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vendredi 3 octobre 2025

La combinaison des moyens de défense incomplets ou rejetés peuvent tout de même être cumulativement pertinents pour évaluer l’intention de tuer

R. v. Phillips, 2017 ONCA 752

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[154]   In a murder case, evidence that supplies the air of reality to place a defence, justification or excuse before a jury may also be relevant for the jury to consider in deciding whether the Crown has proven the mental or fault element in murder beyond a reasonable doubt: Cudjoe, at para. 103. The device by which to draw the jury’s attention to such evidence is the rolled-up charge, prosaically described as “a stew of failed individual defences, justifications, or excuses whose ingredients are combined together and left with other relevant evidence for jurors to consider cumulatively in deciding whether [the prosecutor] has proven the mental element essential in murder” (emphasis in original): Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, 2nd ed., at p. 1206.

[155]   The purpose of a rolled-up charge is to instruct the jury not to take a compartmentalized approach to the evidence by considering it only in connection with a discrete defence, justification, or excuse. Instead, the trial judge should remind the jury “they should consider the cumulative effect of all relevant evidence in determining the adequacy of the prosecution’s proof of the mental or fault element in murder” beyond a reasonable doubt: Cudjoe, at para. 104R. v. Robinson1996 CanLII 233 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683, at para. 59R. v. Fraser (2001), 2001 CanLII 8611 (ON CA), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 540 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 25, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 11.

[156]   Even where the partial defence of provocation is not left for the jury, evidence of an accused’s anger, excitement or instinctive reactions can have an impact on the formation of the requisite intent for murder and must be considered by the jury on that issue: R. v. Bouchard2013 ONCA 791, 305 C.C.C. (3d) 240, at para. 62, aff’d 2014 SCC 64, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 283; R. v. Singh2016 ONSC 3739, at paras. 84-85.

Les circonstances qui ne suffisent pas à soutenir une défense de provocation, notamment la conduite de la victime, peuvent être pertinentes pour évaluer l’intention de tuer

Palma c. R., 2019 QCCA 762



[35]        Reste que les circonstances qui ne suffisent pas à soutenir une défense de provocation, notamment la conduite de la victime, peuvent être pertinentes pour évaluer l’intention. Le jury doit être guidé sur tous les éléments qui peuvent avoir un impact sur celle-ci : R. c. Bouchard2014 CSC 64 (CanLII), [2014] 3 R.C.S. 283.

[36]        Dans cet arrêt, la Cour confirme sommairement la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario : R. c. Bouchard2013 ONCA 791. Dans cette affaire, le juge du procès avait correctement instruit le jury sur la défense de provocation et l’intoxication. Même s’il rejetait ces deux moyens individuellement, le juge avait ensuite invité le jury à considérer l’effet combiné de l’intoxication et de la provocation avec toute la preuve pour déterminer si la poursuite avait satisfait son fardeau de prouver l’intention requise pour le meurtre. Le juge Doherty, pour la Cour, écrit au paragraphe 62 :

[62]      However, potentially provocative conduct that fails the ordinary person test and, therefore, cannot qualify as provocation under s. 232, must still be considered by a jury in assessing whether an accused had the necessary mens reaIn the context of the mens rea inquiry, the accused’s intoxication could potentially play a significant role in support of the claim that a deceased’s conduct caused the accused to act without regard to the consequences and without the necessary mens rea.

(Je souligne.)

[37]        Évidemment, un élément fort différent avec cette affaire demeure que la défense de provocation n’a pas, ici, d’air de vraisemblance. Lorsque la défense de provocation est présentée au jury, comme dans l’arrêt Bouchard, il y a un risque que le jury confonde la défense de provocation et les éléments qui la composent. S’il est important que le jury fasse la distinction, il doit également et toujours considérer les éléments provocateurs indépendamment de l’existence ou du rejet de la défense de provocation.

[38]        Cela est rappelé dans l’arrêt R. c. Philipps2017 ONCA 752, où la défense de provocation n’avait pas, comme ici, un air de vraisemblance. La Cour écrit :

[154]   In a murder case, evidence that supplies the air of reality to place a defence, justification or excuse before a jury may also be relevant for the jury to consider in deciding whether the Crown has proven the mental or fault element in murder beyond a reasonable doubt: Cudjoe, at para. 103. The device by which to draw the jury’s attention to such evidence is the rolled-up charge, prosaically described as “a stew of failed individual defences, justifications, or excuses whose ingredients are combined together and left with other relevant evidence for jurors to consider cumulatively in deciding whether [the prosecutor] has proven the mental element essential in murder” (emphasis in original): Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, 2nd ed., at p. 1206.

