La fouille accessoire à l'arrestation peut viser trois objectifs principaux, à savoir la sécurité des policiers et du public, empêcher la destruction de la preuve et permettre la découverte d’autres éléments de preuve

R. c. Rock, 2021 QCCA 878

Lien vers la décision

[31]      Le ministère public plaide que la juge a erré en droit en concluant qu’une fouille accessoire à une arrestation ne pouvait être effectuée que pour assurer la sécurité des patrouilleurs. Selon le ministère public, la fouille accessoire à l’arrestation peut viser trois objectifs principaux, à savoir la sécurité des policiers et du public, empêcher la destruction de la preuve et permettre la découverte d’autres éléments de preuve.

[32]      Je partage l’avis du ministère public sur cette question.

[33]      La fouille accessoire à l’arrestation n’a pas pour seul objectif d’assurer la sécurité des policiers et du public. Elle peut être jugée valide si elle permet, par exemple, d’empêcher la destruction d’éléments de preuve ou d’en découvrir de nouveaux, lesquels pourront être utilisés au procès[15]. Dans les cas où la fouille vise ce dernier objectif, il faudra cependant que les policiers aient « des chances raisonnables de trouver des éléments de preuve concernant l’infraction pour laquelle l’accusé est arrêté »[16].

[34]      La fouille accessoire à une arrestation peut s’étendre à la fouille d’un véhicule automobile[17]. La validité de cette fouille accessoire d’une automobile et l’étendue de la fouille effectuée dépendront d’un certain nombre de facteurs tels que le motif de l’arrestation, l’endroit où se trouve le véhicule par rapport au lieu de l’arrestation, le délai entre l’arrestation et la fouille et d’autres circonstances pertinentes[18].

[35]      Je précise ici que je ne me prononce pas sur l’application de l’article 487.11 du Code criminel ou du paragraphe 11(7) de la LRCDAS, qui n’ont pas été débattus ni en première instance ni devant cette Cour.

[36]      En l’espèce, la fouille du camion était accessoire à l’arrestation des intimés. Il existait un nexus entre les motifs de l’arrestation et le véhicule. L’une des sources avait indiqué que l’intimé Rock effectuait du trafic de stupéfiants à partir d’un véhicule. Les informations transmises le jour même par les sources indiquaient que les intimés se rendraient au tournoi de golf en véhicule. On peut constater des photos VD-1 qu’une substance s’apparentant à du cannabis se trouve dans celui-ci. La fouille s’effectue dans les minutes qui suivent l’arrestation. Les attentes raisonnables en matière de vie privée des intimés à l’égard du véhicule étaient limitées. L’intimé Rock n’était pas le propriétaire du véhicule fouillé et l’intimé Shecanapish n’en était que le passager[19].

[37]      L’arrestation sans mandat était légale, comme l’était la fouille accessoire du véhicule que les intimés occupaient. La juge a erré en droit en excluant la preuve matérielle qui a été saisie et en prononçant l’acquittement des intimés. Il y a donc lieu d’accueillir l’appel et d’ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès.

Le processus de soumission successive des demandes de mandat à deux juges différents, avec divulgation complète de la première décision et des motifs de refus, ne constitue pas du "judge shopping"

R. v. Bond, 2021 ONCA 730

Lien vers la décision

[22]      As set out in the Facts section of this judgment, on December 27, 2016, the police applied twice for search warrants relating to two properties and one vehicle.

[23]      At 2:32 p.m., the Justice of the Peace refused to authorize the warrants, giving four reasons in support.

[24]      At 5:20 p.m., the justice of the Ontario Court of Justice authorized the warrants, without reasons.

[25]      At trial, the appellant raised this issue, labelling it “impermissible judge-shopping”. The trial judge dealt with it in a footnote:

The defence argued that taking the second request to [the justice at the Ontario Court of Justice] was impermissible judge-shopping. Police disclosed the prior request to the Justice of the Peace, including the rejection and reasons for the rejection, when they made the request of [the second application judge]. This is not impermissible judge-shopping: it was within [the second application judge’s] discretion to decide the warrant request, and he did so on full and fair information: R. v. Campbell, [2014] OJ No. 6541 (SCJ), per McMahon J.

[26]      The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in reaching this conclusion. His position on this issue is succinctly summarized in his factum, at para. 58:

Judge shopping strikes at the core of our judicial system. The concept undermines the high level of confidence that is placed in our judicial system, where the decision of a judicial officer is final and binding unless and until it has been overturned by a higher court. Section 487(2) of the Criminal Code provides that a “justice” may issue a warrant. The Criminal Code defines a “justice” as a Justice of the Peace or a judge of the provincial court. Therefore, [the justice at the Ontario Court of Justice] cannot be considered a higher court than [the] Justice of the Peace … By applying for successive warrants on the same information to a different judge of the same court, the police committed impermissible judge-shopping. [Emphasis added.]

