La défense de plaisanterie n'invalide pas l'intention de voler lorsqu'il y a privation du bien

Bogner v. The Queen, 1975 CanLII 2458 (QC CA

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Reste à savoir si l'infraction de vol a été commise. On peut trouver dans la preuve chacun des éléments de l'infraction: la chaise a été prise frauduleusement et sans apparence de droit, en ce sens que l'enlèvement a été fait intentionnellement, sous l'effet d'aucune erreur ou croyance d'un état de faits pou­vant le justifier, mais le groupe se rendait bien compte que la chose ainsi prise était la propriété de l'hôtelier; la chaise a été déplacée avec l'intention d'en priver temporairement son propriétaire. Tel que le mentionne l'art. 283, la prise d'une chose peut être entachée de fraude même si elle a lieu ouverte­ment ou sans tentative de dissimulation. 

En défense, l'appelant prétend qu'il s'agissait d'une plais­anterie organisée par un groupe d'amis, en somme qu'il y aurait absence de mens rea. Je ne puis partager cette opinion. La mens rea est l'intention de poser les actes constituant les éléments de l'actus reus ou l'insouciance déréglée envers ces actes. L'existence en soi d'un état d'esprit malhonnête en général, en plus d'une intention qui s'adresse aux éléments de l'infraction, n'est pas requise bien que sa constatation révé­lera sûrement la présence de la mens rea; mais en loi celle-ci s'arrête au facteur mental requis pour l'infraction particulière en question, donc pour chacun de ses éléments. Celui qui a posé volontairement les actes qui constituent les éléments d'un vol s'en rend coupable si sa seule défense est que son mobile était une plaisanterie. Bien sûr que la gravité de l'infraction en devient considérablement atténuée et que le tribunal pourra la considérer comme une infraction de droit strict au niveau de la sentence, mais je ne vois pas comment l'acquittement lui-même peut alors se justifier.

La défense d'intoxication vue par la Cour d'appel de Colombie-Britannique

R. v. Crossley, 2025 BCCA 224

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[31]      In R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that a person who is not “so intoxicated as to lack [any] capacity” to form intent, may nonetheless raise a reasonable doubt on the Crown’s proof of a specific intent by arguing that intoxication impacted their ability to exercise that capacity: at para. 40, emphasis added.

[32]      Daley made it clear that with a specific intent offence (including murder), the defence of intoxication will not succeed on evidence of “mild” intoxication: at para. 41. This is because “mild” intoxication will generally cause a person’s “inhibitions and socially acceptable behaviour” to be relaxed but will not negate specific intent: at para. 41. Instead, a successful intoxication defence requires evidence of “advanced” intoxication: Daley at para. 41.

[33]      What does that mean? Daley did not specify the kind of evidence necessary to meet this threshold or identify specific indicia of impairment that must be present for the defence to succeed. Instead, the focus of the “advanced” intoxication inquiry is the overall impact of intoxication on the accused’s state of mind at the time of the offence, as borne out by the entirety of the evidence. In the murder context, evidence of “advanced” intoxication is evidence that reasonably supports a finding that intoxication impaired the accused’s “… foresight of the consequences of [their] act sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the requisite mens rea”: Daley at para. 41. In other words, it is evidence that reasonably raises a doubt as to whether the accused intended to kill the victim or meant to cause the victim bodily harm that the accused knew was likely to cause their death and was reckless as to whether death ensued.

[34]      As a practical matter, whether the evidence of intoxication in a particular case will be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the intent for murder will vary with the circumstances: Daley at para. 42, citing R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683 at para. 52, 1996 CanLII 233. See also R. v. Sundman, 2021 BCCA 53 at para. 103, aff’d 2022 SCC 31; R. v. Arjun, 2015 BCCA 273 at para. 5, leave to appeal ref’d [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 324; R. v. Florence, 2014 BCCA 288 at para. 22. This is an individualized inquiry.

