Quand le consentement initial à une bagarre consensuelle devient vicié

R. v. Sullivan, 2011 NLCA 6

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The First Reason: Changed Nature Vitiating Consent

[34]         Whether consent to a fist fight is explicit or implied, it must be taken to have been given in the expectation that what follows will be a fist fight, carrying with it some risk of serious bodily harm.  It is difficult to imagine a fist fight that will not have some risk, however minimal, of serious bodily harm.  Employing tactics which will change the nature of a consensual fist fight from an activity having some risk of serious bodily harm to an activity with a significant risk of serious bodily harm makes the fight essentially a fraud.  As was recently decided in R. v. Mabior, 2010 MBCA 93, at paragraph 57, in the course of discussing the view expressed by Cory J. in R. v. Cuerrier, 1998 CanLII 796 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371:

The criminal law definition of commercial fraud applied by Cory J. to sexual assault vitiates consent whenever there is a deception resulting in deprivation.  The element of deception is satisfied by failure to disclose.  The element of deprivation is satisfied by exposure to a significant risk of serious bodily harm.

[35]         The same can be said to occur when two parties consent to resolve their differences by a fist fight but during the course of the fight one resorts to more forceful means.  The element of deception is satisfied by failure to disclose a willingness to resort to application of force by a means more hazardous than normal punching with a fist.  The element of deprivation is satisfied by exposure to a significant risk of serious bodily harm.

[36]         I do not read Jobidon as requiring, or even supporting, a view that it is not helpful to consider that consent may have been vitiated by the nature of the fight being changed as a result of one party employing tactics that had not been reasonably contemplated in the first instance.  At pages 766 to 767, Gonthier J. wrote:

How, and to what extent is consent limited?

The law's willingness to vitiate consent on policy grounds is significantly limited.  Common law cases restrict the extent to which consent may be nullified; as do the relevant policy considerations.  The unique situation under examination in this case, a weaponless fist fight between two adults, provides another important boundary.

The limitation demanded by s. 265 as it applies to the circumstances of this appeal is one which vitiates consent between adults intentionally to apply force causing serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm to each other in the course of a fist fight or brawl.  (This test entails that a minor's apparent consent to an adult's intentional application of force in a fight would also be negated.)  This is the extent of the limit which the common law requires in the factual circumstances of this appeal.  It may be that further limitations will be found to apply in other circumstances.  But such limits, if any, are better developed on a case by case basis, so that the unique features of the situation may exert a rational influence on the extent of the limit and on the justification for it.

Stated in this way, the policy of the common law will not affect the validity or effectiveness of freely given consent to participate in rough sporting activities, so long as the intentional applications of force to which one consents are within the customary norms and rules of the game.  Unlike fist-fights, sporting activities and games usually have a significant social value; they are worthwhile.  In this regard the holding of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R. v. Cey, supra, is apposite.

The court's majority determined that some forms of intentionally applied force will clearly fall within the scope of the rules of the game, and will therefore readily ground a finding of implied consent, to which effect should be given.  On the other hand, very violent forms of force which clearly extend beyond the ordinary norms of conduct will not be recognized as legitimate conduct to which one can validly consent.

                                                         (Emphasis added.)

[37]         Clearly, Gonthier J. is saying that the application of common law principles to the proof of absence of consent, required by section 265, would permit vitiation of consent on policy grounds only in limited circumstances. One of those, he writes, is “consent between adults intentionally to apply force causing serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm to each other in the course of a fist fight or brawl”.

