Les principes fondamentaux de la défense d'alibi, vus par la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario

R. v. Tomlinson, 2014 ONCA 158

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[48]   The principles that govern the defence of alibi are uncontroversial.  A brief reference to some of their features is sufficient for our purposes.

[49]   First, the Latin word “alibi” means “elsewhere”.  When used in the context of criminal prosecution, an alibi is a claim that a person, usually a person charged with a crime, was elsewhere when the allegedly criminal conduct took place and thus it was impossible for him or her to have committed it:  R. v. Hill (1995), 1995 CanLII 271 (ON CA), 102 C.C.C. (3d) 469 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 478; and R. v. Wright, 2009 ONCA 623, 98 O.R. (3d) 665, at para. 19.

[50]   Second, to constitute an alibi the supportive evidence must be dispositive of the final issue of guilt or innocence of the accused:  Hill, at pp. 478-479; R. v. Sgambelluri and Sgambelluri Ltd. (1978), 1978 CanLII 2514 (ON CA), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 496 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 500; and R. v. R.(M.) (2005), 2005 CanLII 5845 (ON CA), 195 C.C.C. (3d) 26 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 31.

[51]   Third, alibi, as with any defence, justification or excuse advanced at trial, is subject to the air of reality test or standard described in R. v. Cinous, 2002 SCC 29 (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3:  there must be some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could acquit, if the jury believe the evidence to be true.

[52]   Fourth, a trial judge is under no obligation to use the term “alibi” in jury instructions on the defence, provided that, when read as a whole, the instructions apprise the jury of the legal effect of the supportive evidence.

[53]   Finally, instructions on alibi must relate reasonable doubt to the evidence adduced in support of the alibi.  The instructions on alibi should make it clear:

i.      that there is no onus on the accused to prove an alibi;

ii.      that if the jury believes the alibi evidence, they must find the accused not guilty;

iii.   that even if the jury does not believe the alibi evidence, if they are left in a reasonable doubt by it, they must find the accused not guilty; and

iv.   that even if the alibi evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt about an accused’s guilt, the jury must determine, on the basis of all the evidence, whether Crown counsel has proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

See, R. v. Parrington (1985), 1985 CanLII 3610 (ON CA), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 184 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 187; and R. v. O’Connor (2002), 2002 CanLII 3540 (ON CA), 170 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34.

L'importance de bien qualifier un moyen de défense / la définition de ce qu'est un alibi

Berman c. R., 2017 QCCA 79

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[2]           Le mot « alibi », emprunté du latin, signifie « ailleurs »[2]. En droit criminel, l’alibi constitue « la réfutation par un défendeur d'être l'auteur de l'infraction puisqu'au moment où celle-ci est commise, il est ailleurs que sur les lieux de l'infraction.[3] » L’alibi consiste donc à nier l’actus reus. Ceci étant, l’alibi doit être déterminant au niveau de la culpabilité : s’il est cru, l’alibi rend impossible que l’accusé ait commis l’infraction[4]. Si l’alibi n’est pas déterminant, la défense constitue plutôt une défense de tiers impliqué[5] ou d’absence d’opportunité pour commettre l’infraction[6] et l’obligation de divulgation à la poursuite ne s’applique pas.

[3]           Le cœur du raisonnement du juge de première instance se trouve aux paragraphes suivants[7] de son jugement:

[140]   Dans la présente affaire, la défense présentée par les accusés remplit les critères de l’alibi parce que ceux-ci affirment avoir été ailleurs que sur les lieux de la plantation. Dès les premiers contacts avec les enquêteurs en novembre 2013, monsieur Gordyn a annoncé son alibi en informant l'enquêteur Richard qu'il avait sous-loué, donc qu'il n'était pas sur les lieux et possédait un bail à cet effet.

[141]   Bien qu'invité à transmettre à l'enquêteur copie de ce bail, ce n'est que lors de son témoignage en août 2014 que monsieur Gordyn a produit ce bail, sur lequel nous reviendrons plus loin.

