pour démontrer sa bonne réputation[8].

[33]               Comme le souligne le juge Hill de la Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario dans R. v. Golov, « [t]he rule of inadmissibility is not […] “unyielding where the evidence of disposition of the victim relates to a material issue” in the case and is not excluded in the balancing of legal relevance considerations »[9]. Tel que le note le juge Martin, pour la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, dans l’arrêt Scopelliti,

[…] the disposition of a person to do a certain act is relevant to indicate the probability of his having done or not having done the act. The law prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence for the purpose of showing that the accused is a person who by reason of his criminal character (disposition) is likely to have committed the crime charged, on policy grounds, not because of relevance. There is, however, no rule of policy which excludes evidence of the disposition of a third person for violence where that disposition has probative value on some issue before the jury […].[10]

[Italiques dans l’original; le Tribunal souligne.]

[34]               Le juge du procès a le pouvoir discrétionnaire de limiter ou d’exclure la preuve du caractère de la victime lorsque l’effet préjudiciable de cette preuve excède sa valeur probante :

The trial judge must weigh the evidence and balance a variety of factors in the particular circumstances of the case. The weighing process involves an exercise of judgment or discretion and is not an application of a bright line. The trial judge may limit or exclude proffered evidence of the deceased’s bad character if its potential prejudice outweighs its probative value.[11]

[références omises; le Tribunal souligne]

[35]        En effet, comme le souligne le juge Martin dans Scopelliti, « [s]ince evidence of prior acts of violence by the deceased is likely to arouse feelings of hostility against the deceased, there must inevitably be some element of discretion in the determination of whether the proffered evidence has sufficient probative value for the purpose for which it is tendered to justify its admission. Moreover, great care must be taken to ensure that such evidence, if admitted, is not misused »[12].

[36]        L’évaluation de la valeur probante de la preuve du caractère violent de la victime fait intervenir plusieurs facteurs :

51   The probative value of past aggressive propensity by a deceased must be assessed having regard to the nature of the past behaviour and the strength of its asserted linkage to the current transaction including consideration of temporal proximity: Scopelliti, at para. 48; R. v. Varga (2001), 2001 CanLII 8610 (ON CA), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 502 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 72 (leave to appeal refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 278 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Jackson, 2013 ONCA 632 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 24, 38 (affd 2014 CSC 30 (CanLII), [2014] 1 S.C.R. 672 (S.C.C.)). To be logically probative, the disposition evidence relating to the deceased need not pass a significant probative value test: R. v. Yaeck (1991), 1991 CanLII 2732 (ON CA), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 563 (leave to appeal refused [1992] 1 S.C.R. xii (S.C.C.)); Hamilton, at para. 43; Varga, at paras. 71-74, 76.

52  Turning to the discretionary balancing to be undertaken by the court to determine whether the probative value in the case of disposition evidence relating to the deceased is substantially exceeded by potential prejudice, various factors have received judicial examination. Depending upon the nature of the disposition evidence, moral or reasoning prejudice may arise, in terms of the triers of fact unfairly stigmatizing the deceased as a bad person or engendering hostility toward the deceased or a feeling that he may have been undeserving of the protection of the law: Scopelliti, at para. 47; Varga, at para. 71; Watson, at para. 42. The courts also take into account whether there will, in any event, be evidence in the prosecution case of aggressive behaviour on the part of the deceased: Varga, at paras. 73-76; Hamilton, at para. 76; R. v. Mulligan (1997), 1997 CanLII 995 (ON CA), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 559 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 26; R. v. Williams, 2008 ONCA 413 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 65-67, 71.

53   As observed in Grant, at para. 40:

. . . these significant prejudicial effects must nonetheless be evaluated in accordance with the fundamental principles governing criminal proceedings. In giving constitutional protection to the accused's rights to make full answer and defence and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, we must accept a certain amount of complexity, length, and distraction from the Crown's case as a necessary concession to the actualization of those rights. (See, for example, [State v.] Scheidell, [227 Wis.2d 285 (1999)], at para. 65, per Abrahamson C.J., dissenting in the result.)[13]

[37]        Par ailleurs, comme le souligne les auteurs Vauclair et Desjardins dans leur Traité général de preuve et de procédures pénales :

Tabler sur la personnalité de la victime peut équivaloir à mettre sa bonne réputation en jeu et permet alors au ministère public de présenter à son tour une preuve de caractère ou de propension à l’égard de l’accusé pour éviter une distorsion des faits.[14]

[38]        Cependant, cela ne signifie pas non plus que toute révélation de traits de personnalité négatifs de la victime, sans mettre davantage en cause son caractère, ouvre ainsi la porte au poursuivant.[15]

[39]        Enfin, dans tous les cas, la preuve doit être pertinente et le Tribunal doit s’assurer qu’une telle preuve ne cause pas un préjudice à l’accusé[16] ou à la recherche de la vérité.[17]