Un policier peut exercer, sans mandat, tous les pouvoirs prévus aux paragraphes 487(1) lorsque l’urgence de la situation rend difficilement réalisable l’obtention du mandat, sous réserve que les conditions de délivrance de celui-ci soient réunies

R. v. Capehart, 2025 ONSC 2557

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[32]      The power of police to engage in a warrantless search on the basis of “exigent circumstances” is well established in Canadian law. Section 487.11 of the Criminal Code provides one statutory avenue under which police may engage in a lawful, yet warrantless, search on the basis of “exigent circumstances”. Other statutory avenues for warrantless searches are available depending on the particular circumstances of a case. For example, ss. 117.02 or 117.04(2) of the Criminal Code, or s. 11(7) of the CDSA; however, these provisions are not applicable in this case.

 

[33]      Section 487.11 of the Criminal Code provides that where a peace officer, or a public officer who has been appointed or designated to administer or enforce any federal or provincial law and whose duties include the enforcement of this or any other Act of Parliament, may, in the course of his or her duties, exercise any of the powers described in subsection 487(1) or 492.1(1) without a warrant if the conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but by reason of exigent circumstances it would be impracticable to obtain a warrant. A warrantless search may be justified under section 487.11 where: a. The conditions for obtaining a normal search warrant exist [i.e., a warrant under ss.487(1) or 482(1)]; and b. It would be impracticable by reason of exigent circumstances to obtain that warrant.

 

[34]      “Exigent circumstances” and “impracticability” are not defined in section 487.11. In R. v. Paterson, 2017 SCC 15, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada considered the interpretation of “exigent circumstances” in relation to s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. In summary, the Court held that the search must be “compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police action to preserve evidence, officer safety or public safety,” and that “this urgency must be shown to have been such that taking the time to obtain a warrant would pose serious risk to those imperatives”.

[35]      While Paterson dealt with a different statutory authority (s.11(7) CDSA, vs. s.487.11 Criminal Code), I agree with the Crown that the language of the two provisions is so similar that there is no basis upon which to distinguish them. The interpretation of these terms in Paterson ought to apply equally to section 487.11 of the Code.

 

[42]      Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.  Exigent circumstances only arise where there is a risk to public or officer safety or the destruction or loss of evidence: R. v. Kelsy, 2011 ONCA 605, at para. 24.  I can accept that there was sufficient exigency to download the data before the obtaining of a warrant to search the phones. The issue of greatest concern in the present case is the subsequent interval of six days between when the data was downloaded on October 1, and when a warrant was applied for and obtained on October 7.  This is too long.  It bespeaks a complacency on the part of the police regarding the accused’s s.8 Charter rights.   Exigent circumstances should be considered as extraordinary and treated as such.  They may be relied upon to justify an intrusion into privacy only where necessary.  Any less stringent test would have the effect of the police circumventing the need to obtain prior judicial authorization where it is merely inconvenient or not expedient:  R. v. Bakal, 2021 ONCA 584, at para. 19.  In this circumstance, while the police may have acted promptly to preserve the potential evidence by the download of data from the phone, they are not entitled to then adopt a leisurely approach to obtaining a warrant.  This was clearly not considered a priority.  I agree with Justice Brennan that exigent circumstances cannot be used as an excuse merely because it would be more convenient or expedient for the police.

Des gestes criminels posés par le contrevenant qui ne sont donc pas « ponctuels, irréfléchis et de courte durée » militent contre l'octroi d'une absolution

Vandal c. R., 2024 QCCA 1496

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[58]      Or, même s’il reconnaît que la conduite de l’appelante « ne démontre pas une préméditation importante et encore moins un système sophistiqué », le juge retient néanmoins avec raison la périodicité des retraits d’argent durant une longue période.

[59]      Les gestes posés par l’appelante ne sont donc pas « ponctuels, irréfléchis et de courte durée »[16]. À cet égard, je partage l’opinion des auteurs Parent et Desrosiers qui écrivent ce qui suit :

Bien que l’article 730 C.cr. n’interdise pas l’octroi d’une absolution dans les cas de gestes planifiés, commis à plusieurs reprises et/ou sur une longue période, le recours à cette mesure s’avère plus approprié lorsqu’il s’agit d’un geste isolé ou de criminalité ponctuelle laissant présager une erreur de parcours, un geste irréfléchi ou un incident n’ayant aucune commune mesure avec la personnalité du sujet[17].

[Renvois omis]

[60]      Il est manifeste que la multiplicité des retraits d’argent pendant une durée étendue militait fortement contre l’octroi d’une absolution inconditionnelle et je ne vois aucune erreur dans l’évaluation du juge. Finalement, je ne vois aucune insuffisance dans la motivation et l’analyse du juge du critère de l’intérêt public.

