Voies de fait graves : des marques au cou constituent de par leur nature des lésions corporelles confirmant l'emploi intentionnel de la force

N.D. c. R., 2006 QCCA 14

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[126]      Dans l’arrêt R. c. Cuerrier, la Cour suprême énonce les éléments essentiels de l’infraction de voies de fait graves :

Une telle accusation exige que le ministère public prouve, premièrement, que les actes de l’accusé ont mis en danger la vie du plaignant (par. 268(1)) et, deuxièmement, que l’accusé a, d’une manière intentionnelle, employé la force contre le plaignant sans son consentement (al. 265(1)a))[19].

[127]      En l’espèce, l’emploi de la force contre la plaignante ne pose pas problème. D’ailleurs, les marques au cou de la plaignante sont clairement des lésions corporelles de par leur nature.

Un juge n'est pas tenu de donner des directives au jury sur une infraction incluse si l'ensemble de la preuve et les positions des parties justifient une approche de « tout ou rien » limitant le verdict à l'accusation principale

R. v. Wong, 2006 CanLII 18516 (ON CA)

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[11]         The offence of assault causing bodily harm is an included offence in a charge of aggravated assault by wounding:  see Criminal Code s. 662(1), R. v. R. (G.) (2005), 2005 SCC 45 (CanLII), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 161 at paras. 25-34 (S.C.C.).  A trial judge is not, however, obliged to instruct a jury on all offences that are as a matter of law included offences.  The trial judge’s obligation to instruct on included offences will depend on the evidence led, the issues raised and the positions of the parties:  see R. v. Smith (1978), 1978 CanLII 161 (SCC), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 417 (S.C.C.).  It has long been recognized that in some cases, having regard to the entirety of the evidence, the issues raised by the evidence, and the positions taken by the parties, an “all or nothing” instruction leaving the jury with only two possible verdicts – guilty or not guilty – is appropriate:  see e.g. R. v. Melyniuk and Humeniuk (1930), 1930 CanLII 508 (AB SCAD), 53 C.C.C. 296 at 300 (Alta. C.A.), aff’d (1930), 1930 CanLII 34 (SCC), 58 C.C.C. 106 (S.C.C.);  R. v. Wright (1945), 1945 CanLII 41 (SCC), 83 C.C.C. 225 (S.C.C.);  R. v. Aalders (1993), 1993 CanLII 99 (SCC), 82 C.C.C. (3d) 215 (S.C.C.);  R. v. Wade (1995), 1995 CanLII 100 (SCC), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), rev’g (1994), 1994 CanLII 10562 (ON CA), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 39 (Ont. C.A.). 

Un animal, tel qu'un chien utilisé pour attaquer, correspond à la définition générale d'une « arme » au sens de l'article 2 du Code criminel

R. v. McLeod, 1993 CanLII 14674 (YK CA)

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There are three charges against the accused, two of common assault under s. 266, to which she entered a plea of guilty, and a third count that in committing the assault set out in count 1, that is, the assault on Karen Mary Woodcock, the accused used a weapon, her dog, contrary to the provision in the Criminal Code. The accused has admitted in an agreed statement of facts: first, that she had sicced her dog, a pit bull, upon a dog owned by the complainant. There was no evidence as to whether or not the dog heeded that command or did anything with respect to it; secondly, and I am going to read exactly what was said, "the accused told the dog to sic the complainant, and the dog then jumped at the complainant and bit the complainant's hand breaking the skin on the thumb and first finger". The dog did then follow the command given to it by its owner, the accused. I think I can take judicial notice of the fact that when a dog is sicced upon another person (I do not know whether "sic" is even a word that the English dictionaries recognize, but it is recognized in everyday common language), it means to, in effect, attack the person to whom the dog is directed. 

The question then arises, and it is the sole question for determination, whether or not a dog is a weapon as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The word "weapon" is described as being. 