[35]      For example, in a case where the accused is alleged to have killed someone by pointing a loaded shotgun directly at their head and pulling the trigger, the evidence of intoxication will likely “have to establish a particularly advanced degree of intoxication” before it will be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the intent for murder because death will have been such an obviously foreseeable consequence of the unlawful act: Daley at para. 42, emphasis added. In a different case, where the natural and probable consequences of the unlawful act that causes death may not be as clear, “advanced” intoxication of a lesser degree may suffice to raise a reasonable doubt. It is generally the case that the “… more severe the injuries and the more force required to inflict them, the stronger the inference will be that the accused [including an intoxicated accused] intended to kill the victim or cause the victim bodily harm knowing it was likely to cause death …”: R. v. So, 2024 BCCA 101 at para. 91, citing R. v. Rodgerson, 2015 SCC 38 at paras. 20, 55.

[36]      Deciding whether evidence of intoxication reasonably supports the defence is determined case-by-case. What is critical in the murder context is that whatever the evidence might consist of, it must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether intoxication by drugs or alcohol impaired the accused’s foresight of the consequences of their actions: Daley at para. 41. As aptly articulated by this Court in R. v. Ruff, 2019 BCCA 412, the evidence must be sufficient to “reduce” the accused’s “appreciation of the consequences of [their] actions, at the time of the act”: at para. 21.

[37]      In making this assessment, the trier of fact may consider: the nature of the act(s) that caused death; the manner in which those acts were committed; the quantity of alcohol or drugs consumed before the offence; whether the accused was displaying impairment at the time of the offence and to what extent; evidence of purposive behaviour before, during, and after the offence; and any expert evidence that may be adduced specific to intoxication, including its likely effect on the accused’s ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions: Sundman at para. 108. This is not a closed list. There may be other types of evidence relevant to the assessment. Again, as explained in R. v. Matchatis, 2020 ABCA 435, “[d]etermining whether an accused’s level of intoxication rises to the level of impairing an accused’s foresight of the consequences of their acts is a highly factual and contextual exercise”: at paras. 26–27. The trier of fact:

[32]        … must weigh and consider all of the evidence of intoxication in a contextual manner to determine whether the accused’s intoxication crossed the line from mere loss of inhibition, impaired judgment and increased bravado to the point where they are left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the intoxication was severe enough that its effect might have impaired the accused’s foresight of the consequences of their actions.

[Matchatis, emphasis added.]

See also R. v. Rogers, 2024 NSCA 100 at paras. 56–57.

Le droit canadien ne permet pas qu’un justiciable invoque, en défense à une infraction criminelle ou réglementaire, les conseils juridiques obtenus d’un avocat quant à la légalité de sa conduite (idem pour les conseils d'un ami)

Céré c. Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales, 2024 QCCA 344

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C.   Erreur provoquée par l’ami de l’appelant

[132]   J’aborde maintenant la question sous un angle différent parce que les multiples facettes des arguments présentés par l’appelant l’exigent. Certes, l’appelant soutient que l’essence de sa défense est une erreur de fait, mais il ajoute néanmoins que l’erreur commise résulte des assurances que lui avait données son ami en qui il avait confiance.

[133]   Par conséquent, l’appelant revendique le bénéfice d’une défense d’erreur provoquée par son ami. Or, comme je l’ai indiqué auparavant, seule l’erreur de droit provoquée par une personne en autorité peut entraîner la suspension des procédures[99], mais l’erreur provoquée par un ami en qui l’on a confiance ne le peut certainement pas.

[134]   Retenir la défense proposée par l’appelant aurait pour effet de reconnaître une nouvelle défense à l’encontre de multiples infractions réglementaires, soit celle de l’erreur provoquée par un ami ou une personne qui aurait des connaissances particulières concernant l’activité réglementée sans être une personne en autorité contrairement à ce qu’exige l’arrêt Lévis (Ville) c. Tétreault[100].

[135]   On peut facilement imaginer les conséquences incalculables d’une telle conclusion qui est totalement incompatible avec le principe selon lequel l’ignorance de la loi n’est pas une défense à l’encontre d’une infraction réglementaire au Québec[101].

[136]   De plus, j’estime que cela contredirait un autre principe bien ancré dans la jurisprudence relative aux moyens de défense pouvant être soulevés en matière d’infraction criminelle et réglementaire, à savoir la non-recevabilité d’une défense fondée sur les conseils juridiques reçus.

