L'arrestation citoyenne et les déclarations du suspect faites à la personne personne procédant à son arrestation

R. v. Raymond, 2017 ONSC 4864

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            2.         Applicable Principles

A.  Voluntariness and Persons in Authority

[115]      Generally, an accused’s out-of-court statements are admissible at trial under the “party admissions” exception to the hearsay rule:  see R. v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 20.  When such statements are made to ordinary persons, they are presumptively admissible without the requirement of a voir dire: see S.G.T., at para. 20.

[116]      A different rule applies when such statements are made to persons in authority.  This is the confessions rule.  Where an accused has made a statement to a person in authority, the Crown must prove the voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt on a voir dire as a prerequisite to its admission:  see S.G.T., at para. 20; R. v. Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 34.  Voluntariness, in this regard, encompasses not only the classic Ibrahim rule – “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage” – but also embraces the absence of an “atmosphere of oppression”, the operating mind doctrine, and police trickery:  see R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 24, 27, 63 & 65.  A contextual approach is required:  see R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 11. 

[117]      Before embarking on a voluntariness voir dire resolution, however, the “person in authority” issue is a threshold question. 

[118]      Whether the recipient of a statement is a person in authority is determined from the point of view of the accused:  see S.G.T., at para. 22; Grandinetti, at para. 38; R. v. Hodgson, 1998 CanLII 798 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at paras. 32 - 34.  In S.G.T., at para. 22, the Supreme Court states:

To be considered a person in authority, the accused must believe that the recipient of the statement can control or influence the proceedings against him or her, and that belief must be reasonable.

[119]      In other words, according to Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 4, persons in authority are

[t]hose persons whom the accused reasonably believes are acting on behalf of the police or prosecuting authorities and could therefore influence or control the proceedings against him or her ….

[120]      The accused bears an evidential burden to establish that there is a valid issue for consideration in relation to the person in authority requirement:   see Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 8; Grandinetti, at para. 37.  Once that burden is met, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the recipient was not a person in authority or, if it is found that the recipient was a person in authority, that the statement was voluntary:  see Hodgson, at para. 48, principle 8; Grandinetti, at para. 37. 

            B.  Citizen’s Arrest

[121]      Arrests by citizens are statutorily authorized pursuant to s. 494(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46:

                        (1)        Any one may arrest without warrant

            (a)     a person whom he finds committing an indictable offence; or

            (b)     a person who, on reasonable grounds, he believes

                     (i)      has committed a criminal offence, and

                     (ii)     is escaping from and freshly pursued by persons who have lawful authority to arrest that person.

[122]      A person making a citizen’s arrest has a statutory duty to turn the arrested person over to the police “forthwith” pursuant to s.494(3):

                                    Any one other than a peace officer who arrests a person without warrant shall forthwith deliver the person to a peace officer.

                        C.  Exclusion of Statements under Common Law

[123]      In R. v. Wells, 2003 BCCA 242, the British Columbia Court of Appeal noted, at para. 64, the existence of an alternative avenue for exclusion of statements where the recipient is not a person in authority:

[I]n my respectful view, the majority opinion in Hodgson cannot be taken to require that all confessions to persons not in authority, regardless of whether the confession is obtained by violence or threats of violence, must be admitted into evidence.  To so hold would ignore the court’s discretion to exclude evidence, the probative value of which is outweighed by [its] prejudicial effect, and the power and discretion of the courts to ensure the fair trial of an accused.

[124]      In reaching this conclusion, the Wells court relied on R. v. Harrer, 1995 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, and R. v. Terry, 1996 CanLII 199 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207, where the Supreme Court found that a trial judge has discretion under common law to exclude evidence that would result in an unfair trial. 

[125]      A similar rationale was subsequently endorsed in Grandinetti where the Supreme Court concluded, at para. 36:

There is no doubt, as the Court observed in Hodgson at para. 26, that statements can sometimes be made in such coercive circumstances that their reliability is jeopardized even if they were not made to a person in authority.  The admissibility of such statements is filtered through exclusionary doctrines like abuse of process at common law and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to prevent the admission of statements that undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

                        D.  Tainting

[126]      A prior involuntary statement can taint a subsequent statement rendering the subsequent statement involuntary as well:  see R. v. I.(L.R.), 1993 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504.  However, a necessary predicate is a prior involuntary statement. 

