En règle générale, la déclaration extrajudiciaire vidéo d'un accusé peut être expurgée afin d'éviter tout préjugé indu et d'éliminer les éléments qu'il vaut mieux que le jury ignore, car trop préjudiciable

R. v. Calnen, 2015 NSSC 318 

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[12]        The applicable legal principles are not controversial.  As a general rule, the statement of an accused person may be edited to avoid undue prejudice and eliminate matters which it is best the jury not know:  R. v. Weaver (1966), 51 Cr. App. R. 77.  The editing process must ensure, however, that the remaining portions of the statement retain their proper meaning in relation to the whole of the statement:  R. v. Kanester (1966), 1966 CanLII 544 (BC CA), 48 C.R. 352, [1966] B.C.J. No. 77 (C.A.).  Where a statement includes reference to an irrelevant fact or facts, if the facts may be separated from the rest of the statement without affecting its tenure, the irrelevant parts should be excluded:  R. v. Beatty, 1944 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1944] S.C.R. 73.

[13]        I have reviewed a host of cases to assist with the task of determining whether any, all or some portions of the statements should be excluded from the jury.  In considering the general principles to be followed, I have found a very helpful canvassing of the law by Justice Moreau in R. v. White, 2006 ABQB 788 (CanLII) at paras. 4-11:

[4]               Evidence may be excluded if its admission would result in unfairness or the prejudicial effect of its admission outweighs its probative value: R. v. Buhay, [2003] 1 S.C .R. 631, per Arbour J., speaking for the Court, at para. 40:

 

... even in the absence of a Charter breach, judges have a discretion at common law to exclude evidence obtained in circumstances such that it would result in unfairness if the evidence was admitted at trial, or if the prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence outweighs its probative value (See, in the context of confessions: R. v. Rothman, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 410, at p. 696 per Lamer J., as he then was; R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38 (CanLII), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 69, per Iacobucci J....

 

[5]               In balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, consideration may be given to whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence would be out of proportion to its true evidential value.  Maclean J.A.’s dissenting reasons in R. v. Kanester, 1966 CanLII 544 (BC CA), [1966] 4 C.C.C. 231 (B.C.C.A.), adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada (1966 CanLII 529 (SCC), [1967] 1 C.C.C. 97), referred, at para. 91, to the comments of Lord du Parcq in Noor Mohammed v. Rex, 1949 CanLII 437 (UK JCPC), [1949] A.C. 182, at 192:

 

It is right to add, however, that in all such cases the judge ought to consider whether evidence which it is proposed to adduce is sufficiently substantial, having regard to the purpose to which it is professedly directed, to make it desirable in the interest of justice that it should be admitted.  If, so far as that purpose is concerned, it can in the circumstances of the case have only trifling weight, the judge will be right to exclude it.  To say this is not to confuse weight with admissibility. The distinction is plain, but cases must occur in which it would be unjust to admit evidence of a character gravely prejudicial to the accused even though there may be some tenuous ground for holding it technically admissible. The decision must then be left to the discretion and the sense of fairness of the judge.

 

[6]               In R. v. Beatty, 1944 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1944] S.C.R. 73, Duff C.J.C. clarified his reasoning in Rex v. Thiffault, 1933 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1933] S.C. R. 509 as to the restrictions on the use of a prior admission by an accused that contains inadmissible evidence (at para. 9):

 

We also considered that a document professing to embody the effect of admissions obtained in the way the admissions were obtained in that case, and containing inter alia a record of an admission of a fact that would be inadmissible as evidence against the accused and was calculated to prejudice him, ought not to be admitted as evidence against him.

 

[7]               In Thiffault, the portion of the police interview of the accused relating to his earlier arrest for another criminal offence was determined (at para.12) not to be admissible, not only on the ground that it was wholly irrelevant, but also on the basis of the unfair prejudice to the accused.

 

[8]               Duff C.J.C., in Beatty, pointed out (at para. 10) that if the statement of the irrelevant fact can be separated from the rest of the document without in any way affecting the tenor of that which remains, then the trial judge in most cases would probably be able to excise the objectionable portion while permitting the unobjectionable part of the document to go before the jury. The trial judge’s duty in that regard was described by Maclean J.A. in Kanester, at para. 48:

 

A very heavy duty lies upon a trial judge who admits a statement of this nature, where editing is of paramount importance, in order that evidence which may be irrelevant or unnecessarily prejudicial to the accused may be carved out from the original statement and yet insure that the remaining portions will retain their proper meaning in relation to the whole in the sense that when taken out of context the admissibility portions are relevant and do not lose their meaning and yet are freed from unnecessary prejudice that is out of balance with the purpose to be served by admitting the edited statement.

