Un juge n'est pas tenu de donner des directives au jury sur une infraction incluse si l'ensemble de la preuve et les positions des parties justifient une approche de « tout ou rien » limitant le verdict à l'accusation principale

R. v. Wong, 2006 CanLII 18516 (ON CA)

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[11]         The offence of assault causing bodily harm is an included offence in a charge of aggravated assault by wounding:  see Criminal Code s. 662(1), R. v. R. (G.) (2005), 2005 SCC 45 (CanLII), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 161 at paras. 25-34 (S.C.C.).  A trial judge is not, however, obliged to instruct a jury on all offences that are as a matter of law included offences.  The trial judge’s obligation to instruct on included offences will depend on the evidence led, the issues raised and the positions of the parties:  see R. v. Smith (1978), 1978 CanLII 161 (SCC), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 417 (S.C.C.).  It has long been recognized that in some cases, having regard to the entirety of the evidence, the issues raised by the evidence, and the positions taken by the parties, an “all or nothing” instruction leaving the jury with only two possible verdicts – guilty or not guilty – is appropriate:  see e.g. R. v. Melyniuk and Humeniuk (1930), 1930 CanLII 508 (AB SCAD), 53 C.C.C. 296 at 300 (Alta. C.A.), aff’d (1930), 1930 CanLII 34 (SCC), 58 C.C.C. 106 (S.C.C.);  R. v. Wright (1945), 1945 CanLII 41 (SCC), 83 C.C.C. 225 (S.C.C.);  R. v. Aalders (1993), 1993 CanLII 99 (SCC), 82 C.C.C. (3d) 215 (S.C.C.);  R. v. Wade (1995), 1995 CanLII 100 (SCC), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), rev’g (1994), 1994 CanLII 10562 (ON CA), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 39 (Ont. C.A.). 

L'application du principe de l'arrêt Kienapple permet d'ordonner l'arrêt conditionnel des procédures pour une agression armée factuellement subsumée dans une accusation de voies de fait graves découlant d'un geste unique

Dubourg c. R., 2018 QCCA 1999

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[25]        L’appelant soutient que la juge du procès a erré en droit en le déclarant coupable à la fois de voies de fait graves et d’agression armée [12]. Il estime que vu le principe interdisant les condamnations multiples dégagé dans l’arrêt Kienapple[13], la juge aurait dû prononcer un arrêt conditionnel des procédures sur le chef le moins grave, soit celui d’agression armée. L’intimée soumet que le principe de l’arrêt Kienapple ne devrait pas trouver application vu l’absence d’un lien légal suffisant entre les éléments des deux infractions.

[26]        Le critère original permettant de décider s’il y a lieu de prononcer un arrêt conditionnel pour éviter des condamnations multiples pour un seul geste « est de savoir si la même cause ou chose (plutôt que la même infraction) se trouve comprise dans deux infractions ou plus », c’est-à-dire que le même comportement ou délit correspond à plusieurs infractions différentes[14]. Il doit également exister un lien juridique suffisant entre les infractions en cause[15].  Il est entendu qu’une volonté claire du Parlement de créer deux infractions distinctes qui devront se cumuler fait obstacle à l’application de la règle interdisant les condamnations multiples[16].

[27]        L’application de ce principe a priori simple a été et demeure source de controverse en jurisprudence. Une jurisprudence contradictoire existe actuellement au Canada quant à l’application de la règle interdisant les condamnations multiples entre les infractions de voies de fait graves et d’agression armée. Les cours d’appel du Québec[17], de l’Ontario[18] et de la Nouvelle-Écosse[19] se sont prononcées en faveur d’arrêts conditionnels, tandis que celles d’Alberta[20] et de Colombie-Britannique les ont refusés[21]. Ces divergences reposent sur une appréciation plus ou moins rigide du lien juridique requis entre les infractions en cause et sur des différences factuelles inévitables entre les cas à l’étude.

