Clarifier sans contre-interroger : jusqu'où un juge peut-il questionner l'accusé lors d'un procès ?

R. v. Walton, 2025 ONCA 368

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[19]      The overriding principle governing a trial judge’s intrusion into the questioning of a witness is cautious restraint, in light of the roles that our adversarial system accords to the judge, the jury, counsel, the parties, and to witnesses. The supporting principles are well known but sometimes require restatement.[5]

[20]      In the context of a jury trial, the judge holds in tension two considerations, outlined by Kelly J.A. in R. v. Torbiak and Campbell,[6] at para. 5:

On the one hand his position is one of great power and prestige which gives his every word an especial significance. The position of established neutrality requires that the trial judge should confine himself as much as possible to his own responsibilities and leave to counsel and members of the jury their respective functions. On the other hand his responsibility for the conduct of the trial may well require him to ask questions which ought to be asked and have not been asked on account of the failure of counsel, and so compel him to interject himself into the examination of witnesses to a degree which he might not otherwise choose.

[21]      Later cases have elaborated on this tension between preserving judicial neutrality and intervening by questioning a witness.

[22]      The trial judge is duty-bound to exercise restraint and remain neutral to promote both the reality and the appearance of fairness.[7] However, a trial judge is permitted to intervene where doing so is essential to ensure justice is done in both substance and appearance.[8] A trial judge is entitled to and must “manage the trial and control the procedure to ensure that the trial is effective, efficient and fair to both sides”, and to witnesses.[9]

[23]      However, trial judges should, consistent with the principle of cautious restraint, confine themselves to their own responsibilities, leaving counsel and the jury to perform their respective functions.[10]

[24]      In this light, I point out that examination-in-chief and cross-examination are and must remain the responsibility of counsel; a trial judge should not become an investigator.[11] A trial judge must not cause a reasonable person to believe that he has “placed the authority of his office” on either side, particularly that of the prosecution, and must also be careful not to usurp the role of counsel because the overall impression created may be fatal to the appearance of trial fairness.[12]

[25]      Although the trial judge may ask questions that should have been asked by counsel, the trial judge must not usurp counsel’s role. The judge must not “leave his or her position of neutrality as a fact-finder and become the cross-examiner.”[13] When the trial judge does intervene in questioning a witness, “it is important that they use care and not create an impression through the questioning process of having adopted a position on the facts, issues or credibility.”[14]

[26]      As this court instructed in Chippewas, at para. 239, a trial judge should try to avoid interfering with the organization and flow of the evidence, because judicial intervention might impede counsel in following an organized line of inquiry. This is especially important during examination-in-chief.[15] Obviously, the trial judge should never cross-examine a witness. Rather, when the trial judge believes that it is necessary to question a witness, the judge’s questions should be asked after counsel has completed his examination, or at least after counsel has finished a particular line of questioning. An exception would be a fast clarification that does not become a digression.

[27]      Stucky and Murray provide useful bookends on permissible and impermissible interventions. In Stucky, at para. 64, this court adopted and summarized the comments of Martin J.A. in Valley, at para. 53:

Martin J.A. set out three situations in which questions put by a trial judge to a witness may be justified, namely: to clear up ambiguities and call a witness to order; to explore some matter which the witnesses’ answers have left vague; or, to put questions which should have been asked by counsel in order to bring out some relevant matter, but which were nonetheless omitted.

[28]      The other bookend, in Murray, provides the counterpoint, at para. 94, per Watt J.A.:

The principal types of intervention that attract appellate disapprobation include, but are not limited to,

(i)        questioning an accused or witnesses in such a way as to convey an impression that the judge aligns him or herself with the case for the Crown;

(ii)      questioning witnesses in such a way as to make it impossible for counsel to present the defence case;

(iii)     intervening to such an extent in the testimony of the accused that it prevents the accused from telling his or her story; and

(iv)     inviting the jury to disbelieve the accused or other defence witnesses.