[27]      I do not accept this submission, including the emphasized conclusion.

[28]      I begin by observing that I do not think that there should be a bright-line rule that the police cannot make a second application for a warrant if the first application is rejected. It needs to be recalled that there is no appeal from the initial refusal: see R. v. Campbell, [2014] O.J. No. 6541 (S.C.), at para. 40.

[29]      On this point, I agree with what Thackray J.A. said in R. v. Duchcherer, 2006 BCCA 171, at para. 29:

The procedure of applying successively for search warrants cannot reasonably be said, as such, to be an abuse of process or a “subversion” of the judicial system. Within the process there can, of course, be abuses that would lead to such a finding. It will be a fact driven decision in each case whether the circumstances amount to an abuse of process. 

[30]      My second contextual observation is that the second judge considering whether to grant the search warrant is not sitting in appeal of the first judge’s decision nor in review of that judge’s decision by way of prerogative writ. As Thackray J.A. said in Duchcherer, at para. 17, “where a judge knows of the previous application to a justice of the peace for a search warrant, but exercises his own discretion, it is a hearing de novo, not a review of the decision of the justice of the peace.”: see also R. v. Colbourne (2001), 2001 CanLII 4711 (ON CA), 157 C.C.C. (3d) 273 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 41.

[31]      This court in Colbourne, at para. 42 began to address the issue of whether a warrant could be granted on a second application. I agree with Doherty J.A. that “had the second information been the same as the first information, the initial refusal would have played a much more significant role in how the second Justice of the Peace exercised his or her discretion.” While it does play a role and should be considered by the second application judge, the fact a warrant request has been rejected is not determinative to the second request. This is supported by Doherty J.A.’s further reasoning in Colbourne, at para. 42, that he “need not decide whether I would go so far as to say that two applications based on the same information are improper even if full disclosure of the initial refusal is made.”

[32]      Turning to the merits of the appellant’s submission on this issue, in my view, the disclosure to the second application judge of the previous refusal and the reasons for that refusal ensured the openness and transparency of the process that the appellant submits was lacking. Those factors were endorsed by McMahon J. in Campbell, at para. 56:

In submitting the materials the officer should ensure the ITO includes the particulars of the earlier refusal, including the time, name of the judicial officer, and the reasons of refusal.

A copy of any reason or endorsement provided by the judicial officer who refused the warrant should be an appendix to the ITO.

[33]      As the trial judge noted in the footnote dealing with the judge-shopping issue, the police complied with these factors. The second application judge, who issued the search warrant, was fully apprised of the previous application, its timing, the fact that it had been rejected, and the reasons for the rejection. He was well-positioned to consider the application de novo.

[34]      McMahon J. in Campbell also identified another factor to consider, namely that no specific officer should be selecting individually any reviewing judge; instead, the second judicial officer should be the one on call. I note that the appellant does not allege that this factor is in play in this case.

[35]      In conclusion, like McMahon J. in Campbell, at para. 58, “I do not accept the argument that allowing successive search warrant applications on the same materials would amount to judge-shopping and would be a reason not to allow for such procedure”. Each case will need to be addressed on its own facts. In this case, the trial judge did not err by affirming the validity of the second search warrant.

Un policier peut exercer, sans mandat, tous les pouvoirs prévus aux paragraphes 487(1) lorsque l’urgence de la situation rend difficilement réalisable l’obtention du mandat, sous réserve que les conditions de délivrance de celui-ci soient réunies

R. v. Capehart, 2025 ONSC 2557

Lien vers la décision

[32]      The power of police to engage in a warrantless search on the basis of “exigent circumstances” is well established in Canadian law. Section 487.11 of the Criminal Code provides one statutory avenue under which police may engage in a lawful, yet warrantless, search on the basis of “exigent circumstances”. Other statutory avenues for warrantless searches are available depending on the particular circumstances of a case. For example, ss. 117.02 or 117.04(2) of the Criminal Code, or s. 11(7) of the CDSA; however, these provisions are not applicable in this case.

 

[33]      Section 487.11 of the Criminal Code provides that where a peace officer, or a public officer who has been appointed or designated to administer or enforce any federal or provincial law and whose duties include the enforcement of this or any other Act of Parliament, may, in the course of his or her duties, exercise any of the powers described in subsection 487(1) or 492.1(1) without a warrant if the conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but by reason of exigent circumstances it would be impracticable to obtain a warrant. A warrantless search may be justified under section 487.11 where: a. The conditions for obtaining a normal search warrant exist [i.e., a warrant under ss.487(1) or 482(1)]; and b. It would be impracticable by reason of exigent circumstances to obtain that warrant.

