Comment un juge doit apprécier l'allégation d'état de choc ou d'intoxication du suspect lors de son interrogatoire policier quant au caractère libre et volontaire de sa déclaration

R. c. Bourget, 2023 QCCQ 9229 

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[74]        S’il est vrai que le policier présent auprès de lui avant que les enquêteuses ne le rencontrent mentionne que l’accusé est agité et bouleversé, et qu’il pourrait être intoxiqué, le Tribunal ne retient pas de son témoignage qu’il est dans un état d’esprit qui entrave sa capacité de comprendre ce qui se déroule. En effet, le témoin raconte que si l’accusé est un moulin à paroles et qu’il est difficile d’avoir son attention, il comprend les questions et y répond, même s’il s’éparpille, peut être difficile à suivre, et semble perdu dans ses dates. Si l’accusé ne souhaite initialement pas parler à un avocat, il le fait plus tard. L’accusé, assis sur le trottoir ou dans le véhicule de patrouille, est par ailleurs coopératif et n’est pas menotté pendant les quelque trois heures et trente minutes où le policier est auprès de lui.

[75]        Cela dit, même s’il est inutile de déterminer de manière définitive si l’accusé est dans un état d’esprit conscient lors de ce premier volet de l’intervention policière du 13 mai, l’écoute de la rencontre avec les enquêteuses, enregistrée rappelons-le, convainc de l’aptitude de l’accusé alors à comprendre à la fois ce qui lui est dit, incidemment que ses propos pourraient servir de preuve contre lui dans des procédures criminelles, et ce qu’il dit.

[76]        À la différence de l’arrêt Ward[27] sur lequel l’accusé attire l’attention, rien ne supporte en l’espèce que l’accusé est dans un état de choc tel qu’il ne sait pas ce qu’il dit et n’a pas la capacité cognitive requise pour satisfaire au critère de l’état d’esprit conscient.

[77]        Le Tribunal ne souscrit pas non plus à la possibilité que son état le mène à avoir un certain espoir d’éviter d’être accusé s’il parle à la police, dans le contexte où il a d’abord été accusé avant de ne plus l’être, cette prétention ne reposant aucunement sur la preuve. Rappelons que l’accusé ne témoigne pas.

[78]        Revenons à la rencontre.

[79]        Après avoir identifié les parties présentes, le moment et le lieu de l’entretien, et avoir fait mention de l’enregistrement de la rencontre, l’enquêteuse Montpetit informe l’accusé de son droit de recourir à l’assistance d’un avocat, lui mentionne qu’il n’est pas en état d’arrestation ni accusé, qu’on cherche à avoir sa version, lui donne son droit au silence et le met en garde. Ce qui précède est fait de manière minutieuse et détaillée. L’accusé manifeste à plusieurs égards sa compréhension, expliquant notamment qu’il a parlé à un avocat plus tôt, qu’il a l’intention de « dire ce qu’il a à dire » malgré les recommandations, et répondant « je comprends » lorsqu’informé du contexte de la rencontre, de son droit au silence, et du fait que tout ce qu’il dira pourra servir de preuve contre lui. Plus tard pendant la rencontre, se souvenant à l’évidence de la mention que les enquêteuses souhaitent en apprendre sur les dernières 24 heures de vie de sa conjointe, l’accusé précise qu’il sait qu’il vient de déborder de cette période, mais qu’il sent le besoin de se raconter. Lors de son récit, il corrige également de lui-même une chronologie à l’évidence incorrecte. De nombreux éléments qu’il rapporte s’avèrent par ailleurs exacts selon ce qui est constaté dans l’appartement.

[80]        Autrement, le Tribunal ne retient pas de la preuve que l’accusé est intoxiqué de façon à ce que son état en soit affecté. Rien dans le témoignage des enquêteuses ne le supporte. On constate d’ailleurs à l’écoute de l’enregistrement de la rencontre que l’accusé est courtois, calme et coopératif, et que ses propos sont logiques et cohérents, même s’il peut s’éloigner du sujet, comme vu précédemment lorsqu’il s’écarte des dernières 24 heures de vie de sa conjointe. Il précise son récit quand on lui demande de le faire.

