La défense d'erreur de fait & de consentement implicite en matière de voies de fait

R. v. Bennett, 2006 CanLII 31012 (NL PC)

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THE ELEMENT OF CONSENT IN THE OFFENCE OF ASSAULT

[37]  When an accused person is charged with the offence of assault, the Crown must prove that the complainant did not consent to being touched.  This is a subjective test (see Ewanchuk, at paragraphs 25 to 30).  The Crown must also prove that the accused knew that there was a lack of consent or was reckless or wilfully blind to its absence (see R. v. Williams, 2003 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, at paragraphs 22 and 36).

MISTAKE OF FACT

[38]  If the Crown can prove a lack of consent, the accused may still argue that he or she had an honest, but mistaken belief that the person touched was consenting.  In Ewanchuk, the nature of this defence was described as follows (at paragraphs 43 and 44):

The accused may challenge the Crown's evidence of mens rea by asserting an honest but mistaken belief in consent.  The nature of this defence was described in Pappajohn v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 at p. 148, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481, 111 D.L.R. (3d) 1, by Dickson J. (as he then was) (dissenting in the result): Mistake is a defence . . . where it prevents an accused from having the mens rea which the law requires for the very crime with which he is charged.  Mistake of fact is more accurately seen as a negation of guilty intention than as the affirmation of a positive defence.  It avails an accused who acts innocently, pursuant to a flawed perception of the facts, and nonetheless commits the actus reus of the offence.  Mistake is a defence though, in the sense that it is raised as an issue by an accused. The Crown is rarely possessed of knowledge of the subjective factors which may have caused an accused to entertain a belief in a fallacious set of facts.

The defence of mistake is simply a denial of mens rea. It does not impose any burden of proof upon the accused (see R. v. Robertson, 1987 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 918 at p. 936, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 321), and it is not necessary for the accused to testify in order to raise the issue…

[39]  In determining if an accused person had an honest belief that consent existed, section 265(4) of the Criminal Code indicates the Court must consider the “presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief”:

Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented to the conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused’s belief, to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief.

[40]  Finally, to constitute an honest mistake, the accused's belief cannot be a reckless or willfully blind one (Ewanchuk, at paragraph 65).

WHAT IS IMPLIED CONSENT?

[41]  As has been seen, the mere touching of another person without their consent can constitute an assault.  The manner in which the offence of assault has been defined in Canada is such that it does not require proof of any level of harm having occurred or having been intended.  The Crown does not have to prove any intent beyond the intent to touch another person without their consent.  Hostility is not a component of the Canadian definition of assault.[5]  As a result, the present definition of assault in Canadian law has the potential to criminalize very trivial behaviour.[6]  This potential harshness is tempered by allowing for contact to occur, without criminal liability, when it occurs between individuals in situations in which the existence of consent is implied.[7]  This aspect of the law of assault was explained by Smith and Hogan, in the context of their examination of the concept of violence in the common law offence of battery, as follows:

Violence here includes the smallest degree of personal contact – a mere touching without consent is enough.  But there is an implied consent to that degree of contact which is necessary or customary in everyday usage.  In Tuberville v. Savage it was said that it is no assault to strike another on the hand, arm or breast in ordinary discourse.  Touching another to attract his attention is not a battery even if, as in Coward v. Baddeley, P has already told D to go away and mind his own business…[8]

 

[42]   Fletcher describes implied consent as an inevitable component of “group living”:

It is difficult to argue that touching per se is incriminating.  In some societies, all forms of human contact might be regarded as trespassing on the domain of another, but we regularly accept a gentle hand on the shoulder as both the price and the benefit of group living.  Sexual

 

 

contact is obviously different…[9]

 

[43]  In Collins v Wilcock, [1984] 3 All ER 374 (Q.B.), it was pointed out, at page 378, that it “has long been established that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery.”  It was said that this principle is based upon the premise that “every person’s body is inviolate.”  As regards the doctrine of implied consent, the Court suggested that rather than attempting to label certain contact as falling within the scope of such a doctrine it is preferable to view such contact as examples of a “general exception” to the requirement for explicit consent (at page 378): 