 

[9]               In R. v. Dubois (1986), 1986 CanLII 4683 (ON CA), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 325 (Ont.C.A.), Morden J.A. noted at para. 56 that portions of the wiretap evidence in that case, although substantially irrelevant, were part of a context for understanding the evidence that did relate to the charge before the court.  A new trial was ordered, however, the trial judge having failed to weigh the probative value of the challenged evidence against its prejudicial effect, having admitted clearly irrelevant or only tenuously relevant evidence, and having failed to adequately instruct the jury on the use they could make of the evidence.

 

[10]            Ferguson J. referred in R. v. Jacobsen 2004 CarswellOnt 6675, (Ont. S.Ct.) at para. 4 to a useful summary of principles applied to the editing of statements in R. v. Grewall, 2000 BCSC 820 (CanLII), [2000] B.C.J. No. 2383 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 36:

(a)  Editing of a statement may at times be necessary because of the inclusion of irrelevant or unnecessarily prejudicial evidence but such editing must not affect the tenor of a relevant statement.

 

(b)  Edited statements must be free from unnecessary prejudice, but the remaining portions must retain their proper meaning.

 

(c)  The jury should have as much as possible of a statement said to constitute an admission in order to place it into context for the purpose of determining its truth.

 

(d)  Even though substantively irrelevant, contextual evidentiary relevance may allow admission.

 

(e)  The extent of the admissibility of that contextual evidence and probative value must still, however, be weighed and balanced against its prejudicial effect.

 

[11]            A further consideration in the editing process is whether a limiting instruction will be effective to address any prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence: Jacobsen, at para. 7.

[14]        I will apply these general principles to the statements under consideration in this case.

Le droit au silence précédant l’arrestation & le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’exclure une preuve pertinente

R. c. Pelletier, 2018 QCCS 4463

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[27]        L’accusé ne bénéficiait pas du droit au silence prévu à l’article 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés les 15 et 16 juillet 2013, puisqu’il n’était pas encore détenu au sens de la Charte dans l’enquête sur le meurtre de Julie Morrisson[4].

[28]        Néanmoins, cette absence de droit constitutionnel ne fait pas en sorte de lui imposer une obligation légale de collaborer avec les enquêteurs au dossier[5].

[29]        En effet, il est reconnu qu’un citoyen n’a, en principe, aucune obligation de collaborer à une enquête de nature criminelle au Canada.

[30]        La Cour suprême indique ce qui suit dans l’arrêt Grant : « il y a une absence d’obligation légale de tout citoyen de répondre aux questions qui lui sont posées par les policiers et de leur prêter ainsi assistance. Il existe plutôt un devoir moral et social en ce sens. »[6]

[31]        La Cour suprême avait déjà tenu de tels propos dans l’arrêt Rothman : « Au Canada, le droit d’un suspect de ne rien dire à la police ne découle pas d’un droit de ne pas s’incriminer, mais n’est que l’exercice, de sa part, du droit général dont jouit toute personne de ce pays de faire ce qui lui plaît, de dire ce qui lui plaît ou de choisir de ne pas dire certaines choses à moins que la loi ne l’y oblige. »[7]

[32]        Ainsi, le privilège de ne pas s’incriminer ne s'applique pas qu’au moment du procès. Il s’étend aussi aux déclarations antérieures, lors de l'enquête, comme c’est le cas de la règle des confessions[8].

[33]        Louis Pelletier n’avait donc aucune obligation de collaborer avec les policiers ni de leur dévoiler où il se trouvait lorsqu’ils lui ont demandé de le rencontrer.

[34]        Or, lorsque Louis Pelletier choisit de collaborer à l’enquête les 15 et 16 juillet 2013 et qu’il décide de mentir aux enquêteurs, il ne peut, par la suite, prétendre que ce mensonge reflétait son désir de garder le silence, comme le soutient la défense.

[35]        Louis Pelletier n’a pas omis de dévoiler certaines choses, il a plutôt menti. Cela devient une circonstance dont le jury peut tenir compte dans son analyse, comme c’est le cas de toute déclaration qu’un accusé fait aux autorités ou à quiconque, qu’elle soit le reflet de la réalité ou non.

[36]        De plus, il n’y a pas de risque de donner au jury l’impression que l’accusé doit prouver son innocence relativement au mensonge qu’il aurait dit au policier, soit qu’il se trouvait au Nouveau-Brunswick[9].

[37]        En résumé, Louis Pelletier n’a pas refusé de rencontrer les enquêteurs. Ce n’est pas ce que la poursuite souhaite établir.

[38]        Les faits révèlent, au contraire, que Louis Pelletier a répété vouloir collaborer avec les enquêteurs.

[39]        En conséquence, le droit au silence de Louis Pelletier n’a pas été enfreint.

