De la prévisibilité des lésions corporelles à l'usage d'un objet pour blesser : rappel des éléments constitutifs des voies de fait graves et de la définition d'une arme

R. v. Walia, 2018 ONCA 197

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[7]         We accept this submission. As we have said, there was no dispute at trial that the appellant hit her sister-in-law in the face with a glass and that the blow wounded her sister-in-law. The contested issue was whether the blow was reflexive or intentional.

[8]          To prove the appellant guilty of aggravated assault, the Crown had to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

•        the appellant intentionally applied force to her sister-in-law;

•        her sister-in-law did not consent to the application of force; 

•        the appellant knew her sister-in-law did not consent to the application of force;

•        the force applied by the appellant wounded her sister-in-law; and

•        a risk of bodily harm was objectively foreseeable in the circumstances.

[9]          To prove the appellant guilty of assault with a weapon, the Crown had to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

•        the appellant intentionally applied force to her sister-in-law;

•        her sister-in-law did not consent to the application of force; 

•        the appellant knew her sister-in-law did not consent to the application of force; and

•        in applying force to her sister-in-law, the appellant used a weapon.

[10]      Weapon is defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code as:

any thing used, designed to be used or intended for use

a)   in causing death or injury to any person, or

b)   for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person

[11]      In the circumstances of this case, to prove the final element of assault with a weapon, the Crown had to prove only that the appellant used the glass to injure her sister-in-law and that injury was reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances: R. v. Lamy 2002 SCC 25, 1 S.C.R 868, at paras. 11-16.

[12]      Given the evidence and issues at trial, a properly instructed jury could not render a verdict of guilty to the aggravated assault charge but not guilty to the assault with a weapon charge. It was conceded that the appellant struck her sister-in-law with a glass thereby wounding her. The wound was obviously an injury. Injury was reasonably foreseeable based from the appellant striking her sister-in-law in the face with a glass. The only live issue was whether the strike was reflexive or intentional.

Comment démontrer la causalité factuelle

R. v. Kippax, 2011 ONCA 766

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[21]         To determine whether a person can be held responsible for causing a particular result, in this case death or bodily harm, we must determine whether the person caused that result not only in fact but also in law: R. v. Nette, 2001 SCC 78, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 488, at para. 44.

[22]         Factual causation involves an inquiry about how the victim died or suffered bodily harm, in a medical, mechanical or physical sense, and an accused’s contribution to that result: Nette, at para. 44.

[23]         Factual causation involves a determination of whether A caused B. The answer to the question of whether A caused B is resolved in a criminal case by the evidence of witnesses, those who testify about facts and others who offer relevant opinions: R. v. Smithers, 1977 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506, at 518. The factual determination of whether A caused B has nothing to do with intention, foresight or risk: Smithers, at p. 518.

[24]         To prove factual causation, the Crown does not have prove that an accused’s conduct was either the direct or predominant contributing cause of the prohibited consequence, whether death or bodily harm. It is no defence for an accused to say that the conduct of another was a greater or more substantial cause of the death or injuries. The Crown need only prove that an accused’s conduct was a significant contributing cause of the death or injuries or, said another way, that the accused’s conduct was “at least a contributing cause…outside the de minimis range”: Smithers, at p. 519; Nette, at paras. 70-71; and R. v. Hughes, 2011 BCCA 220, 305 B.C.A.C. 112, at paras. 56 and 64.

[25]         Factual causation, as the term itself would indicate, is a question of fact, reviewable only in accordance with a standard of palpable and overriding error: Hughes, at para. 65; and R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 527, at para. 18.

[26]         Legal causation, on the other hand, has to do with whether an accused should be held responsible in law for a prohibited consequence of his or her conduct, for example, death or bodily harm: Nette, at para. 45. In legal causation, the inquiry is directed at the question of whether an accused should be held criminally responsible for the consequences that occurred: Nette, at para. 45; R. v. Shilon (2006), 2006 CanLII 41280 (ON CA), 240 C.C.C. (3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 32. In the analysis of legal causation in negligence-based offences, like dangerous driving, reasonable foreseeability of harm is a relevant consideration: Shilon, at para. 33.