"(a) anything used or intended for use in causing death or injury to persons 

whether designed for that purpose or not, or 

(b) anything used or intended for use for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person." 

There is no question that the complainant was injured. Whether she was threatened or intimidated, I do not know because there is nothing to indicate that she was, and that really is not in issue here. 

The Crown's position is that the words "whether designed for that purpose or not" must include an animate object such as this dog which, in the Crown's opinion, becomes an extension of the owner of the animal, who commands that the animal attack, which this animal did. 

Ms. Blakley's position is that this definition in the Code does not include an animate object, and that animate objects cannot and are not weapons which fall within the definition, and that the word "anything" does not include an animate object such as an animal or the dog in question. She says her submission is strengthened by the words which follow the last word in para. (b) of the definition: "... and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm as defined in s. 84". 

As far as I am aware, and as far as counsel are aware, this is the first occasion that a court has been faced with the question as to whether or not a dog, used in the manner it was by Ms. McLeod, is a weapon. The dog did respond to the command. Mr. Aubé says that command was given by a moral person, able to exercise judgment and able to give commands of the type the dog was given. 

Ms. Blakley asks a rather pertinent question, and that is, is the dog, in fact, as Mr. Aubé would suggest, an extension of the will of the accused? I have looked at the word "anything" as defined in the Oxford dictionary, I have looked at the word "weapon" as defined in both the Oxford dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, and I am not quite sure they help me in this particular problem. I think I can say, however, that had Parliament, when defining the word "weapon" as it appears in the Criminal Code, intended that a weapon include an animate object such as a dog, it would have, and should have, said so in clear and unambiguous terms. 

Mr. Aubé provided a picture of dogs being used to control crowds; dogs trained for the purpose of controlling crowds, and that these dogs can, I think from what we know and from what we have seen and heard, inflict injury and harm. But that being the case, is the dog an extension of the individual who is controlling the dog? I do not think so. I think the dog is trained for the particular purpose and follows the commands given to it, but I go back to say that if Parliament had intended animate objects such as dog be included in the definition of the word "weapon", it would have said so in, and I repeat, clear and unambiguous terms, and having failed to do so, I cannot read into the definition of the word "weapon" the animate object of a dog. 

Having so found, Ms. McLeod is, of course, acquitted on count 2 of the indictment. 

The offence created by s. 267(1)(a) is a more serious offence than simple assault envisaged in s. 266 where the maximum penalty is only five years. Section 267(1) reads: 

267(1) Every one who, in committing an assault, 

(a) carries, uses or threatens to use a weapon or an imitation thereof, 

or 

(b) causes bodily harm to the complainant, 

is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. 

(Emphasis added.) A "weapon" used in s. 267(1)(a) is defined in 

s. 2 in these words: 

"weapon" means 

(a) anything used or intended for use in causing death or injury to 

persons whether designed for that purpose or not, or 

(b) anything used or intended for use for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person, and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm as defined in section 84; 

(Emphasis added.) 

I have taken the liberty of underlining what I consider to be the operative words of both sections of the Code. 

In the case at bar the parties agreed on the facts. It has been clearly established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused used her dog to cause injury to the complainant victim. 

In her factum and argument before this court, Crown counsel urged us to find that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the applicable law. She submitted that a dog fell within the definition of the word "weapon", as it was encompassed in the general expression "anything used ... in causing ... injury to persons". 

In his factum and argument, counsel for the accused submitted that the trial judge was correct in interpreting the word "anything" as excluding animate objects such as dogs. He submitted that, historically, a dog was not considered to be a weapon. In his submission, he reviewed the history of the definition of "weapon" back to Canada s first Criminal Code. In s. 3 of the Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29, the term "offensive weapon" is defined in these words: 

3(r) The expression "offensive weapon" includes any gun or other firearm, 

or air-gun, or any part thereof, or any sword, sword blade, bayonet, pike, 

pike-head, spear, spear-head, dirk, dagger, knife, or other instrument intended 

for cutting or stabbing, or any metal knuckles, or other deadly or dangerous 

weapon, and any instrument or thing intended to be used as a weapon, and all 

ammunition which may be used with or for any weapon; 

If this definition was operative today, I would, applying the ejusdem generis rule, accede to the argument that animate beings do not fall within it. 