L'absence de consentement en matière de séquestration et d'arrestation citoyenne

R. v. Lahaie, 2019 ONCA 899

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[24]      In Magoon, at para. 64, the Supreme Court stated that “[u]nder s. 279(2) of the Criminal Code, the Crown must establish that (1) the accused confined the victim, and (2) the confinement was unlawful.” At para. 72, the court concluded:

There is no doubt that [the deceased child] was confined on Sunday. She was coercively restrained and directed contrary to her wishes. And the confinement was clearly unlawful. The acts of “discipline” were grossly disproportionate, cruel, degrading, deliberately harmful, and far exceeded any acceptable form of parenting. [Emphasis added.]

[25]      These passages suggest that the lack of consent is not a separate component of the actus reus, but is instead an aspect of the component of confinement. However, there is also authority suggesting that lack of consent is an aspect of the component of lawful authority: see e.g. David Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Instructions, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2015), at p. 885.

[26]      The matter need not be resolved for purposes of this appeal. Whether it is subsumed within one or both of the components of confinement and unlawfulness, there is no doubt that a lack of consent is an element of the offence of unlawful confinement that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. Gough, (1985) 18 C.C.C. (3d) 454 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 458. This appeal succeeds because the jury was not adequately informed of this requirement.

[45]      As the trial judge noted, there was no doubt that the complainants were physically restrained — all parties accepted that they were tied with zip ties following their arrest. The question was whether the complainants consented to remaining confined, and this issue needed to be specifically addressed and explained by the trial judge.

[46]      Although the trial judge referred to this issue, read as a whole his instructions focused on the wrong issue. Even if the appellants failed to call the police forthwith — an issue that went to the continuing lawfulness of the complainants’ arrest — their confinement of the complainants was unlawful only if the complainants did not consent to it. Consent in no way depended on whether or when the appellants called the police. If the appellants’ evidence were accepted, or if it at least left the jury in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether the complainants consented, they were entitled to be acquitted, and any concern about their failure to call the police forthwith was irrelevant.

[51]      Again, this summary is erroneous because it ignores the fact that the jury was required to acquit the appellants if they had a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainants consented to their continued confinement. It was incumbent on the trial judge to correct the Crown’s erroneous remarks, lest the jury be left with a misunderstanding of the law, but he failed to do so.

[52]      Moreover, Crown counsel told the jury that the Lahaies were guilty of unlawful confinement even on the defence version of the facts. But as the trial judge put it in his jury instruction, Sylvain Lahaie’s version of the facts was that he decided not to call the police because the complainants begged him not to. He claimed that he specifically asked the complainants if they were proposing that they be cut loose on a promise that they would return and pay for what they had previously stolen. He said that the complainants confirmed this was not what they were proposing, and they instead proposed that their parents be called, and compensation paid.

[53]      On this version of events, the appellants would not be guilty of unlawful confinement because the complainants consented to their continued confinement. The trial judge should have corrected the Crown’s assertion to the contrary and made it clear that it is the Crown’s obligation to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt: the appellants were not guilty of unlawful confinement if the jury found, or had a reasonable doubt about whether, the complainants consented.

[55]      In summary, the consent of the complainants was a live issue on these facts. The combination of the erroneous statements in the Crown’s closing submissions, the trial judge’s failure to correct them, and the errors in the trial judge’s instructions gives rise to a real risk that the jury may have convicted the appellants of unlawful confinement despite having a reasonable doubt about whether the complainants consented to their continuing confinement. The absence of an objection to the charge by defence counsel is no reason to deny relief for the errors in this case. The convictions cannot stand.

L' infraction doit être apparente pour une personne raisonnable placée dans les mêmes circonstances pour conclure qu'un suspect est « en train » de commettre une infraction aux fins du pouvoir d'arrestation citoyen

Jones c. R., 2005 NBBR 14

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[8]                                       Dans l’arrêt Roberge c. La Reine, 1983 CanLII 120 (CSC), [1983] 1 R.C.S. 312, la Cour a conclu en ces termes :

 

Le pouvoir d’arrestation attribué par cet alinéa doit être exercé promptement, bien que, strictement parlant, il soit impossible de dire si une infraction a été commise tant que la personne arrêtée n’a pas été déclarée coupable par les tribunaux. Si cette disposition doit être interprétée de cette façon, un agent de la paix ne pourrait jamais décider, lorsqu’il arrête une personne sans mandat, que la personne arrêtée est « en train de commettre une infraction criminelle ». À mon avis, le texte de l’al. b), qui est réduit à sa plus simple expression, signifie que le pouvoir d’arrêter sans mandat est accordé lorsque l’agent de la paix constate lui-même une situation où une personne est apparemment en train de commettre une infraction.

