Est-ce que déplacer un détenu du poste de police au lieu de la commission de l'infraction suivant sa détention pour soutirer une déclaration constitue un comportement abusif?

R v Pietz, 2025 MBCA 5

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[22]                     The accused submits that the trial judge erred in finding that his detention (i.e., the drive) was lawful. He submits that the trial judge erred in her application of the legal principles to the facts and that the facts do not satisfy the correct legal test. More particularly, he maintains that the detention was not carried out by the police officers in a reasonable manner, rendering it arbitrary. He asserts that it was unreasonable for the police officers to (1) remove him from the police headquarters in the middle of the night to take him on a lengthy drive without his consent; (2) use abusive language towards him; (3) not provide him with shoes, a jacket or a blanket while outside; and (4) keep him in handcuffs during the drive.

[23]                     The Crown submits that it was not unreasonable for the police officers to have continued the investigation by driving the accused to Arborg and that their conduct during the drive was not so egregious as to render the detention arbitrary. The Crown contends that the trial judge identified the correct legal test and there was no error in the application of the legal principles to the facts of the case that justifies this Court interfering with her findings.

[24]                     In our view, the trial judge correctly identified the test under section 9 of the Charter: “detention must be authorized by law, the authorizing law itself must not be arbitrary and the manner in which the detention is carried out must be reasonable” (decision at para 38, citing R v Le, 2019 SCC 34 at para 124). The trial judge properly found that there is authority to support the legality of the police actions in taking a detainee from a police station or interview room for the purposes of furthering the investigation, as long as it is reasonable to do so (see Storrey at 254).

[25]                     In Storrey, the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that the essential role of police is to investigate crimes, and that role and function can and should continue after police have made a lawful arrest (see ibid).

[26]                     Further, the trial judge correctly stated: “To put it another way, an otherwise lawful detention may be rendered arbitrary where the conditions of the detention are unrelated to or inconsistent with its lawful purpose” (decision at para 41, citing R v Steadman, 2021 ABCA 332 at para 64).

[27]                     We are satisfied that the trial judge articulated the correct legal principles to determine whether there had been a breach of section 9 of the Charter and applied the principles correctly.

[28]                     The trial judge’s findings are amply supported by a review of the evidence. She found that the conditions of detention were not unrelated to or inconsistent with its lawful purpose. In this case, the drive was part of the ongoing investigation to attempt to have the accused confess and admit that he moved the victim’s body to the Arborg area. It was not unreasonable for the police officers to take him to that location to attempt to elicit a reaction or a confession.

[29]                     As for the circumstances of the drive, the trial judge found, and we agree, that the police officers’ conduct was “not flawless” (decision at para 56). The accused was not provided with shoes, a jacket, a blanket or anything to stay warm when he was taken out of the police vehicle. As well, the police officers used offensive and profane language. However, the trial judge was not satisfied that their conduct was so egregious as to render the detention arbitrary. While the police officers’ conduct should not be condoned, their conduct can be contrasted with the conduct of the officer in R v Z (MJ), 2022 MBCA 61 at paras 37, 39, 64-65, where the officer used denigrating language and implied threats, which was found to exceed permissible boundaries.

[30]                     The accused submits that it was an error for the trial judge to state: “In some cases, this kind of conduct may render inadmissible any resulting statement given by a detainee. It cannot, in this case, lead to a finding that [the accused’s] detention was arbitrary” (decision at para 54). The accused submits that once there is a breach of section 9, it should not matter whether the accused provided any statement.

[31]                     In our view, the trial judge correctly recognized that the voluntariness analysis in connection with a statement does not circumscribe the section 9 Charter right. The section 9 analysis is distinct from the voluntariness analysis. That said, in this case, the accused maintained his right to silence throughout the entire investigation, including during the drive. As a result, there was no statement, and no voluntariness inquiry was required.

[32]                     We are satisfied that the trial judge made no error in law in her analysis. She articulated the correct legal test and applied it properly to the facts as she found them. She reviewed the relevant evidence, including the evidence of the police officers, which she found to be credible. She made no palpable and overriding errors in her findings of fact. Applying the law to the facts, she correctly concluded that the detention was not arbitrary.

