Un procureur de la Couronne ne devient pas inhabile du simple fait qu'un accusé ait porté plainte contre lui au Barreau

Ste-Marie c. R., 2022 QCCA 1137 

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[79]      Les appelants prétendent que, compte tenu de la demande d’enquête qui les visait, les procureurs de l’intimée ne pouvaient plus agir avec modération et détachement et s’acquitter convenablement de leurs obligations de poursuivants, ajoutant qu’une personne raisonnable observant la scène ne pourrait que conclure à l’absence d’équité procédurale.

[80]      En première instance, l’avocat de Michel Ste-Marie a plaidé qu’on ne pouvait conclure que la plainte de Dax et Mélanie Ste-Marie (deux parties qui n’étaient pas représentées par avocat) était frivole ou portée dans le seul but de forcer les procureurs de l’intimée à se récuser. Il a renchéri qu’il serait inapproprié que les procureurs puissent les contre-interroger dans ce contexte puisqu’ils perdraient nécessairement l’objectivité requise.

[81]      Pour la poursuite, les procureurs ne devaient pas être déclarés inhabiles sur la base d’allégations non démontrées et fermement contestées alors que rien ne permettait de croire qu’ils ne s’acquitteraient pas de leurs devoirs avec intégrité et équité.

[82]      Le cadre d’analyse approprié me semble être celui retenu dans R. c. Babos, 2014 CSC 16, [2014] 1 R.C.S. 309, qui porte sur la conduite d’un procureur qui, en menaçant de représailles un accusé, risquait de miner l’intégrité du processus judiciaire, ce qui pourrait constituer un abus de procédure. Dans un tel cas, une déclaration d’inhabilité peut certes être envisagée. Ainsi, dans R. c. Tshiamala, 2011 QCCA 439, cette Cour a ordonné, de manière exceptionnelle, que le procureur visé n’agisse pas en poursuite lors du nouveau procès qu’elle ordonnait.

[83]      Dans le présent cas toutefois, comme le juge du procès, il me semble que rien n’indiquait, au moment de la requête en inhabilité, que l’intégrité des procureurs était compromise ou le serait vraisemblablement dans l’avenir. D’ailleurs, même dans le présent pourvoi, les appelants se limitent à plaider les mêmes arguments qu’en première instance et ne pointent aucun comportement répréhensible de la part des procureurs qui découlerait de la demande d’enquête au syndic. Ils n’indiquent pas davantage ce qui est advenu de cette demande par la suite.

[84]      Pour reprendre les mots de R. v. Trang, 2002 ABQB 286, paragr. 75 : « I think the simple answer to this proposition is that if there is no manifestation of a loss of objectivity, there is no reason to delve into the discretion of the Crown to determine which counsel will prosecute any given case on this basis ».

[85]      Par ailleurs, rien n’indique que cette décision ait pu affecter l’équité du procès et il ne suffit pas d’invoquer en appel un risque purement hypothétique pour obtenir un nouveau procès. Celui-ci a eu lieu et tout indique qu’il s’est tenu de manière tout à fait acceptable sans mettre en cause son équité et l’intégrité du système judiciaire.

La confidentialité qui s'attache aux discussions qui entourent la négociation de plaidoyer et le devoir d'un avocat de ne pas présenter à la cour une preuve qu'il sait fausse

R. c. Legato, 2002 CanLII 41296 (QC CA)

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[73]           On peut comprendre que pour celui qui s'apprête à se parjurer, il soit important de savoir avant d'entrer dans la boîte des témoins si la Couronne pourra le contre-interroger et le contredire avec sa propre version des événements.

[74]           La poursuite s'est opposée, bien à tort à mon avis, à ce que la juge rende une décision immédiatement sur cette question au motif qu'il serait ainsi permis à l'accusé de choisir sa défense.