[142]   En fait, même si monsieur Gordyn a annoncé très tôt qu'il n'était pas le responsable de cette plantation, on ne peut pas dire que par la suite, il a donné des détails suffisants pour permettre à la poursuite de vérifier cette thèse avancée par la défense qu'elle soit qualifiée d'alibi ou non.

[Soulignements ajoutés]

[4]           Il existe une nette distinction entre la défense d’alibi et la défense présentée dans cette affaire. En effet, la prétention des appelants n’était pas qu’ils étaient « ailleurs » et donc dans l’impossibilité de commettre l’infraction. Au contraire, ils ont avancé une défense de tiers impliqué : tout en avouant leur présence ponctuelle sur les lieux, ils ont témoigné qu’une autre personne habitait et contrôlait les lieux[8].

[5]           Force est de constater que la qualification erronée de la nature de la défense a eu un impact important sur le raisonnement du juge, surtout dans son évaluation des obligations des parties en ce qui concerne la communication de la preuve. Il critique M. Gordyn vivement pour « sa parcimonie à transmettre les informations pertinentes relativement à sa défense d’alibi, ce qui affecte grandement sa crédibilité », et ce, à plusieurs reprises[9].

[6]           Pourtant, notre Cour et la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario ont déjà souligné l’importance de bien qualifier la nature de la défense, puisque cette obligation de prompte communication, comme déjà mentionné, ne s’applique pas à toute défense de dénégation. Une qualification erronée risque d’entraver le droit au silence de l’accusé[10] ou de renverser le fardeau de preuve[11]. C’est ce qui s’est produit en l’espèce.

Entre meurtre et homicide involontaire : l'évaluation de l'intention coupable à l'épreuve de l'intoxication extrême

R. v. Odette, 2026 ONSC 760

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[125]      Mr. Odette is charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder. The burden is on the Crown to prove Mr. Odette’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption is only discharged when, and if, the Crown proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown at all times bears the onus of proving the case. The Crown is required to prove the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. I must assess the case on the whole and decide whether, on the basis of all of the evidence, or lack thereof, the Crown has proven the guilt of Mr. Odette beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320.

 

[126]      The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an exacting one. It is more than probable or likely guilt. Indeed, proof beyond a reasonable doubt falls much closer to absolute certainty than it does to proof on a balance of probabilities. Mr. Odette cannot be convicted unless after considering all the evidence or lack of evidence, I am sure that he is guilty of tan offence.

 

[127]      The defence concedes that Mr. Odette unlawfully caused the death of Katie Kainz and that he stabbed Ashley Bernard. The defence submits though that the Crown has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Odette had the requisite intent for murder and attempt murder and submits that Mr. Odette should only be guilty of manslaughter and aggravated assault.

 

[128]      For an unlawful killing to be murder, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Odette either meant to kill the person (Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 229 (a)(i)) or meant to cause the person bodily harm that he knew was likely to kill the person, and was reckless whether the person died or not (Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 229)(a)(ii)). The Crown does not have to prove both routes.

 

[129]      With respect to s. 229(a)(ii), the essential element is that of intending to cause bodily harm of such a grave and serious nature that the accused knew that it was likely to result in the death of the victim. The reckless criterion is considered an afterthought. As explained by Fairburn J.A. in R. v. Zoldi, 2018 ONCA 384, 360 C.C.C. (3d) 476, at para. 40:

 

Once the Crown establishes the principal’s intention to cause such grave and serious bodily harm that he knows it is likely to result in death, recklessness follows as almost a matter of course: R. v. Nygaard, 1989 CanLII 6 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1074, at p. 1088. See also: Cooper, at p. 154-155; Rodgerson, at para. 23, aff’d on other grounds, 2015 SCC 38, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 760; Moo, at para. 63. This is why being “reckless whether death ensues or not” is often referred to as an “afterthought.”

