R. v Norris, 2019 NLCA 29
[39] Where the Crown adduces evidence to rebut a defence, the accused may be permitted to adduce surrebuttal evidence. In R. v. Chaulk, 1990 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, Lamer C.J.C., for the majority, explained, at page 1364:
The principle that the Crown is obliged to adduce, as part of its case, only evidence that is relevant to an element of the offence that the Crown must prove is affirmed by the corollary principle that the Crown need not adduce evidence in chief to challenge a defence that an accused might possibly raise. I approve of the analysis in this respect of Peter K. McWilliams, Q.C., in Canadian Criminal Evidence (3rd ed. 1990), at p. 31-5:
In R. v. Campbell (1977), 1977 CanLII 1191 (ON CA), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 6 (Ont. C.A.), Martin, J.A, said at p. 26:
Rebuttal evidence by the prosecution is restricted to evidence to meet new facts introduced by the defence. The accused’s mere denial of the prosecution’s case in the witness-box does not permit the prosecution in reply to reiterate its case, or to adduce additional evidence in support of it. In practice, however, it may often be difficult to distinguish between evidence, properly the subject of rebuttal, and evidence of facts relevant to prove guilt which should have been proved in the first instance by a full presentation of the prosecution’s case … .
(Emphasis in original.)
[40] In the case of both rebuttal and surrebuttal evidence it is necessary to determine the scope of allowable evidence. In R. v. Dupe, 2016 ONCA 653, the Court provided obiter dicta regarding the scope of surrebuttal evidence where the accused sought to recall a psychiatrist who had testified about the accused’s state of mind when the victim was stabbed. The judge allowed surrebuttal evidence on four of fourteen issues raised by the accused. While the Court’s decision did not turn on the issue of surrebuttal evidence, Doherty J.A., for the Court, commented:
[69] … The trial judge understood that he had the discretion to permit surrebuttal evidence. He considered the relevance of the proposed surrebuttal testimony and whether the [accused] had had a full opportunity to address the issues which were the subject of the proposed surrebuttal with Dr. Gojer when Dr. Gojer testified as part of the defence … .
[41] In R. v. Ewert (1989), 1989 CanLII 7140 (BC CA), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 280 (B.C.C.A.), the accused’s defence of insanity was based on the evidence of one psychologist. The Crown retained three experts who were present in court when the accused testified. The Crown’s experts testified “partly on the basis of prior examination and partly on the basis of observations made in the courtroom” (Ewert, at page 282). Taylor J.A., for the Court, explained, at pages 283 to 284:
… Specifically, counsel [for Ewert] sought to have Dr. Koopman [the defence expert] deal with the “twenty-two points” mentioned by Dr. Kerr [a Crown expert on rebuttal] as indicia of psychopathy and Dr. Kerr’s contention that assessment of the accused against these criteria showed his behaviour to be psychopathic.
It is asserted on appeal that the accused ought to have had the opportunity to adduce surrebuttal evidence to meet this evidence given for the Crown tending to show that the conduct of the accused, both before and during the trial, was that of a psychopath rather than that of a person suffering from a disease of the mind as described in the defence evidence.
… The right of the accused to a full opportunity to answer the case entered against him by the Crown must apply to evidence given by way of rebuttal as well as to that given during the Crown’s case-in-chief. The rules regarding the permissible scope of surrebuttal must, it follows, be applied liberally in favour of an accused person in such circumstances as the present.
…
In this case some of the evidence led by the Crown in rebuttal was new evidence, particularly that which dealt with the indicia of psychopathy and the alleged presence of those indicia in observed behaviour of the accused. This evidence included observations on the testimony of the accused at trial which, according to the Crown’s experts, showed him to have a psychopathic personality rather than the described disease of the mind.
…
The evidence of the Crown’s witnesses went not simply to denial of the thesis advanced by the defence but to establishing an alternative explanation for the accused’s conduct inconsistent with the contention advanced on his behalf. For the most part, the opinions of the Crown’s experts and the observations on which they were based had not been put to Dr. Koopman in cross-examination, and there had,
therefore been no opportunity for the defence to deal with that evidence in its own case.
(Emphasis added.)
[42] These decisions demonstrate the balance that must be engaged when the defence seeks to adduce surrebuttal evidence. I begin with the premise that the permissible scope of defence surrebuttal evidence should be liberal in favour of the accused in order to ensure the opportunity to make full answer and defence.
[43] That said, the accused’s opportunity to make full answer and defence does not mean that the defence should be permitted to “split its defence” just as the Crown is not permitted to “split its case”. Failure to present its full case, whether the Crown in proving the elements of the offence, or the accused in establishing a defence, may result in prejudice to the other side and interference with the orderly and expeditious conduct of the trial.
[44] Factors that may be considered in determining the appropriate scope of surrebuttal evidence include: (1) the relevance of the proposed surrebuttal testimony; (2) whether the accused had the opportunity during the presentation of his or her defence to address the issues for which surrebuttal evidence is requested; (3) whether the accused failed to provide a complete foundation for the defence, and sought, instead to split its case; (4) the extent to which the evidence adduced by the Crown in rebuttal is new, for example, evidence directed to an alternative explanation not dealt with in the defence evidence, or Crown rebuttal evidence that included observation of the accused during the trial, as in Ewert; (5) whether the Crown conducted vigorous cross-examination of the defence witnesses so as to reduce the probable need to recall the witness for surrebuttal evidence; (6) the extent to which the whole of the evidence is inter-related, making the definition of a permissible scope of examination more difficult; and (7) whether the witness giving surrebuttal evidence is new or has previously testified on behalf of the accused.
[45] The above is not an exhaustive list of factors that may be considered by a judge in exercising the discretion to allow surrebuttal evidence, nor would every one be relevant in every case. Admissibility of the evidence together with the permitted scope of examination will depend on all the circumstances.