[137]   Le droit canadien ne permet pas qu’un justiciable invoque, en défense à une infraction criminelle ou réglementaire, les conseils juridiques obtenus d’un avocat quant à la légalité de sa conduite[102].

[138]   Dans l’arrêt Stucky, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario écrit :

[109]   In our view, there can be no doubt that reliance on a lawyer’s advice is a mistake of law which affords no defence to the commission of an offence.  Accordingly, we do not view Mr. Stucky’s reliance on legal advice as a matter properly considered under the second branch of the due diligence defence[103].

[139]   Dans l’arrêt Eizenga, la juge Weiler énonce le même principe :

[79]      First, it was not open to Eizenga to advance what amounts to a mistake of law defence based on the legal advice that he received. It is well established that reliance on legal advice is a mistake of law which affords no defence to the commission of an offence: R. v. Pea (2008), 2008 CanLII 89824 (ON CA), 93 O.R. (3d) 67 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 17; R. v. Pontes, 1995 CanLII 61 (CSC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44 (S.C.C.), at paras. 33-34; R. v. Kotch (1990), 1990 ABCA 348 (CanLII), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 132 (Alta. C.A.), at p. 138; and R. v. Stucky (2009), 2009 ONCA 151 (CanLII), 240 C.C.C. (3d) 141 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal discontinued at [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 186 (S.C.C.). Thus, Eizenga’s reliance on legal advice concerning the use of the seed capital exemption or the RRSP eligibility of the investments was no defence[104].

[140]   Dans l’arrêt Gingras[105], la Cour, s’appuyant notamment sur l’arrêt Eizenga, formule les observations suivantes :

[15]      De toute manière, le jugement sur cette question n’est pas attaquable. L’erreur de droit n’est pas une défense en droit criminel. Un accusé ne peut espérer échapper à sa responsabilité criminelle en invoquant qu’il s’est enquis de la légalité de ses actes et a agi conformément à un avis juridique qui s’est avéré erroné. L’un des fondements de cette règle est la préservation de l’intégrité de l’administration judiciaire, en évitant que des citoyens tentent de se draper d’une immunité à l’encontre de poursuites criminelles par l’obtention d’opinions juridiques favorables à leur thèse.

[Renvois omis]

[141]   Curieusement, l’appelant admet que la défense d’erreur de droit provoquée par une personne en position d’autorité n’est pas recevable, les critères d’ouverture de celle-ci n’étant pas respectés[106]. Il reconnaît également que M. Raiche ne peut être considéré comme une personne en position d’autorité[107].

[142]   Par conséquent, si les conseils d’un avocat ne donnent pas ouverture à une défense, les conseils d’un ami chasseur n’offrent guère davantage de protection en défense.

Légitime défense au domicile : un moyen de défense qui admet l’erreur de fait et l’imprécision de la force sans jamais imposer le devoir de fuir

R. v. Cunha, 2016 ONCA 491

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[5]         On March 11, 2013, the Citizen’s Arrest and Self-Defence Act, S.C. 2012, c. 9, came into force, repealing the former ss. 34 to 37 of the Criminal Code and replacing them with a new s. 34 self-defence provision. At trial, the parties did not have the benefit of this court’s decision in R. v. Bengy, 2015 ONCA 397, 325 C.C.C. (3d) 22, in which this court held that the new Criminal Code provisions regarding self-defence do not apply retrospectively. However, the parties submit, and I agree, there is no relevant difference, for the purposes of this case, between the old provisions and the new. 

[6]         At para. 28 of Bengy, Hourigan J.A. set out the elements of self-defence:

The test for self-defence was, therefore, simplified into three basic requirements, applicable to all cases:

Reasonable belief (34(1)(a)): the accused must reasonably believe that force or threat of force is being used against him or someone else;

Defensive purpose (34(1)(b)): the subjective purpose for responding to the threat must be to protect oneself or others; and

Reasonable response (34(c)): the act committed must be objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

[7]         As for the objective element of the defence, it is accepted that in considering the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of defensive force, the court must be alive to the fact that people in stressful and dangerous situations do not have time for subtle reflection, as this court noted in R. v. Mohamed, 2014 ONCA 442, 310 C.C.C. (3d) 123, at para. 29:

As Professor Paciocco notes at p. 36:

The law's readiness to justify "mistaken self-defence" recognizes that those in peril, or even in situations of perceived peril, do not have time for full reflection and that errors in interpretation and judgment will be made.