Des conditions particulièrement strictes de mise en liberté constituent au mieux un facteur relatif à la situation du délinquant dont le tribunal peut tenir compte pour déterminer la peine juste et appropriée

R. c. Paquette, 2025 QCCA 422

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[62]      Le respect par un délinquant des conditions de sa mise en liberté pendant l’instance n’est pas un facteur atténuant à proprement parler[40]. En effet, cet élément ne se rattache ni à la gravité de l’infraction ni au degré de responsabilité du délinquant et ne saurait donc être qualifié de facteur atténuant[41]. De plus, « [i]l est dans l’ordre des choses »[42] qu’un délinquant respecte ces conditions. Des conditions particulièrement strictes de mise en liberté constituent au mieux un facteur relatif à la situation du délinquant dont le tribunal peut tenir compte pour déterminer la peine juste et appropriée[43]. Le poids à accorder à ce facteur, s’il en est, est cependant variable[44].

[63]      Or, en l’espèce, la preuve est muette quant à la teneur des conditions ayant été imposées à l’intimé et quant à leur effet sur ce dernier (le cas échéant)[45]. La juge n’aurait pas dû considérer le respect par l’intimé de conditions de sa mise en liberté comme un facteur pertinent, et encore moins comme un facteur atténuant. Il s’agit là d’une erreur de principe.

Dans quel contexte une preuve de mauvais caractère de la victime peut devenir pertinente?

R. c. Boudreau-Chartrand, 2023 QCCS 3926

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[31]               En principe, un accusé ne peut chercher à démontrer le « mauvais caractère » de la victime puisque cette preuve n’est généralement pas pertinente quant à la question de savoir s’il a commis ou non l’infraction qui lui est reprochée[7].

[32]               Cependant, une preuve de mauvais caractère de la victime peut devenir pertinente. Par exemple, elle peut répondre à la preuve narrative de la poursuite qui cherche, par exemple, à établir un climat conjugal détérioré pour offrir un contexte au crime, sans que cela ne soit pas un blanc-seing à l’accusé pour démontrer sa bonne réputation[8].

[33]               Comme le souligne le juge Hill de la Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario dans R. v. Golov, « [t]he rule of inadmissibility is not […] “unyielding where the evidence of disposition of the victim relates to a material issue” in the case and is not excluded in the balancing of legal relevance considerations »[9]. Tel que le note le juge Martin, pour la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, dans l’arrêt Scopelliti,

[…] the disposition of a person to do a certain act is relevant to indicate the probability of his having done or not having done the act. The law prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence for the purpose of showing that the accused is a person who by reason of his criminal character (disposition) is likely to have committed the crime charged, on policy grounds, not because of relevance. There is, however, no rule of policy which excludes evidence of the disposition of a third person for violence where that disposition has probative value on some issue before the jury […].[10]

[Italiques dans l’original; le Tribunal souligne.]

[34]               Le juge du procès a le pouvoir discrétionnaire de limiter ou d’exclure la preuve du caractère de la victime lorsque l’effet préjudiciable de cette preuve excède sa valeur probante :

The trial judge must weigh the evidence and balance a variety of factors in the particular circumstances of the case. The weighing process involves an exercise of judgment or discretion and is not an application of a bright line. The trial judge may limit or exclude proffered evidence of the deceased’s bad character if its potential prejudice outweighs its probative value.[11]

[références omises; le Tribunal souligne]

[35]        En effet, comme le souligne le juge Martin dans Scopelliti, « [s]ince evidence of prior acts of violence by the deceased is likely to arouse feelings of hostility against the deceased, there must inevitably be some element of discretion in the determination of whether the proffered evidence has sufficient probative value for the purpose for which it is tendered to justify its admission. Moreover, great care must be taken to ensure that such evidence, if admitted, is not misused »[12].

[36]        L’évaluation de la valeur probante de la preuve du caractère violent de la victime fait intervenir plusieurs facteurs :

51   The probative value of past aggressive propensity by a deceased must be assessed having regard to the nature of the past behaviour and the strength of its asserted linkage to the current transaction including consideration of temporal proximity: Scopelliti, at para. 48; R. v. Varga (2001), 2001 CanLII 8610 (ON CA), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 502 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 72 (leave to appeal refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 278 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Jackson, 2013 ONCA 632 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 24, 38 (affd 2014 CSC 30 (CanLII), [2014] 1 S.C.R. 672 (S.C.C.)). To be logically probative, the disposition evidence relating to the deceased need not pass a significant probative value test: R. v. Yaeck (1991), 1991 CanLII 2732 (ON CA), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 563 (leave to appeal refused [1992] 1 S.C.R. xii (S.C.C.)); Hamilton, at para. 43; Varga, at paras. 71-74, 76.