[38]         Gonthier J. also says that “it may be that further limitations will be found to apply in other circumstances”.  I suggest that one such circumstance occurs where consent is vitiated by reason of one party employing hazardous tactics that change the nature of the consensual fight.  I would also note that a change in the nature of a consensual fist fight is a circumstance that in many instances can be more readily proven.  Thus, analysis of evidence indicating changed circumstances may be very helpful.  The comments that Gonthier J. made about one of the decisions he considered, without criticism of the point, would support these views.  At page 750 he wrote:

In 1972, the Appeal Division of the New Brunswick Supreme Court rendered its decision in R. v. MacTavish (1972), 1972 CanLII 1456 (NB CA), 8 C.C.C. (2d) 206, a case in which two boys got in a schoolyard fight that ended when one boy sustained a broken nose from kicks landed by the other.  The court simply assumed that consent was an operative defence to a charge of assault under (then) s. 244 of the Code -- the onus being on the Crown to prove absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, in strict terms that view was obiter because, on the facts, while the injured boy had consented to a "fair fight", he had not consented to having his "head kicked in".  He had not agreed to having that kind of force inflicted on him, nor had he agreed to that particular form of activity.  The court upheld the conviction on that basis, not on the ground that the defence of consent must in all situations be legally effective.

[39]         Here, the trial judge having found, as a fact, that “the consensual fight was a fist fight … [not] a kneeing fight or a kicking fight…” and that Mr. Sullivan employed his knee to impact the complainant’s head, was clearly justified in concluding that the nature of the fight was changed and, as a result, consent was vitiated.  The complainant’s jaw having been broken as a result of force intentionally applied by Mr. Sullivan, in circumstances where consent was vitiated, the elements of the offence are readily established. That, alone, is sufficient to require dismissal of the appeal.

The Second Reason: Intention to Inflict Serious Injury

[40]         The second reason that the trial judge expressed to support her conclusion that the offence of assault causing bodily harm had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is that the two elements identified in Jobidon – intention to cause serious bodily harm and actually causing serious bodily harm – had been proven.  She concluded that by delivering upper cuts to the complainant and doing so “as hard as he could”, Mr. Sullivan was reckless as to whether his acts caused bodily harm to the complainant. 

[41]         After Jobidan, it is very difficult to see how intention to cause serious bodily harm will ever be in question, in a consensual fist fight, since in virtually every fist fight between adults each is trying to inflict discomfort or bodily harm, even if only a knockout (a concussion), that will be sufficiently serious to cause the opponent to concede. Perhaps the emphasis should be on the stage at which the conduct moves into the realm of, in the words of Gonthier J., “very violent forms of force which clearly extend beyond the ordinary norms of conduct”. Thus, an intention to cause a black eye or broken nose, or even a knockout, using only fists would be acceptable while an intention to cause more serious harm would not.

[42]         In reality, parties would not be that nuanced in the degree of force to be employed. The probable result is that, in the case of limitation by public policy, parties would have to accept the risk of criminal sanctions in every fight, since serious bodily harm could be caused and a court applying policy considerations could conclude that, in the circumstances, it was intended.

[43]         Limitation of consent as a result of public policy considerations need only become an issue where consent has not, on the evidence, been otherwise vitiated. In this case, the trial judge correctly decided the complainant’s consent was vitiated as a result of Sullivan changing the nature of the fight when he chose to apply his knee to the complainant’s head. As noted above, that is, in itself, sufficient to allow this Court to dismiss the appeal.

[44]         Nevertheless, as the second reason was also relied upon by the trial judge, and accepted by Welsh J.A., it is appropriate to comment on it. The trial judge cited R. v. A.E., (2000) 2000 CanLII 16823 (ON CA), 35 C.R. (5th) 386, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 449 as authority for the proposition that “the mental element of intention of assault causing bodily harm is satisfied by proof that the accused was reckless, whether his acts caused bodily harm to the defendant…”.  In that case the Ontario Court of Appeal decided that “the Crown need only prove that in acting as he did, the appellant was reckless whether or not his act caused harm to the baby for the mental element to be established”.