…Generally speaking, consent is a defence to a battery; and most of the physical contacts of ordinary life are not actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so expose themselves to the risk of bodily contact.  So nobody can complain of the jostling which is inevitable from his presence in, for example, a supermarket, an underground station or a busy street; nor can a person who attends a party complain if his hand is seized in friendship, or even if his back is (within reason) slapped (see Tuberville v. Savage (1669), 1 Mod Rep 3, 86 ER 684).  Although such cases are regarded as examples of implied consent, it is more common nowadays to treat them as falling within a general exception embracing all physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life....

 

…In each case, the test must be whether the physical contact so persisted in has in the circumstances gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct; and the answer to that question will depend on the facts of the particular case.

 

[44]  In applying the doctrine of implied consent, its inherent limitations must be clearly recognized.  We exist in a society in which personal choice as regards the type and manner of contact we have with other people is virtually sacrosanct.  In R. v. Ogg-Moss, 1984 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 173, for instance, it was held that one “of the key rights in our society is the individual's right to be free from unconsented invasions on his or her physical security or dignity and it is a central purpose of the criminal law to protect members of society from such invasions.”  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ewanchuk pointed out that the right to “physical integrity is a fundamental principle” which the “criminalization of assault” seeks to protect and assert:

…Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both physical and psychological, of every individual.  Having control over who touches one's body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity and autonomy.  The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code expresses society's determination to protect the security of the person from any non-consensual contact or threats of force.  The common law has recognized for centuries that the individual's right to physical integrity is a fundamental principle, "every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it in any the slightest manner": see Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th ed. (1770), Book III, at p. 120.  It follows that any intentional but unwanted touching is criminal.[10]

[45]  Though most of us accept that a certain degree of contact with other people will occur in our everyday lives, we expect such contact or touching to be limited, contextually appropriate and consistent with the rationale for our consent to it being implied.  As pointed out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. E.(A.) (2000), 2000 CanLII 16823 (ON CA), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paragraph 33, implied consent, is “a creature of public policy” and thus, it must “be strictly limited to conduct which is consistent with the purpose and rationale underlying the policy basis for the consent…Otherwise, the positive social value of deemed consent loses its rationale.”[11]  As a result, for the doctrine of implied consent to operate, the touching must fall within the scope of the type of touching which our customary norms of social interaction deem to be consensual.  This is an objective standard (see R. v. Cey (1989), 1989 CanLII 283 (SK CA), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Sask. C.A.), at page 490).

Il n'existe aucune règle voulant que l’actus reus d’une agression sexuelle, ou de toute autre voie de fait, ne puisse être démontré que par la preuve d’attouchements physiques

Roy c. R., 2021 QCCA 619

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[20]      Comme l’explique la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt R. c. Ewanchuk : « [l]’infraction consiste en des voies de fait visées par l’une ou l’autre des définitions du par. 265(1) du Code, et qui sont commises dans des circonstances de nature sexuelle telles qu’il y a atteinte à l’intégrité sexuelle de la victime »[4]. L’actus reus d’une agression sexuelle est prouvée lorsqu’une personne commet un geste énuméré aux paragraphes 265(1) a) et b) à caractère sexuel sur une autre personne sans le consentement de celle-ci. Le standard à appliquer pour déterminer si les gestes comportent la nature sexuelle requise est celui de la personne raisonnable tenant compte de toutes les circonstances[5].