52  Turning to the discretionary balancing to be undertaken by the court to determine whether the probative value in the case of disposition evidence relating to the deceased is substantially exceeded by potential prejudice, various factors have received judicial examination. Depending upon the nature of the disposition evidence, moral or reasoning prejudice may arise, in terms of the triers of fact unfairly stigmatizing the deceased as a bad person or engendering hostility toward the deceased or a feeling that he may have been undeserving of the protection of the law: Scopelliti, at para. 47; Varga, at para. 71; Watson, at para. 42. The courts also take into account whether there will, in any event, be evidence in the prosecution case of aggressive behaviour on the part of the deceased: Varga, at paras. 73-76; Hamilton, at para. 76; R. v. Mulligan (1997), 1997 CanLII 995 (ON CA), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 559 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 26; R. v. Williams, 2008 ONCA 413 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 65-67, 71.

53   As observed in Grant, at para. 40:

. . . these significant prejudicial effects must nonetheless be evaluated in accordance with the fundamental principles governing criminal proceedings. In giving constitutional protection to the accused's rights to make full answer and defence and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, we must accept a certain amount of complexity, length, and distraction from the Crown's case as a necessary concession to the actualization of those rights. (See, for example, [State v.] Scheidell, [227 Wis.2d 285 (1999)], at para. 65, per Abrahamson C.J., dissenting in the result.)[13]

[37]        Par ailleurs, comme le souligne les auteurs Vauclair et Desjardins dans leur Traité général de preuve et de procédures pénales :

Tabler sur la personnalité de la victime peut équivaloir à mettre sa bonne réputation en jeu et permet alors au ministère public de présenter à son tour une preuve de caractère ou de propension à l’égard de l’accusé pour éviter une distorsion des faits.[14]

[38]        Cependant, cela ne signifie pas non plus que toute révélation de traits de personnalité négatifs de la victime, sans mettre davantage en cause son caractère, ouvre ainsi la porte au poursuivant.[15]

[39]        Enfin, dans tous les cas, la preuve doit être pertinente et le Tribunal doit s’assurer qu’une telle preuve ne cause pas un préjudice à l’accusé[16] ou à la recherche de la vérité.[17]

La doctrine de la possession récente repose sur l'existence d'une proximité temporelle entre la possession par l'accusé et le moment du vol. La force de la déduction que peut tirer le juge des faits dépend de la récence de la possession, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est proportionnelle à la brièveté de l'intervalle écoulé depuis le vol

R. v. Morgan, 2013 ONSC 1522

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[51]      In R. v. Gagnon, supra, Hamilton J.A., outlined the considerations that can be taken into account in determining whether the items were “recently” stolen:

12     The requirement that the Crown prove that the goods were recently stolen relates to when the underlying offence occurred. Any number of factors can be considered in determining whether a possession is recent including the nature of the object, its rareness, the readiness in which it can, and is likely to, pass to another and the ease of identification. See Saieva v. The Queen, 1982 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 897.

 

13     When deciding whether to infer only possession of the stolen goods or to infer the underlying offence, the trier of fact must consider all the circumstances. See Kowlyk and R. v. Abernathy (J.C.) 2002 BCCA 8, 161 B.C.A.C. 247. Common sense factors to be considered include how close in time to the theft or robbery are the goods in possession of the accused and the nature of the stolen goods. Obviously, the closer in time possession is to the underlying offence, the more likely it is that the trier of fact will draw the inference of guilt on the underlying offence. However, a longer period of time does not prevent the inference. This is evident in Kowlyk where the break-ins occurred on June 1, 6, and 8 and on July 11, but it was not until August 27th that the goods were found in the possession of the accused. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions on the underlying offences.

 

14     Ultimately, the trier of fact, upon a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, will decide which inference is to be drawn. That is a question of fact. As such, deference is owed to such finding. See, for example, H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, and R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621.

 

 

[52]      In R. v. Bakos, 2008 ONCA 712, [2008] O.J. No. 4067, the Court of Appeal accepted that four months between theft and possession could constitute recent possession:

21     In support of their argument, the appellants rely on Saieva v. The Queen (1982), 1982 CanLII 51 (SCC), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 97, in which the Supreme Court of Canada considered "recency" on the basis of the relevant factors, including the rareness of the object, the readiness with which it is likely to pass from hand to hand, its transferability and its ease of identification. However, Saieva involved different circumstances and raised different issues than those present in this case. Moreover, the theft in Saieva could have occurred 50 to 55 weeks before the possession. Also in Saieva, there was no evidence about the date of theft and, in order to establish a date, it was necessary to consider "intricate facts" about how the stolen property was used before the theft.