Le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’exclure une preuve pertinente

La pertinence et la force probante

[40]        En droit criminel canadien, il existe un principe fondamental en matière de preuve voulant que tout renseignement pertinent soit admissible afin de permettre au juge et au jury de découvrir la vérité et de bien trancher les questions en litige[10].

[41]        La pertinence est en lien direct avec les faits litigieux qui découlent de l’infraction reprochée et des moyens de défense soulevés par l’accusé[11].

[42]        Elle s’appuie aussi sur la conduite reprochée, ce qu’on veut lui inférer, sur la position des parties ainsi que sur l’ensemble de la preuve[12].

[43]        Une preuve qui tend à accroître ou à diminuer la probabilité de l’existence d’un fait en litige est pertinente et elle n’a pas à être concluante à cet effet[13].

[44]        En conséquence, un élément pertinent est habituellement admissible en preuve et soumis au jury afin qu’il détermine le poids à lui accorder aux fins de rendre ultimement un verdict de culpabilité ou de non‑culpabilité[14].

[45]        Il incombe au juge du procès d’exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire de s’assurer de l’équité du procès[15].

[46]        Ce pouvoir ne doit pas être interprété restrictivement[16].

[47]        Le Tribunal peut ainsi utiliser son pouvoir discrétionnaire afin d’exclure une preuve jugée pertinente lorsque son effet préjudiciable l’emporte sensiblement sur sa valeur probante[17].

[48]        C’est ce que la défense demande au Tribunal concernant certaines déclarations de l’accusé que la poursuite veut utiliser à titre de comportements postérieurs à l’infraction.

[49]        Dans l’arrêt White, le juge Binnie, dissident sur l’issue du pourvoi, énonce un principe partagé par la majorité voulant que : « La preuve du comportement postérieur à l’infraction, dans son ensemble, se retrouvera simplement au dossier comme une partie banale de l’exposé des faits. Lorsqu’elle est invoquée à l’appui de la thèse de la poursuite, elle sera évidemment pertinente et admissible si, selon la logique, le bon sens et l’expérience humaine (comme le veut l’expression), elle aide à trancher une question en litige. » [18]

[50]        Ainsi, le Tribunal doit d’abord déterminer la pertinence logique et juridique de la preuve que souhaite présenter la poursuite au jury[19].

[51]        Une fois cette conclusion tirée, il est possible d’exclure une preuve dont l’effet préjudiciable surpasse sa force probante[20].

Les juges possèdent un pouvoir issu de la common law d'exclure une déclaration extrajudiciaire d'un accusé obtenue par la violence ou l'oppression, même si elle n'est pas fournie à une personne en situation d'autorité

R. v. Wells, 2003 BCCA 242

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[53]   The majority in Harrer and the unanimous court in Terry were of the opinion that if an accused is able to establish that the admission of evidence would violate his or her right to a fair trial, now recognized in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, the accused could seek exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(1) (para. 21 of Harrer; para. 25 of Terry).  Alternatively, McLachlin J., as she then was, said in Harrer that, under the common law, a trial judge has the discretion to exclude evidence where its prejudicial effect would outweigh its probative value and, as well, a judge may exclude evidence which was not obtained by Charter breach but which would render the trial unfair either at common law or under s. 24(1) of the Charter (paras. 41-43).

[54]   I agree with counsel for the respondent that the statements in Harrer and Terry may be viewed as having been taken by "persons in authority".  No one would argue that a police officer interrogating a person held in custody in that officer's country would be regarded as anything other than a person in authority.  The hope for advantage or fear of prejudice from a foreign police officer comes from the foreign officer's obvious authority over those in custody in the foreign country.  However, the fact that the interrogations in those cases were conducted by "persons in authority" does not undermine the appellant's proposition that where interrogations are not subject to s. 10 Charter scrutiny, but are obtained in circumstances of oppression and violence, the statements may nonetheless be excluded pursuant to the common law power to ensure a fair trial, now guaranteed by s. 11(d) and s. 7 of the Charter.  The observations in Harrer and Terry on trial fairness and the principles of fundamental justice, are the critical portions of those cases with respect to the arguments on this appeal. 

[55]   In Harrer, Mr. Justice La Forest considered the various remedies available for the exclusion of evidence:

[22]  ... the argument was strongly advanced that since there was no breach of the Charter in obtaining the evidence, a prerequisite to the power to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, there was no Charter-based jurisdiction to exclude evidence.  The difficulty with this contention is that it fails to appreciate the full nature of a fair trial.  As I mentioned, while s. 24(2) is directed to the exclusion of evidence obtained in a manner that infringed a Charter right, it does not operate until there is a Charter breach.  What we are concerned with here is not the remedy for a breach but with the manner in which a trial must be conducted if it is to be fair.