[28]        Je suis d’avis qu’il n’est ni nécessaire ni souhaitable de dégager une règle absolue pour toutes les situations où des accusations d’agression armée et de voies de fait graves (ou causant des lésions) sont portées conjointement contre le même accusé lorsqu’il s’agit d’un seul évènement avec une seule victime. Les faits de chaque cas et la finalité du principe ont une importance primordiale et doivent guider l’exercice.  Ici, l’intimée concède à juste titre qu’il existe un lien factuel suffisant entre les deux infractions. En effet, il est reproché à l’appelant d’avoir posé un seul geste en lançant un projectile vers la victime qui lui a causé des blessures en l’atteignant près de l’œil. C’est ce geste unique qui fonde les deux accusations. Le débat repose entièrement sur le lien juridique suffisant.

[29]        À mon avis et avec respect pour l’opinion contraire, l’approche stricte qui semble prévaloir en Alberta et en Colombie-Britannique est à défavoriser dans la plupart des situations. Il est indéniable que, par définition, les infractions d’agression armée et de voies de fait graves ou causant des lésions comprennent des éléments essentiels différents; néanmoins, dans plusieurs cas dont celui qui nous occupe, l’emploi de la force qui cause la conséquence requise pour les voies de fait graves est factuellement indissociable de l’utilisation de l’arme qui fonde l’accusation d’agression armée.

[30]        En effet, l’emploi de la force ici est prouvé par l’utilisation de l’arme, arme qui a blessé la victime. Un seul mouvement, impliquant l’arme, est à l’origine des blessures subies. Les voies de fait graves ici ont été commis en utilisant l’arme de manière non seulement concomitante, mais surtout causale à l’infliction des blessures. En somme, dans le présent dossier, l’infraction d’agression armée est subsumée dans celle de voies de fait graves. Aucun élément additionnel et distinct ne devait être prouvé pour établir la culpabilité de l’appelant quant au chef d’agression armée. Il n’y a pas de scénario dans lequel l’appelant pouvait être déclaré coupable d’une des accusations, mais pas de l’autre. Dans les circonstances particulières du présent dossier, ce moyen d’appel est bien fondé et un arrêt conditionnel des procédures devrait être prononcé sur le chef d’agression armée.

[31]        En conclusion, sur le principe dans l’arrêt Kienapple, la jurisprudence a toujours été divisée en deux courants dans son application. Selon un courant, les tribunaux semblent insister plutôt sur un critère d’identité formel entre les éléments de deux infractions. Selon l’autre, ils semblent insister sur une proximité fonctionnelle entre les éléments. Dans le premier, la jurisprudence souligne l’importance de faire preuve de déférence envers le législateur en ce qui a trait à la définition des éléments de culpabilité et des contours de la responsabilité criminelle. Cette approche est plus stricte et technique. Elle souligne également la déférence dont doivent faire montre les tribunaux face à la discrétion de la poursuite dans la sélection de chefs d’accusation. Dans le second courant, la jurisprudence souligne une finalité téléologique qui est d’éviter la redondance inutile dans les condamnations et l’administration de la peine. Cette approche est entièrement compatible avec la démonstration d’une déférence envers le législateur et envers la poursuite parce que dans son application le principe de l’arrêt Kienapple n’empêche pas une détermination de culpabilité sur plus d’un chef, mais plutôt l’imposition d’une peine sur un chef redondant et moins grave. Elle a également l’avantage d’être plus flexible. À mon avis, la jurisprudence actuelle au Québec et en Ontario s’inscrit de manière générale dans le second courant et donc suit le principe téléologique qui a pour finalité d’éviter la redondance dans l’imposition de la peine[22]. Cette approche est bien illustrée dans le présent dossier puisque la peine infligée sur les deux chefs était de quinze mois sur chacun d’eux à être purgée de façon concurrente.

Au-delà de la contrainte interne : Les limites de l'incitation policière et la séparation des rôles dans l'évaluation de l'admissibilté des déclarations extrajudiciaires de l'accusé à des personnes en situation d'autorité

R. v. Fernandes, 2016 ONCA 772

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(a)   General Principles

[21]      The law regarding voluntariness is well settled and need not be reviewed in detail for the purposes of this appeal. 

[22]      Because of the criminal justice system’s overriding concern not to convict the innocent, for a statement made to a person in authority to be admissible it must be voluntary. This is known as the confessions rule. The onus to establish the voluntariness of a statement lies with the Crown, and it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

[23]      When reviewing a confession, a trial judge should consider all the relevant factors to understand whether the circumstances surrounding the confession give rise to a reasonable doubt as to the confession’s voluntariness. The relevant factors include: oppression, threats or promises (i.e. inducement), the operating mind requirement, and police trickery: R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3.