I do not consider it necessary to trace in detail the Criminal Code amendments between 1892 and the present. To the extent it is helpful, the legislative history suggests that in 1985, when the present definition was enacted by virtue of s. 2(8) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1985, c. 19, Parliament intended to enlarge the scope of the definition. To illustrate this I reproduce, for purposes of comparison, the definition found in s. 2 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, in its amended form immediately prior to the 1985 amendment, followed by the definition of "weapon" as it now stands and with which we are concerned on this appeal. 

"offensive weapon" or "weapon" means 

(a) anything that is designed to be used as a weapon, or 

(b) anything that a person uses or intends to use as a weapon, whether 

or not it is designed to be used as a weapon, 

and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm as defined in section 82; 

"weapon" means 

(a) anything used or intended for use in causing death or injury to 

persons whether designed for that purpose or not, or 

(b) anything used or intended for use for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person, and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm as defined in section 84; 

It will be seen the present definition is no longer confined to anything designed to be used as a weapon or anything used or intended to be used as a weapon. The meaning of the word "weapon" within the prior definition has become irrelevant and cases such as R. v. Laidley (1978), 39 C.C.C. (2d) 406 (Ont. C.A.), where the Ontario Court of Appeal considered this question are of no assistance in construing the present definition. 

The focus of the definition has been shifted from the character of the instrumentality in question to the result of its use or the purpose for which it was used. 

Counsel for the accused further drew to our attention a definition of the word "weapon" in a publication of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal Law (1987), and a revised definition of "weapon" enacted in 1991, c. 40, s. 1, which was not proclaimed in force until August 1, 1992. I do not consider it appropriate or helpful in the task at hand to consider either the Law Reform Commission's proposal or legislation that was not in force at the time that this alleged offence occurred. 

Counsel for the accused's concluding submission on statutory interpretation was this: 

The definition of "weapon" has evolved from providing a list of standard offensive weapons which would commonly be used in an assault type situation to its current more general definition. However, it is submitted that the evolution of the definition of "weapons" has not become so encompassing that one can imply that Parliament has, in the progression of the definition, expressly included animate objects such as canines. 

Counsel for the accused sought to uphold this acquittal on an alternative basis. His submission was that there was little or no evidence to suggest that the accused had had appropriate control or decision-making capacity over the dog. Because there was a reasonable doubt as to the dog's level of compliance and training, the accused should be entitled to the benefit of doubt. In view of the stance taken by counsel for the accused at trial, where all the essential ingredients of the offence were admitted except the question of law as to whether a dog could be a weapon, I do not propose to address that additional issue. That problem may arise in some other case and will be more appropriately dealt with in light of facts supporting such an argument. 

I turn now to consider the appropriate interpretation of "weapon" as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. 

I am in agreement with the trial judge that this case appears to be the first time the current definition of "weapon" has been considered by a Canadian court. Crown counsel referred us to a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal, R. v. G. (ill.C.), appeal No. 10213Y0, pronounced June 21, 1988 [summarized 5 W.C.B. (2d) 402]. That was a sentence appeal by the Crown on a charge under s. 245.1(1)(a) (now s. 267(1)(a)), where the Court of Appeal increased a young offender's sentence. I have obtained the record of those proceedings and determined that the young offender pleaded guilty, before His Honour Judge Fitch of the Provincial Court, to a charge of committing an assault while carrying, using or threatening to use a weapon, to wit a dog. Accordingly, there were no judicial pronouncements on the definition of "weapon" in that case. 