In a similar vein, Martin J.A. commented in R. v. Baxter (1975), 1975 CanLII 1510 (ON CA), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 96, at p. 111, that

in deciding whether the force used by the accused was more than was necessary in self-defence under both s. 34(1) and (2), the jury must bear in mind that a person defending himself against an attack, reasonably apprehended, cannot be expected to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of necessary defensive action.

[8]         It is well established that self-defence can be invoked on the basis of reasonable mistakes of fact, including whether the putative assailant was armed.   As this court noted in R. v. Currie 2002 CanLII 44973 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 2101, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 190 (C.A.), at para. 43:

The Supreme Court of Canada in Cinous [2002 SCC 29] confirmed the principle established in R. v. Pétel, 1994 CanLII 133 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3 that the existence of an actual assault is not a prerequisite for a defence under s. 34(2). The question that the jury must ask itself is not whether the accused was unlawfully attacked, but whether he reasonably believed in the circumstances that he was being unlawfully attacked. The question for the trial judge on the threshold evidential test is whether there is evidence upon which a jury acting reasonably could conclude that the accused reasonably believed he was about to be attacked and that this belief was reasonable in the circumstances.

[9]         It is also the law that a person who is defending himself, and other occupants of his house, is not obliged to retreat in the face of danger. In R. v. Forde, 2011 ONCA 592, 277 C.C.C. (3d) 1, this court considered the issue of retreat at some length, and concluded at para. 55: “a jury is not entitled to consider whether an accused could have retreated from his or her own home in the face of an attack (or threatened attack) by an assailant in assessing the elements of self-defence.”

Les composantes de la défense d’excuse raisonnable prévue à l’art. 320.15 C. cr

Bouzergan c. R., 2025 QCCS 1089

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[11]         La défense d’excuse raisonnable prévue à l’art. 320.15 C. cr. a trois composantes qui doivent toutes être prouvées par l’accusé selon la prépondérance des probabilités[3] :

11.1.   Dans un premier temps : L’accusé doit convaincre le juge du procès que l’excuse qu’il invoque a un fondement factuel[4] ;

11.2.   Dans un deuxième temps : L’accusé doit démontrer que l’excuse qu’il invoque a réellement motivé son refus d’obtempérer. Autrement, il n’y a logiquement aucune raison de lui permettre de s’en prévaloir ;

11.3.   Dans un troisième temps : L’accusé doit convaincre le juge du procès que son excuse était objectivement raisonnable, en ce sens qu’il aurait été raisonnable pour une personne placée dans les mêmes circonstances que l’accusé de refuser d’obtempérer à l’ordre du policier.

[12]        Il est donc erroné de qualifier la défense d’excuse raisonnable de purement objective. Il est plus juste d’affirmer qu’elle traduit des considérations à la fois subjectives et objectives.

Ce n’est pas parce qu'un accusé déclare ne pas avoir eu pour but la commission d’une infraction criminelle que ce vœu constitue une preuve contraire justifiant un acquittement en matière d'introduction par effraction

R. c. Lévesque, 2022 QCCA 510

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[42]      L’introduction par effraction dans un dessein criminel requiert l’intention spécifique de l’accusé de commettre ce crime[21]. Or, cette infraction jouit d’une présomption quant à la mens rea. La preuve de l’introduction dans un endroit par effraction suffit pour constituer la preuve que cette introduction a lieu avec l’intention d’y commettre un acte criminel (art. 348(2) a) C.cr.).

[43]      Cette présomption permet d’inférer chez l’auteur de l’introduction par effraction que, ce faisant, il poursuit un but illégitime. Toutefois, cette présomption peut être réfutée par une « preuve contraire »[22].

[46]      Ce n’est pas parce que l’intimé déclare ne pas avoir eu pour but la commission d’une infraction criminelle que ce vœu constitue une preuve contraire. Qu’il n’y ait eu aucun cri, menace, ni haussement de ton de sa part et de celle de ses comparses n’y change rien, tout comme c’est le cas pour la remise des fleurs et d’un trophée satirique aux employés de Vice. Ces constats n’ont nullement pour effet de neutraliser la preuve de l’intention de l’intimé de poser volontairement les gestes qui allaient porter atteinte à la jouissance ou à l’exploitation légitime du local de Vice, et ce, même si ces conséquences découlaient de son insouciance[23].