[24]      In R. v. Whittle, 1994 CanLII 55 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, Justice Sopinka, writing for the court, summed up the analysis with the following question, at para. 31: "Did the action of police authorities deprive the suspect of making an effective choice by reason of coercion, trickery, misinformation or the lack of information?"

[25]      In the present case, the trial judge concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent had the required operating mind. There was also no issue of police trickery. The trial judge’s analysis focused on the issues of oppression and inducement. I turn now to that analysis.

(b)     Inducement

[26]      Where the state induces a suspect to confess, regardless of whether the inducement comes in the form of a threat or a promise, the confession will be inadmissible when the inducement, whether standing alone or in combination with other factors, is strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of the subject has been overborne: Oickle, at para. 57.

[27]      The most important consideration in determining whether the accused's statement has been induced by such a threat or promise is whether there was a quid pro quo offer by the interrogators. A quid pro quo offer is an inducement for the suspect to confess that raises the possibility that the suspect is confessing, not because of any internal desire to confess, but merely in order to gain the benefit offered by the interrogator: R. v. Heatley, 2015 BCCA 350, 375 B.C.A.C. 194, at para. 6, and Oickle, at para. 56.

[30]      Second, the act of supplying accurate factual information to an accused does not constitute an inducement: R. v. Backhouse (2005), 2005 CanLII 4937 (ON CA), 195 O.A.C. 80 (C.A.), R. v. Teske (2005), 2005 CanLII 31847 (ON CA), 202 O.A.C. 239 (C.A.). Officer Sowyrda had a duty to provide information to the respondent regarding his potential jeopardy. Indeed, if he did not do so, the statement made by the respondent could potentially be found to be involuntary on that basis. I agree with the submission of the Crown that police officers should not be placed in an untenable position where both providing and failing to provide suspects with information about their potential jeopardy could each render statements inadmissible.

(c)     Oppression

[33]      A statement of an accused will be rendered involuntary and inadmissible where the conduct of a police officer or the circumstances of the detention are so oppressive as to raise a doubt whether the accused was able to make an independent choice to speak to the police or remain silent: Lederman, Bryant and Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2014), at para. 8.63.

[34]      Examples of oppressive conditions include situations where the detainee is deprived of food, clothing, sleep, or medical attention. Excessively aggressive, intimidating questioning by the police for a prolonged period of time may also constitute oppression: Oickle, at paras. 59 to 62, R. v. Hoilett 1999 CanLII 3740 (ON CA), [1999], 121 O.A.C. 391 (C.A.), at paras. 25-26.

[36]      Under the confessions rule, the oppressive conditions must be caused or created by the state. The concern underlying this part of the rule is that state agents may abuse their authority over an accused to effectively negate the accused’s ability to make an independent decision to speak to the authorities: Oickle, at para. 60. Here the trial judge found that the conduct of the police was “unimpeachable” and “blameless.” Given these findings, it is not possible that oppression was a factor.

[37]      The trial judge also found that the respondent had an operating mind. Consequently, in the absence of police misconduct, he was responsible for his decision to speak to police and not maintain his right to silence. As Justice Sopinka put it in Whittle, at para. 55: “Inner compulsion, due to conscience or otherwise, cannot displace the finding of an operating mind unless, in combination with conduct of a person in authority, a statement is found to be involuntary.” While the respondent’s inner compulsion may have led to his confession, there was nothing in the conduct of the police that would render the statement involuntary.

(d)     Conflation of Roles

[39]      The Crown submits, and I accept, that the trial judge’s ruling demonstrates that she conflated her role on the voir dire of determining whether the statement was voluntary with her role at trial of determining if the statement is reliable.

[42]      The effect of this error is that it deprived the Crown of the opportunity to tender the statement in the context of all of the evidence at trial to prove its veracity beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, by conflating the two exercises the trial judge considered the ultimate reliability of the statement without the benefit of the rest of the evidence.