La question du caractère volontaire est de nature objective, même si les caractéristiques individuelles de l’accusé constituent des facteurs pertinents pour appliquer le critère objectif

R v Mucpa, 2024 NUCA 15

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[25]           In assessing this aspect of the Voir Dire Decision we must ensure the trial judge applied the correct legal principles, did not admit irrelevant evidence, and did not otherwise err in law. No deference is owed in this respect: R v TWW, 2024 SCC 19 at paras 21-22.

[26]           We agree that the trial judge erred by admitting the appellant’s criminal record. It was not relevant or admissible with respect to the issues before him. Ultimately, however, the trial judge did not use the appellant’s criminal record or past experiences in the criminal justice system in his analysis. As such, we are satisfied that those errors are harmless.

[27]           In objectively assessing the voluntariness of an accused’s statements to the police, the “individual characteristics of the accused” are relevant: R v Tessier, 2022 SCC 35 at para 56 [Tessier]; R v Singh, 2007 SCC 48 at para 36. Depending on the specific issue before the court, this may include whether the accused has prior experience with the criminal justice system: R v Engel, 2016 ABCA 48 at paras 17, 19; R v Favel, 2022 ABQB 570 at para 494; R v Spencer, 2007 SCC 11 at para 21. Moreover, although the Crown need not prove an accused understood his right to remain silent, proof of subjective understanding can weigh in favour of finding voluntariness: Tessier at paras 57, 88.

[28]           The evidence through which experience with the criminal justice is demonstrated will vary from case to case; in many cases an accused will not dispute their prior involvement with the criminal justice system.

[29]           In this case the trial judge could have considered the appellant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system in a manner consistent with this case law. However, the trial judge needed to assess how reviewing the appellant’s criminal record assisted in resolving the questions at issue; he needed to identify the relevance of the record to the issues. In addition, the trial judge needed to assess whether the probative value of admitting the record outweighed its prejudicial effect: R v Villeda, 2010 ABCA 351 at paras 23-25; R v Handy, 2002 SCC 56 at paras 71-73. The trial judge did not make either of those assessments. He did not explain why the criminal record was relevant to the issues raised in the voir dire, and his reason for admitting it cannot be deduced from his analysis since he never referred to the appellant’s prior criminal experience in his assessment of the issues.

[30]           We acknowledge that admitting the criminal record may be less problematic in a voir dire than in a trial proper, and that the trial judge did not consider the criminal record in the appellant’s trial. Nonetheless, on our review of the record here we are satisfied that the criminal record was not admissible with respect to voluntariness, and there was no legal basis for admitting it with respect to s. 10(b).

[31]           Moreover, the trial judge drew improper factual inferences from the appellant’s criminal record. The fact of a prior arrest and conviction does not in and of itself provide evidence of what occurred during the course of that arrest. It is not sufficient to ground the inference that the appellant had his right to counsel and right to silence explained to him by the police and by duty counsel when previously arrested: Voir Dire Decision at para 49. The fact that the appellant had “experienced counsel” with respect to his prior offences does not logically illuminate what happened to him on arrest for those offences, especially absent evidence that his counsel assisted him during the arrest.

Les déclarations extrajudiciaires disculpatoires d’un accusé et l'exception de res gestae et celle de l’arrêt Edgar

R. c. Ghazi, 2020 QCCS 1108 

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[31]            Les déclarations extrajudiciaires disculpatoires d’un accusé sont sujettes à la règle générale d’exclusion du ouï-dire. Elles sont en principe inadmissibles puisqu’elles sont considérées comme intéressées et dépourvues de valeur probante[4].

[32]            De nombreuses autres raisons justifient la règle de l’exclusion de telles déclarations, y compris :

•         le principe voulant qu’un accusé ne devrait pas pouvoir faire des déclarations non solennelles et en forcer l’admission en preuve sans avoir à prêter serment et sans subir de contre-interrogatoire[5];

•         le risque de fabrication[6];

•         les impératifs d’efficacité du procès[7]; et

•         le principe interdisant à une partie de produire une preuve destinée exclusivement à renforcer la crédibilité de ses propres témoins[8].

[33]            Il existe cependant plusieurs exceptions à cette règle[9], y compris les exceptions de res gestae et de l’arrêt Edgar[10] qu’invoque M. Ghazi.

Exception de res gestae

[34]            Issue de la common law, l’exception traditionnelle de res gestae permet d’introduire en preuve plusieurs types de déclarations extrajudiciaires[11], y compris, en certaines circonstances, les déclarations extrajudiciaires disculpatoires d’un accusé[12].