[27]         Conduct that is inherently dangerous and carries with it a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm satisfies the standard required for legal causation: Shilon, at para. 38. Where the conduct of another is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct of an accused, the accused may be liable as a principal for the conduct of that other person: Shilon, at para. 54. A person may be liable as a principal if she or he actually does or contributes to the actus reus with the required mens rea: Hughes, at para. 77.

[28]         It is well-established that independent, voluntary human intervention in events started by an accused may break the chain of causation: Shilon, at para. 43. A new event may result in an accused’s conduct not being a significant contributing cause of a prohibited consequence. But legal responsibility for an event will remain and the chain of causation will not be broken where an accused intentionally produced the outcome, recklessly brought it about, or if the ordinarily circumspect person would have seen it as a likely consequence of his or her own conduct: R. v. Maybin, 2010 BCCA 527, 263 C.C.C. (3d) 485, at para. 35.

La causalité en matière de voies de fait graves & le principe de « l’homme au crâne fragile »

Rhéaume c. R., 2019 QCCA 73

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[15]      Pour établir la causalité en matière de voies de fait graves, la poursuite doit démontrer, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que les voies de fait ont contribué de façon plus que mineure aux blessures[6]. Dit autrement, les voies de fait doivent être une cause ayant contribué de façon appréciable aux blessures[7].

[16]      Dans l’arrêt Nette, la Cour suprême rappelle que le juge des faits doit évaluer comment la blessure s’est produite et de quelle manière l’accusé y a contribué pour établir la causalité factuelle[8]. Autrement dit, « la question de fait à trancher, c’est si A a causé B »[9]. Pour y arriver, le juge doit soupeser les différents témoignages entendus en preuve et garder en tête que la réponse à cette question n’a rien à voir avec « l’intention, la prévoyance ou le risque »[10].

[17]      L’approche privilégiée par la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt Maybin consiste plus spécifiquement à se poser la question suivante : « la mort [dans notre cas la blessure] serait-elle survenue, ʺ n’eût été ʺ la conduite de l’accusé »[11]?  Le témoignage d’un expert peut s’avérer utile pour apprécier la causalité factuelle sur le plan médical.

[18]      Dans certaines circonstances, des causes dites intermédiaires peuvent rompre le lien de causalité. Ce sera notamment le cas lorsque les gestes de l’accusé ne contribuent pas de façon appréciable à la blessure en raison d’un ou de plusieurs événements nouveaux ou postérieurs[12]. Dans l’arrêt Maybin, la Cour suprême précisait :

[28]      […]  Ni un acte intermédiaire imprévisible ni un acte intermédiaire indépendant ne sont nécessairement suffisants pour rompre le lien de causalité juridique. De même, le fait que l’acte intermédiaire était raisonnablement prévisible ou n’était pas un acte indépendant n’est pas nécessairement suffisant pour établir la causalité juridique. Même lorsqu’une partie prétend qu’un acte intermédiaire a rompu le lien de causalité juridique, le critère de causalité formulé dans Smithers et confirmé dans Nette demeure le même : les actes dangereux et illégaux de l’accusé ont‑ils contribué de façon appréciable à la mort de la victime?[13]

[Soulignement ajouté]

[19]      Enfin, les tribunaux reconnaissent qu’une condition physique particulière – même imprévisible – de la victime ne peut justifier une rupture du lien causal[14]. Cela découle du principe bien connu de « l’homme au crâne fragile » selon lequel « celui qui commet des voies de fait sur une autre personne doit prendre sa victime comme il la trouve »[15]. Aussi, il peut être difficile de démontrer que des soins médicaux inadéquats constituent une cause indépendante et distincte lorsque le traitement résulte lui‑même de l’existence préalable d’une blessure dangereuse[16].