[81]        Il est ainsi manifeste que l’accusé est conscient de ce qui se déroule lors de cette rencontre, de ce qu’il fait, et de ce qu’il dit. Il est clair qu’il est en mesure de faire un choix utile de parler ou non à la police, et que ce choix n’est pas indûment influencé par le comportement de l’État.

[82]        Le Tribunal ne constate pas par ailleurs de changement contextuel au fil de la rencontre, ni de variation dans l’état de l’accusé.

[83]        En ce qui concerne les brefs propos de l’accusé au sujet de la photo qui lui est montrée par une policière en présence des enquêteuses peu de temps après la rencontre, ils sont pour le Tribunal dans la continuité de la rencontre, et aucune procédure supplémentaire n’est nécessaire à l’endroit de l’accusé dans la mesure où son statut dans le cadre de l’enquête est toujours le même, celui d’une personne d’intérêt[28].

[84]        Rien dans le témoignage de la policière ou des enquêteuses ne laisse par ailleurs entendre que l’accusé est dans un état différent de celui décrit lors de la rencontre avec les enquêteuses. Le Tribunal note que l’accusé est posément assis dans un véhicule de patrouille attendant de retrouver l’accès à son logement lorsqu’on lui montre la photo.

[85]        Maintenant, comme déjà mentionné, l’accusé fait plus tard trois appels sur le cellulaire de l’enquêteuse Montpetit, qui, à la fin de la rencontre, lui laisse son numéro de téléphone s’il a des questions ou si quelque chose lui revient en tête.

[86]        Pour le Tribunal, ces appels de l’accusé, où il veut fournir quelques détails supplémentaires, sont aussi dans la continuité de la rencontre avec les enquêteuses, et, comme pour la photo, aucune procédure supplémentaire n’est nécessaire à l’endroit de l’accusé[29]. L’écoute des enregistrements convainc d’autre part que les propos de l’accusé sont ici aussi logiques et cohérents, et qu’il semble dans un état similaire à celui constaté lors de sa rencontre avec les enquêteuses. Ces dernières ne notent aussi rien de différent chez l’accusé par rapport à la rencontre précédente.

[87]        Compte tenu des observations qui précèdent, le Tribunal conclut que l’accusé est dans un état d’esprit conscient tout au long des déclarations visées au voir-dire 3, et que les propos qui y sont visés sont volontaires, cela hors de tout doute raisonnable.

Hart and Mack: New Restraints on Mr. Big and a New Approach to Unreliable Prosecution Evidence

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Dufraimont, Lisa. "Hart and Mack: New Restraints on Mr. Big and a New Approach to Unreliable Prosecution Evidence." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 71. (2015).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1320
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol71/iss1/18

L'exactitude ou l'exhaustivité d'une confession est une question de valeur probante qui est laissé à l'appréciation du juge des faits

R. v. Gauthier, 2024 ONCA 621

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[76]      The approach to be taken by an appellate court in its assessment of a trial judge’s finding of voluntariness was recently restated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Tessier, 2022 SCC 35, 419 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 43:

A finding of voluntariness calls for deference unless it can be shown that it represents a palpable and overriding error. An appellate court may only intervene where the error is “overriding and determinative in the assessment of the balance of probabilities with respect to that factual issue”. The standard of review associated with the finding of voluntariness is tied to the idea that the analysis under the confessions rule must be a contextual one in which bright-line rules are few. Where the law is properly understood and the relevant circumstances considered, the trial judge is best placed to measure that context and make the relevant findings. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.]

[77]      Here, the appellant argues that the voluntariness ruling is not entitled to deference because the trial judge misapplied the law and failed to grapple with and consider the gaps in the evidentiary record tendered by the Crown on the voir dire. The appellant makes three submissions:

•        The trial judge shifted the burden of proof to the accused.