[45]         In her draft reasons Welsh J.A. cites the decision in R. v. Williams, 2003 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, which determined the mens rea required for aggravated assault and concluded that the same standard applies to assault causing bodily harm.  I agree.  As a result I also agree with Welsh J.A. that, “it was not necessary for the Crown to prove that Mr. Sullivan intended to break the complainant’s jaw… the necessary mens rea will be proven if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that force was applied recklessly and the risk of serious bodily harm was objectively foreseeable”.

[46]         There may, however, be some difficulty concluding, as Welsh J.A. does, that Mr. Sullivan applying upper cuts as hard as he could demonstrates intention to cause serious bodily harm, in the context of a consensual fist fight.  In the ordinary course, coming to that conclusion may require some evidence that such uppercuts would likely or, at the very least, could, break a jaw.  It is not, however, necessary to resolve that in the circumstances of this case.  On direct examination, in the course of  Mr. Sullivan describing the manner in which he was delivering “five or six” uppercuts to the complainant, the following exchange occurs:

Q.        So do you feel that when you hit him with the upper cut that that may be was when his jaw was broken?

A.        Well, there was no other way like really coming up something had to give.

Clearly, as Welsh J.A. concludes, Mr. Sullivan was reckless as to whether his actions would cause bodily harm to the complainant.  His recognition that something had to give puts that beyond reasonable doubt.  I agree with her that that is sufficient to establish the mental element of the offence charged. Accordingly, this appeal can be dismissed on that basis as well.

L’infraction de refus de souffler dans un éthylomètre constitue un crime d’intention générale ne nécessitant que la connaissance par l’accusé du fait que l’ordre a été donné (et autres crimes d'intention générale)

Gauthier c. R., 2025 QCCS 3431

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[23]      L’infraction de refus de souffler dans un éthylomètre constitue un crime d’intention générale ne nécessitant que la connaissance par l’accusé du fait que l’ordre a été donné[12]. L’infraction de voies de fait constitue un crime d’intention générale[13]. Par extension, le crime de voies de fait contre un agent de la paix ne requiert qu’une intention générale tout en sachant qu’il s’agit de policiers[14]. L’infraction d’entrave prévue au paragraphe 129a) du Code criminel constitue également un crime d’intention générale[15].

La défense d'erreur de fait & de consentement implicite en matière de voies de fait

R. v. Bennett, 2006 CanLII 31012 (NL PC)

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THE ELEMENT OF CONSENT IN THE OFFENCE OF ASSAULT

[37]  When an accused person is charged with the offence of assault, the Crown must prove that the complainant did not consent to being touched.  This is a subjective test (see Ewanchuk, at paragraphs 25 to 30).  The Crown must also prove that the accused knew that there was a lack of consent or was reckless or wilfully blind to its absence (see R. v. Williams, 2003 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, at paragraphs 22 and 36).

MISTAKE OF FACT

[38]  If the Crown can prove a lack of consent, the accused may still argue that he or she had an honest, but mistaken belief that the person touched was consenting.  In Ewanchuk, the nature of this defence was described as follows (at paragraphs 43 and 44):

The accused may challenge the Crown's evidence of mens rea by asserting an honest but mistaken belief in consent.  The nature of this defence was described in Pappajohn v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 at p. 148, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481, 111 D.L.R. (3d) 1, by Dickson J. (as he then was) (dissenting in the result): Mistake is a defence . . . where it prevents an accused from having the mens rea which the law requires for the very crime with which he is charged.  Mistake of fact is more accurately seen as a negation of guilty intention than as the affirmation of a positive defence.  It avails an accused who acts innocently, pursuant to a flawed perception of the facts, and nonetheless commits the actus reus of the offence.  Mistake is a defence though, in the sense that it is raised as an issue by an accused. The Crown is rarely possessed of knowledge of the subjective factors which may have caused an accused to entertain a belief in a fallacious set of facts.