[155]   The purpose of a rolled-up charge is to instruct the jury not to take a compartmentalized approach to the evidence by considering it only in connection with a discrete defence, justification, or excuse. Instead, the trial judge should remind the jury “they should consider the cumulative effect of all relevant evidence in determining the adequacy of the prosecution’s proof of the mental or fault element in murder” beyond a reasonable doubt: Cudjoe, at para. 104; R. v. Robinson1996 CanLII 233 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683, at para. 59R. v. Fraser (2001), 2001 CanLII 8611 (ON CA), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 540 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 25, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 11.

[156]   Even where the partial defence of provocation is not left for the jury, evidence of an accused’s anger, excitement or instinctive reactions can have an impact on the formation of the requisite intent for murder and must be considered by the jury on that issueR. v. Bouchard2013 ONCA 791 (CanLII), 305 C.C.C. (3d) 240, at para. 62, aff’d 2014 SCC 64 (CanLII), [2014] 3 S.C.R. 283; R. v. Singh2016 ONSC 3739, at paras. 84-85.

(Je souligne.)

[39]        Cela ne saurait cependant pas « élever au rang de moyens de défense autonomes des circonstances qui n'en sont pas, comme la colère… », écrit le juge Doyon dans l’arrêt R. c. Helpin2012 QCCA 1523, par. 46.

[40]        En effet, je rappelle que la colère seule, même intense, n’est pas un moyen de défense autonome sauf, comme l’a précisé la Cour suprême, si la colère extrême fait « sombrer une personne dans un état d’automatisme où elle ne sait plus ce qu’elle fait, enlevant ainsi à l’actus reus son caractère volontaire : R. c. Stone1999 CanLII 688 (CSC), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 290 […] ce qui aurait pour effet d’entraîner l’acquittement et non de réduire le meurtre à un homicide involontaire coupable » : R. c. Parent2001 CSC 30 (CanLII), [2001] 1 R.C.S. 761, par. 10.

[41]        Cependant, lorsque la colère ou des émotions équivalentes et d’autres éléments de preuve sont pertinents, comme l’intoxication, tous ces éléments doivent être soupesés cumulativement pour trancher la question de l’intention. Il ne s’agit pas de donner à cette émotion, colère ou autre, un caractère de défense autonome, mais d’évaluer le poids cumulatif des éléments pertinents.

[42]        L’appelant a donc raison, particulièrement lorsqu’il souligne que la « meilleure pratique » voudrait que le juge regroupe dans une section de ses directives l’ensemble des éléments qui peuvent, dans un cas donné, influencer l’analyse de l’élément de l’intention. À n’en pas douter, tout ce qui amène le jury à mieux comprendre son travail est bienvenu. Les directives s’évaluent cependant en fonction d’un autre critère, celui de leur caractère approprié : R. c. Jacquard1997 CanLII 374 (CSC), [1997] 1 R.C.S. 314; R. c. Calnen2019 CSC 6, par. 8 et 11; R. c. Dandurand2005 QCCA 762.

samedi 27 septembre 2025

Une instruction telle que « ne vous inquiétez pas, faites simplement ce qu'on vous dit » peut, selon les circonstances, éveiller des soupçons plutôt que les dissiper

R. v. Bisram, 2011 ONSC 3913

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[277]       An instruction, “[d]on’t worry, just do as you are told” may, depending on the circumstances, raise not dispel suspicions: R. v. Niemi (2006), 2006 CanLII 13949 (ON CA), 208 C.C.C. 119 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 78.  Where a person has real suspicion causing him or her to see the need for an inquiry, and inquiry is made, there may, depending on the factual context, arise an issue as to whether real suspicions remained with a failure to make yet further inquiries.  In R. v. Lagace (2004), 2003 CanLII 30886 (ON CA), 181 C.C.C. (3d) 12 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 27-9, the court stated :

Counsel for the appellant also argues that as a matter of law, the doctrine of wilful

blindness could not operate against the appellant because he made an inquiry after his

suspicion was aroused.

 

I disagree.  Culpability on the basis of wilful blindness rests on a finding of deliberate

ignorance.  An accused who suspects that property is stolen but declines to make the

inquiries that will confirm that suspicion, preferring instead to remain ignorant is culpable. 

Where an accused makes some inquiry, the question remains whether that accused

harboured real suspicions after that inquiry and refrained from making further inquiries

because she preferred to remain ignorant of the truth.  Where some inquiry is made, the

nature of that inquiry will be an important consideration in determining whether the

accused remained suspicious and chose to refrain from further inquiry because she

preferred to remain deliberately ignorant of the truth.  For example, a finding that an

accused took all reasonable steps to determine the truth would be inconsistent with the

conclusion that the accused was wilfully blind:  R. v. Mara1997 CanLII 363 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 630 at para.

