La doctrine de la possession récente repose sur l'existence d'une proximité temporelle entre la possession par l'accusé et le moment du vol. La force de la déduction que peut tirer le juge des faits dépend de la récence de la possession, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est proportionnelle à la brièveté de l'intervalle écoulé depuis le vol

R. v. Morgan, 2013 ONSC 1522

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[51]      In R. v. Gagnon, supra, Hamilton J.A., outlined the considerations that can be taken into account in determining whether the items were “recently” stolen:

12     The requirement that the Crown prove that the goods were recently stolen relates to when the underlying offence occurred. Any number of factors can be considered in determining whether a possession is recent including the nature of the object, its rareness, the readiness in which it can, and is likely to, pass to another and the ease of identification. See Saieva v. The Queen, 1982 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 897.

 

13     When deciding whether to infer only possession of the stolen goods or to infer the underlying offence, the trier of fact must consider all the circumstances. See Kowlyk and R. v. Abernathy (J.C.) 2002 BCCA 8, 161 B.C.A.C. 247. Common sense factors to be considered include how close in time to the theft or robbery are the goods in possession of the accused and the nature of the stolen goods. Obviously, the closer in time possession is to the underlying offence, the more likely it is that the trier of fact will draw the inference of guilt on the underlying offence. However, a longer period of time does not prevent the inference. This is evident in Kowlyk where the break-ins occurred on June 1, 6, and 8 and on July 11, but it was not until August 27th that the goods were found in the possession of the accused. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions on the underlying offences.

 

14     Ultimately, the trier of fact, upon a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, will decide which inference is to be drawn. That is a question of fact. As such, deference is owed to such finding. See, for example, H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, and R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621.

 

 

[52]      In R. v. Bakos, 2008 ONCA 712, [2008] O.J. No. 4067, the Court of Appeal accepted that four months between theft and possession could constitute recent possession:

21     In support of their argument, the appellants rely on Saieva v. The Queen (1982), 1982 CanLII 51 (SCC), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 97, in which the Supreme Court of Canada considered "recency" on the basis of the relevant factors, including the rareness of the object, the readiness with which it is likely to pass from hand to hand, its transferability and its ease of identification. However, Saieva involved different circumstances and raised different issues than those present in this case. Moreover, the theft in Saieva could have occurred 50 to 55 weeks before the possession. Also in Saieva, there was no evidence about the date of theft and, in order to establish a date, it was necessary to consider "intricate facts" about how the stolen property was used before the theft.

 

22     In this case, there was no dispute about when and where the theft occurred. Here, the possession of the stolen components by the appellants was alleged to be within four and a half months of the theft. The date when the components came into Mr. Stewart's possession was also clear. Indeed, the gap between the theft and the appellants' possession is shorter than the four plus months described because the appellants must have had the components at an earlier time in order to incorporate them into the Stewart motorcycle and advertise it for sale.

 

23     In any event, while Saieva required the trial judge to provide the jury with the criteria for determining "recency", in my view those criteria were adequately delivered to the jury in this case when the charge is considered as a whole. The jury had extensive evidence about the Chinery sale, the Dennis theft, the amalgamation of the two motorcycles into the Stewart motorcycle, the possible use made of the Dennis motorcycle in the summer of 2004 and the appellants' possession of the components for a period of time before the sale to Stewart.

 

24     The nature of the issues in this trial and the components of the offences were clear to the jury. The factual issues and the applicable law were reviewed in detail in the trial judge's charge. This was not a complicated trial requiring a detailed explanation of "recent": see also Watt at pp. 649-58. Further, in my view, the Crown was not compelled, as suggested in oral argument, to call expert evidence, if such evidence was available, on the transferability in practice of stolen motorcycle components when taken by a dealer for inclusion in a rebuilt motorcycle. I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.

 

 

[53]      Accordingly, in order to determine recency, the court is entitled to consider a variety of factors including, but not limited to:

(1)         Rareness and nature of the object,

 

(2)         Readiness with which it is likely to pass from hand to hand,

 

(3)         Its transferability,

 

(4)         Its ease of identification.

 

[54]      The authors of McWilliams, in Canadian Criminal Evidence, (3^rd edition), at pp. 5-14 refer to the Cockins Case (1836), 168 E.R. 1139, where the trial judge instructed the jury, with respect to a charge of theft of socks found in the accused’s possession twenty days after they were missed, that:

If I was to lose my watch and in a few minutes it was to be found on the person one of you, it would afford the strongest ground for presuming that you had stolen it; but if a month hence it were to be found in your possession, the presumption of your having stolen it would be greatly weakened because stolen property passes through many hands.

 

 

[55]      Further, the McWilliams’ authors write that the “strength of the presumption depends on how recent the possession is, that is, in proportion to the shortness of the interval since the theft. It also depends on the nature of the possession, whether it is open or avowed or secret and concealed and the nature of the account given of it: R. v. Exall [citation omitted]”.     