•        The trial judge did not address whether the Crown had discharged its burden of production of an evidentiary record which will permit the court to fairly adjudicate the voluntariness question.

•        The trial judge also failed to consider whether the inculpatory statements were provided by an accused who was of “sound mind” when he made them.

[78]      I do not agree with the appellant that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof. Read fairly, the trial judge clearly identified that the Crown bore the burden of proof and while the statement “in the absence of any direct evidence from the accused” appears problematic, when read fairly, and in the context of the entire ruling, I am satisfied that the trial judge was stating that on the record before him, the Crown had established voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused did not raise anything that caused him to doubt the voluntariness of the accused’s statements.

[79]      I am, however, satisfied that the trial judge erred in his assessment of all the relevant circumstances. In my view, he failed to grapple with the inadequate evidentiary record tendered by the Crown on the voir dire. Regarding the alleged confession to Officer Paquette and Officer Mantha on the way to court, the trial judge acknowledged the defence argument that “there are obvious ‘gaps’ resulting from the testimony of [both police officers], who were apparently together at the relevant times the statements and utterances were made”, but other than pointing out that the two police officers did not record in their notes the same statements, he did not deal with the submission that the evidentiary record was insufficient to prove that the statements and utterances were voluntary.

[80]      The trial judge correctly observed that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply as to whether the statement was actually made. He stated that to satisfy the onus of showing that the appellant made a statement, the Crown need only introduce some evidence that the accused made the statement attributed to him. The standard of proof required is minimal, and not often the subject of dispute, except in cases such as here where it is not a formal police interview and not video recorded. The trial judge was on solid ground because the accuracy and completeness of the record of a voluntary statement is an issue of weight that is usually left for the trier of fact, in this case, the jury: R. v. Lapointe and Sicotte (1983), 1983 CanLII 3558 (ON CA), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 366 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d 1987 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1253.

[81]      However, the trial judge did not grapple with the defence submission in this case, that the accuracy and completeness of the record of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement were deficient and those gaps were fatal to the Crown in proving that the statements were voluntary: R. v. Moore-McFarlane (2001), 2001 CanLII 6363 (ON CA), 56 O.R. (3d) 737, at para. 67 (Ont. C.A.). In fairness to the trial judge, this distinction is often difficult to apply, especially in a case like the one at bar where no evidence is called by the defence on the voir dire.[8] It may be unclear in some cases whether the defence is raising issues of voluntariness or issues of accuracy. However, I am satisfied, in this case, the defence did raise the inadequacy of the evidentiary record specifically as a challenge to establishing voluntariness. And the trial judge acknowledged this when he summarized the position of the defence. However, in my view he did not address the deficient record introduced by the Crown in this case. This court stated in Moore-McFarlane, at para. 67:

It is important to read this statement of principle in context. The issue that arose in Lapointe – whether the accused’s capacity to understand English was sufficient for him to have given the statement alleged by the police officers – was one that related to the ultimate reliability of the statement and the weight that was to be attached to it. As the court stated, it was only where an accused’s capacity was so deficient as to make it impossible for him to have given a statement that the trial judge would be justified in excluding the statement on that basis. Hence the court concluded that, in this case, this issue was not a matter to be determined at the voir dire stage of the proceedings. The decision in Lapointe does not stand for the proposition that all issues of accuracy and completeness of recording are left to the triers of fact. Such an interpretation would run contrary to centuries of jurisprudence that require careful scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the taking of a statement by persons in authority. And, in my view, the completeness, accuracy and reliability of the record have everything to do with the court’s inquiry into and scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Crown could discharge its heavy onus of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt where proper recording procedures are not followed. [Emphasis added.]

[82]      In this case, the relevant circumstances included the following:

1.            None of the confessions was video or audio-recorded. Each is a memo book statement and required the trial judge to examine very closely the completeness of the note entries.