51

 

I, of course, do not suggest that there is any onus on the accused to demonstrate that all

reasonable steps were taken.  In any case where the Crown relies on the doctrine of

wilful blindness and some inquiry has been made, the trier of fact will have to decide

whether the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that despite that inquiry the

accused remained suspicious and refrained from making any further inquiry because she

preferred to remain ignorant of the truth.

Le fait qu'un accusé ait pu espérer que la privation n'aurait pas lieu ne constitue pas un moyen de défense

R. v. Emms, 2010 ONCA 817

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[32] The respondent's second argument turns on the definition of fraud. As McLachlin J. pointed out in R. v. Theroux, 1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5, [1993] S.C.J. No. 42 and R. v. Zlatic, 1993 CanLII 135 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29, [1993] S.C.J. No. 43, the fact that an accused may have hoped the deprivation would not take place is no defence. All that the Crown had to prove was that the appellant knew that he was undertaking a prohibited act that could cause deprivation in the sense of depriving the complainants of their property or putting their property at risk. The appellant's dealings with Ms. Earle did not meet the Crown's case. Even if the appellant honestly and reasonably believed that Ms. Earle would make good on the replacement cheque, that would have been sufficient only to pay back part of the loan to Cheques-4-Cash. The replacement cheque would not have been sufficient to cover the complainants' deposits. Further, that money would not support the furniture order to Global, which the appellant had to pay for when the goods were delivered. The appellant conceded that he had used the complainants' deposits, which totalled approximately $15,000, for his own purposes. The appellant had no other source of income and had other very substantial debts.

Il est évident que la définition de la fraude ne laisse aucune place à l'erreur

R. v. Pearson, 2010 ABQB 727

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[12]           It is apparent that there is no room in the definition of fraud for mistake of fact: R. v. Wolsey (2008), 2008 BCCA 159 (CanLII), 233 C.C.C. (3d) 205 B.C.C.A.  Therefore, it would not avail the accused in this case if he said he honestly believed that the bank would cover the cheques he wrote despite the lack of funds because they had done so on virtually every occasion in the past. The actus reus is complete upon the accused voluntarily writing a cheque on an account without funds. That is a falsehood (false representation as to the existence of funds). The issue that remains however, with respect to the actus reus is whether there was in fact insufficient funds at the time the cheques were written. In my view, there were sufficient funds. The accounts involved were regularly and routinely funded by the bank’s allowance of an overdraft.  There were but two criteria relevant to that extension of credit: that any overdraft would be covered by noon on the day it occurred and interest was chargeable on all overdrafts at the rate of 21% per annum. Far from prohibiting the use of overdraft, Ms. Sun actually sanctioned the practice as it was plainly and regularly occurring and she would have had reports of that fact in relation to both accounts virtually every day from October 1997 until February 1999 when she no longer had responsibility for the accounts. In effect, there were funds pre-authorized in each of the accounts subject to the bank’s discretion.  Therefore, the representation by the Defendant, that by writing and depositing a cheque, there were funds in the account to cover the cheque, was accurate. Plainly the representation could prove to be false by noon the next day, but in my view, after all, the bank could, as it had in the past, simply do nothing.  The actus reus requires falsity independent of unpredictable third party intervention. 

La diligence d'un accusé lors des dernières dans la lutte contre la fraude n’est d’aucune pertinence face à son utilisation de chèques contrefaits et utilisés pour tromper des institutions financières

Hammami c. R., 2013 QCCA 2051

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[6]         En l’espèce, il ne fait pas de doute que les chèques mis en preuve ont été contrefaits, puis utilisés pour tromper des institutions financières. La diligence de ses dernières dans la lutte contre la fraude n’est d’aucune pertinence (Chagnon c. R.2005 QCCA 335, paragr. 10, autorisation de pourvoi à la C.S.C. rejetée, 20 octobre 2005, [2005] 2 R.C.S. vi). Il ne restait à la poursuite qu’à établir, hors de tout doute raisonnable, l’implication et la connaissance de l’appelant dans le stratagème.

[7]         La preuve offerte par la poursuite, qui consistait outre la preuve documentaire, en les témoignages de quatre employés d’institutions financières, une personne sur le compte de laquelle un chèque frauduleux fut tiré et deux enquêteurs de la Sûreté du Québec, de même que le témoignage de l’appelant, permettaient à la juge du procès de conclure raisonnablement à la participation et à la connaissance de l’accusé. À tout le moins, son insouciance ou aveuglement volontaire à répétition étaient flagrants ce qui était suffisant pour sa condamnation (R. c. Théroux1993 CanLII 134 (CSC), [1993] 2 R.C.S. 5, j. McLachlin; R. v. Wolsey2008 BCCA 159, paragr. 28 et s., 233 CCC (3d) 205; R. v. Bondok2011 ONCA 698).