[29]      There are other relevant limits on the right to intervene. As Lamer J. emphasized in Brouillard, at para. 24, when an accused testifies, “prudence and the resulting judicial restraint must be all the greater”.[16]

[30]      Lastly, a trial judge must be especially cautious in questioning an accused or a witness while sitting with a jury.[17] In particular, the judge should be careful to not ask questions that seem to favour one side or the other. In jury trials, trial judges “must always keep in mind that they are neither an advocate nor the trier of fact.”[18]

« Why Couldn’t You Just Keep Your Knees Together? » L’obligation déontologique des juges face aux victimes de violences sexuelles

Lessard, M. (2017). « Why Couldn’t You Just Keep Your Knees Together? » L’obligation déontologique des juges face aux victimes de violences sexuelles. McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill, 63(1), 155–187. https://doi.org/10.7202/1054354ar

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Un juge peut rouvrir le procès s'il constate un accroc à la règle d'équité procédurale (Browne c. Dunn) durant son délibéré et doit soulever l’écueil de lui-même s’il le constate, même en l’absence d’observations des parties, et il doit alors les appeler à commenter la situation

Blais c. R., 2025 QCCA 877

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[24]      Dans son mémoire, comme le permettent les règles de la Cour, l’appelant soulève deux nouveaux moyens qu’il qualifie de questions de droit. Présumant qu’il s’agit bien de questions de droit, et parce que l’intimé a présenté des observations sur ces moyens, j’y réponds. La première serait une erreur dans l’application du principe de l’arrêt Browne v. Dunn (1893), 1893 CanLII 65 (FOREP), 6 R. 67 (H.L.) : voir R. c. Chandroo, 2018 QCCA 1429 [Chandroo]. La seconde serait un double standard dans l’appréciation de la preuve testimoniale.

[25]      L’appelant reproche au juge d’avoir accordé moins de valeur probante au témoignage de la sœur de la plaignante, qui avait affirmé avoir été constamment dans la chambre de sa sœur lorsque l’appelant y était durant la période délictuelle.

[26]      Au procès, aucune partie n’a plaidé au juge que le défaut d’avoir contre-interrogé la plaignante sur cet aspect du récit de sa sœur avait une incidence sur l’évaluation du témoignage de cette dernière. Par conséquent, au procès, aucune observation n’a été offerte à ce sujet ou à propos des principes de l’arrêt Browne v. Dunn. Dans l’arrêt Chandroo, le juge Healy, pour la Cour, explique qu’un juge doit soulever l’écueil de lui-même s’il le constate, même en l’absence d’observations des parties, et il doit alors les appeler à commenter la situation : Chandroo, par. 21.

[27]      Qu’en est-il lorsque le constat est fait pendant le délibéré ? Dans l’arrêt Dowd, la Cour d’appel du Manitoba a rejeté l’argument voulant qu’il soit irréaliste de rouvrir un procès et de rappeler les parties si le juge, pendant son délibéré, estime qu’il y a un problème : R. c. Dowd, 2020 MBCA 23, par. 30-32. Cette approche est certainement envisageable et il est sans doute préférable d’y recourir lorsque les circonstances s’y prêtent.

[28]      Notre Cour ne s’est jamais prononcée sur le bien-fondé de cette exigence particulière et sur les conséquences qui en découlent. Aux fins du présent appel, sans trancher la question, j’accepte l’approche manitobaine puisqu’il s’agit de la position la plus favorable à l’appelant.

[29]      Le juge n’ayant pas alerté les parties, il était erroné de sa part d’évoquer l’absence de contre-interrogatoire de la plaignante, d’autant que ce facteur ne pouvait, dans les circonstances, affaiblir le témoignage de la sœur de la plaignante. En effet, il est douteux que les principes établis par Browne v. Dunn trouvaient application.

[30]      Il est évident que la réponse de la plaignante aurait été de nier la version de sa sœur puisqu’elle n’a jamais prétendu que les agressions dans la chambre ont eu lieu en sa présence. En fait, le juge aurait dû se passer de cette surenchère de motivation puisque le véritable questionnement soulevé par la version de ce témoin était le caractère raisonnable de son affirmation selon laquelle elle se trouvait toujours avec la plaignante dans la chambre. Ainsi, la valeur du récit de la sœur ne dépendait pas d’une réponse de la plaignante. Inéluctablement, il aurait été vain de lui poser la question. Après tout, il s’agissait de la théorie de cause de la défense que la plaignante mentait sur les événements.

[31]      Cela dit, il est tout aussi clair que l’erreur n’a pas compromis l’équité du procès. D’abord, les thèses étaient bien connues et claires. Ensuite, et probablement de manière plus importante, le juge écarte le récit du témoin pour plusieurs autres raisons indépendantes de cette erreur, qu’il explique dans son jugement. Comme le souligne l’intimé, le rejet de ce témoignage est non-équivoque malgré l’erreur. Il a raison. Cette erreur en soi semble inoffensive dans les circonstances.