2.            The recordings in the notebooks were not verbatim accounts. The two police officers specifically acknowledged that their notes of the statement allegedly uttered by the appellant on the way to court were not verbatim accounts. Officer Mantha agreed with the suggestion that his independent recollection was vague, and his evidence was based entirely on his notes, and he generally had very little independent memory without his notebook.

3.            The statement allegedly made by the appellant on the way to court was a “late entry” memo book recording in the police officers’ notebooks. As noted above, Officer Paquette acknowledged that he did not make a note until more than 15 hours after the words were allegedly uttered. He agreed ultimately that he had opportunities to make his notes earlier. Constable Mantha conceded that his notes of the appellant’s admissions were a late entry, and he acknowledged failing in his duty to make timely entry. And he had no explanation for why he made contemporary notes of some of the appellant’s utterances on the way to court, but failed to make contemporaneous notes of the confession to killing his girlfriend. Officer Mantha testified he had no memory of whether he talked with Officer Paquette about it the following day and made his late entry thereafter. Regarding the confession allegedly uttered in the jail cell, Sergeant Keefe believed he probably made his notebook entry an hour after the statement was made, but acknowledged on cross-examination it may have been later or earlier, and he could not be sure. He also acknowledged inserting an additional detail of the statement into the margin of his notes later.

4.            The statements were devoid of context, and most of the time that the officers spent with the appellant is unaccounted for. In this case, there are several gaps from when the appellant was arrested to when he made these statements. The police arrested the appellant shortly before midnight on November 14, 2017. But there is sparse information as to what happened from the arrest until 6:00 a.m. in the morning. At that time, Officer Mantha and another police officer who did not testify then took the appellant to the hospital, where he made the statement that was not led in front of the jury. At 3:15 p.m. on November 15, 2017, more than 15 hours after the arrest, Officer Mantha and Officer Paquette transported the appellant to court in North Bay, about 30 minutes away, during which car trip he allegedly uttered the first confession that was heard by the jury. After the court appearance, at 4:56 p.m. he was brought to the jail in North Bay where he was placed in segregation, and there is a longer gap from 4:56 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., when Sergeant Keefe heard the inculpatory statement allegedly uttered by the appellant in his jail cell. There was no evidence led by the Crown as to the appellant’s interactions with others during that time. To the contrary, the Crown led a sparse record, only from those officers who interacted with the appellant who say he made these inculpatory statements, despite the fact that these officers were not with the appellant the entire time.

5.            The Crown’s witnesses had little independent recollection of the statements.

6.            There was very little evidence led as to the conditions of custody. There was very little evidence led about relevant information central to the voluntariness inquiry such as whether the appellant slept and when he slept, what he ate, or when he ate. There were large gaps in the record with the appellant’s interactions with jail staff besides the three officers who testified, and on what he was doing other than the culminating points discussed by the three officers who testified.

[83]      I agree with the appellant that the deficient evidentiary record alone was a sufficient basis for the trial judge to find that the Crown had not discharged its evidentiary burden. The Crown bore the onus to produce a record capable of demonstrating that the appellant’s statements were not the product of undue influence or coercion.

[84]      In sum, the trial judge did not deal with the gaps in the evidentiary record. The trial judge’s ruling does not attract deference and I would conclude that, when the relevant considerations are properly considered, the Crown has not discharged its onus to show that the statements were voluntary.