Research for English and Commonwealth authorities has been unproductive. However, there are decisions in the United States where dogs have been held at law to be dangerous weapons. The first of those cases is Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 326 N.E. 2d 710 (Massachusetts A.C., 1975). In that case, the accused was convicted of armed robbery. He was accompanied on the robbery by a German shepherd dog. The victim perceived the dog to be a threat. 

There is an annotation on the subject of dogs as weapons reported at 7 A.L.R. (4th) 607. It deals with seven other dog cases emanating from various other jurisdictions in the United States. I do not propose to consider these cases as each has different statutory and common law considerations irrelevant to the statutory interpretation problem I have to consider. 

The approach I take is to determine, if possible, the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words in the definition of the word "weapon" in s. 2. The key to the resolution of the problem is whether a dog or other animate being falls within the concept of "anything". The trial judge concluded that a dog did not. "Anything" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary has two meanings: 

1. A combination of ANY and THING in the widest sense of the latter. 

2. Thing of any kind. 

Unlike the trial judge, I am unable to discern that the definition of "anything" is restricted to inanimate items, or, excludes animate ones. 

As "anything" is a composite word, I turn next to the Shorter Oxford meanings given for the word "thing". I do not propose to reproduce all possible meanings of the word, save to observe that its scope is very, very broad. Included in those meanings are these at: 

3. Applied (usu. with qualifying word) to a living being or creature; occas. to a plant 0E. 4. Applied to a person, now only in contempt, reproach, pity, or affection; formerly also in commendation or honour ME. 

5. A material object, a body; a being or entity consisting of matter, or occupying space 0E. 

From those meanings, I conclude that when Parliament employed the word "anything", that word included both animate and inanimate bodies. Accordingly, a dog can be used, or intended to be used, as a weapon. 

The concept of an animate thing used to cause injury or to threaten is not inherently absurd. To handle a poisonous snake in a manner intended to threaten or intimidate or to use a living thing to inflict actual injury are but two examples. 

In the case at bar the animate thing was a dog whose use was effective only if it obeyed instructions. The evidence admits of no doubt: the accused intended the result which followed her command to the dog. The constituent elements of s. 267(1)(a) are made out. The accused, in the course of committing an assault, used a "weapon", namely, an animate thing, thereby causing injury to the victim. 

I am, therefore, of the view that this appeal must be allowed and the acquittal set aside and a conviction entered. The matter will be remitted to the Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory for sentencing. 

Braquer une arme à feu sur un invité pour l'intimider et l'expulser suffit à constituer des voies de fait armées, même sans intention d'employer la force physique

R. c. Thibeault, 2015 QCCA 400 

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[7]         Celui qui, désirant expulser de chez lui un invité récalcitrant, va chercher un fusil de calibre 12 qu’il porte ostensiblement à son retour crée, par sa seule présence armée, la menace ou la tentative de menace que sanctionne l’alinéa 265(1)b) C.cr. Cette disposition ne requiert pas la preuve que l’accusé avait l’intention d’employer la force contre une autre personne; la menace ou même la tentative de le faire suffit[2].

[8]         Lorsqu’il pointe l’arme à bout touchant sur le menton de sa victime, l’infraction est aggravée et il commet alors le crime prévu à l’article 267(a) C.cr.

[9]         Le fait que l’intimé ait braqué l’arme à feu constitue une menace d’employer la force contre le plaignant, en utilisant son arme pour l’expulser de sa maison. La preuve révèle par ailleurs de façon satisfaisante qu’il était alors en mesure d’accomplir son dessein.