 

22     In this case, there was no dispute about when and where the theft occurred. Here, the possession of the stolen components by the appellants was alleged to be within four and a half months of the theft. The date when the components came into Mr. Stewart's possession was also clear. Indeed, the gap between the theft and the appellants' possession is shorter than the four plus months described because the appellants must have had the components at an earlier time in order to incorporate them into the Stewart motorcycle and advertise it for sale.

 

23     In any event, while Saieva required the trial judge to provide the jury with the criteria for determining "recency", in my view those criteria were adequately delivered to the jury in this case when the charge is considered as a whole. The jury had extensive evidence about the Chinery sale, the Dennis theft, the amalgamation of the two motorcycles into the Stewart motorcycle, the possible use made of the Dennis motorcycle in the summer of 2004 and the appellants' possession of the components for a period of time before the sale to Stewart.

 

24     The nature of the issues in this trial and the components of the offences were clear to the jury. The factual issues and the applicable law were reviewed in detail in the trial judge's charge. This was not a complicated trial requiring a detailed explanation of "recent": see also Watt at pp. 649-58. Further, in my view, the Crown was not compelled, as suggested in oral argument, to call expert evidence, if such evidence was available, on the transferability in practice of stolen motorcycle components when taken by a dealer for inclusion in a rebuilt motorcycle. I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.

 

 

[53]      Accordingly, in order to determine recency, the court is entitled to consider a variety of factors including, but not limited to:

(1)         Rareness and nature of the object,

 

(2)         Readiness with which it is likely to pass from hand to hand,

 

(3)         Its transferability,

 

(4)         Its ease of identification.

 

[54]      The authors of McWilliams, in Canadian Criminal Evidence, (3^rd edition), at pp. 5-14 refer to the Cockins Case (1836), 168 E.R. 1139, where the trial judge instructed the jury, with respect to a charge of theft of socks found in the accused’s possession twenty days after they were missed, that:

If I was to lose my watch and in a few minutes it was to be found on the person one of you, it would afford the strongest ground for presuming that you had stolen it; but if a month hence it were to be found in your possession, the presumption of your having stolen it would be greatly weakened because stolen property passes through many hands.

 

 

[55]      Further, the McWilliams’ authors write that the “strength of the presumption depends on how recent the possession is, that is, in proportion to the shortness of the interval since the theft. It also depends on the nature of the possession, whether it is open or avowed or secret and concealed and the nature of the account given of it: R. v. Exall [citation omitted]”.     

[56]      Recency has been held to be established in the following circumstances: (1) money stolen from a bank robbery four hours earlier  (R. v. Dionne [2005] S.C.J. No. 27); (2) guns stolen 17 days earlier (R. v. Choquette [2007] O. J. No. 3137 (C.A.)); (3) truck with significant alterations stolen 56 days earlier (R. v. MacNair [2006] O.J. No. 2430 (C.A.)); (4) bank card stolen 72 hours earlier (R. v. Barrett [2011] (S.C.J.); horse stolen 3 days earlier; Clement’s case (1830), 168 E.R. 980 – see R. v. Kowlyk).

[57]      In dealing with a stolen radio, the Court of Appeal indicated in R. v. Cousineau, 1982 CanLII 3720 (ON CA), [1982] O.J. No. 150 (C.A.), at para. 14:

…Although the date of the theft is unknown, the interval between the theft and the sale was less than one month. While it is true that the presumption of knowledge from recent possession does not apply where common, easily transferable articles are held for a long period, I know of no authority which would compel me to find that the presumption could not apply where the period is less than one month. The decisions on this issue show that the operation of the presumption turns on the facts of each case.

La doctrine de la possession récente peut permettre au juge des faits d'inférer la connaissance que l'objet est volé, mais peut aussi permettre de conclure à la participation à la commission de l'infraction

R. v. Ricciardi, 2017 ONSC 5562

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[26]      This finding does not end matters. The common law doctrine of recent possession permits an inference of guilt in circumstances where an accused person is found in the unexplained possession of recently stolen property: see R. v. Kowlyk, 1988 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1988] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 12. The inference is permissive, not mandatory. It is not a presumption. The inference of guilt may relate to knowledge that the items are stolen, but it may also relate to participation in a related offence such as theft, break and enter, and even murder: see R. v. Morgan, 2013 ONSC 1522 and R. v. Hubler, 2013 ABCA 31.