La tactique, souvent utilisée par la police, de révéler petit à petit des éléments de preuve (réels ou faux) au détenu pour démontrer ou exagérer la solidité de la preuve contre lui ne constitue pas une violation des ses droits constitutionnels

R v Pearson, 2024 ABCA 245

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[77]           Abuse of process is intended to guard against state conduct which society finds unacceptable and threatens the integrity of the justice system: Hart at para 113. The accused has the onus to establish an abuse of process. Although the presence of inducements is not problematic, the combination of inducements and threats can coerce a confession which may amount to an abuse of process. Confessions derived from physical violence or threats of violence will not be admissible. In addition, threats that prey on a suspect’s mental health problems, substance addictions or youthfulness will often amount to an abuse of process no matter how reliable the confession. The court in Hart indicated that police misconduct should not be tolerated even if it resulted in a demonstrably reliable confession: para 112. The court also explained that there may be other misconduct that offends the community’s sense of fair play and decency that could amount to an abuse of process: paras 117-118.

[78]           The ability of a court to grant a stay and the abuse of process doctrine were discussed in R v Nixon, 2011 SCC 34 at para 41, where the court stated:

Under the residual category of cases, prejudice to the accused’s interests, although relevant, is not determinative. Of course, in most cases, the accused will need to demonstrate that he or she was prejudiced by the prosecutorial conduct in some significant way to successfully make out an abuse of process claim. But prejudice under the residual category of cases is better conceptualized as an act tending to undermine society’s expectations of fairness in the administration of justice. This essential balancing character of abuse of process under the residual category of cases was well captured by the words of L’Heureux-Dubé J. in R v Conway, 1989 CanLII 66 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 1659. She stated the following:

Under the doctrine of abuse of process, the unfair or oppressive treatment of an appellant disentitles the Crown to carry on with the prosecution of the charge. The prosecution is set aside, not on the merits (see Jewitt, supra, at p. 148), but because it is tainted to such a degree that to allow it to proceed would tarnish the integrity of the court. The doctrine is one of the safeguards designed to ensure “that the repression of crime through the conviction of the guilty is done in a way which reflects our fundamental values as a society” (Rothman v. The Queen, 1981 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at p. 689, per Lamer J.). It acknowledges that courts must have the respect and support of the community in order that the administration of criminal justice may properly fulfil its function. Consequently, where the affront to fair play and decency is disproportionate to the societal interest in the effective prosecution of criminal cases, then the administration of justice is best served by staying the proceedings. [Emphasis added; p. 1667.]

[79]           R v Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, was not dealing with a Mr. Big confession, but an accused’s statement to the police and the issue of its voluntariness. The use of police trickery and what might shock the community were discussed and the Supreme Court stated at para 66:

[In Rothman v The Queen, 1981 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1981] 1 SCR 640] Lamer J. was also quick to point out that courts should be wary not to unduly limit police discretion (at p. 697):

[T]he investigation of crime and the detection of criminals is not a game to be governed by the Marquess of Queensbury rules. The authorities, in dealing with shrewd and often sophisticated criminals, must sometimes of necessity resort to tricks or other forms of deceit and should not through the rule be hampered in their work. What should be repressed vigorously is conduct on their part that shocks the community. [Emphasis added.]

[80]           As examples of what might “shock the community”, Lamer J suggested a police officer pretending to be a chaplain or a legal aid lawyer, or injecting truth serum into a diabetic medicine under the pretense that it was insulin. Lamer J’s discussion on this point was adopted by the Supreme Court in R v Collins, 1987 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 286-87, 38 DLR (4th) 508; see also R v Clot (1982), 1982 CanLII 3744 (QC CS), 69 CCC (2d) 349, 27 CR (3d) 324 (QC CS).

[81]           Mr. Big operations are premised on lies and the ability of police officers to convince suspects of a number of untruths: Hart at para 60. Even in cases where uniformed police officers interrogate suspects, the courts have not found it offensive to lie to the suspects by “gradually revealing (actual or fake) evidence to the detainee in order to demonstrate or exaggerate the strength of the case against him”: R v Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 at para 60, R v Lafrance, 2022 SCC 32 at para 69.

Est-ce que déplacer un détenu du poste de police au lieu de la commission de l'infraction suivant sa détention pour soutirer une déclaration constitue un comportement abusif?