[10]      Il s’agit alors de voies de fait armées au sens de l’affaire Hovington c. R.[3] :

[60]      Le juge explique clairement la nécessité d’un acte ou d’un geste posé dans les circonstances prévues par la loi. Il explique également la nécessité de l’intention d’aider ou d’encourager pour être complice. Il les applique aux faits de l’espèce et le jury est maintenant en mesure de savoir à quel moment débutent les voies de fait, c’est-à-dire, en ce qui a trait au cinquième chef, au moment où le policier menace, par un acte ou un geste, d’employer la force en utilisant le bâton. Je m’attarderai plus loin davantage sur la question du caractère raisonnable des verdicts de culpabilité sur ce chef, mais il me paraît nécessaire de souligner immédiatement que la preuve permettait de conclure que l’infraction de voies de fait armées avait été commise, sans toutefois, pour le moment, m’interroger sur l’identification des auteurs de l’infraction. Une preuve selon laquelle trois policiers attendent, debout, côte à côte, un détenu menotté et soumis au pouvoir de la police, près de la porte où il sera conduit, sans raison d’y être eux-mêmes, alors que l’un d’eux tient ostensiblement un bâton dans ses mains et dit, de manière menaçante, : « C’est toi ça, t’aimes ça battre les polices », permet de soutenir que des voies de fait armées « par menace » ont été perpétrées. Le fait de tenir de façon évidente un bâton de type « manche à balai », et non pas le bâton parfois utilisé par les policiers, dans les circonstances décrites précédemment, satisfait les exigences de la loi et constitue un acte ou un geste menaçant pouvant constituer des voies de fait armées.

[11]      Finalement, les parties conviennent que la peine prononcée par le juge est adéquate, compte tenu du profil de l’intimé et des circonstances de la perpétration des voies de fait armées. Il n’y a donc pas lieu de retourner le dossier en Cour du Québec pour qu’une nouvelle peine soit prononcée.

La Cour d'appel du Québec confirme qu'un évanouissement provoqué par une douche froide forcée n'est pas une blessure banale et constitue bel et bien une « lésion corporelle » justifiant une condamnation pour négligence criminelle

A.N. c. R., 2015 QCCA 1109

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[98]        The error of law in this regard had no bearing on the result. Given the overwhelming evidence and the inevitable conclusion that anyone who cut a pant leg with a sizeable kitchen knife whilst the victim was wearing the trousers has markedly and significantly departed beyond any norm of conduct acceptable to a reasonable person in the circumstances. Thus, despite the error of law, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred. As urged by the Respondent, Section 686(1)(b)(iii) Cr.C. will be applied and the appeal on this point will be dismissed.

[99]        The other argument raised in this ground is that the conviction of Appellant under Count 14 for negligence causing bodily harm because he forced X under a cold shower for a prolonged period of time, causing him to lose consciousness is tainted with an error of law since fainting does not constitute bodily harm. The judge said this:

[839]   (…) Le concept juridique de « lésions corporelles » prévu à l’art 2 du Code criminel exige que la lésion en cause ne soit pas de nature passagère, mais dans le contexte particulier de cette cause, je considère que les éléments constitutifs requis ont été prouvés, et ce, hors de tout doute raisonnable.

The Crown agrees that this part of the judgment should be reversed and that an acquittal be entered. The Court however is not bound by the Crown’s position.[44] I think it is wrong; fainting can be “bodily harm” in my opinion.

[100]     The definition of bodily harm in the Criminal Code is as follows:

2. In this Act, (…)  “bodily harm” means any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or comfort of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature;

2. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. [...] « lésions corporelles » Blessure qui nuit à la santé ou au bien-être d’une personne et qui n’est pas de nature passagère ou sans importance.

[101]     Despite some ambiguity, in the foregoing quote from paragraph 839 of the judgment, the judge arrived at the conclusion that the elements of the offence were proved. In this regard she found that:

i)            the cold shower caused hurt or injury to X;

ii)            that the hurt or injury interfered with X’s health or comfort; and

iii)           that the hurt or injury was not trifling or was not transient.

[102]     The facts found by the judge are not challenged. Rather, Appellant argues that fainting cannot constitute bodily harm.

[103]     Bodily harm is not restricted to cuts, bruises, scratches or other injuries which are readily visible on the victim’s body.[45]

[104]     The ultimate issue in this case is the manner in which “transient or trifling” in the definition of bodily harm should be read. Otherwise stated, is the definition met where (in this case) the hurt is more than merely transitory or more than merely trifling?[46] At Common Law, the definition was “more than merely transitory and trifling”. The “and” became an “or” on codification.