[21]      Bien qu’un grand nombre de cas de voies de fait et d’agression sexuelle implique des attouchements physiques, le paragraphe 265(2) du Code criminel rend applicable toutes les modalités de l’infraction de voies de fait visées aux paragraphes 265(1)a) et b) à des circonstances sexuelles[6]. Le paragraphe 265(1)b) dispose qu’il y a agression lorsque l’accusé « tente ou menace, par un acte ou un geste, d’employer la force contre une autre personne, s’il est en mesure actuelle, ou s’il porte cette personne à croire, pour des motifs raisonnables, qu’il est alors en mesure actuelle d’accomplir son dessein ». Force est de constater que cette disposition reconnaît explicitement la distinction entre l’emploi actuel de force physique contre une autre personne et un emploi de force appréhendé tel que défini dans le paragraphe. 

[22]      La jurisprudence de la Cour suprême ou de cette cour n’impose aucune règle voulant que l’actus reus d’une agression sexuelle, ou de toute autre voie de fait, ne puisse être démontré que par la preuve d’attouchements physiques. Une telle règle supposerait que la Cour suprême a, par ses arrêts, abrogé les paragraphes 265(1) et (2) du Code criminel. Lorsque la Cour dit dans l’arrêt Ewanchuk qu’un attouchement physique est un élément de l’actus reus de l’infraction de voies de fait, elle ne fait qu’affirmer qu’un attouchement physique est un élément suffisant aux fins de l’application du paragraphe 265(1). À aucun moment la Cour n’affirme-t-elle que l’attouchement physique est un élément strictement nécessaire à l’infraction. Cela va de soi, puisque la disposition en question prévoit explicitement d’autres modalités d’exécution qui sont également suffisantes pour conclure à la culpabilité.

Comment apprécier si un arrêt conditionnel s'impose face à des condamnation à des chefs d’accusation d’agression sexuelle et d’incitation à des contacts sexuels

Mariona c. R., 2018 QCCA 1524

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[10]        En vertu de l’article 265 C.cr, une agression sexuelle correspond à des voies de faits qui surviennent dans des circonstances de nature sexuelle[13].

[11]        Dans Ewanchuk, le juge Major énonce :

L’actus reus de l’agression sexuelle est établi par la preuve de trois éléments: (i) les attouchements, (ii) la nature sexuelle des contacts, (iii) l’absence de consentement.  Les deux premiers éléments sont objectifs.  Il suffit que le ministère public prouve que les actes de l’accusé étaient volontaires.  La nature sexuelle de l’agression est déterminée objectivement; le ministère public n’a pas besoin de prouver que l’accusé avait quelque mens rea pour ce qui est de la nature sexuelle de son comportement. ^[14]

[Références omises]

[12]        La preuve révèle que l’appelant prend la main de la plaignante afin de la forcer à toucher son pénis. Pour ce faire, il utilise la force en raison de l’absence de consentement de la victime. Ce geste s’assimile à des voies de faits. Puisqu’il est posé à des fins sexuelles, la juge de première instance a eu raison de conclure à une agression sexuelle même si aucun geste à caractère sexuel n’a été posé sur le corps de la victime[15].

[13]        La juge condamne également l’appelant pour incitation à des contacts sexuels (art 152 C.cr.) puisque la preuve révèle la présence des éléments constitutifs de cette infraction:

[52] Pour déclarer un accusé coupable d’une infraction selon l’article 152 C.cr., un juge doit conclure que la preuve établit, hors de tout doute raisonnable, l’existence concomitante d’une invitation, d’un encouragement ou d’une incitation à toucher, plus qu’un simple acquiescement passif ou un défaut de résister, et d’une intention spécifique que cela se fasse à des fins d’ordre sexuel.[16]

[14]        L’appelant a incité X à le toucher et lui a pris la main pour le faire. Le geste constitue une invitation même en l’absence de communication verbale. La mens rea spécifique est également présente puisque l’intention était manifestement de se faire toucher à des fins d’ordre sexuel.

[15]        Cela étant, en vertu des principes de l’arrêt Kienapple, la juge aurait dû ordonner l’arrêt conditionnel des procédures relativement au chef d’agression sexuelle.