Enseignements de Brenda L. Nightingale (The Law of Fraud and Related Offences) sur la supercherie, le mensonge et la mens rea de l'infraction de fraude (insouciance, aveuglement volontaire et l'erreur)

R. v. Pchajek, 2009 MBQB 265


[33]         In Théroux at p. 457, McLachlin J. referred to cases in which fraud by other fraudulent means has been found in the following factual situations: the use of corporate funds for personal purposes, non-disclosure of important facts, unauthorized diversion of funds and unauthorized arrogation of funds or property.

[34]         Nightingale, Brenda L., considered the actus reus of fraud in The Law of Fraud and Related Offences, loose leaf ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 2008), and she offered the following additional principles at p. 2-23 regarding fraud by deceit and by falsehood:

-        deceit is defined as inducing a person to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practicing the deceit knows or believes to be false;

-        the subsequent honouring of intention or a future undertaking does not remove culpability;

-        deceit does not have to be practiced on the victim, but there must be a causal connection between the deceit and the deprivation suffered by the victim;

-        the failure to avoid the deception by the person to whom the misrepresentation was made does not remove the culpability;

-        deceit is not a required element of the actus reus of fraud, but is merely one of the means by which fraud may be practiced.

At p. 2-24, Nightingale adopted the definition of falsehood as being a “falsity, something untrue, contrary to fact; lies, lying”.

[35]         In Zlatic and Théroux, the Supreme Court held that the law regarding the mens rea of fraud is as follows:

-        the mens rea of fraud is established by proof of the following:

(i)      subjective knowledge of the prohibited act; and

(ii)      subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another (which deprivation may consist in knowledge that the victim’s pecuniary interests are put at risk);

-        the test is not whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the consequences of the prohibited act, but whether the accused subjectively appreciated those consequences at least as a possibility;

-        subjective knowledge does not require that the crown prove exactly what was in the accused’s mind – the inference of subjective knowledge may be drawn from the facts as the accused believed them to be;

-        knowledge of the consequences includes recklessness as to those consequences – i.e., the accused undertook acts that could bring about a loss or risk of loss and was reckless as to whether or not the loss ensued;

-        it is no defence to a charge of fraud for the accused to say that he did not intend to cause a loss or that he believed that his actions would subsequently be ratified;

-        it is also not a defence to a charge of fraud for the accused to state that he did not believe that his conduct was wrong or that no one would be hurt in the end – i.e., the accused does not have to subjectively appreciate the dishonesty of his acts.

[36]         The mens rea of fraud is described by Nightingale, at p. 9-14, as follows:

-        mens rea  can be defined as:

(a)      knowledge or recklessness as to the facts that constitute a “deceit,” a “falsehood” or “other fraudulent means”; and

(b)     foresight or recklessness as to the facts found in law to constitute “deprivation”;

-        a belief by the accused that his or her conduct is not dishonest will not negate a finding of mens rea;

-        a belief by the accused that his or her conduct will not cause deprivation will not negate a finding of mens rea.

[37]         Nightingale considered the doctrines of recklessness, wilful blindness and mistake in relation to the intent required for fraud.  She provided the following summary of the law regarding recklessness and wilful blindness at p. 11-8.5:

(1)              fraudulent intent can be established upon proof that the accused was reckless or wilfully blind with respect to either or both of the conduct and consequence elements of the actus reus of fraud;

(2)              an accused is reckless with respect to the conduct element of the actus reus of fraud when he or she is knowingly careless with respect to the facts upon which deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means are found – the accused is aware that there is a risk that such conduct may be prohibited, but nevertheless persists in spite of the risk;

(3)              an accused is reckless with respect to the consequence element of the actus reus of fraud when he or she is knowingly careless with respect to the occurrence of the consequence of deprivation – the accused is aware that there is a risk that such conduct may bring about the prohibited consequence, but nevertheless persists in spite of the risk;

(4)              an accused is wilfully blind with respect to the conduct element of the actus reus of fraud when he or she is aware that certain facts exist that would make such conduct a deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means, but deliberately refrains from making inquiries so as to remain ignorant;

(5)              an accused is wilfully blind with respect to the consequence element of the actus reus of fraud when he or she is aware that certain facts exist giving rise to a belief that the prohibited consequences will flow from such conduct, but deliberately refrains from making inquiries so as to remain ignorant.