[32]      Sur la seconde question soulevée dans le mémoire, soit l’évaluation des témoignages selon un double standard, l’appelant ne démontre pas que le juge a procédé à une telle évaluation de la preuve testimoniale, laquelle est souvent associée à d’autres erreurs : R. c. G.F., 2021 CSC 20 (CanLII), [2021] 1 R.C.S. 801, par. 99-100. On ne peut pas simplement prétendre que le juge commet une erreur parce qu’il tranche une question de crédibilité. Il faut en plus pointer les passages où le juge applique un double standard: R. c. Figaro, 2019 QCCA 1557, par. 19; R. c. Gauvreau, 2017 QCCA 1414, par. 9. La généralité des reproches trahit l’absence de fondement de cet argument.

[33]      Bien que le jugement comporte une erreur en lien avec la notion de collusion de même qu’une erreur concernant l’application des principes de Browne v. Dunn, celles-ci n’affectent pas le récit des faits au cœur des accusations qu’ont livré les protagonistes. L’appelant a d’ailleurs, à bon droit, reconnu à l’audience que le témoignage de la sœur de la plaignante était très marginal.

[34]      En somme, vu leur nature, ces erreurs ne sont pas toujours inoffensives, mais dans la présente affaire, le dossier démontre que c’est le cas, principalement parce qu’elles touchent à des aspects sans conséquence. Le ministère public me convainc qu’elles sont négligeables ou inoffensives et qu’aucun tort important ni aucune erreur judiciaire grave ne s’est produit. Il y a lieu d’appliquer la disposition réparatrice : R. c. Abdullahi, 2023 CSC 19, par. 33; R. c. Châteauneuf, 2024 QCCA 598.

Il est possible de rouvrir un procès et de rappeler les parties si le juge, pendant son délibéré, estime que la situation le requiert

R v Dowd, 2020 MBCA 23 

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[30]                     It was entirely appropriate for the trial judge to raise with counsel a potential breach of the rule on her own motion provided that a fair procedure occurred thereafter.  In addition, like a jury, a trial judge deciding a case does not have to convey to counsel his or her impressions about the evidence or matters that the law requires must be considered before making findings of fact.  However, the problem here is that the first time the parties learned about the application of a legal rule against the accused (which involves the exercise of considerable discretion) being relevant to the trial judge’s findings of fact was when she delivered her reasons for decision.

[31]                     The Crown’s submission that it was “unrealistic” for the trial judge to recall witnesses or hear further submissions after the closing arguments is unpersuasive.  The trial judge could have advised counsel of her concern about a breach of the rule and possible remedies and decided on a procedure, bearing in mind the requirements of sections 650(1) and 800(2) of the Code.  The Crown’s submission that it would have been inconvenient to reconvene the trial at all because it took place in the town of Ashern (roughly a two-hour drive from Winnipeg) is unconvincing.

[32]                     The accused was not entitled to a perfect trial; however, it would be more than simple irony to conclude that a law designed to prevent trial by ambush could itself be deployed to the surprise of the parties by the Court on its own motion in a manner that affected the result of the trial.  The fundamental fairness of the accused’s trial was compromised by the trial judge’s application of the rule.  In such circumstances, it was an error for the appeal judge to dismiss the accused’s appeal because of appellate deference.

Le juge a le devoir de poser des questions à un témoin pour clarifier une réponse obscure ou pour résoudre toute incompréhension découlant d'une réponse du témoin

R. v. Redden, 2021 BCCA 230 

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[96]      In R. v. Russell, 2011 BCCA 113, this Court canvassed the principles that govern this ground of appeal. In that case, a Supreme Court judge convicted Mr. Russell of a drug offence. He appealed his conviction on the ground that questions posed to him by the judge after the Crown’s cross-examination raised a reasonable apprehension of bias. When he finished his questioning, the judge told counsel that he asked the questions for the specific purpose of assessing Mr. Russell’s credibility (at para. 11). Similar to the complaints on this appeal, Mr. Russell argued that the judge’s “questioning of him conveyed the impression that he was placing his authority on the side of the prosecution and conveyed the impression of disbelief” (at para. 20).