[35]            L’exception de res gestae vise notamment les déclarations spontanées qui font partie intégrante d’un évènement ou qui sont faites sous l’emprise du stress ou de l’émotion en résultant[13].

[36]            L’admissibilité de ce type de déclarations est permise si ces déclarations sont contemporaines à l’évènement en cause et qu’elles sont faites dans un contexte où le déclarant a subi une contrainte ou une intensité émotive découlant de l’évènement, ce qui en garantit la fiabilité[14].

[37]            L’exigence de la contemporanéité s’apprécie de manière contextuelle. Il n’y a pas de limite temporelle déterminée au-delà de laquelle une déclaration extrajudiciaire spontanée ne peut être admise[15]. Comme le note l’honorable David Watt, la question déterminante consiste plutôt à s’assurer que les circonstances dans lesquelles la déclaration a été faite permettent d’écarter la possibilité que le déclarant ait fabriqué celle-ci :

The degree of proximity required between the event and the statement is problematic. What is required is a realistic, not a metaphysical approach to the transaction. The principal issue is whether the circumstances are such that the possibility of concoction or distortion may be safely disregarded. The circumstances of the statement should be so unusual, startling or dramatic that they dominate the declarant’s thoughts, hence reduce the risk of concoction or distortion.[16]

[soulignement ajouté; italiques dans l’original]

[38]            Cela dit, plus le temps entre la déclaration et l’évènement est long, plus la probabilité que l’accusé ait retrouvé son processus de pensée normal — et donc, ait pu concocter une fausse déclaration — s’accroît[17].

[39]            La déclaration extrajudiciaire disculpatoire qui remplit les exigences de l’exception de res gestae est en principe admissible sans qu’il soit nécessaire d’en démontrer la nécessité[18].

[40]            Cependant, dans l’arrêt Starr, la Cour suprême reconnaît qu’il se peut que « dans de rares cas, des circonstances particulières fassent en sorte qu’une preuve manifestement visée par une exception par ailleurs valide ne satisfasse […] pas aux exigences de nécessité et de fiabilité de la méthode fondée sur des principes »[19] (aussi appelée « méthode d’analyse raisonnée »[20]). Dans de tels cas, forcément inhabituels, la preuve devrait être écartée. La partie qui conteste l’admissibilité de la preuve visée par une exception traditionnelle à la règle du ouï-dire a le fardeau de démontrer que la preuve doit néanmoins être inadmissible[21].

[41]            Ainsi, l’on peut envisager que dans certains cas, la déclaration extrajudiciaire disculpatoire d’un accusé, même si elle répondait aux exigences de l’exception de res gestae, pourrait être exclue s’il était démontré qu’elle n’était pas nécessaire. En l’espèce, la poursuite et les mis en cause n’ont toutefois pas avancé d’arguments en ce sens.

Exception de l’arrêt Edgar

[42]            Une autre exception à l’inadmissibilité des déclarations extrajudiciaires disculpatoires d’un accusé a été développée par la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans l’arrêt Edgar[22].

[43]            En vertu de cette exception, la déclaration faite spontanément par un accusé lors de son arrestation ou lorsqu’il est confronté pour la première fois à l’accusation qu’on lui reproche — que ce soit par un policier ou par une autre personne[23] — est admissible si celui-ci témoigne et peut être contre-interrogé[24]. La spontanéité constitue une garantie importante de la fiabilité de la déclaration[25].

[44]            La déclaration extrajudiciaire de l’accusé n’est pas admise afin de faire preuve de son contenu[26], mais plutôt en vue de démontrer la réaction de l’accusé (son état d’esprit) et la cohérence de cette déclaration avec son témoignage au procès[27]. Une telle déclaration extrajudiciaire est pertinente à la fois pour le verdict et pour évaluer la crédibilité de l’accusé[28]. Pour reprendre les termes du juge Laskin, au nom de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, dans l’arrêt Liard :

 […] The statements are evidence of an accused’s reaction to being accused of a crime and are relevant to show consistency with an accused’s trial testimony. Thus, although not admissible for the truth of their contents, they are relevant to an accused’s credibility and as a piece of circumstantial evidence bearing on an accused’s guilt or innocence. In short, the statements are relevant because an accused’s immediate reaction to an accusation of a crime may be more reliable and more probative than the accused’s testimony given years later in a courtroom. […][29]

[soulignement ajouté; référence omise]