[75]           Citant Ewaschuk,[14] au par. 16 2260, à l'effet que ce n'est pas la pratique au Canada de rendre des « prospective rulings » la juge a refusé de se prononcer immédiatement, distinguant le cas de l'affaire  R. c. Underwood.[15]

[76]            L'arrêt Underwood posait la question de savoir si un accusé de meurtre avait le droit de savoir, avant de témoigner, si le juge allait exclure son lourd casier judiciaire. La Cour suprême a répondu par l'affirmative à cette question. Au par. 6 de son opinion, le juge Lamer qui a rendu le jugement de la Cour rappelle que : « Notre processus pénal est fondé sur le principe selon lequel, avant que l'accusé produise une preuve pour sa propre défense, il doit connaître la preuve complète qui pèse contre lui ».

[77]           La question soulevée par l'appelant exige que nous examinions les questions suivantes : la confidentialité qui s'attache aux discussions qui entourent la négociation de plaidoyer et le devoir d'un avocat de ne pas présenter à la cour une preuve qu'il sait fausse.

[78]           Dans leur ouvrage Ethics and Canadian Criminal Law, Irwin Law Inc., 2001,  Michel Proulx et David Layton  affirment, à la p. 417, qu'un tel privilège existe. Ils le font dans les termes suivants:

Communications between defence counsel and prosecutor during plea discussions are confidential and privileged.[16] :  Public policy encourages full and candid discussion between the parties, and what has been revealed during those discussions is not admissible at trial.  However, there may be circumstances where the privilege is set aside, most particularly where the client later waives privilege by alleging a denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

[79]           John Sopinka, Sidney S. Lederman et Alan W. Bryant, reconnaissent dans leur ouvrage[17], aux numéros 14.202 et 14.220, qu'un privilège de confidentialité entoure les négociations de plaidoyer en matière criminelle, mais que tel privilège n'est pas absolu.

[80]           Je tiens, pour un, que la Couronne ne peut pas se servir, dans le but de prouver la culpabilité d'un accusé au procès, de ce qui lui a été dit ou communiqué par l'avocat d'un accusé lors d'une séance de négociation de plaidoyer qui a échoué.

[81]           Cependant  il en va différemment,  à mon avis, lorsqu'un accusé rend ou se prépare à rendre un faux témoignage. Je tiens qu'il en est ainsi en l'espèce, parce que du moment que l'appelant ne prétend pas que ce qu'il a dit au psychiatre est faux, et il ne le prétend pas, il n'aurait pu affirmer qu'il n'avait pas poignardé la victime sans se parjurer. Et quant à la recherche d'une condamnation amoindrie, il ne viendrait pas à l'esprit de quiconque de tenter de faire réduire une accusation de meurtre  en s'accusant faussement d'un geste meurtrier qu'on n'a pas posé.

[82]           Il me paraît s'inférer nécessairement de la thèse que l'appelant a proposée aux jurés, un meurtre commis par un tiers, que le seul intérêt de faire décider immédiatement si le rapport psychiatrique pourrait être utilisé pour contre-interroger l'appelant était pour le cas où celui-ci avait l'intention d'affirmer sous serment qu'il n'avait pas poignardé la victime.

[83]           Ceci m'amène à considérer le devoir d'un avocat dont le client s'apprête à se parjurer. À mon avis,  il  se dégage clairement de la demande de décision préliminaire présentée par le procureur de l'appelant que lui et son client voulaient savoir si l'appelant pourrait se parjurer sans risquer d'être mis en contradiction par sa propre déclaration au psychiatre qu'il consultait.

[84]           La question du client qui s'apprête à se parjurer pose un sérieux problème d'éthique judiciaire à l'avocat.  Elle a été étudiée de façon magistrale par les auteurs Proulx et Layton aux pages 356 et suivantes de leur ouvrage[18].

[85]           Aux pages 404 et suivantes de leur ouvrage, les auteurs font leurs recommandations à l'avocat confronté à ce problème.