 

[130]      In R. v. Hodgson, 2024 SCC 25, 494 D.L.R. (4th) 501, the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the mens rea requirement for a conviction for murder. The Court stated at paras. 48 and 49:

 

In contrast, “a conviction for murder cannot rest on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective foresight” (R. v. Vaillancourt, 1987 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at p. 654 (emphasis added); R. v. Martineau, 1990 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at p. 646). Murder is distinguished from manslaughter “only by the mental element with respect to the death” (Vaillancourt, at p. 654, quoted in Creighton, at p. 17, per Lamer C.J., concurring). The requisite intent for murder is “an intent to kill or an intent to cause bodily harm that the offender knows is likely to cause death and is reckless as to whether or not death ensues” (R. v. Walle, 2012 SCC 41, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 438, at para. 3).

 

A conviction for murder requires subjective intent because it is an offence that “carries with it the most severe stigma and punishment of any crime in our society” (Martineau, at p. 645). The law requires subjective foresight of death because the criminal liability for murder is of the highest kind and cannot be justified except where the actor possesses a culpable mental state in respect of that result (Martineau, at p. 645, citing R. v. Bernard, 1988 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833). Thus, the harsh stigma and punishment associated with murder is reserved for “those who choose to intentionally cause death or who choose to inflict bodily harm that they know is likely to cause death” (Martineau, at p. 646).

 

[131]      To prove that Mr. Odette committed murder, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either Mr. Odette meant to kill Ms. Kainz or that he meant to cause Ms. Kainz bodily harm that he knew was so serious and dangerous that it would likely kill Ms. Kainz and proceeded despite his knowledge Ms. Kainz would likely die as a result of that bodily harm.

 

[132]      To find Adam Odette guilty of the attempted murder of Ashley Bernard, the Crown must prove: (1) that the accused took some steps towards the commission of the offence beyond mere acts of preparation, and (2) that he had a specific intention to kill. Recklessness does not suffice to establish the mens rea for attempted murder: R. v. B.F., 2025 SCC 41, at para. 69, R. v. Boone, 2019 ONCA 652, at para. 49; and R. v. Ancio, 1984 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 225.

 

[133]      As summarized by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Collins, 2023 ONCA 394, at para. 54: “It has long been settled law in Canada that the mens rea for attempted murder is a specific intention to kill: see The Queen v. Ancio, 1984 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 225, at pp. 250-251; and R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36, at para. 36.” The reckless route in s. 229(a)(ii)is not an available pathway to a conviction for attempted murder. As stated by the Court of Appeal in Boone at para. 57, in the context of attempted murder:

 

Recklessness is not, however, to be equated with intention based on a belief in the virtual certainty that the consequences will flow: Buzzanga, at p. 384. The mens rea required for attempted murder is not satisfied by recklessness as to the consequence. A person who appreciates that his acts may, or probably will, lead to the victim's death is not guilty of attempted murder unless killing his victim was his purpose: Ancio, at pp. 248-51.

 

[134]      There is evidence that Mr. Odette consumed drugs and alcohol prior to the killing. An accused who was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and thus in a state of advanced intoxication may not have had the requisite intent to commit murder. As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 523, at para 49:

 

Second, there is what we might call “advanced” intoxication. This occurs where there is intoxication to the point where the accused lacks specific intent, to the extent of an impairment of the accused’s foresight of the consequences of his or her act sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the requisite mens rea. The Court in Robinson noted that this will most often be the degree of intoxication the jury will grapple with in murder trials:

 

▪  In most murder cases, the focus for the trier of fact will be on the foreseeability prong of s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, that is, on determining whether the accused foresaw that his or her actions were likely to cause the death of the victim. For example, consider the case where an accused and another individual engage in a fight outside a bar. During the fight, the accused pins the other individual to the ground and delivers a kick to the head, which kills that person. In that type of a case, the jury will likely struggle, assuming they reject any self-defence or provocation claim, with the question of whether that accused foresaw that his or her actions would likely cause the death of the other individual. [emphasis added]