[105]     The Ontario Court of Appeal examined the definition of bodily harm in R. v. J.A.[47] and although the observations are largely obiter[48] they are applicable to the present issue and I agree with them. In R. v. J.A., Simmons J.A., writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal, preferred a “positive” interpretation because of:

i)            the wording which focuses on what constitutes bodily harm rather than what is excluded;

ii)            the legislative history which does not indicate that Parliament intended to change the meaning of the Common Law formulation, and

iii)           the fact that injuries of short duration are recognized by the courts as being sufficiently serious to constitute bodily harm.[49] For example, one can lose consciousness upon receiving an electric shock from a taser. The fact that one shortly regains consciousness may make the injury transient but hardly trifling. Is this not bodily harm? The answer is self-evident.

[106]     In this case, the fainting of X was certainly not trifling even though it may have been transient. The fainting constitutes bodily harm and is an indication that the act (the cold shower) caused such interference with X’s health by an effect (hypothermia) on his system which resulted in a loss of consciousness. There was no expert evidence. However, the facts speak for themselves as to the causal link between the cold shower and the loss of consciousness.

[107]     I should not be taken to say that every loss of consciousness will satisfy the definition of bodily harm since not every loss of consciousness stems from an injury (for example sleeping). However, in this case, since the judge’s factual findings are not put in issue and because I disagree with the parties’ submission that fainting does not, per se, in law, constitute bodily harm, I see no reason to interfere with the finding of guilt on count 14. The issue is one of mixed fact and law and as can be seen in the foregoing analysis, I find no error in the judge’s conclusion.

La Cour d'appel de l'Alberta confirme le faible seuil requis pour établir des « lésions corporelles », statuant que l'inconfort de la victime peut être directement déduit de ses blessures visibles sans nécessiter de preuve médicale explicite quant à leur durée ou à la douleur

R v Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251

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[42]           The appellants say that the trial judge erred in law by finding that Keepness’s injuries constitute bodily harm. Drawing from section 2 of the Criminal Code, they stress that “bodily harm” requires (1) hurt or injury; (2) that interferes with health or causes discomfort; and (3) is not “transient or trifling” (meaning, they say, that it is not of a very short duration or of a very minor degree). The main argument here is that the degree and duration of Keepness’s injuries were insufficient to qualify as bodily harm, since the trial judge made no finding about the duration of his injuries, and the injuries were very minor in degree. The appellants also argue that Keepness’s injuries cannot qualify without a finding (or evidence) that they interfered with his health or caused him discomfort.

[43]           The Crown’s response to the appellant’s main argument is that Keepness’s injuries (multiple abrasions, cuts, lacerations, swelling to his cheek), which caused bleeding from the head and neck and necessitated a trip to hospital, the application of Steri-Strips and a tetanus injection, are serious enough to qualify. The Crown also says that there was an implicit durational dimension to the trial judge’s findings (since Keepness’s injuries lasted at least from the time of his attack to his treatment in hospital). No direct response to the appellants’ argument regarding health/discomfort is offered, and we assume that the Crown’s view is that Keepness’s discomfort would have been so obvious as not to require an explicit finding by the trial judge.

[44]           Section 2’s definition of “bodily harm” states a low threshold: R v Dorscheid, 1994 ABCA 18 at para 11, [1994] AJ No 56 (CA). It means something more than “a very short time period and an injury of very minor degree which results in a very minor degree of distress”: R v Dixon (1988), 1988 CanLII 2824 (BC CA), 42 CCC (3d) 318 at 332, [1988] 5 WWR 577 (Esson JA, as he then was, concurring). Not surprisingly, then, indisputably minor injuries have been found to constitute “bodily harm”: R v Rabieifar, [2003] OJ No 3833 (QL) (CA) (scratches and abrasions of less than one inch on the complainant’s body, and some bruising and swelling on her face, thigh and hand); R v CK, 2001 BCCA 379 at para 3, [2001] BCJ No 1119 (QL) (small bruise on the complainant’s right calf, a small anal tear, and a deviated septum that resulted in some bruising and swelling, all of which was said by a physician to be “not serious and … expected to resolve itself within a few days”); R v Moquin, 2010 MBCA 22 at paras 32-33, 251 Man R (2d) 160 (several bruises lasting 11 days, a sore hand and a sore throat); and Dorscheid (scrapes, lacerations and bruises).