 

[9]                                       Par conséquent, « il faut […] que ce soit “apparent” aux yeux d’une personne raisonnable qui se trouve dans la situation du policier qui procède à l’arrestation à ce moment ».

 

[10]                                 En l’espèce, aurait-il été apparent pour une personne raisonnable que, vers minuit, la voiture conduite d’une manière aussi déconcertante que celle de M. Jones était conduite par un conducteur dont les facultés étaient affaiblies par l’effet de l’alcool? Cette question a été examinée dans R. c. Sirois, [1999] J.Q. n^o 1079, décision de la Cour d’appel du Québec. Dans cette affaire, des policiers militaires avaient arrêté l’appelant hors du territoire de leur base militaire. Par conséquent, ils agissaient comme simples citoyens et se sont fondés sur l’alinéa 494(1)a) du Code criminel. Les faits sont ainsi relatés :

 

¶9        Les faits incontestés démontrent qu’une personne a alerté les policiers militaires qui circulaient sur une route civile, leur signalant un véhicule qui venait tout juste de s’immobiliser, le conducteur semblant en état d’ébriété « dû à sa conduite ». Ils ont observé le véhicule qui s’est engagé sur la route et qui, sur un court trajet, a chevauché la ligne centrale à cinq reprises. C’est à ce moment, et ce malgré la formulation adoptée tant par les parties que leurs avocats dans les admissions de faits et les mémoires, qu’ils ont « arrêté » le conducteur. Après avoir constaté une odeur d’alcool et un langage incohérent, ils ont demandé à l’appelant de sortir de son véhicule, durant l’attente des policiers de la Sûreté municipale.

 

[. . .]

 

¶11      Dans ce contexte, il faut plutôt se demander si, compte tenu des renseignements obtenus d’un tiers quant à l’état du conducteur et des observations que le véhicule a zigzagué à cinq reprises sur une très courte distance, il pouvait être apparent (pour une personne raisonnable placée dans les mêmes circonstances) que l’appelant était en train de commettre l’infraction de conduire un véhicule alors que ses facultés étaient affaiblies par l’alcool?

 

[11]         Après avoir examiné les arrêts R. c. Biron, 1975 CanLII 13 (CSC), [1976] 2 R.C.S. 56, et Roberge (précité), la Cour a conclu :

 

¶13      Il n’est pas nécessaire qu’un citoyen qui procède à une arrestation selon l’al. 494(1)a) ait une connaissance personnelle de tous les éléments qui le mènent à sa conclusion que la personne est « en train » de commettre une infraction; il peut déduire, d’un ensemble de circonstances, qu’une personne est apparemment en train de commettre une infraction et cette infraction doit être apparente pour une personne raisonnable placée dans les mêmes circonstances. De l’avis de la Cour, c’était le cas en l’espèce.

 

¶14      En conséquence, la conclusion s’impose que l’arrestation par les policiers militaires était légale. Comme l’était tout autant la détention de l’appelant qui en a résulté de même que la preuve recueillie par les agents de la paix mandés sur les lieux après l’arrestation, la déclaration de culpabilité est bien fondée.

 

[12]                                 Il est évident que, vers minuit, un conducteur, surtout celui qui possède les mêmes antécédents que ceux du caporal Starks, qui observe un véhicule venant en sens inverse chevaucher la ligne médiane pour se retrouver sur l’accotement, soupçonnerait que le conducteur a consommé de l’alcool. D’autres raisons pourraient expliquer pareil comportement, mais je suis d’avis que le caporal Stark a conclu à juste titre qu’une infraction était en train d’être « commise ». Ce serait apparent pour une personne raisonnable placée dans les mêmes circonstances. Les circonstances existaient pour que soit déclenchée l’application de l’alinéa 494(1)a) du Code criminel.

L'arrestation citoyenne peut entraîner une séquestration s'il n'y a pas remise rapide du suspect aux policiers

R. v. Corbett, 2004 BCCA 378

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[12]   It seems to me that those comments of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal are apposite in the present case.  While the appellant and his colleague, Mr. Davies, may have been entitled to restrain the complainant from an attack upon the person or the possessions of the appellant at the residence after she had arrived and engaged in assaultive behaviour, the continuing confinement of the complainant at the residence for several hours grossly exceeded any permissible bounds of self-help or purported exercise of authority under s. 494 of the Code.  There is a large measure of unreality, it seems to me, in asserting that this was somehow a proceeding that could be said to be encompassed within the term "lawful authority" contained in the relevant Code section.  Counsel for the appellant argues that because "without lawful authority" is a constituent element of the offence, it was for the jury to pass on this and not for the trial judge to remove what was said to be this element of the offence from their consideration.  I think an answer to this submission can be found in the following words of Fish J. giving the judgment of the court in the case of R. v. Fontaine, 2004 SCC 27, at para. 56:

... Like all other disputed issues, however, defences of this sort will only be left to the jury where a sufficient evidential basis is found to exist.  That foundation cannot be said to exist where its only constituent elements are of a tenuous, trifling, insignificant or manifestly unsubstantive nature: there must be evidence in the record upon which a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defence that has been raised.