[16]        L’arrêt Prince[17] précise certains critères relativement à l’application de l’arrêt Kienapple. Tout d’abord, les infractions doivent avoir un lien factuel évident. Il faut donc se demander si les accusations sont fondées sur le même acte de l'accusé[18]. Si la réponse est positive, il est nécessaire d’examiner le lien juridique entre les infractions. Afin d’ordonner un arrêt des procédures sur l’une ou l’autre des infractions, il ne doit pas y avoir d’éléments constitutifs supplémentaires ou distinctifs entre elles[19]. Finalement, en appliquant ces critères, il faut « se garder de pousser la logique au point de contrecarrer l'intention du législateur ou de perdre de vue la question clé de savoir si les deux accusations sont fondées sur la même cause, la même chose ou le même délit »[20]. L’arrêt des procédures prononcé en vertu de Kienapple, s’applique à l’infraction la moins grave[21].

[17]        Certes, dans Casavant[22], notre cour n’applique pas la règle de l’arrêt Kiennaple à des chefs d’accusation d’agression sexuelle et d’incitation à des contacts sexuels qui constituent « des infractions différentes, qui visent des comportements qui ne sont pas essentiellement identiques et dont les liens factuels et juridiques ne sont pas étroits au sens de l’arrêt R c. Prince.»

[18]        La situation factuelle est toutefois différente en l’espèce. En effet, les deux accusations concernent un seul événement de très courte durée. Les faits relatifs aux deux infractions sont identiques. L’emploi de la force pour amener la main de la plaignante vers son sexe, qui constitue les voies de fait justifiant la condamnation pour agression, est le même geste qui est assimilé à une incitation pour les fins de la seconde infraction. La mens rea requise est également similaire, soit une intention de toucher ou de commettre des attouchements à des fins sexuelles sans le consentement de la victime.

L’accusé qui soulève un doute raisonnable sur le consentement de la victime à l’emploi de la force sera acquitté d'une infraction de voies de fait et cette détermination du consentement s’effectue selon un critère subjectif

Bérubé-Gagnon c. R., 2020 QCCA 1389

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[22]      L’absence de consentement de la victime est un élément essentiel de l’infraction de voies de fait. Si la victime consent à se battre, les voies de fait ne seront pas illégales. Ainsi, l’accusé qui soulève un doute raisonnable sur le consentement de la victime à l’emploi de la force sera acquitté. L’état d’esprit de la victime au moment des événements permettra de déterminer si elle a consenti expressément ou tacitement à une bagarre. La détermination du consentement s’effectue donc selon un critère subjectif[8].

[23]      Par ailleurs, l’article 265(4) C.cr. prévoit qu’un accusé peut avoir cru que la victime ait consenti aux voies de fait. Cette croyance n’a pas à être raisonnable, mais doit être sincère et fondée sur des motifs objectivement raisonnables. Voici ce qu’en a dit le juge Rochette, dans LSJPA – 093 :

[21] Constituant une erreur de fait, la croyance sincère de l'accusé au consentement de la victime, un critère subjectif, n'a pas à être raisonnable, mais doit être fondée sur des motifs objectivement raisonnables.

[22]  Il s'agit ici d'examiner la mens rea de l'infraction, soit la croyance de bonne foi appréciée selon le critère de la vraisemblance.  Si l’accusé satisfait au fardeau de présentation, il peut bénéficier du doute raisonnable, que le doute découle de sa version ou de la preuve du poursuivant, à moins que le ministère public démontre hors de tout doute raisonnable que l'accusé savait que la victime ne consentait pas à l'emploi de la force contre elle.  Ce fardeau est exigeant, tous en conviendront.[9]

[24]      Le juge n’a pas commis d’erreur sur cette question. Il pouvait conclure que l’absence de consentement du plaignant a été prouvée hors de tout doute raisonnable. La preuve lui permettait aussi de rejeter la défense de croyance sincère, parce qu’invraisemblable et qu’aucun geste ne pouvait laisser croire à l’appelant que le plaignant acceptait de se battre. Le juge n’a pas retenu de la preuve que l’appelant avait été poussé par le plaignant, mais plutôt que ce dernier a posé sa main sur l’épaule de l’appelant. Le juge motive bien cette détermination.