Voies de fait armées et transfert d'intention : Analyse jurisprudentielle de l'utilisation d'un animal comme arme

R v Park, 2024 MBCA 93

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[25]                     The accused conceded at the appeal and at trial that courts have found the use of a dog to constitute a weapon as defined in section 267(a) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [the Code] (see R v B(T), 2003 CarswellOnt 8736, 2006 ONCJ 391 (ONCJ) [B(T)]).  The accused states that the issue is whether she intended to use the dog as a weapon in the assault against Ms. Neufeld. 

[26]                     She submits that even if she commanded the dog to attack Mr. Watt, this intent should not be transferred to Ms. Neufeld.  She underscores that there was no evidence that she commanded the dog to attack Ms. Neufeld.  She submits that the dog is animate rather than an inanimate object and that it was able to make decisions beyond her control.  She maintains that the dog was out of her control when it attacked Ms. Neufeld.  She argues that the trial judge accepted that she was yelling the dog’s name in an attempt to gain control over it and that he found that at the time it bit the accused, the dog was out of control.  She submits that these findings were inconsistent with transferred intent.

[27]                     Next, the accused argues that the incident with Mr. Watt was over.  She submits that it was separate and apart from the act involving Ms. Neufeld.  That is, these were two different acts and not the same act to which the doctrine of transferred intent could apply.

[28]                     The Crown argues that Deakin continues to be good law that applies or should be expanded to apply to the intent of the accused in assaulting Ms. Neufeld.

[29]                     Regarding the animate nature of the dog, the Crown submits that the trial judge’s decision was not inconsistent with his finding that once the accused caused the dog to be in attack mode, in the circumstances of this case, her initial intent was sufficient to support both convictions.  Furthermore, it submits that given that a dog can be a weapon for the purpose of the charge of assault with a weapon, the animate nature of it is irrelevant.  That is, if the accused had commanded the dog to attack Mr. Watt, but it instead attacked Ms. Neufeld, the doctrine of transferred intent would apply.

[30]                     The Crown concedes that this is not the typical situation as described above.  However, the Crown submits that the attacks on Mr. Watt and Ms. Neufeld were not separate events.  It argues that the two attacks were a single transaction.  In addition, it submits that the doctrine of transferred intent has been applied in cases where additional victims are injured along with the intended target (see R v LP, 2022 CanLII 97955 at paras 46-50 (NLPC) [LP]).

[31]                     In any event, the Crown argues that it is not necessary to resolve the issue as the appeal can be disposed of without reference to transferred intent because the accused had contemporaneous intent to commit the offence.  It relies on R v Buzzanga and Durocher, 1979 CarswellOnt 1502, 1979 CanLII 1927 (ONCA) [Buzzanga], as authority for the proposition that knowledge can be an adequate substitute for intent.  That is, “a person who foresees that a consequence is certain or substantially certain to result from an act which he does in order to achieve some other purpose, intends that consequence” (ibid at para 45).  The Crown submits that, given the accused’s knowledge of the dog and the circumstances of the situation, the accused was “certain or substantially certain” the dog would follow her lead in attacking Ms. Neufeld.

[32]                     In support of its argument, the Crown emphasizes that the trial judge found that the accused pinned down Ms. Neufeld while she was trying to call 911 and not because she was trying to stop the dog from attacking.  The trial judge accepted that the accused called out a different address while Ms. Neufeld was trying to give information to the 911 operator.  He also found that when the accused intentionally assaulted Ms. Neufeld, the dog “followed her lead”.

The Law—Intent, Recklessness and Transferred Intent

Intent

[34]                     An assault is committed when someone intentionally applies force to another person absent of their consent (see the Code, s 265(1)(a)).  

[35]                     An assault with a weapon is defined in section 267(a) of the Code.  It states:

       (Omis)

[36]                     Assault is a subjective mens rea or intent offence as opposed to a negligence-based offence.  This is evidenced by the use of the word “intentionally” in the definition of offence (ibid, s 265(1)(a)).  It is a general, as opposed to specific, intent offence.  In R v George, 1960 CanLII 45 at 890 (SCC) [George], Ritchie J provided the following guidance on the mental element of assault and the difference between general and specific intent crimes:

In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be drawn between “intention” as applied to acts done to achieve an immediate end on the one hand and acts done with the specific and ulterior motive and intention of furthering or achieving an illegal object on the other hand. Illegal acts of the former kind are done “intentionally” in the sense that they are not done by accident or through honest mistake, but acts of the latter kind are the product of preconception and are deliberate steps taken towards an illegal goal. The former acts may be the purely physical products of momentary passion, whereas the latter involve the mental process of formulating a specific intent. A man, far advanced in drink, may intentionally strike his fellow in the former sense at a time when his mind is so befogged with liquor as to be unable to formulate a specific intent in the latter sense. The offence of robbery, as defined by the Criminal Code, requires the presence of the kind of intent and purpose specified in ss. 269 and 288, but the use of the word “intentionally” in defining “common assault” in s. 230(a) [now s 265(1)] of the Criminal Code is exclusively referable to the physical act of applying force to the person of another.

 

[emphasis added]

 

[37]                     In R v Hominuk, 2019 MBCA 64 [Hominuk], this Court relied on George (among other authorities) in stating that a “finding that the accused was ‘hysterical’ or ‘out of control’ does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that she was unable to form the minimal intent required for assault” (Hominuk at para 7).  Rather, “such acts ‘may be the purely physical products of momentary passion”’ (ibid).

[38]                     As argued by the Crown, Buzzanga stands for the proposition that certainty or substantial certainty of the consequences of one’s actions may constitute intent.  This statement has been endorsed by courts throughout the country. 

[39]                     For example, in R v Chartrand, 1994 CarswellOnt 1161, 1994 CanLII 53 (SCC) [Chartrand], the trial judge allowed a motion for non-suit where the accused was charged with abducting a person under fourteen years of age, contrary to section 281 of the Code, which states:

              (Omis)

[40]                     The accused had met an eight-year-old boy in a park, convinced him to come in his car, and driven him to various locations to take pictures of him. They were intercepted by a police officer and the boy’s father.  The accused said he was taking photos of the boy as a surprise for his parents.  The trial judge concluded that the offence required an unlawful taking of the child from his parents, which he interpreted to mean an intentional deprivation.  The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that a properly instructed jury could not find intent to deprive the parents of possession of their child.

[41]                     The Supreme Court disagreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, writing for the Court, examined the mens rea required by section 281 of the Code.  In Chartrand at para 54, she wrote:

 

General principles of mens rea apply to the words “with intent to”, and, accordingly, in order to conclude that the mens rea of the offence under s. 281 has been made out, it is sufficient that the taker knows or foresees that his or her actions would be certain or substantially certain to result in the parents (guardians, etc.) being deprived of the ability to exercise control over the child.

 

[42]                     In support of her conclusion, she cited Buzzanga with approval, remarking that the Court had earlier endorsed it in R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 1990 CanLII 24 (SCC) (see Chartrand at para 55).  She added that in R v Olan, 1978 CanLII 9 (SCC), the Court noted that intent under section 380 of the Code (fraud) “may encompass a contemplated outcome distinct from the purpose of the conduct” (Chartrand at para 55).  Further, in R v Meddoui, 1990 ABCA 168, aff’d 1991 CanLII 42 (SCC), the Court concluded that it was open to the trial judge to infer the necessary intention from the facts; it was irrelevant whether the accused had an innocent motive (see Chartrand at para 56).

[43]                     Chartrand therefore also stands for the principle that motive and purpose are distinct from intent.  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concluded (ibid at para 61):

 

[T]he main body of jurisprudence and the academic commentaries support the view that the mens rea in offences such as s. 281 of the Code can also be proven by the mere fact of the deprivation of possession of the child from the child's parents (guardians, etc.) through a taking, as long as the trier of fact draws an inference that the consequences of that taking are foreseen by the accused as a certain or substantially certain result of the taking, independently of the purpose or motive for which such taking occurred.

 

[44]                     In R v Boone, 2019 ONCA 652 [Boone], Doherty JA described the meaning of intent as stated in Buzzanga as a “mental state predicated on a belief that a result is a virtually certain consequence of one’s action” (Boone at para 57), adding that “‘virtual certainty’ . . . connotes the very high degree of certainty required” (ibid at para 56; see also R v Barton, 2024 ABCA 34 at para 150; R v Ellis, 2023 NSCA 63 at para 47; R v Alsager, 2016 SKCA 91 at para 52).