Le pouvoir d'arrestation du citoyen peut trouver application lorsque le suspect est pris en flagrant délit d’infraction

R. v. Abel & Corbett, 2008 BCCA 54 

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[31]           I do not accept the interpretation of “finds committing” advanced by the appellants.  An examination of the common law roots and historical statutory usage of this expression reveals that it connotes a situation where the arresting party comes upon someone in the very act of committing an offence.  In other words, criminal activity must be taking place in the presence of the arresting party.  This view is further supported by the French version of other federal statutes, discussed below, that authorize arrest on the basis of “finds committing.”

[62]           The French version of “finds committing” in the more recent enactments is “qu’il prend (qu’ils prennent) en flagrant délit d’infraction”, meaning “to be caught in the act” or “caught red-handed.”  In other words, the detection of a crime in progress.

[63]           To the extent that the expressions “finds committing” and “qu’il trouve en train de commettre” used in the Criminal Code may be ambiguous, which I do not think they are, any ambiguity is resolved by having regard to how Parliament has expressed itself in French in these other statutes.  The interpretation common to all versions in both official languages, i.e., their shared meaning, is that the person effecting the arrest must have come upon someone who, at that very moment and at that very place, is engaged in criminal activity.

Il est interdit de légitimer une arrestation ex post facto

R. c. Sirois, 1999 CanLII 13753 (QC CA)

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N'est pas ici en litige le pouvoir d'intercepter le conducteur d'un véhicule, puisque selon le Code de sécurité routière[1] et la common law[2], ce pouvoir n'est conféré qu'aux agents de la paix.  Il convient ici de préciser que les policiers militaires ne pouvaient pas intercepter le conducteur pour faire certaines vérifications avant de décider de l'arrêter:  en ce cas, l'interception aurait été illégale et on ne saurait valider l'arrestation sur la base d'indices constatés à la suite d'une interception illégale.  On ne pourrait donc tenter de légitimer l'arrestation ex post facto, soit sur la base de ce qui a été observé après une interception qui serait illégale si elle ne consistait pas alors en une véritable arrestation.

Il n'est pas nécessaire qu'un citoyen qui procède à une arrestation selon l'al. 494 (1)a) ait une connaissance personnelle de tous les éléments qui le mènent à sa conclusion que la personne est «en train» de commettre une infraction

R. c. Sirois, 1999 CanLII 13753 (QC CA)

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Il n'est pas nécessaire qu'un citoyen qui procède à une arrestation selon l'al. 494 (1)a) ait une connaissance personnelle de tous les éléments qui le mènent à sa conclusion que la personne est «en train» de commettre une infraction; il peut déduire, d'un ensemble de circonstances, qu'une personne est apparemment en train de commettre une infraction et cette infraction doit être apparente pour une personne raisonnable placée dans les mêmes circonstances.[3]  De l'avis de la Cour, c'était le cas en l'espèce.

Un citoyen procédant à l'arrestation d'un suspect n'a pas à parfaitement mesurer l'emploi de la force utilisée à cette fin

R v Schubert, 2016 SKQB 137

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[64]                     In his testimony, Mr. Schubert said that he was simply trying to stop and apprehend Ms. Desnomie. He said he wanted to make a “citizen’s arrest”.

[65]                     Section 494(2) of the Criminal Code permits the owner of property to arrest someone he finds committing an offence on or in relation to his property. Section 25(1)(a) authorizes a person lawfully making such an arrest to do “what he is required or authorized to do” and to use “as much force as is necessary for that purpose”.

[66]                     A person making an arrest does not have to weigh to a nicety his or her actions, or the amount of force required to effect his or her purpose. Actions taken in the name of law enforcement should not be judged against a standard of perfection. That said, s. 25 does not grant carte blanche to a person who determines that it is necessary to make an arrest. The authority to use force, or otherwise act, in s. 25 is constrained by principles of proportionality, necessity, and reasonableness: R v Power, 2016 SKCA 29.