[97]      The Court dismissed the appeal. It acknowledged that the questions of Mr. Russell were “relatively extensive” (at para. 22). It further acknowledged that they were “effective in probing the implausibility” of Mr. Russell’s testimony on a collateral point (at paras. 21–22). However, once considered in the context of the entire trial, neither the extent of the questions nor the manner in which the judge posed them conveyed the “impression that [he] placed his authority on the side of the prosecution” (at para. 23).

[98]      In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed a number of authorities, holding that they “make plain” the discretionary allowance of a trial judge to ask questions (at para. 26).

[99]      For example, R. v. Darlyn (1946), 1946 CanLII 248 (BC CA), 88 C.C.C. 269 (B.C.C.A.) held that a judge “not only [has] the right, but also the duty to put questions to a witness in order to clarify an obscure answer or to resolve possible misunderstanding of any question by a witness, even to remedy an omission of counsel” (at 277).

[100]   In R. v. Valley (1986), 1986 CanLII 4609 (ON CA), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (Ont. C.A.), it was noted that a judge “may question witnesses to clear up ambiguities, explore some matter which the answers of a witness have left vague or, indeed, he may put questions which should have been put to bring out some relevant matter, but which have been omitted” (at 230).

[101]   However, the discretion to ask questions “must be exercised judicially which, in every case, means that care must be taken not to overstep the permissible bounds of intervention”: Russell at para. 26. Judicial overstepping that has led to the quashing of convictions includes, but is not limited to:

•         questions that leave an impression of partiality towards the Crown;

•         interventions that functionally make it impossible to present a defence in the manner strategized by counsel, such as diverting counsel from their line of questioning or preventing a proper testing of evidence;

•         preventing an accused from telling their story because of interruptions; or,

•         comments to or about defence counsel that imply they are conducting themselves unethically or unprofessionally, thereby undermining the integrity and good faith of counsel in the eyes of their client or the jury.

Valley at 230–232, as cited in R. v. C.S.M., 2008 BCCA 397 at paras. 8–9.

See also R. v. Murray, 2017 ONCA 393 at paras. 91–97; R. v. Pompeo, 2014 BCCA 317 at paras. 70–82.

[102]   The assessment of whether one or more interventions undermined trial fairness is contextual and undertaken with reference to the trial as a whole. It is not an assessment completed on the bases of “isolated occurrences”: R. v. Stucky, 2009 ONCA 151 at para. 72. Ultimately, the question to ask is whether the appellant “might reasonably consider that [they] had not had a fair trial or whether a reasonably minded person who had been present throughout the trial would consider that the [appellant] had not had a fair trial”: Valley at 232, citing Brouillard Also Known as Chatel v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 39.

Les juges ont le devoir, dans certaines circonstances, de soulever d’office une transgression de la Charte et ils doivent le faire lorsqu’il existe une preuve solide prima facie de violation d’un droit garanti par la Charte

R. v. Travers, 2001 NSCA 71

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32)      In my view, the evidence at trial was more than sufficient to alert the trial judge that he should raise the question of the admissibility of evidence in light of possible Charter infringement.  The trial judge should have conducted an inquiry into whether there had been any violation of the appellant’s Charter rights.  At that time, after hearing submissions from the appellant and the Crown, the judge could have considered any argument by the Crown based on exigent circumstances. If he found any infringement of rights, he should have then determined whether the evidence obtained pursuant to it, namely the clock radio, should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

 

33)      I recognize that trial judges have generally considered it improper to raise Charter issues when the parties before them did not do so.  See, for example, R. v. Kane [Mistrial], [1998] N.S.J. No. 557 (S.C.) at §14. This is hardly surprising as they have been found to have erred when they did so, not only where the accused was represented by counsel but also where the accused was self-represented.  For illustrations of the latter circumstance, see R. v. Sheppard, [1990] N.J. No. 76 (S.C.) and R. v. Sveinson, [1990] M.J. No. 671 (Q.B.).  