 

[34]      “Exigent circumstances” and “impracticability” are not defined in section 487.11. In R. v. Paterson, 2017 SCC 15, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada considered the interpretation of “exigent circumstances” in relation to s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. In summary, the Court held that the search must be “compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police action to preserve evidence, officer safety or public safety,” and that “this urgency must be shown to have been such that taking the time to obtain a warrant would pose serious risk to those imperatives”.

[35]      While Paterson dealt with a different statutory authority (s.11(7) CDSA, vs. s.487.11 Criminal Code), I agree with the Crown that the language of the two provisions is so similar that there is no basis upon which to distinguish them. The interpretation of these terms in Paterson ought to apply equally to section 487.11 of the Code.

 

[42]      Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.  Exigent circumstances only arise where there is a risk to public or officer safety or the destruction or loss of evidence: R. v. Kelsy, 2011 ONCA 605, at para. 24.  I can accept that there was sufficient exigency to download the data before the obtaining of a warrant to search the phones. The issue of greatest concern in the present case is the subsequent interval of six days between when the data was downloaded on October 1, and when a warrant was applied for and obtained on October 7.  This is too long.  It bespeaks a complacency on the part of the police regarding the accused’s s.8 Charter rights.   Exigent circumstances should be considered as extraordinary and treated as such.  They may be relied upon to justify an intrusion into privacy only where necessary.  Any less stringent test would have the effect of the police circumventing the need to obtain prior judicial authorization where it is merely inconvenient or not expedient:  R. v. Bakal, 2021 ONCA 584, at para. 19.  In this circumstance, while the police may have acted promptly to preserve the potential evidence by the download of data from the phone, they are not entitled to then adopt a leisurely approach to obtaining a warrant.  This was clearly not considered a priority.  I agree with Justice Brennan that exigent circumstances cannot be used as an excuse merely because it would be more convenient or expedient for the police.

Le consentement à la fouille d'un accusé peut être vicié en raison d'information erronée transmise par la police concernant la possibilité de le retenir jusqu'à l'arrivée d'une unité canine

R. v. Bergauer-Free, 2009 ONCA 610

Lien vers la décision

[53]         With respect, the motion judge failed to bring the proper considerations to bear in assessing whether the appellant’s “consent” was fully informed and meaningful. On this record, taking the Crown’s case at its highest, those preconditions could not, in my view, be satisfied.

[54]         The appellant’s “consent” was not fully informed because Officer Yousif led him to believe that if he did not consent to the search of his trunk, he could be lawfully detained pending the arrival of the canine unit. That of course, was not accurate; on the contrary, it was misinformation. And that is the context against which Officer Yousif’s comment about bringing in the canine unit must be assessed.

[55]         Leaving aside the fact that in the circumstances, any “search” carried out by the canine unit would itself have been unconstitutional (see R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.C. 18), Officer Yousif had no lawful authority to hold the appellant for an additional moment beyond the time required to finalize the traffic ticket. Far from making that known to the appellant and giving him the choice to leave immediately, Officer Yousif led him to believe that he could be kept there pending the arrival of the canine unit. And he did so because he was not about to give up on his “gut instinct” that there was something in the trunk; rather, as he acknowledged, he was going to find out “one way or the other” what was in there.

[56]         How, in these circumstances, the appellant’s purported consent could be said to be “fully informed” escapes me. Telling the appellant that the canine unit could be called in carried with it the connotation that he could be lawfully kept there until it arrived. That was misinformation, hardly the stuff that makes for a finding of “fully informed” consent. Standing alone, that would be sufficient to vitiate the appellant’s purported consent.

[57]         On the facts of this case, however, the misinformation had the further effect of eviscerating any meaningful choice the appellant had available to him. Translated, the message he received from Officer Yousif was: - you can refuse to consent but it will do you no good because I will bring in the canine unit regardless. That amounts to what the United States Supreme Court referred to in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), as “colorably lawful coercion”.  And, as Stewart J. for the majority observed at p. 550: “Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent”. I agree.

[58]         Officer Yousif had no authority to hold the appellant while he brought in the canine unit.  His erroneous representation to the contrary rendered the appellant’s right to withhold his consent illusory and effectively left him with no choice at all. In my view, that too vitiated his purported consent.

[59]         It follows that on this record, taking the case for the Crown at its highest, had the motion judge brought the proper considerations to bear, he could not reasonably have concluded that the appellant fully consented to the search of his trunk and thereby waived his s. 8 rights. Accordingly, that finding cannot stand. Rather, the search of the appellant’s trunk amounted to a violation of his rights under s. 8 of the Charter.

Remedy

[60]         As indicated, in view of my conclusion that the search of the appellant’s trunk was unlawful and constituted a violation of his s. 8 rights, the motion judge’s alternate determination that the handgun was admissible under s. 24(2) is not entitled to deference. While counsel for the appellant invited us to redo the s. 24(2) analysis and make our own determination, in my view, this is not an appropriate case to do so.