Recklessness

[45]                     Courts have affirmed that the intent for assault also includes recklessness.  In the leading case of Sansregret v R, 1985 CanLII 79 at
para 16 (SCC) [Sansregret], McIntyre J, writing for the Court, described recklessness, distinguishing it from negligence:

 

The concept of recklessness as a basis for criminal liability has been the subject of much discussion. Negligence, the failure to take reasonable care, is a creature of the civil law and is not generally a concept having a place in determining criminal liability. Nevertheless, it is frequently confused with recklessness in the criminal sense and care should be taken to separate the two concepts. Negligence is tested by the objective standard of the reasonable man. A departure from his accustomed sober behaviour by an act or omission which reveals less than reasonable care will involve liability at civil law but forms no basis for the imposition of criminal penalties. In accordance with well-established principles for the determination of criminal liability, recklessness, to form a part of the criminal mens rea, must have an element of the subjective. It is found in the attitude of one who, aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk. It is, in other words, the conduct of one who sees the risk and who takes the chance. It is in this sense that the term ‘recklessness’ is used in the criminal law and it is clearly distinct from the concept of civil negligence.

[emphasis added]

[46]                     The Supreme Court continues to rely on Sansregret as an authoritative statement on the meaning of recklessness.  In R v Morrison, 2019 SCC 15 [Morrison], Moldaver J, for the majority, explained: “Recklessness refers to the state of mind of a person who, ‘aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk’” (at para 100, citing Sansregret at para 16; see also R v Hills, 2023 SCC 2 at paras 160, 193; R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at paras 117, 119). 

[47]                     This Court has applied the definition of recklessness in Sansregret in the cases of R v Barca, 2022 MBCA 80 at paras 78, 122 and R v Noble (PDJ), 2010 MBCA 60 at para 11.

[48]                     In Nagle v R, 2023 NBCA 35 at para 21, the Court described recklessness as it applies to the offence of assault as follows:

 

An assault, as defined in the Code, can occur only where, inter alia, the accused person intentionally applies force to another person, without that person’s consent (s. 265(1)). In the same context, the word “intentionally” has been interpreted to include recklessness (see R. v. D.J.W., 2011 BCCA 522, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2463 (QL), at para. 70, aff’d on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada at 2012 SCC 63, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 396, at para. 1). Consequently, an assault may occur where a person recklessly applies force to another person, without that person’s consent. A person engages in recklessness where they are subjectively aware of the risk associated with their actions and act in disregard of that risk (see Watts v. R., 2022 NBCA 34, [2022] N.B.J. No. 160 (QL), at para. 28).

 

[49]                     Courts have applied the definition of recklessness in Sansregret to the offence of assault with a weapon.  In R v Wesaquate, 2022 SKCA 101, the accused was convicted at trial of assault causing bodily harm, under section 267(b), and acquitted of several other charges, including assault with a weapon.  The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge erroneously failed to consider the three levels of mens rea, which Kalmakoff JA described as “knowledge, wilful blindness, and recklessness” (ibid at para 36).  At para 38, he cited Moldaver J’s description of recklessness found in Morrison at paras 98-101 (see also SH c R, 1987 CanLII 407 at
paras 9, 22 (QCCA)).

[50]                     Other cases have relied on proof of recklessness to satisfy the intent requirement for assault with a weapon without referring to Sansregret.  For example, in R v Dawydiuk, 2010 BCCA 162 [Dawydiuk], the accused drove his vehicle onto a crowded sidewalk, striking an innocent bystander.  He argued that he was in fear of being attacked and was trying to leave the scene but was boxed in by a taxi.  He said he made reasonable efforts to avoid hitting pedestrians.  Relying on George, the Court described the intent of assault with a weapon to mean “not done by accident or through honest mistake” (Dawydiuk at para 29).  This would encompass the conduct of someone who sees the risk and takes the chance (see also R v Zaworski, 2022 BCCA 144 at paras 41-46; R v DJW, 2011 BCCA 522 at para 70, aff’d 2012 SCC 63).