The defence of mistake is simply a denial of mens rea. It does not impose any burden of proof upon the accused (see R. v. Robertson, 1987 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 918 at p. 936, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 321), and it is not necessary for the accused to testify in order to raise the issue…

[39]  In determining if an accused person had an honest belief that consent existed, section 265(4) of the Criminal Code indicates the Court must consider the “presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief”:

Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented to the conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused’s belief, to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief.

[40]  Finally, to constitute an honest mistake, the accused's belief cannot be a reckless or willfully blind one (Ewanchuk, at paragraph 65).

WHAT IS IMPLIED CONSENT?

[41]  As has been seen, the mere touching of another person without their consent can constitute an assault.  The manner in which the offence of assault has been defined in Canada is such that it does not require proof of any level of harm having occurred or having been intended.  The Crown does not have to prove any intent beyond the intent to touch another person without their consent.  Hostility is not a component of the Canadian definition of assault.[5]  As a result, the present definition of assault in Canadian law has the potential to criminalize very trivial behaviour.[6]  This potential harshness is tempered by allowing for contact to occur, without criminal liability, when it occurs between individuals in situations in which the existence of consent is implied.[7]  This aspect of the law of assault was explained by Smith and Hogan, in the context of their examination of the concept of violence in the common law offence of battery, as follows:

Violence here includes the smallest degree of personal contact – a mere touching without consent is enough.  But there is an implied consent to that degree of contact which is necessary or customary in everyday usage.  In Tuberville v. Savage it was said that it is no assault to strike another on the hand, arm or breast in ordinary discourse.  Touching another to attract his attention is not a battery even if, as in Coward v. Baddeley, P has already told D to go away and mind his own business…[8]

 

[42]   Fletcher describes implied consent as an inevitable component of “group living”:

It is difficult to argue that touching per se is incriminating.  In some societies, all forms of human contact might be regarded as trespassing on the domain of another, but we regularly accept a gentle hand on the shoulder as both the price and the benefit of group living.  Sexual

 

 

contact is obviously different…[9]

 

[43]  In Collins v Wilcock, [1984] 3 All ER 374 (Q.B.), it was pointed out, at page 378, that it “has long been established that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery.”  It was said that this principle is based upon the premise that “every person’s body is inviolate.”  As regards the doctrine of implied consent, the Court suggested that rather than attempting to label certain contact as falling within the scope of such a doctrine it is preferable to view such contact as examples of a “general exception” to the requirement for explicit consent (at page 378): 

…Generally speaking, consent is a defence to a battery; and most of the physical contacts of ordinary life are not actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so expose themselves to the risk of bodily contact.  So nobody can complain of the jostling which is inevitable from his presence in, for example, a supermarket, an underground station or a busy street; nor can a person who attends a party complain if his hand is seized in friendship, or even if his back is (within reason) slapped (see Tuberville v. Savage (1669), 1 Mod Rep 3, 86 ER 684).  Although such cases are regarded as examples of implied consent, it is more common nowadays to treat them as falling within a general exception embracing all physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life....

 

…In each case, the test must be whether the physical contact so persisted in has in the circumstances gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct; and the answer to that question will depend on the facts of the particular case.

 

[44]  In applying the doctrine of implied consent, its inherent limitations must be clearly recognized.  We exist in a society in which personal choice as regards the type and manner of contact we have with other people is virtually sacrosanct.  In R. v. Ogg-Moss, 1984 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 173, for instance, it was held that one “of the key rights in our society is the individual's right to be free from unconsented invasions on his or her physical security or dignity and it is a central purpose of the criminal law to protect members of society from such invasions.”  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ewanchuk pointed out that the right to “physical integrity is a fundamental principle” which the “criminalization of assault” seeks to protect and assert:

…Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both physical and psychological, of every individual.  Having control over who touches one's body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity and autonomy.  The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code expresses society's determination to protect the security of the person from any non-consensual contact or threats of force.  The common law has recognized for centuries that the individual's right to physical integrity is a fundamental principle, "every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it in any the slightest manner": see Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th ed. (1770), Book III, at p. 120.  It follows that any intentional but unwanted touching is criminal.[10]