R v Pietz, 2025 MBCA 5

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[22]                     The accused submits that the trial judge erred in finding that his detention (i.e., the drive) was lawful. He submits that the trial judge erred in her application of the legal principles to the facts and that the facts do not satisfy the correct legal test. More particularly, he maintains that the detention was not carried out by the police officers in a reasonable manner, rendering it arbitrary. He asserts that it was unreasonable for the police officers to (1) remove him from the police headquarters in the middle of the night to take him on a lengthy drive without his consent; (2) use abusive language towards him; (3) not provide him with shoes, a jacket or a blanket while outside; and (4) keep him in handcuffs during the drive.

[23]                     The Crown submits that it was not unreasonable for the police officers to have continued the investigation by driving the accused to Arborg and that their conduct during the drive was not so egregious as to render the detention arbitrary. The Crown contends that the trial judge identified the correct legal test and there was no error in the application of the legal principles to the facts of the case that justifies this Court interfering with her findings.

[24]                     In our view, the trial judge correctly identified the test under section 9 of the Charter: “detention must be authorized by law, the authorizing law itself must not be arbitrary and the manner in which the detention is carried out must be reasonable” (decision at para 38, citing R v Le, 2019 SCC 34 at para 124). The trial judge properly found that there is authority to support the legality of the police actions in taking a detainee from a police station or interview room for the purposes of furthering the investigation, as long as it is reasonable to do so (see Storrey at 254).

[25]                     In Storrey, the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that the essential role of police is to investigate crimes, and that role and function can and should continue after police have made a lawful arrest (see ibid).

[26]                     Further, the trial judge correctly stated: “To put it another way, an otherwise lawful detention may be rendered arbitrary where the conditions of the detention are unrelated to or inconsistent with its lawful purpose” (decision at para 41, citing R v Steadman, 2021 ABCA 332 at para 64).

[27]                     We are satisfied that the trial judge articulated the correct legal principles to determine whether there had been a breach of section 9 of the Charter and applied the principles correctly.

[28]                     The trial judge’s findings are amply supported by a review of the evidence. She found that the conditions of detention were not unrelated to or inconsistent with its lawful purpose. In this case, the drive was part of the ongoing investigation to attempt to have the accused confess and admit that he moved the victim’s body to the Arborg area. It was not unreasonable for the police officers to take him to that location to attempt to elicit a reaction or a confession.

[29]                     As for the circumstances of the drive, the trial judge found, and we agree, that the police officers’ conduct was “not flawless” (decision at para 56). The accused was not provided with shoes, a jacket, a blanket or anything to stay warm when he was taken out of the police vehicle. As well, the police officers used offensive and profane language. However, the trial judge was not satisfied that their conduct was so egregious as to render the detention arbitrary. While the police officers’ conduct should not be condoned, their conduct can be contrasted with the conduct of the officer in R v Z (MJ), 2022 MBCA 61 at paras 37, 39, 64-65, where the officer used denigrating language and implied threats, which was found to exceed permissible boundaries.

[30]                     The accused submits that it was an error for the trial judge to state: “In some cases, this kind of conduct may render inadmissible any resulting statement given by a detainee. It cannot, in this case, lead to a finding that [the accused’s] detention was arbitrary” (decision at para 54). The accused submits that once there is a breach of section 9, it should not matter whether the accused provided any statement.

[31]                     In our view, the trial judge correctly recognized that the voluntariness analysis in connection with a statement does not circumscribe the section 9 Charter right. The section 9 analysis is distinct from the voluntariness analysis. That said, in this case, the accused maintained his right to silence throughout the entire investigation, including during the drive. As a result, there was no statement, and no voluntariness inquiry was required.

[32]                     We are satisfied that the trial judge made no error in law in her analysis. She articulated the correct legal test and applied it properly to the facts as she found them. She reviewed the relevant evidence, including the evidence of the police officers, which she found to be credible. She made no palpable and overriding errors in her findings of fact. Applying the law to the facts, she correctly concluded that the detention was not arbitrary.