[86]           Pour les fins de la question précise à résoudre en l'espèce, je me contente de citer l'introduction et les deux premières recommandations :

Client perjury, whether anticipated or completed, presents a lawyer with the daunting challenge of reconciling the competing duties of loyalty to the client and fidelity to the truth-finding function of the criminal justice system.  The potential options available to counsel are varied and complicated, and commentators often disagree as to the propriety of any given course of action.  Our recommendations for the lawyer who is confronted by client perjury are as follows:

1.      Counsel must first determine that the client intends to mislead the court through the presentation of false testimony.  A lawyer is fixed with such knowledge where he or she reasonably draws an irresistible conclusion of falsity from available information (section (1) ).

2.      Once counsel comes to the firm conclusion that a client intends to commit perjury, the immediate reaction should be to attempt to dissuade the client from pursuing such a course.  The client should be informed of the serious adverse consequences that can flow from perjurious testimony, including the remedial responses available to counsel (section F(2) ).

[87]           J'ajoute  que le Code de déontologie des avocats du Québec ne laisse guère de place à l'équivoque. Les art. 3.02.01 c) et 4.02.01 c) et g) se lisent :

3.02.01 L'avocat doit s'acquitter de ses obligations professionnelles avec intégrité.  Sans restreindre la généralité de ce qui précède, l'avocat ne doit pas:

c)                              induire ou tenter d'induire le tribunal en erreur ou, par des moyens illégaux, créer le doute en faveur de son client;

4.02.01      En outre des actes dérogatoires mentionnés aux articles 57 et 58 du Code des professions (L.R.Q., c. C-26)  est dérogatoire à la dignité de la profession le fait pour un avocat:

c)      de tirer sciemment avantage d'un parjure ou d'une fausse preuve;

g)  de conseiller ou d'encourager son client à poser un acte qu'il sait être illégal ou frauduleux;

[88]           Je tiens donc qu'un accusé n'a pas le droit de se parjurer pour tenter de se faire acquitter et que son avocat ne peut l'encourager à le faire. Il doit au contraire tenter de l'en dissuader et si le client persiste dans son intention, demander au tribunal l'autorisation de se retirer du dossier tout en nuisant le moins possible à son  client, le tout sous réserve de cas particuliers dont discutent les auteurs Proulx et Layton et qui n'ont pas d'application en l'espèce.

[89]           Dans l'arrêt R. c. Calder,[19] la Cour suprême a décidé à la majorité qu'une déclaration obtenue d'un détenu en violation du droit garanti par l'art. 10b) de la Charte et écartée par le juge du procès, en application de l'art. 24(2),  ne peut être utilisée pour le contre-interroger.

[90]           La situation est différente dans la présente cause, car le rapport a été remis à la Couronne par l'avocat de l'accusé et en l'absence de toute allégation de violation d'un droit garanti par la Charte.

[91]           Les propos de madame le juge McLachlin aux par. 44 et 45 de son opinion dissidente dans Calder me paraissent s'appliquer parfaitement aux faits de la cause :

44.      Deux des soucis fondamentaux qui sous-tendent les procès criminels – la découverte de la vérité et la protection du droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable – peuvent produire des effets différents dans ces deux situations.

45.      Le souci de découvrir la vérité peut militer contre l'utilisation d'une déclaration produite en tant que preuve de fond, si l'on craint que la violation de la Charte l'ait rendue peu fiable.  Le même souci de découvrir la vérité peut par ailleurs militer en faveur de l'utilisation de cette déclaration en contre-interrogatoire pour éprouver la crédibilité de l'accusé et faire ressortir les inexactitudes ou les fabrications de son témoignage en interrogatoire principal.  Du point de vue du cas individuel, il importe de permettre au jury d'apprécier justement la véracité du témoignage.  Du point de vue des procès en général, il est tout aussi important de ne pas permettre que des témoins viennent à la barre fabriquer des mensonges sans craindre d'être contre-interrogés sur des déclarations antérieures contradictoires. (Soulignement ajouté).

Est-ce que l'imposition de conditions en lien avec la communication de la preuve brime les droits constitutionnels d'un accusé?