Le consentement à la bagarre est vicié lorsqu'une partie utilise des tactiques qui transforment la nature de la bagarre consensuelle, la faisant passer d'une activité présentant un certain risque de blessures graves à une activité présentant un risque important de telles blessures

R. v. Toth, 2024 BCCA 139

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[77]      The absence of consent to intentionally applied force is a material element of the offence of assault under s. 265 of the Criminal Code, and therefore consent acts as a defence to assault. In a manslaughter charge based on assault as the unlawful act under s. 222(5)(a), consent will indirectly act as a defence to that offence as well. The role of consent in assault in relation to a fist fight or brawl was discussed in R. v. Jobidon, 1991 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714. Justice Gonthier, for the majority, concluded that common law principles limiting consent to assault continue to apply, but in narrow scope:

The law’s willingness to vitiate consent on policy grounds is significantly limited. Common law cases restrict the extent to which consent may be nullified; as do the relevant policy considerations. The unique situation under examination in this case, a weaponless fist fight between two adults, provides another important boundary.

The limitation demanded by s. 265 as it applies to the circumstances of this appeal is one which vitiates consent between adults intentionally to apply force causing serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm to each other in the course of a fist fight or brawl.

[Emphasis in original.]

[78]      In R. v. Paice, 2005 SCC 22, Justice Charron, for the majority, made it clear that Jobidon requires serious bodily harm be both intended and caused for consent to be vitiated: at para. 18.

[79]      This formulation has been applied in numerous cases involving fist fights between adults: see, for example, R. v. Sullivan, 2011 NLCA 6; R. v. McDonald, 2012 ONCA 379; R. v. Modeste, 2015 ONCA 398; and R. v. Zsombor, 2023 BCCA 37.

[82]      It is not certain that recklessness and the objective foreseeability of serious bodily harm is sufficient to establish the intention requirement to vitiate consent. The majority reasons in Sullivan agreed with Welsh J.A. to the extent that the recklessness standard applied to the offence of aggravated assault but noted the difficulty in applying this standard in the context of a consensual fist fight: at paras. 45–46.

[87]      Respectfully, I disagree. The defence never asserted a defence of consent, for good reason. The evidence does not support any finding of an agreement or understanding between Mr. Ocampo and Mr. Toth to engage in a fight, express or implied. Although Mr. Ocampo sought out the encounter, there was no evidence on which an inference could be drawn that Mr. Toth consented to being attacked by pepper spray and what followed was a consensual fight. R. v. Piapot, 2014 SKCA 9 at para. 32 and R. v. Mitchell, 2015 ABPC 99 at paras. 68–69, cases on which Mr. Toth relies, merely support the proposition that, in certain circumstances, consent may be found in an implied agreement to engage in a fight. In neither case did the court find there was consent to engage in a fight, and as I have explained, there is no evidence supportive of the conclusion that was the case here.

[89]      The concept that consent can be withdrawn during a fight, as noted by counsel in this passage, is consistent with the jurisprudence. As Justice Frankel held in Zsombor, consent is vitiated where one party employs tactics that change the nature of what began as a consensual fight “from an activity with some risk of serious bodily harm to one with a significant risk of such harm; i.e., tactics that were not reasonably contemplated in the first instance”: at para. 33.

Le consentement à la bagarre ne peut être invalidé que s'il y a à la fois intention de causer des lésions corporelles et que des lésions corporelles graves sont causées

R. v. McDonald, 2012 ONCA 379

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[21]         On appeal, counsel for the appellant takes the position that R. v. Paice, 2005 SCC 22 (CanLII), [2005] 1S.C.R. 339 and R. v. Quashie, 2005 CanLII 23208 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 2694 (C.A.) have clarified that consent may be available as a defence on a charge of aggravated assault even where serious bodily harm is inflicted so long as the accused did not intentionally cause the serious bodily harm.