 

[135]      The British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Crossley, 2025 BCCA 224, at para. 33 explained the inquiry that must be conducted:

 

Instead, the focus of the “advanced” intoxication inquiry is the overall impact of intoxication on the accused's state of mind at the time of the offence, as borne out by the entirety of the evidence. In the murder context, evidence of “advanced” intoxication is evidence that reasonably supports a finding that intoxication impaired the accused’s “...foresight of the consequences of [their] act sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the requisite mens rea”: Daley at para. 41. In other words, it is evidence that reasonably raises a doubt as to whether the accused intended to kill the victim or meant to cause the victim bodily harm that the accused knew was likely to cause their death and was reckless as to whether death ensued.

 

L'évaluation de la défense d'intoxication avancée exige une analyse contextuelle globale du comportement, de la mémoire et des preuves pour déterminer si l'accusé possédait l'intention spécifique de tuer

R v Matchatis, 2020 ABCA 435

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[26]           Determining whether an accused’s level of intoxication rises to the level of impairing an accused’s foresight of the consequences of their acts is a highly factual and contextual exercise. While expert evidence is not a prerequisite to a defence of advanced intoxication as it is with intoxication akin to automatism, it is nonetheless common: R v Arjun, 2015 BCCA 273 at para 39, leave to appeal ref’d [2015] SCCA No 324. Expert evidence as to the accused’s blood alcohol level when the crime was committed, and the impact the accused’s blood alcohol level would have on their cognition, can provide important context in which to assess the accused’s actions. For her part, Dr. Massey provided only an assumption based on the evidence of Phyllis and Matchatis, that “If you did a blood alcohol reading on him, I’m pretty sure he’d be really high.”

[27]           Other relevant factors include the mannerisms of the accused (slurring, staggering, glossy eyes); ability to recall details of the day and the events in question; and ability to act responsively or to carry out purposeful actions before the commission of the offence. Further, an accused’s post-offence conduct may be considered to discredit a defence, like advanced intoxication, relating to whether an accused formed the requisite intent: R v Jaw, 2009 SCC 42, [2009] 3 SCR 26 at para 40.

[28]           Absent expert evidence on this issue, the trial judge was left with generic evidence as to Matchatis’ level of impairment. Indisputably, the evidence suggests Matchatis had been drinking all day and was intoxicated. The trial judge recounted that Tyler placed his father’s intoxication that evening at 9 on a scale from 1 to 10, and Phyllis’ evidence that he was “just about blacked out drunk” but generally can function even when drunk and it takes a lot of alcohol for him to pass out. Phyllis said Matchatis was a seasoned drinker who, after a period of abstinence, had been drinking regularly for over a year; he could handle his liquor, particularly beer.

[32]           A trial judge must weigh and consider all of the evidence of intoxication in a contextual manner to determine whether the accused’s intoxication crossed the line from mere loss of inhibition, impaired judgment and increased bravado to the point where they are left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the intoxication was severe enough that its effect might have impaired the accused’s foresight of the consequences of their actions. In our view, the trial judge did just that. Matchatis’ actions both before and after the shooting, together with his detailed recall of the events, evinced a sense of awareness. We defer to his ultimate finding that the nature of this homicide was consistent with an intention to kill the deceased.