[56]      Recency has been held to be established in the following circumstances: (1) money stolen from a bank robbery four hours earlier  (R. v. Dionne [2005] S.C.J. No. 27); (2) guns stolen 17 days earlier (R. v. Choquette [2007] O. J. No. 3137 (C.A.)); (3) truck with significant alterations stolen 56 days earlier (R. v. MacNair [2006] O.J. No. 2430 (C.A.)); (4) bank card stolen 72 hours earlier (R. v. Barrett [2011] (S.C.J.); horse stolen 3 days earlier; Clement’s case (1830), 168 E.R. 980 – see R. v. Kowlyk).

[57]      In dealing with a stolen radio, the Court of Appeal indicated in R. v. Cousineau, 1982 CanLII 3720 (ON CA), [1982] O.J. No. 150 (C.A.), at para. 14:

…Although the date of the theft is unknown, the interval between the theft and the sale was less than one month. While it is true that the presumption of knowledge from recent possession does not apply where common, easily transferable articles are held for a long period, I know of no authority which would compel me to find that the presumption could not apply where the period is less than one month. The decisions on this issue show that the operation of the presumption turns on the facts of each case.

La doctrine de la possession récente peut permettre au juge des faits d'inférer la connaissance que l'objet est volé, mais peut aussi permettre de conclure à la participation à la commission de l'infraction

R. v. Ricciardi, 2017 ONSC 5562

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[26]      This finding does not end matters. The common law doctrine of recent possession permits an inference of guilt in circumstances where an accused person is found in the unexplained possession of recently stolen property: see R. v. Kowlyk, 1988 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1988] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 12. The inference is permissive, not mandatory. It is not a presumption. The inference of guilt may relate to knowledge that the items are stolen, but it may also relate to participation in a related offence such as theft, break and enter, and even murder: see R. v. Morgan, 2013 ONSC 1522 and R. v. Hubler, 2013 ABCA 31.

La doctrine de la possession récente

R. c. Farruggia, 2019 QCCQ 7079

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[51]         In the seminal case of R. v. Kowlyk[27], the Supreme Court succinctly stated the doctrine of recent possession in the following terms:

 

[…] Upon proof of the unexplained possession of recently stolen property, the trier of fact may—but not must—draw an inference of guilt of theft or of offences incidental thereto. Where the circumstances are such that a question could arise as to whether the accused was a thief or merely a possessor, it will be for the trier of fact upon a consideration of all the circumstances to decide which, if either, inference should be drawn. In all recent possession cases the inference of guilt is permissive, not mandatory, and when an explanation is offered which might reasonably be true, even though the trier of fact is not satisfied of its truth, the doctrine will not apply[28].

 

[52]         The doctrine of recent possession applies if the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that:

 

1.   the accused was in possession of the property;

 

2.   the property was stolen;

 

3.   the theft was recent; and

 

4.   the accused’s possession of the property was unexplained[29].

 

[53]         If applicable, the doctrine of recent possession permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to draw a common sense inference that a person in unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a thief, or is knowingly in possession of stolen goods[30].

[61]         The courts have recognized that “recency” depends largely upon the nature of the article stolen. In R. v. Wilson[33], Justice Martin for the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated:

 

The expression ‘recent possession’ is pliable. In one case it might be held to be recent possession if the article were found in the possession of the accused within a month of the theft, and in another case 12 months after[34].

 

[62]         This statement was referenced in R. v. Killam[35]. In that case, Mr. Killam appealed his conviction for possession of stolen property. The property involved was a shipment of pearls contained in two steamer trunks valued by various witnesses at between $250,000 and one million dollars. Mr. Killam was found in possession of the two trunks full of pearls 8½ months after they had been stolen in a robbery. 

 

[65]         Adopting Justice Martin’s statement in Wilson[36], the Court reiterated that recent possession in cases of this class depends upon the nature of the goods. Justice Maclean stated:

 

Here it must be remembered that the property in question was one quarter million dollars-worth or more of cultured pearls contained in two trunks, a most unusual piece of property. The pearl expert Sereth said in his evidence that this quantity of pearls would represent a quantity equal to that traded in the Canadian market for five years. I think that the learned trial Judge was entitled to apply the doctrine of “recent possession” in this case[37].

 

[66]         Although dissenting in the result, Justice Bull also concluded that the trial judge was entitled to implement the doctrine of recent possession even if the possession was some 8 ½ months after the theft. Of significance, he mentioned the following:

 

[...]  The question of whether a theft is or is not "recent" must of necessity depend on all the circumstances.  The word "recent" is relative and is incapable of any exact or precise definition.  It is a question of fact and the very nature of the stolen article, its rareness, the readiness in which it can, and is likely to, pass from hand to hand, the ease of its identification and the likelihood of transferability all may have bearing to reach a conclusion as to whether its theft was recent or not.  Possession of clothing, household and personal effects or appliances, jewellery and common tools might require a very short period after theft to be considered "recently stolen ".  On the other hand, possession of extraordinary, unique, large, unusual or unlikely transferable goods might permit a very much longer time for the theft to retain the status of "recent". The very volume of the goods might have an important bearing.  In my view, the nature of the goods in this case, a unique, bulky and very valuable shipment of cultured pearls said to weigh about 600 lb. and sufficient to satisfy the Canadian market for some years, leads me to the same conclusion the trial Judge must have reached, that the appellant in early August, 1970, had possession of pearls fairly described as “recently stolen” some 8½   months before. I am unable, therefore, to accede to the appellant’s first submission that the doctrine was not applicable because the pearls in question were not “recently stolen”[38].