Abel c. R., 2019 QCCS 5832

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[32]      At this stage, the Court must rule on the following issue: is the disclosure procedure or the restrictions on the disclosure of the evidence imposed by the Crown contrary to its duty to disclose and does it infringe the applicant’s right to make full answer and defence?[10]

[33]      The right to the disclosure of evidence is an essential component of the right to make full answer and defence guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[11] The Crown must disclose all relevant information, in its possession or under its control, to an accused, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, subject to the exercise of the Crown’s discretion to refuse to disclose information that is privileged or plainly irrelevant.[12]

[34]      The Crown retains some discretion as to the time, extent and form of disclosure of the evidence. The exercise of this discretion remains subject to control by the trial judge,[13] where the accused is not satisfied with the evidentiary disclosure received. In this context, the Crown does not enjoy the same protection as that afforded during a judicial review of its prosecutorial discretion.[14]

[35]      In this case, the Crown has made the evidence available to the applicant and his counsel, on certain conditions and as long as it is examined on the premises of the Sûreté du Québec.

[36]      Here, counsel for the applicant may examine a copy of the material as many times as necessary, take notes while viewing the material, be accompanied by another lawyer while viewing the material to get a second opinion, and has access to a private room upon request for confidential discussions on site with his client. The expert retained by the defence, who will also be required to conduct his analyses on the premises of the Sûreté du Québec, will be able to export the activity reports, lists of files and histories created or found to a CD in order to complete and draft a report at his place of business.[15]

[37]      Therefore, this is not a situation where the Crown is refusing to disclose the evidence; at the hearing, the Crown noted that at all times it was prepared to provide access to the required material. The applicant, however, objected to being subject to the proposed conditions, arguing that they interfered with the performance of his counsel’s mandate and that they deprived him of full answer and defence.

[38]      It should be noted that the applicant’s right to disclosure of the evidence is not equivalent to an absolute right to obtain identical copies of the material. The Crown is not obliged to disclose the evidence in the exact format sought by the applicant, but it must provide him with the relevant information.[16]

[39]      In exceptional cases, it can be sufficient, even in the interests of justice, to provide access only to the material sought, and not to provide a copy of it. The Crown can exercise some discretion in this respect, so long as the accused is able to make full answer and defence:

[93]   Ordinarily, disclosure is achieved by providing photographs, photocopies or electronic copies of documents or things capable of reproduction: Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosure, and Resolution Discussions, the Hon. G. Arthur Martin, Chair (Ontario: Queen’s Printer, 1993), at pp. 234-35, 470-72, recommendation 41.12 (the “Martin Report”). This is arguably what Sopinka J. envisaged in Stinchcombe when he spoke, at p. 338, of “[p]roduction to the defence”. Yet some things, such as pornographic images of children, should not be copied. Other information may be too sensitive to lose control over. In these exceptional cases, where it is in the interests of justice to do so, inspection by the defence may have to do: R. v. Blencowe (1997), 1997 CanLII 12287 (ON SC), 35 O.R. (3d) 536 (Gen. Div.), at p. 44.

[94]   The Crown therefore has discretion as to the manner in which disclosure is made. That discretion is not unbridled. The first principle is that disclosure must be meaningful, in the sense that it is adequate to enable the accused to make full answer and defence: R. v. Pan, 2014 ONSC 4645, 2014 CanLII 74050, at paras. 72-75. This requires that disclosure must be accessible. The disclosed information must be capable of identification and the disclosure must enable proper trial preparation: R. v. Dunn (2009), 2009 CanLII 75397 (ON SC), 251 C.C.C. (3d) 384 (Ont. S.C.). To enable full answer and defence, the accused must also have the means to access the disclosed information in court, as needed.[17]

[Emphasis added.]