[61]         Accepting that the handgun was obtained in a manner that breached the appellant’s rights under s. 8 and s. 9 of the Charter, it is open to question whether the appellant was made aware of his rights to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter before he opened the trunk. Without wishing to prejudge the outcome of the s. 24(2) motion at the new trial, that could be a significant factor in assessing the bone fides of Officer Yousif’s conduct and the overall seriousness of the s. 8 and s. 9 breaches and their impact on the appellant’s Charter-protected interests. Also, although Officer Yousif had no legal right in the circumstances to bring in the canine unit, the law on that subject was not entirely clear at the time of the incident and Officer Yousif’s understanding of it is not spelled out in the record. I am not in a position to make those and other assessments that will no doubt figure in the s. 24(2) analysis having regard to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in R. v. Grant, supra.

 

[62]         Accordingly, I would allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and order a new trial.

L'horizon temporel pour exécuter un mandat de perquisition selon la Cour d'Appel de l'Ontario

R. v. Samuels, 2024 ONCA 786

Lien vers la décision

[28]      First, since Det. Veal already had grounds to obtain a search warrant for the apartment by September 1, 2020, he could have prepared and submitted the application for the warrant before the appellant was arrested. Even if it was reasonable for Det. Veal and his superiors to want to delay the apartment search until after the appellant had been arrested, “[t]here is no statutory time limit for the execution of conventional search warrants”: R. v. Jodoin, 2018 ONCA 638, at para. 18. A search warrant with no express execution date must be executed on the same day that it is issued, but a justice of the peace can also specify “a range of dates”: R. v. Saint, 2017 ONCA 491, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 467, at paras. 1, 19-21. Since Det. Veal’s grounds for believing that drugs were in the apartment were not particularly time-sensitive, he could have submitted his search warrant application on September 1, but asked the issuing justice to extend the execution period long enough to give the police time to first find and arrest the appellant. Indeed, Det. Veal agreed at trial that he knew he could have requested a 24-hour execution window.

Les 5 questions qui doivent généralement trouver réponse pour qu'un juge puisse émettre une autorisation judiciaire

R. v. Adams, 2004 CanLII 12093 (NL PC)

Lien vers la décision

[24]  Generally speaking, there are five main questions which the issuing justice must ensure that an information to obtain a search warrant provides reasonable grounds to answer before he or she agrees to issue a search warrant:

1. that the items specified exist;

2. that the items specified will be found in the place to be searched at the time of the search;

3. that the offence alleged has been, or will be, (depending on the type of search warrant being sought) committed;

4. that the items specified will afford evidence of the offence alleged; and

5. that the place to be searched is the location where the items will be located.

[25]  In R. v. Colby, [1999] S.J. No. 915 (Q.B.), at paragraph 10, the essential elements of a C.D.S.A. warrant were described as follows:

...There must be reasonable and probable grounds for believing that the items to be searched for and seized are then in the place for which the warrant is to issue.  If that were not the case police relying on extremely outdated information, could seek and obtain a warrant to search a dwelling house.  Such was not the intention of the legislators.

Le procureur peut conseiller l'affiant dans la rédaction de son affidavit à l'appui d'une autorisation judiciaire sollicitée pour qu'il réponde aux normes établies par la jurisprudence

R. v. Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851

Lien vers la décision

[49] While the Crown agent should help the affiant present the evidence in a clear and concise manner and point out any flaws, inconsistencies or ambiguities in the affidavit, he or she should not become an investigator and engage in a wholesale review of the file. This would blur the line between the mutually independent functions of the police and the Crown, each of whom properly maintains a distinct role in the criminal justice system.

L’autorisation de perquisitionner dans un lieu emporte celle de fouiller les espaces et contenants se trouvant dans ce lieu

R. v. Charles, 2012 ONSC 2001

Lien vers la décision

[61]           Defence counsel argued that the police had no power under the search warrant to open the safe, but rather were required to apply for a second warrant to examine its contents.  I disagree.  The search warrant empowered the police to search the apartment and its contents.  If, in the course of that search, they encountered a desk, they were empowered to look inside the desk.  That would include opening the drawers of the desk and looking inside those drawers.  They would not be required to get a new warrant if a desk drawer was locked.  The warrant provides them with all the authority they need to look inside the locked drawer.  There is nothing about a safe that makes it any different from a locked drawer.  There is every reason to believe that a person who is believed to be a drug dealer, who is found to have crack cocaine and a large amount of cash on his person, and who has a safe in his closet, is likely to have placed either drugs or proceeds or both in the safe.  Indeed, there is every reason to believe that is why he would have acquired a safe in the first place.

*** Note de l'auteur de ce blog: ce passage est cité avec approbation par R. c. Vu, 2013 CSC 60, par 39 ***