[38]         Nightingale provided the following summary of the law regarding mistake at pp. 11-17 – 11-18:

(1)      An honest though mistaken belief as to the facts upon which a Court will find in law to constitute “deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means” will negative a finding of mens rea with respect to the conduct element of the actus reus;

(2)      An honest though mistaken belief with respect to whether a Court will find in law that certain facts constitute “deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means” will not negative a finding of mens rea with respect to the conduct element of the actus reus;

(3)      An honest though mistaken belief with respect to whether conduct will be characterized as “dishonest” will not negative a finding of mens rea with respect to the conduct element of the actus reus;

(4)      An honest though mistaken belief with respect to the facts upon which a Court will find in law to constitute “deprivation” will negative a finding of mens rea with respect to the consequence element of the actus reus;

(5)      An honest though mistaken belief with respect to whether a Court will find in law that certain facts constitute “deprivation” will not negative a finding of mens rea with respect to the consequence element of the actus reus;

(6)      An honest though mistaken belief with respect to whether the consequence which flowed from the dishonest conduct will be characterized as “deprivation” will not negative a finding of mens rea with respect to the consequence element of the actus reus.

vendredi 26 septembre 2025

La réalité de la vie commerciale exige que la ligne de démarcation entre les actes visant à préserver l'entreprise, même s'ils sont désespérés, et les actes frauduleux soit tracée avec minutie

R. v. Lazeo, 2000 BCCA 483



[47]   Finally, unlike Zlatic, there was no finding by the trial judge in the case at bar that Mr. Lazeo bought the bars from Dr. Aubert without concern for payment.  Where Mr. Zlatic diverted money from his business for his own purposes, the evidence in the case at bar demonstrated that Mr. Lazeo, on  receiving a poor price on the resale of the platinum bars, desperately, and perhaps in foolish ways, attempted to find the money to pay his business debt.  In my view there was insufficient evidence before the trial judge for him to conclude that the appellant deliberately, or recklessly used the funds of his business in an unauthorized manner or that by dishonest means he put his ability to pay his creditor, Dr. Aubert, out of his reach.

[48]   As Carthy J.A. said in R. v. Milec (1996), 1996 CanLII 315 (ON CA), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 439 (O.C.A.) at pp. 444-5:

The reality of commercial life mandates that the line between acts directed to the preservation of the business, even if desperate, and acts which are fraudulent, be meticulously drawn.

[49]   I would set aside the conviction for fraud on count two.

Le fait d'espérer que des manipulations comptables n'entraînent aucune privation n'est aucun secours pour la personne qui les commet

R. v. Drabinsky, 2009 CanLII 12802 (ON SC)

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[472]       The question is whether the accused subjectively appreciated that certain consequences would follow from his act, not whether he believed they were moral:  “…the defrauder will not be acquitted because he believed what he was doing was honest.”[196]

[473]       The fact that the accused may have hoped deprivation would not occur or may have thought what he was doing was not wrong is no defense.  Where the accused knowingly undertook the acts in question aware that deprivation or risk of deprivation could follow, the accused is guilty.  This is so whether he actually intended the consequences or was reckless as to whether they would occur.  In other words a “sanguine belief that all will come out right in the end” is not a defense.   “Many frauds” are perpetrated by people who think there is nothing wrong with what they are doing or who think it will turn out alright in the end.[197] 

[474]       Mr. Drabinsky and Mr. Gottlieb may have thought the manipulations would be temporary. They may have thought there was nothing wrong with accounting practices they were directing. They may have thought it would all work out alright in the end. However:

 …this inquiry has nothing to do with the accused’s system of values. A person is not saved from conviction because he or she believes there is nothing wrong with what he or she is doing. The question is whether the accused subjectively appreciated that certain consequences would follow from his or her acts, not whether the accused believed the acts or their consequences to be moral.[198]

 

[475]       It is essential that dishonest commercial practices which put the pecuniary interest of others at risk be visited with criminal sanctions.[199]


*** Confirmé par R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582, par. 80-82 ***

Le dédommagement à la victime doit toujours être envisagé lors de la détermination de la peine

Un stéréotype dans le contexte d’un procès pour agression sexuelle est une proposition générale fausse ou inexacte tirant sa source dans la discrimination et l’inégalité de traitement, qui est appliquée à une plaignante en particulier, sans égard aux caractéristiques ou circonstances propres à cette personne

R. c. Bik, 2025 QCCA 340 Lien vers la décision [ 14 ]        La Cour suprême a récemment expliqué le concept de mythes et stéréotypes à l’en...