Transferred Intent

 

[52]                     As explained by Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed (London, UK: Stevens & Sons, 1961) at 126:

 

[W]hen an injury intended for one falls on another by accident. In other words, if the defendant intends a particular consequence, he is guilty of a crime of intention even though his act takes effect upon an object (whether person or property) that was not intended. His “malice” (i.e., his intention) is by a legal fiction transferred from the one object to the other. The defendant is then treated for legal purposes as though he had intended to hit the object that he did hit, though in fact he did not have the intent, nor even was reckless as to it.

 

[emphasis added; footnote omitted]

 

See also JC Smith & Brian Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th ed (London, UK: Butterworths, 1992) at 74-76; Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 8th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2020) at 287-88, for helpful descriptions of the doctrine.

[53]                     In Droste v R, 1984 CanLII 68 (SCC) [Droste], Dickson J further explained that there are two situations in which a wrong victim is harmed by the actions of the accused.  The first involves the mistaken identity of the victim.  For example, where a perpetrator shoots at X, but in fact he is Y.  The second has been referred to as a “mistake of the bullet” (ibid at 216).  In this scenario, “the perpetrator aims at X but by chance or lack of skill hits Y” (ibid).  In this case, the trial judge found the latter scenario applied to the accused.

[54]                     In Droste, the accused planned to kill his wife, but in carrying out his plan, killed his two young children instead.  While Dickson J condoned the common law doctrine of transferred intent, he found that he did not need to rely on it, applying sections 212(b) and 214(2) of the Code (now sections 229(b) and 231(2)), which provide a statutory basis for the application of transferred intent.  There is no such provision for the offences of assault or assault with a weapon.

[55]                     In Deakin, this Court applied the doctrine in a situation where an accused swung at his intended victim, Mr. Pelletier, but instead hit a glass ornament atop a television.  The glass shattered and struck Mrs. Pelletier, injuring her.  The trial judge found that the assault charge did not apply to a third party injured accidentally and acquitted the accused.  In overturning the acquittal and entering a conviction, Matas JA explained that, through the accused’s unlawful act of striking at Mr. Pelletier, he injured Mrs. Pelletier. Therefore, “[the] accused’s intention to strike Mr. Pelletier is deemed to have been directed (transferred) to the assault on Mrs. Pelletier” (ibid at para 37).  Further, he noted that “[l]ack of hostility toward Mrs. Pelletier, and lack of a specific intent to harm her, are irrelevant.  Nor is it of any significance that Deakin struck an object which injured Mrs. Pelletier” (ibid) [emphasis in original].

[56]                     In Hominuk, this Court referred to Deakin in upholding the conviction of an accused who, while being placed in a restraining chair, deliberately spit in the air at the officers, hitting one of them. 

[57]                     In LP, the accused was convicted of two counts of assault with a weapon.  The accused purposefully discharged a can of bear spray into the face of one person, CC, and the spray spread to a second person, BB, standing nearby (see ibid at para 1).  The trial judge concluded that the accused had intentionally sprayed CC and BB, the latter through the doctrine of transferred intent (see ibid at para 9).

[58]                     However, the doctrine of transferred intent has been subject to scrutiny and criticism as articulated by Stuart at 290:

 

The doctrine of transferred malice should be rejected in Canada. The two statutory instances [murder and the former aggravated assault provision] should be repealed and the common law doctrine not followed. The doctrine is an historical aberration from the fundamental principle that mens rea be in respect of the prohibited consequence and/or circumstances. The danger is that we might end up punishing a mere accident in circumstances far more sympathetic than those in Deakin and Droste. There is simply no need for an automatic, harsh and arbitrary rule that withdraws this issue from the trier of fact. In the area of murder, for example, where a bullet aimed at someone penetrates a partition wall and kills another innocently seated on the other side, where a suicide attempt involves the accused in a head-on collision in which he kills another motorist, or where poison deliberately left for the occupier of an apartment is swallowed by a burglar who dies, there may be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a sufficient mens rea. But this is a matter for the jury. In such cases, even if acquitted of murder, the accused may be guilty of the serious offence of attempted murder of the intended victim or of manslaughter. Deakin was clearly guilty of attempted assault of [Mr.] Pelletier. The only basis on which he should have been convicted of assaulting Mrs. Pelletier, as he did not intend to harm her, was if he was subjectively reckless toward her.