[45]  Though most of us accept that a certain degree of contact with other people will occur in our everyday lives, we expect such contact or touching to be limited, contextually appropriate and consistent with the rationale for our consent to it being implied.  As pointed out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. E.(A.) (2000), 2000 CanLII 16823 (ON CA), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paragraph 33, implied consent, is “a creature of public policy” and thus, it must “be strictly limited to conduct which is consistent with the purpose and rationale underlying the policy basis for the consent…Otherwise, the positive social value of deemed consent loses its rationale.”[11]  As a result, for the doctrine of implied consent to operate, the touching must fall within the scope of the type of touching which our customary norms of social interaction deem to be consensual.  This is an objective standard (see R. v. Cey (1989), 1989 CanLII 283 (SK CA), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Sask. C.A.), at page 490).

Il n'existe aucune règle voulant que l’actus reus d’une agression sexuelle, ou de toute autre voie de fait, ne puisse être démontré que par la preuve d’attouchements physiques

Roy c. R., 2021 QCCA 619

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[20]      Comme l’explique la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt R. c. Ewanchuk : « [l]’infraction consiste en des voies de fait visées par l’une ou l’autre des définitions du par. 265(1) du Code, et qui sont commises dans des circonstances de nature sexuelle telles qu’il y a atteinte à l’intégrité sexuelle de la victime »[4]. L’actus reus d’une agression sexuelle est prouvée lorsqu’une personne commet un geste énuméré aux paragraphes 265(1) a) et b) à caractère sexuel sur une autre personne sans le consentement de celle-ci. Le standard à appliquer pour déterminer si les gestes comportent la nature sexuelle requise est celui de la personne raisonnable tenant compte de toutes les circonstances[5].

[21]      Bien qu’un grand nombre de cas de voies de fait et d’agression sexuelle implique des attouchements physiques, le paragraphe 265(2) du Code criminel rend applicable toutes les modalités de l’infraction de voies de fait visées aux paragraphes 265(1)a) et b) à des circonstances sexuelles[6]. Le paragraphe 265(1)b) dispose qu’il y a agression lorsque l’accusé « tente ou menace, par un acte ou un geste, d’employer la force contre une autre personne, s’il est en mesure actuelle, ou s’il porte cette personne à croire, pour des motifs raisonnables, qu’il est alors en mesure actuelle d’accomplir son dessein ». Force est de constater que cette disposition reconnaît explicitement la distinction entre l’emploi actuel de force physique contre une autre personne et un emploi de force appréhendé tel que défini dans le paragraphe. 

[22]      La jurisprudence de la Cour suprême ou de cette cour n’impose aucune règle voulant que l’actus reus d’une agression sexuelle, ou de toute autre voie de fait, ne puisse être démontré que par la preuve d’attouchements physiques. Une telle règle supposerait que la Cour suprême a, par ses arrêts, abrogé les paragraphes 265(1) et (2) du Code criminel. Lorsque la Cour dit dans l’arrêt Ewanchuk qu’un attouchement physique est un élément de l’actus reus de l’infraction de voies de fait, elle ne fait qu’affirmer qu’un attouchement physique est un élément suffisant aux fins de l’application du paragraphe 265(1). À aucun moment la Cour n’affirme-t-elle que l’attouchement physique est un élément strictement nécessaire à l’infraction. Cela va de soi, puisque la disposition en question prévoit explicitement d’autres modalités d’exécution qui sont également suffisantes pour conclure à la culpabilité.

Comment apprécier si un arrêt conditionnel s'impose face à des condamnation à des chefs d’accusation d’agression sexuelle et d’incitation à des contacts sexuels

Mariona c. R., 2018 QCCA 1524

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[10]        En vertu de l’article 265 C.cr, une agression sexuelle correspond à des voies de faits qui surviennent dans des circonstances de nature sexuelle[13].