Le consentement à la bagarre est vicié lorsqu'une partie utilise des tactiques qui transforment la nature de la bagarre consensuelle, la faisant passer d'une activité présentant un certain risque de blessures graves à une activité présentant un risque important de telles blessures

R. v. Toth, 2024 BCCA 139

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[77]      The absence of consent to intentionally applied force is a material element of the offence of assault under s. 265 of the Criminal Code, and therefore consent acts as a defence to assault. In a manslaughter charge based on assault as the unlawful act under s. 222(5)(a), consent will indirectly act as a defence to that offence as well. The role of consent in assault in relation to a fist fight or brawl was discussed in R. v. Jobidon, 1991 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714. Justice Gonthier, for the majority, concluded that common law principles limiting consent to assault continue to apply, but in narrow scope:

The law’s willingness to vitiate consent on policy grounds is significantly limited. Common law cases restrict the extent to which consent may be nullified; as do the relevant policy considerations. The unique situation under examination in this case, a weaponless fist fight between two adults, provides another important boundary.

The limitation demanded by s. 265 as it applies to the circumstances of this appeal is one which vitiates consent between adults intentionally to apply force causing serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm to each other in the course of a fist fight or brawl.

[Emphasis in original.]

[78]      In R. v. Paice, 2005 SCC 22, Justice Charron, for the majority, made it clear that Jobidon requires serious bodily harm be both intended and caused for consent to be vitiated: at para. 18.

[79]      This formulation has been applied in numerous cases involving fist fights between adults: see, for example, R. v. Sullivan, 2011 NLCA 6; R. v. McDonald, 2012 ONCA 379; R. v. Modeste, 2015 ONCA 398; and R. v. Zsombor, 2023 BCCA 37.

[82]      It is not certain that recklessness and the objective foreseeability of serious bodily harm is sufficient to establish the intention requirement to vitiate consent. The majority reasons in Sullivan agreed with Welsh J.A. to the extent that the recklessness standard applied to the offence of aggravated assault but noted the difficulty in applying this standard in the context of a consensual fist fight: at paras. 45–46.

[87]      Respectfully, I disagree. The defence never asserted a defence of consent, for good reason. The evidence does not support any finding of an agreement or understanding between Mr. Ocampo and Mr. Toth to engage in a fight, express or implied. Although Mr. Ocampo sought out the encounter, there was no evidence on which an inference could be drawn that Mr. Toth consented to being attacked by pepper spray and what followed was a consensual fight. R. v. Piapot, 2014 SKCA 9 at para. 32 and R. v. Mitchell, 2015 ABPC 99 at paras. 68–69, cases on which Mr. Toth relies, merely support the proposition that, in certain circumstances, consent may be found in an implied agreement to engage in a fight. In neither case did the court find there was consent to engage in a fight, and as I have explained, there is no evidence supportive of the conclusion that was the case here.

[89]      The concept that consent can be withdrawn during a fight, as noted by counsel in this passage, is consistent with the jurisprudence. As Justice Frankel held in Zsombor, consent is vitiated where one party employs tactics that change the nature of what began as a consensual fight “from an activity with some risk of serious bodily harm to one with a significant risk of such harm; i.e., tactics that were not reasonably contemplated in the first instance”: at para. 33.

Le consentement à la bagarre ne peut être invalidé que s'il y a à la fois intention de causer des lésions corporelles et que des lésions corporelles graves sont causées

R. v. McDonald, 2012 ONCA 379

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[21]         On appeal, counsel for the appellant takes the position that R. v. Paice, 2005 SCC 22 (CanLII), [2005] 1S.C.R. 339 and R. v. Quashie, 2005 CanLII 23208 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 2694 (C.A.) have clarified that consent may be available as a defence on a charge of aggravated assault even where serious bodily harm is inflicted so long as the accused did not intentionally cause the serious bodily harm.