 

34)      However, I am of the view that the appropriate approach is that in R. v. Arbour (1990), 4 C.R.R. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.) which held that, in certain circumstances, trial judges have a duty to raise Charter issues on their own motion.  The appellant there had testified at trial that the police had refused to let him call a lawyer before they questioned him and obtained his statement.  If true, his evidence indicated a clear infringement of his rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter.  There was no evidence to indicate that he had waived those rights and no inquiry had been made regarding any such infringement and, if any found, whether his statement would still be admissible notwithstanding s. 24(2) of the Charter.  At p. 372 of Arbour, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:

 

We are of the view that once there was admissible uncontradicted evidence before the court, indicating that there had been an infringement of the appellant’s rights under s.10(b) of the Charter it was incumbent on the trial judge to enter upon an inquiry to ascertain whether such an infringement had occurred.  This was not done.  Accordingly, the statement should not have been admitted in evidence or, having been admitted, should not have been considered as evidence in the circumstances.

 

It allowed the appeal under several grounds including the improper admission of the appellant’s statement, quashed the convictions, and directed a new trial.

 

35)      The appellant in Arbour was represented by counsel.  I suggest that the principle enunciated in that case is equally applicable, if not more so, to proceedings involving a self-represented litigant who is unfamiliar with the law.

 

36)      The approach taken in Arbour is not confined to Ontario.  In the case under appeal in R. v. Fraillon (1991), 1990 CanLII 2828 (QC CA), 62 C.C.C. (3d) 474 (Que. C.A.), the trial judge on his own motion had entered a stay of fraud proceedings on the basis that the accused was not able to make full answer and defence due to delay in laying charges.  At p. 476, the Quebec Court of Appeal stated:

 

Generally, it is open to the judge to point out to the parties that, in his mission to do justice, he is troubled by a point in the facts or in the law which neither one raised. This is especially the case where it is a right recognized by the Charter. But again, he must point it out to the parties and give them all the time necessary to completely argue the question before he rules on it. Here the parties to their great astonishment learned during the rendering of judgment that it was based, and based solely, on a question that the judge had only raised and resolved proprio motu.  (Emphasis added)

 

37)     In R. v. Boire et. al. (1991), 1991 CanLII 2805 (QC CA), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 216, one of the issues considered by the Quebec Court of Appeal was whether, in the absence of a formal application, a court of appeal is entitled to itself raise the violation of a Charter right.  At p. 223, Brossard, J.A. commented that, considering that the Charter constitutes the most fundamental law in respect of human rights and in particular of accused in penal matters, he found it difficult to see how it could be argued that a court would not be entitled, in certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, to itself consider its provisions when confronted with a flagrant violation of the Charter.  He continued by quoting Ewaschuk, J. who wrote in R. v. Boron (1983), 1983 CanLII 1606 (ON SC), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 25 at pp. 32-3, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 36 C.R. (3d) 329 (Ont. H.C.):

 

...Trial judge raising the issue

 

...a penal prosecution is based on the adversary system which requires party presentation of evidence and not active participation by a trial judge. Active participation often bespeaks the taking of sides, i.e., the appearance of partiality, which should be most assiduously avoided. Assuming the goal of a penal prosecution is to do justice to both accused and Crown, justice is best achieved by the non-involvement of the trial judge in the presentation of evidence or the raising of legal issues. However, to do justice in the particular case, judicial intervention, rare though it should be, may be warranted in penal proceedings.

 

38)     I do not suggest that the merest intimation of a possible Charter infringement will found a duty upon a trial judge to enter immediately upon an inquiry where none of the parties before him has raised this argument.  However, and without attempting to fully delineate the point at which the duty arises, where there is strong evidence of a prima facie case of breach of a Charter right relevant to the proceeding, a judge has a responsibility to raise the issue, invite submissions and, if appropriate, to conduct an exclusionary hearing in order to protect the integrity of the judicial process.

 

39)     The evidence before the trial judge in this case warranted his intervention.  It came from the police officers themselves, was uncontroverted, and suggested that the police may have deliberately disregarded the appellant’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter in entering and searching his dwelling and in seizing the clock radio which was entered into evidence at trial.  The judge erred in law when he proceeded without entering into an inquiry as to the possibility of breach of constitutional rights.  The summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law when he upheld the verdict of the trial judge in these circumstances.

 

40)     In my view, the curative provisions of s. 686 (1)(b)(iii) are not applicable in this case.  It cannot be said that there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the error of law had not occurred:  R. v. Charlebois, 2000 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 674.  As indicated in the trial judge’s reasons, the demonstrative evidence placed before the court by the playing of the clock radio in open court clearly had an impact but its extent cannot be assessed from the record before us.