 

[footnotes omitted]

 

[59]                     Canadian courts have refused to expand the application of the doctrine to certain specific intent offences.  For example, in Whittaker, Nakatsuru J rejected the notion that the doctrine should be applied to the specific intent offence of attempted murder where the accused fired shots into a bar, hitting unintended victims.  He distinguished Deakin on the basis that assault is a general intent offence.  In reaching his conclusion, he referred to Stuart’s criticism of the doctrine (see also R v Santhankumar, 1992 CarswellOnt 3722, [1992] OJ No 818 at paras 50-52 (ONCJ (PC))).

[60]                     As well, this Court has refused to apply the provision in circumstances where the original intent was not to commit the resultant criminal act.  In R v Fontaine, 2002 MBCA 107 [Fontaine], the accused, intending to kill himself during a high-speed chase, deliberately drove his car into a parked semi-trailer.  While the accused survived, his passenger was killed.  Justice Steel, writing for the Court, held that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on the doctrine as set out in section 229(b) of the Code in a murder trial.  She explained (Fontaine at paras 14-15):

 

In both the cases of R. v. Deakin (1974), 1974 CanLII 1464 (MB CA), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (Man. C.A.), and Droste v. The Queen, 1984 CanLII 68 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 208, the courts refer to legal texts with approval on the issue that transferred intent only applies within the same crime.  That is, it only applies where the harm that follows is of the same legal kind as that intended.  

 

In order to determine whether an intent to commit suicide is properly transferred pursuant to s. 229(b) of the Criminal Code, it will be necessary to examine the nature of suicide and how it differs, conceptually, from murder.

 

[emphasis in original]

 

[61]                     Justice Steel concluded that the doctrine should not apply as suicide is legal.  Conversely, murder is “the most serious crime in our Criminal Code” (Fontaine at para 85).

[62]                     Similarly, courts have avoided the application of the doctrine to general intent offences when guilt can be determined on the issue of actual intent.  In R v Irwin, 1998 CarswellOnt 716, 1998 CanLII 2957 (ONCA) [Irwin], the accused and Graham got into an altercation on a crowded patio. As they grappled, they knocked Behling to the floor and he was seriously injured.  Behling was an innocent bystander and the accused did not mean to apply force to him.  The trial judge convicted the accused of assault causing bodily harm by applying the doctrine of transferred intent. 

[63]                     On appeal, Doherty JA, stated that, Stuart “persuasively marshalled” the arguments against the application of the doctrine of transferred intent (see Irwin at para 6, n 1).  Citing Stuart, Doherty JA commented that “[t]he application of the common law doctrine of transferred intent to the charge of assault causing bodily harm and to these facts raises difficult problems” (ibid at para 6).  Rather than uphold the conviction on the basis of transferred intent, he found that the Court of Appeal had the authority to amend the indictment to charge the accused with unlawfully causing bodily harm to Behling, pursuant to section 269 of the Code.  In doing so, he upheld the conviction while avoiding the application of the doctrine.

[64]                     Finally, in R v Delaney, 1989 CarswellYukon 10, [1989] YJ No 182 at para 19 (TK Terr Ct) [Delaney], Lilles TCJ refused to apply the doctrine of transferred intent to the charge of assault with a weapon.  In that case, the accused stabbed Mr. Titus and in the course of doing so, accidentally cut Mr. Marada (see ibid at paras 2, 11).  Citing Deakin, the Crown relied on transferred intent in arguing for a conviction of assault with a weapon against the complainant, Mr. Marada (see Delaney at para 15).

[65]                     Citing Stuart, Lilles TCJ concluded that Deakin was incorrectly decided and should not be followed.  He found that the doctrine of transferred intent should not apply to the charge of assault.  Despite Stuart’s suggestion above—that assault could be grounded on recklessness—he also concluded that recklessness should not ground a conviction for assault.  The accused was therefore found not guilty of assault with a weapon against Mr. Marada.

[66]                     Deakin remains good law in Manitoba.  Nonetheless, the doctrine of transferred intent has a checkered history in Canada and continues to be debated by judges, lawyers and academics.  Courts have limited its application and have sought to avoid reliance on it where possible.  As I will explain, the doctrine does not apply in this case.