[22]         Counsel for the Crown relies on the case of R. v. Godin, 1994 CanLII 97 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 484, where the court held on a charge of aggravated assault that the Crown is not required to prove that the accused intended to cause bodily harm.  The court wrote that the mens rea for aggravated assault is “objective foresight of bodily harm” and that: “It is not necessary that there be an intent to wound or maim or disfigure.”  The Crown argues that the mens rea requirement means that, if vitiating consent requires proving that the accused had the intent to inflict serious bodily harm, then the mens rea for aggravated assault will be raised from objective to subjective, which cannot be correct.  Counsel for the Crown further submits that the cases of Jobidon and Paice should be interpreted in light of Godin and that any “consent” given by a complainant during the course of a fight will be vitiated if the Crown establishes that: (1) the accused intentionally applied force to the complainant; (2) the force the accused intentionally applied caused bodily harm to the complainant; and (3) a reasonable person, in the circumstances, would inevitably realize that the force the accused intentionally applied would put the complainant at risk of suffering some kind of bodily harm.

[23]         Crown counsel also takes the position that the defence at trial had admitted certain facts concerning the intentional application of force and causation but contested the issue of objective foresight.  As a result, the trial judge instructed that jury concerning this element of the offence of aggravated assault and said that they needed to decide:

Would a reasonable person, in the circumstances inevitably realize that the force McDonald intentionally applied put Gibson at risk of suffering some kind of bodily harm although not necessarily serious bodily harm or the precise kind of harm that Mr. Gibson suffered here?

[24]         The trial judge then instructed the jury that if they were not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this element had been proven, they must then decide: “...did Gibson consent to the force that McDonald applied?”  This is the point at which the issue of consent was considered relevant. Crown counsel supports the order and the manner of the instruction.

V.   Analysis on the Issue of Consent

[25]         In R. v. Paice, there was a scuffle in a bar and the accused was challenged by the deceased to go outside and fight, which he did.  They exchanged threats and the deceased pushed the accused once or twice. The accused hit the deceased in the jaw, and the deceased fell backward and hit his head twice.  The accused then straddled the deceased and struck him twice more.  The deceased died as a result of his injuries.  The accused was charged with manslaughter.  He argued that the deceased’s consent to the fight vitiated criminal responsibility and that the trial judge used an incorrect test for determining whether consent is negated.  The trial judge held that the defence of consent did not apply if there was either intent to cause serious bodily harm or serious bodily harm was caused.

[26]         The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.  The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.  The court held that the trial judge erred in formulating the test in the alternative.  Rather, the court held at para. 18 that, in accordance with the Jobidon decision, consent cannot be nullified unless there is both intent to cause serious bodily harm and serious bodily harm is caused.  The Supreme Court re-affirmed and refined the Jobidon decision and held that serious harm must be both intended and caused for consent to be vitiated.

[27]         In R. v. Quashie, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from conviction of the offences of sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm where the complainant alleged that she had been sexually assaulted and that she was injured during the second assault.  The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury on the issue of consent in respect of the offence of aggravated or sexual assault causing bodily harm and submitted that there was no suggestion that the accused deliberately inflicted injury or pain to the complainant.  It was argued that whatever injuries the complainant suffered were incidental to sexual intercourse and that consent was an available defence.  Justice Gillese reviewed the decision in R. v. Paice and wrote at para. 57:

Based on the authorities, in my view, it was an error for the trial judge to fail to instruct the jury that in order for bodily harm to vitiate consent, they had to find both that the appellant had intended to inflict bodily harm on the complainant and that the appellant had caused her bodily harm.

[28]         Accordingly, following Paice and Quashie, consent is vitiated only when the accused intended to cause serious bodily harm and the accused caused serious bodily harm.  The defence of consent may, if the facts support it, be available in the context of a charge of aggravated assault.  In the case at bar, in my view, the trial judge erred by removing the defence of consent from the jury for its consideration on the charge of aggravated assault.