[56]   What La Forest J. was addressing in that passage was trial fairness, and not with the conventional way of dealing with exclusion of confessions.  Madam Justice McLachlin, as she then was, also considered trial fairness in Harrer, and quoted with approval, at para. 41, Lord Goddard's statement in Kuruma v. The Queen, [1955] A.C. 197 (P.C.) at 204, that at common law, a trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence "if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused."

[57]   In Harrer, McLachlin J. also noted that evidence may render a trial unfair for a variety of reasons, stating that if evidence is obtained by abusive police conduct, admission of the evidence at trial may render the trial unfair.  Critical to the appellant's argument in this case, McLachlin J. also stated, at para. 46:

The way in which [evidence] was taken may render it unreliable.  Its potential for misleading the trier of fact may outweigh such minimal value it might possess. 

[58]   Madam Justice McLachlin further observed that, "In the case at bar, police abuse or unfairness is the only ground [of rendering a trial unfair] raised, and hence the only one with which we need concern ourselves."   While the Court did not have to go beyond the ground argued, McLachlin J. clearly envisaged that the manner in which evidence is obtained may render a trial unfair if the evidence were admitted and stated at para. 43 that in such situations, the evidence may be excluded pursuant to either the common law discretion or s. 24(1) of the Charter.

[59]   In my opinion, Hodgson, supra, does not stand as a bar to the possibility of evidence of a confession being excluded other than through the confessions rule.   In that case, Cory J. observed, at para. 26, that "there can be no doubt that there may well be great unfairness suffered by the accused when an involuntary confession obtained as a result of violence or credible threats of imminent violence by a private individual is admitted into evidence".  While Cory J. expressed the opinion that change to the common law confessions rule should be effected by Parliament, rather than judicially, because the change would represent a significant change from the traditional rule, Harrer and Terry indicate that an alternative to the common law confessions rule already exists in the law which would permit exclusion of evidence if required to ensure a fair trial.  In other words, Charter guarantees of trial fairness and fundamental justice may prompt exclusion of evidence regardless of whether the traditional common law confessions rule would reach the opposite result.

[60]   In R. v. Buric, supra, Labrosse J.A. expressed the opinion that the obiter dicta in Harrer and Terry regarding trial fairness cannot be taken to displace the general rule that relevant evidence is admissible and its weight is to be determined by the trier of fact.  Buric underlines the primacy of the general rule but, in that case, the evidence the trial judge had excluded was not the statement of an accused person, but of a witness whose evidence might have been tainted by the actions of the police.  The witness whose evidence the trial judge excluded in Buric would have been subject to cross-examination. 

[61]   In this case, the statements sought to be excluded from evidence were made by an accused person.  While the trial judge did not have the benefit of the appellant's testimony on the voir dire, it is apparent from his ruling on the voir dire and his reasons for judgment that he regarded the confession as being the product of the violence and threats of violence directed toward the appellant by the person to whom the confession was made.  When a confession is the product of violence and threats of violence, concerns about its reliability are obviously present. 

[62]   Even if a jury is instructed that a confession obtained by violence or oppression of a private person should be accorded "very little, if any, weight," the jury will still hear the confession.  Simply to admit evidence which should receive little or no weight takes no account of the probative value of the statement as compared to its prejudicial effect on an accused.  As Cory J. stated in Hodgson at para. 14, "[e]vidence of a confession has always been accorded great weight by triers of fact.  This is a natural manifestation of human experience."  Thus, if a statement obtained by violence or threats of violence is not excluded, an accused faces a substantial risk of prejudice by a confession that may have little, if any, probative value. 

[63]   Mr. Justice Cory observed in Hodgson that legislative change in this area of confessions law is desirable and suggested that until legislative change could be effected, an instruction ought to be given to make clear that a confession obtained in circumstances of violence or oppression ought to be given little or no weight.  In effect, that is what the trial judge did in this case.

[64]   The arguments in Hodgson addressed the possible modification of the common law confessions rule and the opinion of the majority addressed that question.  But in my respectful view, the majority opinion in Hodgson cannot be taken to require that all confessions to persons not in authority, regardless of whether the confession is obtained by violence or threats of violence, must be admitted into evidence.  To so hold would ignore the court's discretion to exclude evidence, the probative value of which is outweighed by it prejudicial effect, and the power and discretion of the courts to ensure the fair trial of an accused.

[65]   In my opinion, this is a case in which it was open to the trial judge to exclude the appellant's statements obtained in circumstances of violence and threats of violence on the basis that the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value.  However, that was not a question the trial judge was asked to consider on the voir dire to determine whether the statements ought to be excluded from evidence.