[11]        Dans Ewanchuk, le juge Major énonce :

L’actus reus de l’agression sexuelle est établi par la preuve de trois éléments: (i) les attouchements, (ii) la nature sexuelle des contacts, (iii) l’absence de consentement.  Les deux premiers éléments sont objectifs.  Il suffit que le ministère public prouve que les actes de l’accusé étaient volontaires.  La nature sexuelle de l’agression est déterminée objectivement; le ministère public n’a pas besoin de prouver que l’accusé avait quelque mens rea pour ce qui est de la nature sexuelle de son comportement. ^[14]

[Références omises]

[12]        La preuve révèle que l’appelant prend la main de la plaignante afin de la forcer à toucher son pénis. Pour ce faire, il utilise la force en raison de l’absence de consentement de la victime. Ce geste s’assimile à des voies de faits. Puisqu’il est posé à des fins sexuelles, la juge de première instance a eu raison de conclure à une agression sexuelle même si aucun geste à caractère sexuel n’a été posé sur le corps de la victime[15].

[13]        La juge condamne également l’appelant pour incitation à des contacts sexuels (art 152 C.cr.) puisque la preuve révèle la présence des éléments constitutifs de cette infraction:

[52] Pour déclarer un accusé coupable d’une infraction selon l’article 152 C.cr., un juge doit conclure que la preuve établit, hors de tout doute raisonnable, l’existence concomitante d’une invitation, d’un encouragement ou d’une incitation à toucher, plus qu’un simple acquiescement passif ou un défaut de résister, et d’une intention spécifique que cela se fasse à des fins d’ordre sexuel.[16]

[14]        L’appelant a incité X à le toucher et lui a pris la main pour le faire. Le geste constitue une invitation même en l’absence de communication verbale. La mens rea spécifique est également présente puisque l’intention était manifestement de se faire toucher à des fins d’ordre sexuel.

[15]        Cela étant, en vertu des principes de l’arrêt Kienapple, la juge aurait dû ordonner l’arrêt conditionnel des procédures relativement au chef d’agression sexuelle.

[16]        L’arrêt Prince[17] précise certains critères relativement à l’application de l’arrêt Kienapple. Tout d’abord, les infractions doivent avoir un lien factuel évident. Il faut donc se demander si les accusations sont fondées sur le même acte de l'accusé[18]. Si la réponse est positive, il est nécessaire d’examiner le lien juridique entre les infractions. Afin d’ordonner un arrêt des procédures sur l’une ou l’autre des infractions, il ne doit pas y avoir d’éléments constitutifs supplémentaires ou distinctifs entre elles[19]. Finalement, en appliquant ces critères, il faut « se garder de pousser la logique au point de contrecarrer l'intention du législateur ou de perdre de vue la question clé de savoir si les deux accusations sont fondées sur la même cause, la même chose ou le même délit »[20]. L’arrêt des procédures prononcé en vertu de Kienapple, s’applique à l’infraction la moins grave[21].

[17]        Certes, dans Casavant[22], notre cour n’applique pas la règle de l’arrêt Kiennaple à des chefs d’accusation d’agression sexuelle et d’incitation à des contacts sexuels qui constituent « des infractions différentes, qui visent des comportements qui ne sont pas essentiellement identiques et dont les liens factuels et juridiques ne sont pas étroits au sens de l’arrêt R c. Prince.»

[18]        La situation factuelle est toutefois différente en l’espèce. En effet, les deux accusations concernent un seul événement de très courte durée. Les faits relatifs aux deux infractions sont identiques. L’emploi de la force pour amener la main de la plaignante vers son sexe, qui constitue les voies de fait justifiant la condamnation pour agression, est le même geste qui est assimilé à une incitation pour les fins de la seconde infraction. La mens rea requise est également similaire, soit une intention de toucher ou de commettre des attouchements à des fins sexuelles sans le consentement de la victime.