[40]      Therefore, the case law consistently recognizes that there are situations where the Crown can attach conditions or restrictions on the disclosure of evidence, without infringing the accused’s right to the disclosure of the evidence and to make full answer and defence, or rendering the accused’s trial unfair.[18]

While disclosure is now a constitutional right, it is not disclosure as such that is guaranteed, but disclosure as part of or the means of securing the fairness of the trial and the right of the accused to make full answer and defence. The obligation to disclose is not absolute. My concern in this application is, therefore, whether the trust condition affects the right of the applicant to make full answer and defence. Some means of disclosure may be preferred by the accused over others, but, if there is no adverse effect on the fairness of the trial, the manner of disclosure is not a Charter violation.[19]

[41]      For example, in O. (W.A.), [20] the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan found that the Crown exercised its discretion appropriately when it refused to provide the appellant with a copy of a videotape containing images of the sexual assault that gave rise to the charges brought against him. Counsel for the appellant was informed of the existence and the contents of the recording and he was invited to examine it in private, at his office or that of the Crown, in the presence of the appellant and an expert. Other than the inconvenience of having to inspect the recording under the Crown’s conditions, the Court did not perceive any infringement of the appellant’s right to make full answer and defence.

[42]      Similarly, in Noël-de-Tilly,[21] the Court of Appeal of Quebec dismissed the application for the transmission of the material alleged to be child pornography contained in the trial record to the firm responsible for preparing the appeal brief. As an alternative, the Crown suggested that counsel for the appellant be allowed to examine the material on the premises of the Sûreté du Québec, to which she consented. The Court dismissed the suggestion in the following terms:

[translation]

[3]   Parliament has recognized that child pornography is a social scourge and has enacted strict measures to suppress its use, access and proliferation. That is why the Criminal Code limits the justifications for the possession of this material. It is now up to the courts to ensure that the legislation’s objective is achieved while preserving the procedural and judicial safeguards of the accused.

[4]   In this context, due to the public nature of the appeal record, it is clear that these documents, whether filed at trial in paper or electronic format, must not be included in the brief. The Court must be informed, however, of all the aspects relevant to the case, especially if the appellant is contesting the characterization of the material or claiming that its examination is necessary to rule on its submissions.

…

[6]   This procedure [the examination in a specially designated room at the station] is not appropriate because it does not respect the principle of judicial independence. The court files are in its the custody, not that of the police. Of course, police officers can be used to protect the evidence, but they do so only at the request of and to support the true custodian, the court clerk.

[7]   While it is essential that judges have access to all of the evidence relevant to the outcome of the appeal, it is imperative to avoid the distribution or examination of the pornographic material by third parties. To meet this two-fold objective, the appropriate procedure consists in authorizing the court clerk at the trial stage to transmit the material directly to the clerk of the Court, who will keep it under seal, as his or her counterpart had no doubt done. Thus, this material will be accessible to the panel assigned to the appeal, which can, if necessary, call upon the computer specialists of their choice and determine the procedure that will ensure the confidentiality of the exhibits.

[8]   There remains the matter of counsel for the appellant or for the respondent, as the case may be. It has been suggested that counsel go to the police station after making an appointment. In my opinion, this overlooks the fact that since the trial, the documents adduced into evidence have been in the custody of the courts and no longer that of the police. Therefore, counsel would have access to exhibits under seal, but only with the permission and under the supervision of officers of the Court. Although it is possible for officers of the Court to call upon police officers, the responsibility for providing a complete, but fully secure, examination nevertheless falls to the Court clerk, under the supervision of the Chief Justice or a Judge the Chief Justice designates.

[Emphasis added.]

[43]      The applicant’s right to disclosure of the evidence and to make full answer and defence is of course crucial, but in this case there are countervailing interests that must be taken into account, including the rights of the victims concerned, namely, their right to privacy, and the risk that highly sensitive material will be disseminated.

[44]      The applicant seeks a complete copy of the seized material, without supervision or proposing an expert or a procedure that would allow the risk of dissemination of copies to third parties to be controlled. Counsel for the applicant refuses any interference, arguing that he has the right to be in possession of this evidence. At the hearing, he added that no undue risk of harm would be created if he were to examine a copy of this material at his office on a computer with Internet access because the victims are unknown and the files are freely available on the Internet.

[45]      The Court cannot support the applicant’s position.