[22]         Counsel for the Crown relies on the case of R. v. Godin, 1994 CanLII 97 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 484, where the court held on a charge of aggravated assault that the Crown is not required to prove that the accused intended to cause bodily harm.  The court wrote that the mens rea for aggravated assault is “objective foresight of bodily harm” and that: “It is not necessary that there be an intent to wound or maim or disfigure.”  The Crown argues that the mens rea requirement means that, if vitiating consent requires proving that the accused had the intent to inflict serious bodily harm, then the mens rea for aggravated assault will be raised from objective to subjective, which cannot be correct.  Counsel for the Crown further submits that the cases of Jobidon and Paice should be interpreted in light of Godin and that any “consent” given by a complainant during the course of a fight will be vitiated if the Crown establishes that: (1) the accused intentionally applied force to the complainant; (2) the force the accused intentionally applied caused bodily harm to the complainant; and (3) a reasonable person, in the circumstances, would inevitably realize that the force the accused intentionally applied would put the complainant at risk of suffering some kind of bodily harm.

[23]         Crown counsel also takes the position that the defence at trial had admitted certain facts concerning the intentional application of force and causation but contested the issue of objective foresight.  As a result, the trial judge instructed that jury concerning this element of the offence of aggravated assault and said that they needed to decide:

Would a reasonable person, in the circumstances inevitably realize that the force McDonald intentionally applied put Gibson at risk of suffering some kind of bodily harm although not necessarily serious bodily harm or the precise kind of harm that Mr. Gibson suffered here?

[24]         The trial judge then instructed the jury that if they were not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this element had been proven, they must then decide: “...did Gibson consent to the force that McDonald applied?”  This is the point at which the issue of consent was considered relevant. Crown counsel supports the order and the manner of the instruction.

V.   Analysis on the Issue of Consent

[25]         In R. v. Paice, there was a scuffle in a bar and the accused was challenged by the deceased to go outside and fight, which he did.  They exchanged threats and the deceased pushed the accused once or twice. The accused hit the deceased in the jaw, and the deceased fell backward and hit his head twice.  The accused then straddled the deceased and struck him twice more.  The deceased died as a result of his injuries.  The accused was charged with manslaughter.  He argued that the deceased’s consent to the fight vitiated criminal responsibility and that the trial judge used an incorrect test for determining whether consent is negated.  The trial judge held that the defence of consent did not apply if there was either intent to cause serious bodily harm or serious bodily harm was caused.

[26]         The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.  The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.  The court held that the trial judge erred in formulating the test in the alternative.  Rather, the court held at para. 18 that, in accordance with the Jobidon decision, consent cannot be nullified unless there is both intent to cause serious bodily harm and serious bodily harm is caused.  The Supreme Court re-affirmed and refined the Jobidon decision and held that serious harm must be both intended and caused for consent to be vitiated.

[27]         In R. v. Quashie, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from conviction of the offences of sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm where the complainant alleged that she had been sexually assaulted and that she was injured during the second assault.  The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury on the issue of consent in respect of the offence of aggravated or sexual assault causing bodily harm and submitted that there was no suggestion that the accused deliberately inflicted injury or pain to the complainant.  It was argued that whatever injuries the complainant suffered were incidental to sexual intercourse and that consent was an available defence.  Justice Gillese reviewed the decision in R. v. Paice and wrote at para. 57:

Based on the authorities, in my view, it was an error for the trial judge to fail to instruct the jury that in order for bodily harm to vitiate consent, they had to find both that the appellant had intended to inflict bodily harm on the complainant and that the appellant had caused her bodily harm.

[28]         Accordingly, following Paice and Quashie, consent is vitiated only when the accused intended to cause serious bodily harm and the accused caused serious bodily harm.  The defence of consent may, if the facts support it, be available in the context of a charge of aggravated assault.  In the case at bar, in my view, the trial judge erred by removing the defence of consent from the jury for its consideration on the charge of aggravated assault.