[45]           These injuries are variously similar to those sustained by Keepness. The appellants, however, point out that the trial judge had no evidence before her regarding the duration of those injuries. It is not necessary, however, for the Crown to call physicians to testify to an injury’s less-than-fleeting effects. In Dixon (at 332), Esson JA was content to observe that “[f]rom the time of the assault at least until the medical treatment was completed, it is clear that the victim must have been deprived of any sense of comfort which she might have had before being assaulted.” That observation is equally apposite here. Nor is it necessary for the Crown to have adduced direct evidence of pain or discomfort from Keepness or from a treating practitioner. It is hardly blazing new territory for a court to infer discomfort from such obvious considerations as the victim’s injuries. Again, in Dixon, Esson JA said (at 332, emphasis added) that “it is clear that the victim must have been deprived of any sense of comfort which she might have had before being assaulted”. Similarly, this Court said in Dorscheid (at para 11, emphasis added) that “[s]ignificant bruising will obviously cause discomfort ….”

[46]           In short, we see no error in the trial judge’s handling of the question of bodily harm. Keepness was attacked and beaten by three fellow inmates in an exercise yard. His sustained visible wounds clearly constitute “bodily harm”, which required treatment at the hospital and post-treatment monitoring and would also obviously have caused discomfort. It would have defied good sense for the trial judge to have concluded otherwise.

L'application du principe de l'arrêt Kienapple permet d'ordonner l'arrêt conditionnel des procédures pour une agression armée factuellement subsumée dans une accusation de voies de fait graves découlant d'un geste unique

Dubourg c. R., 2018 QCCA 1999

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[25]        L’appelant soutient que la juge du procès a erré en droit en le déclarant coupable à la fois de voies de fait graves et d’agression armée [12]. Il estime que vu le principe interdisant les condamnations multiples dégagé dans l’arrêt Kienapple[13], la juge aurait dû prononcer un arrêt conditionnel des procédures sur le chef le moins grave, soit celui d’agression armée. L’intimée soumet que le principe de l’arrêt Kienapple ne devrait pas trouver application vu l’absence d’un lien légal suffisant entre les éléments des deux infractions.

[26]        Le critère original permettant de décider s’il y a lieu de prononcer un arrêt conditionnel pour éviter des condamnations multiples pour un seul geste « est de savoir si la même cause ou chose (plutôt que la même infraction) se trouve comprise dans deux infractions ou plus », c’est-à-dire que le même comportement ou délit correspond à plusieurs infractions différentes[14]. Il doit également exister un lien juridique suffisant entre les infractions en cause[15].  Il est entendu qu’une volonté claire du Parlement de créer deux infractions distinctes qui devront se cumuler fait obstacle à l’application de la règle interdisant les condamnations multiples[16].

[27]        L’application de ce principe a priori simple a été et demeure source de controverse en jurisprudence. Une jurisprudence contradictoire existe actuellement au Canada quant à l’application de la règle interdisant les condamnations multiples entre les infractions de voies de fait graves et d’agression armée. Les cours d’appel du Québec[17], de l’Ontario[18] et de la Nouvelle-Écosse[19] se sont prononcées en faveur d’arrêts conditionnels, tandis que celles d’Alberta[20] et de Colombie-Britannique les ont refusés[21]. Ces divergences reposent sur une appréciation plus ou moins rigide du lien juridique requis entre les infractions en cause et sur des différences factuelles inévitables entre les cas à l’étude.