[47]      En somme, que l’intimé ait eu l’intention de commettre un acte criminel avec le moins de heurts possible ne permet pas de conclure autrement qu’il agissait tout de même avec l’intention de le commettre.

[48]      La poursuivante devait donc prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable l’introduction de l’intimé dans un endroit par effraction, ce qu’elle a démontré à l’aide des présomptions de l’article 350b)(i) et (ii) C.cr. Selon le même fardeau, elle devait aussi prouver l’intention de l’intimé de commettre cette infraction dans un dessein criminel, charge dont elle s’est également acquittée grâce à la présomption de l’article 348(2)a) C.cr.

[49]      La preuve contraire quant à elle devait tendre à soulever un doute raisonnable sur l’intention de l’intimé. Or, ce dernier n’a jamais nié avoir agi dans l’intention de poser les gestes qui se sont révélés être de la nature d’un véritable méfait. Les préparatifs préalables à la commission de l’infraction mis en place avec soin par l’intimé, tels que constatés par la juge[24], témoignent éloquemment de cette intention spécifique, et ce, abstraction faite de la preuve des faits subséquents survenus lors de cette introduction par effraction.

[50]      J’estime donc que l’intimé aurait dû être déclaré coupable de l’accusation d’introduction en un endroit par effraction avec l’intention d’y commettre un acte criminel, et que son témoignage, même cru, ne comporte aucun aspect de nature à constituer une preuve contraire au sens de l’article 348(2)a) C.cr.

La défense d'erreur de fait & de consentement implicite en matière de voies de fait

R. v. Bennett, 2006 CanLII 31012 (NL PC)

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THE ELEMENT OF CONSENT IN THE OFFENCE OF ASSAULT

[37]  When an accused person is charged with the offence of assault, the Crown must prove that the complainant did not consent to being touched.  This is a subjective test (see Ewanchuk, at paragraphs 25 to 30).  The Crown must also prove that the accused knew that there was a lack of consent or was reckless or wilfully blind to its absence (see R. v. Williams, 2003 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, at paragraphs 22 and 36).

MISTAKE OF FACT

[38]  If the Crown can prove a lack of consent, the accused may still argue that he or she had an honest, but mistaken belief that the person touched was consenting.  In Ewanchuk, the nature of this defence was described as follows (at paragraphs 43 and 44):

The accused may challenge the Crown's evidence of mens rea by asserting an honest but mistaken belief in consent.  The nature of this defence was described in Pappajohn v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 at p. 148, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481, 111 D.L.R. (3d) 1, by Dickson J. (as he then was) (dissenting in the result): Mistake is a defence . . . where it prevents an accused from having the mens rea which the law requires for the very crime with which he is charged.  Mistake of fact is more accurately seen as a negation of guilty intention than as the affirmation of a positive defence.  It avails an accused who acts innocently, pursuant to a flawed perception of the facts, and nonetheless commits the actus reus of the offence.  Mistake is a defence though, in the sense that it is raised as an issue by an accused. The Crown is rarely possessed of knowledge of the subjective factors which may have caused an accused to entertain a belief in a fallacious set of facts.

The defence of mistake is simply a denial of mens rea. It does not impose any burden of proof upon the accused (see R. v. Robertson, 1987 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 918 at p. 936, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 321), and it is not necessary for the accused to testify in order to raise the issue…

[39]  In determining if an accused person had an honest belief that consent existed, section 265(4) of the Criminal Code indicates the Court must consider the “presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief”:

Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented to the conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused’s belief, to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief.

[40]  Finally, to constitute an honest mistake, the accused's belief cannot be a reckless or willfully blind one (Ewanchuk, at paragraph 65).

WHAT IS IMPLIED CONSENT?