Le principe de modération prend toute son importance lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer la peine d’un jeune délinquant primaire, même en présence d'une condamnation pour voies de fait grave qui commande généralement une peine d’emprisonnement ferme

Bérubé-Gagnon c. R., 2020 QCCA 1382

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[18]      Il est vrai que, dans R. c. Dagenais, la Cour soulignait qu’en matière de voies de fait graves, compte tenu de la nature et de la gravité de l’infraction, la peine commande généralement une peine d’emprisonnement ferme[10]. Cet énoncé s’explique « pour bien démontrer la réprobation de la société à l’égard des crimes violents contre la personne et pour envoyer un message clair de dissuasion. »[11]. 

[19]      Cet énoncé général n’a certes pas comme conséquence d’affirmer qu’en toutes circonstances, les objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion doivent primer, ni qu’il faille diminuer l’importance de tous les autres principes, dont celui de l’harmonisation et l’individualisation des peines.

[20]      En l’espèce, le principe de modération a guidé le juge vers le prononcé d’une peine à être purgée dans une prison provinciale, plutôt que dans un pénitencier fédéral, considérant le jeune âge de l’appelant. Ce qui est approprié.

[21]      Par contre, il devait aussi, toujours considérant que l’appelant avait 18 ans et 2 mois au moment des événements, imposer une peine moins contraignante dans le but de favoriser sa réhabilitation déjà bien entamée.

[22]      Le principe de modération prend toute son importance lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer la peine d’un jeune délinquant primaire. Dans ce cas, ce sont les objectifs de réinsertion sociale et de dissuasion spécifique qui priment, même en présence d’une infraction violente[12].

[23]      Dans R. c. Brisson[13], la Cour rappelait l’importance que la réhabilitation d’un jeune contrevenant sans antécédents criminels et la dissuasion spécifique doivent prendre lors du prononcé de la peine :

[41]        La requérante avance en outre que la dissuasion générale et la dénonciation doivent être les préoccupations dominantes dans ce genre de crime. L’argument ne peut être retenu sans nuances. Par exemple, ces objectifs ne sont pas la considération prédominante pour un jeune sans antécédents criminels dont la réhabilitation est assurée. Le droit veut que les deux objectifs qui doivent primer dans l’établissement d’une peine dans ces circonstances soient la réhabilitation et la dissuasion personnelle et que le juge doive même éviter d’insister indûment sur la dissuasion générale.

[42]       Bien qu'en principe le rôle d'intervention d'une cour d'appel soit limité, il n'en demeure pas moins que la jeunesse est largement considérée comme un facteur atténuant, tant en raison de la possibilité d'une réhabilitation que de la reconnaissance qu'il y a lieu d'être plus tolérant pour un manque de jugement de la part d'un jeune, contrairement aux adultes. Selon les auteurs Ruby & al. : « the transition from statutorily defined young person to adult should not be marked by an immediate abandonment of rehabilitation as the primary goal in cases where the prospect of successful rehabilitation is real ». En somme, selon eux, la règle générale pour la peine à imposer à un jeune défendeur veut que la dissuasion ne doive pas être la motivation primaire; l'accent devrait plutôt être mis sur la réhabilitation. Évidemment, la dissuasion demeure néanmoins une considération valable et doit être envisagée, mais tout en en réduisant l'importance par rapport à la situation d'un adulte.

[43]       Il faut aussi rappeler que les jeunes sont plus influençables et manquent souvent de maturité. Face à cette incontournable réalité, notre Cour écrit dans R. c. Glaude:

[…] les tribunaux, dans le but d’assurer la réhabilitation de ces jeunes adultes délinquants se montrent cléments et évitent généralement de les placer dans un milieu carcéral où les détenus purgent de longues peines et sont souvent lourdement criminalisés.

Il va sans dire toutefois que la jeunesse ne saurait excuser tout comportement et les tribunaux doivent garder présent à l'esprit la nécessité de dissuader d'autres jeunes de commettre les mêmes types de comportement que leurs pairs.