[28]        Je suis d’avis qu’il n’est ni nécessaire ni souhaitable de dégager une règle absolue pour toutes les situations où des accusations d’agression armée et de voies de fait graves (ou causant des lésions) sont portées conjointement contre le même accusé lorsqu’il s’agit d’un seul évènement avec une seule victime. Les faits de chaque cas et la finalité du principe ont une importance primordiale et doivent guider l’exercice.  Ici, l’intimée concède à juste titre qu’il existe un lien factuel suffisant entre les deux infractions. En effet, il est reproché à l’appelant d’avoir posé un seul geste en lançant un projectile vers la victime qui lui a causé des blessures en l’atteignant près de l’œil. C’est ce geste unique qui fonde les deux accusations. Le débat repose entièrement sur le lien juridique suffisant.

[29]        À mon avis et avec respect pour l’opinion contraire, l’approche stricte qui semble prévaloir en Alberta et en Colombie-Britannique est à défavoriser dans la plupart des situations. Il est indéniable que, par définition, les infractions d’agression armée et de voies de fait graves ou causant des lésions comprennent des éléments essentiels différents; néanmoins, dans plusieurs cas dont celui qui nous occupe, l’emploi de la force qui cause la conséquence requise pour les voies de fait graves est factuellement indissociable de l’utilisation de l’arme qui fonde l’accusation d’agression armée.

[30]        En effet, l’emploi de la force ici est prouvé par l’utilisation de l’arme, arme qui a blessé la victime. Un seul mouvement, impliquant l’arme, est à l’origine des blessures subies. Les voies de fait graves ici ont été commis en utilisant l’arme de manière non seulement concomitante, mais surtout causale à l’infliction des blessures. En somme, dans le présent dossier, l’infraction d’agression armée est subsumée dans celle de voies de fait graves. Aucun élément additionnel et distinct ne devait être prouvé pour établir la culpabilité de l’appelant quant au chef d’agression armée. Il n’y a pas de scénario dans lequel l’appelant pouvait être déclaré coupable d’une des accusations, mais pas de l’autre. Dans les circonstances particulières du présent dossier, ce moyen d’appel est bien fondé et un arrêt conditionnel des procédures devrait être prononcé sur le chef d’agression armée.

[31]        En conclusion, sur le principe dans l’arrêt Kienapple, la jurisprudence a toujours été divisée en deux courants dans son application. Selon un courant, les tribunaux semblent insister plutôt sur un critère d’identité formel entre les éléments de deux infractions. Selon l’autre, ils semblent insister sur une proximité fonctionnelle entre les éléments. Dans le premier, la jurisprudence souligne l’importance de faire preuve de déférence envers le législateur en ce qui a trait à la définition des éléments de culpabilité et des contours de la responsabilité criminelle. Cette approche est plus stricte et technique. Elle souligne également la déférence dont doivent faire montre les tribunaux face à la discrétion de la poursuite dans la sélection de chefs d’accusation. Dans le second courant, la jurisprudence souligne une finalité téléologique qui est d’éviter la redondance inutile dans les condamnations et l’administration de la peine. Cette approche est entièrement compatible avec la démonstration d’une déférence envers le législateur et envers la poursuite parce que dans son application le principe de l’arrêt Kienapple n’empêche pas une détermination de culpabilité sur plus d’un chef, mais plutôt l’imposition d’une peine sur un chef redondant et moins grave. Elle a également l’avantage d’être plus flexible. À mon avis, la jurisprudence actuelle au Québec et en Ontario s’inscrit de manière générale dans le second courant et donc suit le principe téléologique qui a pour finalité d’éviter la redondance dans l’imposition de la peine[22]. Cette approche est bien illustrée dans le présent dossier puisque la peine infligée sur les deux chefs était de quinze mois sur chacun d’eux à être purgée de façon concurrente.