[46]      First, the fact that the victims may be unknown or unidentifiable or that the material is in the public domain and already available on the Internet does not at all mitigate the importance of the victims’ rights and interests. This does not make the risk theoretical, contrary to what the applicant suggests, and the impact on the victims remains very real, as indeed the intervener established at the hearing.[22]

[47]      Canadian courts have repeatedly illustrated the repercussions of the dissemination and distribution of child pornography.[23] As noted by LeBel J. in L.M.:[24]

[28] Finally, I note that L.M. disseminated his pornography around the world over the Internet. The use of this medium can have serious consequences for a victim. Once a photograph has been posted on the Web, it can be accessed indefinitely, from anywhere in the world. R.M. will never know whether a pornographic photograph or video in which she appears might not resurface someday.

[48]      Next, both considerations relative to the victims’ privacy and the public interest mitigate in favour of imposing conditions on the disclosure of such evidence, while allowing the applicant to exercise his constitutional rights.

[49]      In Blencowe,[25] Watt J., then of the Ontario Court of Justice, had before him a motion for the disclosure of evidence, that is, videotapes containing child pornography. It was agreed that the applicant was entitled to the disclosure of the evidence and the debate concerned only the conditions of the disclosure. Referring to the recommendations in the “Martin Committee Report”,[26] the judge concluded:

It may fairly be said that, where a video recording is more likely to be tendered and may be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings, the committee recommended that disclosure of it be by copy. Private viewing may be permitted, however, where there are countervailing interests of significance which cannot be adequately protected by imposing conditions on disclosure of copies.

There may exist in this case reasonable privacy interests of the children whose activities are depicted in the video recordings. There is also a significant public interest, reflected in the prohibitions of subss. 163.1(2) to (4) of the Criminal Code, in ensuring that no duplication or distribution occurs in the disclosure process.

It is not suggested that the applicant, his counsel and any expert(s) retained by the defence are not entitled to view the video recordings whose contents are said to constitute the offences charged. Prima facie, the applicant is entitled to copies of the disclosure materials.

…

The privacy and public interests which I have identified only warrant disclosure by private viewing if they cannot be satisfied by an appropriate undertaking by defence counsel. The undertaking is not for the purpose of prohibiting or impeding the viewing of the tapes by the applicant, his counsel or any expert retained by the defence. Of that form of disclosure, the prosecutor cannot and does not complain. There is a matter of constitutional entitlement that cannot be swept aside.

It is necessary, however, that the privacy and public interests identified earlier not be further compromised by copying, viewing, circulation or distribution of the tapes beyond what is necessary to give effect to the applicant's constitutional right. The issue is whether, by conditions attached to the disclosure of copies, the desired result and necessary balance can be achieved. I am satisfied that, in this case, it can be.

(d) The conditions of disclosure

To ensure that the privacy interests of the children depicted in the recordings, and the public interest in ensuring that what may be child pornography or obscene is not further distributed, the following conditions shall be included in an undertaking signed by counsel for the applicant before supply of any copy tapes:

 [Emphasis added.]

[50]      Last, the conditions proposed by the Crown certainly entail inconvenience or irritants for the applicant, his counsel, and the expert they will eventually retain. Other than logistical inconvenience, however, the applicant has not established how his right to make full answer and defence is infringed by the fact that he must examine the evidence on the premises of the Sûreté du Québec rather than receive a complete copy.

[51]      Investigator Frédéric Blouin of the Sûreté du Québec’s technology division testified on the various precautions that must be taken when child pornography is examined on the premises of the Sûreté du Québec, and on the feasibility of the expert report in the environment proposed by the Crown. He explained that the examination of the seized files could require half a day’s work for the expert eventually retained by the applicant, whereas an expert report might take one week.

[52]      The evidence also establishes that the numerous experts contacted by the applicant did not refuse to accept the mandate because of the Crown’s conditions. The situation is quite different: the list of potential experts who refused to accept the mandate instead involved businesses that, for the most part, do not accept mandates from individuals.[27] Out of the 29 companies listed, 2 refused because they are unable to perform a sufficiently detailed analysis, 14 because they only work with companies or do not work for individuals, 9 because they do not perform analyses or troubleshoot, 1 that does not want to be exposed to this type of material, and 3 because they do not have the required skills or availability.