 

[67]         In R. v. Saieva[39], the Supreme Court of Canada, in considering the concept of “recency”, approved the statement made by Justice Bull in Killam that the criteria to be used to establish whether a possession is recent are the nature of its object, “its rareness, the readiness in which it can, and is likely to, pass from hand to hand, the ease of its identification and the likelihood of transferability”[40].

 

[68]         Applying those principles to the case at bar, I can safely conclude that the Riopelle paintings are not on the same footing as clothing, household, personal effects or appliances for the purpose of determining the issue of recency. 

[73]         I agree that the paintings are much less likely to pass from hand to hand than ordinary everyday items of personal property. While their uniqueness surely impacts their transferability, I am not ready to conclude that the paintings are unlikely transferable goods. 

 

[75]         Moreover, the transferability of artwork is not solely dependent on its nature, size or value. Commercial strategy may also impact the readiness in which artwork in general can be transferred.

 

[77]         Overall, taking into account the criteria set out in Killam and Saeiva, it could be reasonable for a jury in our matter to conclude that a longer than usual period of time between the theft and the possession is still within the range to qualify as “recent”. 

 

[80]         The case law reveals that a wide range of time periods have been found to come within the concept of recency. Depending on the individual circumstances of the case, it may be a matter of minutes[45], hours[46], days[47], months[48], but never a matter of years.  

 

[81]         The longest documented time intervals which qualified (or may have qualified[49]) as “recent possession” are found in the Killam and Saieva cases.

 

[82]         As discussed previously, the gap between the theft and the possession of unique and highly valuable pearls in Killam was 8 ½ months.

 

 

[90]         The doctrine of recent possession is premised on the existence of a temporal proximity between the accused’s possession and the time of theft. The strength of the inference that the trier of fact may draw depends on how recent the possession is, that is, in proportion to the shortness of the interval since the theft[51]. The closer in time possession is to the theft, the more likely it is that the trier of fact will draw the inference of knowledge of the unlawful origin of the property.

Les paramètres de la défense d’apparence de droit quant à l'infraction de possession d'un bien criminellement obtenu

R. c. Côté-Guay, 2025 QCCQ 1895

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[117]     Si l’on interprète le chef de recel comme référant à la possession d’un véhicule « volé », les éléments constitutifs prévus à l’art. 322(1) C.cr. sont introduits à l’analyse.

[118]     L’art. 322(1) C.cr. prévoit qu’un vol est commis lorsque l’accusé prend ou détourne un objet « frauduleusement et sans apparence de droit ».

[119]     L’absence d’apparence de droit est donc un élément essentiel de l’infraction qui doit être prouvé par la Couronne hors de tout doute raisonnable. Il n’appartient pas à l’accusé d’établir l’apparence de droit par la prépondérance de preuve. La règle générale du doute raisonnable s’applique[55].

[120]     Dans l’arrêt R. c. Simpson, la Cour suprême du Canada a expliqué que cette défense réfère à une situation où un droit de propriété ou de possession est revendiqué quant au bien en litige. On ne peut prétendre que celui qui affirme en toute honnêteté une chose qu’il croit être une revendication légitime qu’il agit sans « apparence de droit », même si cela peut n’être fondé ni en droit ni en fait. Le terme « apparence de droit » sert aussi à désigner une croyance honnête quant à un état de fait qui, s’il avait effectivement existé, aurait en droit justifié ou excusé le geste posé. En ce sens, la défense s’apparente à une application de la doctrine de l’erreur de fait[56].

[121]     Comme l’a précisé la Cour d’appel du Québec dans l’arrêt R. c. Parent, cette défense peut trouver sa source tout autant dans l’erreur honnête qu’entretient l’accusé du droit applicable à la situation litigieuse que dans son appréciation erronée de la situation factuelle à laquelle il est confronté[57]. Une erreur quant à l’application du droit civil peut donner ouverture à cette défense[58].

[122]     Évidemment, cette croyance erronée doit être sincère[59].

[123]     Il importe de souligner que la défense ne s’applique pas à une croyance morale par l’accusé, qui se considère comme justifié dans sa démarche. Il doit plutôt avoir une croyance légale (1) d’être le propriétaire légitime du bien et (2) d’avoir le droit d’aller récupérer le bien[60]. Au même chapitre, on ne peut invoquer l’apparence de droit pour justifier un geste commis sous la colère ou la frustration. De surcroît, un sentiment général d’injustice ne donne pas ouverture à la défense.