La défense d'intoxication extrême pour nier l'intention de meurtre requiert de prouver l'incapacité de prévoir les conséquences de ses actes, laquelle s'évalue selon plusieurs facteurs factuels et comportementaux clés

R. v. Rogers, 2024 NSCA 100

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[56]         An accused may raise a reasonable doubt about their intent for murder through evidence of advanced intoxication. Where death is the consequence of the accused’s acts, the accused would have to establish a particularly advanced degree of intoxication to successfully avail himself of this defence. The inquiry is whether the accused’s ability to foresee the consequences of his actions was affected by intoxication.[22]

[57]         Factors that may be relevant in assessing advanced intoxication include:

1.                 The amount and type of intoxicant consumed;

2.                 Evidence of the accused’s ability to communicate, process information, and/or problem-solve;

3.                 Evidence of the accused’s fine and gross motor coordination skills and ability to perform divided-attention tasks;

4.                 Observations of the accused’s demeanour at or around the time of the offence;

5.                 Witnesses’ lay opinions of the accused’s level of intoxication;

6.                 Evidence of goal-oriented or rational behaviour by the accused;

7.                 Expert evidence linking the accused’s intoxication to the accused’s ability to foresee the consequences of his actions.[23]

En droit criminel, s'appuyer sur un avis juridique erroné ne constitue pas une défense valable pour échapper à sa responsabilité

Gingras c. R., 2022 QCCA 1546

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[12]      Toujours sur le verdict, l’appelant plaide avoir été privé de son droit à une défense pleine et entière en raison d’un jugement rendu par le juge avant la présentation de sa défense[12]. En effet, l’appelant avait annoncé vouloir faire entendre deux avocats experts en affaires municipales en vue d’établir qu’il a agi conformément à des avis juridiques pour justifier ses gestes. Ce moyen de défense étant apparent et clairement anticipé, le ministère public a présenté une demande visant à restreindre la portée de cette preuve, fondé sur le principe que l’erreur de droit ne constitue pas une défense à une accusation criminelle, codifié à l’article 19 du Code criminel.

[13]      Après analyse du droit applicable, le juge conclut que l’appelant ne peut mettre en preuve devant le jury des avis juridiques obtenus « afin de justifier ses faits et gestes et soutenir un moyen de défense sans enfreindre la règle édictée par l’article 19 » du Code criminel[13]. Le juge n’a pas non plus permis la preuve que l’appelant a suivi des conseils juridiques, puisque ceci reviendrait à faire indirectement ce qu’il ne peut faire directement, c’est-à-dire présenter une défense qui n’est pas juridiquement permise. Cependant, il a autorisé l’appelant à faire une certaine preuve, à savoir :

[28] Le Tribunal permettra néanmoins à l’accusé de se référer à l’obtention d’avis juridiques à titre de narration des événements pour permettre au jury d’évaluer sa conduite en fonction du fait qu’il a ou non obtenu un avis juridique, afin d’apprécier sa conduite eu égard à l’ensemble des circonstances, notamment le quatrième élément constitutif de l’infraction [c’est-à-dire un écart grave et marqué par rapport aux normes que serait censé observer quiconque occuperait le poste de confiance de l’accusé].^[14]

[14]      Lors de l’argumentaire sur cette question en première instance, l’avocat de l’appelant a louvoyé, affirmant qu’il n’entendait pas, en fin de compte, mettre en preuve des opinions juridiques, mais simplement que l’appelant a consulté une firme d’avocats, qu’il a obtenu une opinion et qu’il a pris des actions. Or, dans son témoignage, l’appelant ne s’est pas prévalu de l’ouverture faite par le juge de faire référence à l’obtention d’avis juridique à titre narratif. Le juge avait également gardé une porte ouverte à revisiter son jugement si la situation le justifiait. L’appelant n’a pas soulevé de nouveau cette question.

[15]      De toute manière, le jugement sur cette question n’est pas attaquable. L’erreur de droit n’est pas une défense en droit criminel. Un accusé ne peut espérer échapper à sa responsabilité criminelle en invoquant qu’il s’est enquis de la légalité de ses actes et a agi conformément à un avis juridique qui s’est avéré erroné[15]. L’un des fondements de cette règle est la préservation de l’intégrité de l’administration judiciaire, en évitant que des citoyens tentent de se draper d’une immunité à l’encontre de poursuites criminelles par l’obtention d’opinions juridiques favorables à leur thèse[16].