[41]  As has been seen, the mere touching of another person without their consent can constitute an assault.  The manner in which the offence of assault has been defined in Canada is such that it does not require proof of any level of harm having occurred or having been intended.  The Crown does not have to prove any intent beyond the intent to touch another person without their consent.  Hostility is not a component of the Canadian definition of assault.[5]  As a result, the present definition of assault in Canadian law has the potential to criminalize very trivial behaviour.[6]  This potential harshness is tempered by allowing for contact to occur, without criminal liability, when it occurs between individuals in situations in which the existence of consent is implied.[7]  This aspect of the law of assault was explained by Smith and Hogan, in the context of their examination of the concept of violence in the common law offence of battery, as follows:

Violence here includes the smallest degree of personal contact – a mere touching without consent is enough.  But there is an implied consent to that degree of contact which is necessary or customary in everyday usage.  In Tuberville v. Savage it was said that it is no assault to strike another on the hand, arm or breast in ordinary discourse.  Touching another to attract his attention is not a battery even if, as in Coward v. Baddeley, P has already told D to go away and mind his own business…[8]

 

[42]   Fletcher describes implied consent as an inevitable component of “group living”:

It is difficult to argue that touching per se is incriminating.  In some societies, all forms of human contact might be regarded as trespassing on the domain of another, but we regularly accept a gentle hand on the shoulder as both the price and the benefit of group living.  Sexual

 

 

contact is obviously different…[9]

 

[43]  In Collins v Wilcock, [1984] 3 All ER 374 (Q.B.), it was pointed out, at page 378, that it “has long been established that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery.”  It was said that this principle is based upon the premise that “every person’s body is inviolate.”  As regards the doctrine of implied consent, the Court suggested that rather than attempting to label certain contact as falling within the scope of such a doctrine it is preferable to view such contact as examples of a “general exception” to the requirement for explicit consent (at page 378): 

…Generally speaking, consent is a defence to a battery; and most of the physical contacts of ordinary life are not actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so expose themselves to the risk of bodily contact.  So nobody can complain of the jostling which is inevitable from his presence in, for example, a supermarket, an underground station or a busy street; nor can a person who attends a party complain if his hand is seized in friendship, or even if his back is (within reason) slapped (see Tuberville v. Savage (1669), 1 Mod Rep 3, 86 ER 684).  Although such cases are regarded as examples of implied consent, it is more common nowadays to treat them as falling within a general exception embracing all physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life....

 

…In each case, the test must be whether the physical contact so persisted in has in the circumstances gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct; and the answer to that question will depend on the facts of the particular case.

 

[44]  In applying the doctrine of implied consent, its inherent limitations must be clearly recognized.  We exist in a society in which personal choice as regards the type and manner of contact we have with other people is virtually sacrosanct.  In R. v. Ogg-Moss, 1984 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 173, for instance, it was held that one “of the key rights in our society is the individual's right to be free from unconsented invasions on his or her physical security or dignity and it is a central purpose of the criminal law to protect members of society from such invasions.”  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ewanchuk pointed out that the right to “physical integrity is a fundamental principle” which the “criminalization of assault” seeks to protect and assert:

…Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both physical and psychological, of every individual.  Having control over who touches one's body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity and autonomy.  The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code expresses society's determination to protect the security of the person from any non-consensual contact or threats of force.  The common law has recognized for centuries that the individual's right to physical integrity is a fundamental principle, "every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it in any the slightest manner": see Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th ed. (1770), Book III, at p. 120.  It follows that any intentional but unwanted touching is criminal.[10]

[45]  Though most of us accept that a certain degree of contact with other people will occur in our everyday lives, we expect such contact or touching to be limited, contextually appropriate and consistent with the rationale for our consent to it being implied.  As pointed out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. E.(A.) (2000), 2000 CanLII 16823 (ON CA), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paragraph 33, implied consent, is “a creature of public policy” and thus, it must “be strictly limited to conduct which is consistent with the purpose and rationale underlying the policy basis for the consent…Otherwise, the positive social value of deemed consent loses its rationale.”[11]  As a result, for the doctrine of implied consent to operate, the touching must fall within the scope of the type of touching which our customary norms of social interaction deem to be consensual.  This is an objective standard (see R. v. Cey (1989), 1989 CanLII 283 (SK CA), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Sask. C.A.), at page 490).