Les règles applicables à la communication de la preuve au stade de l'appel

R. v. Schirmer, 2022 BCCA 214

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[54]      Based on the principles developed and applied in those cases, modified where necessary to fit the appeal context, I consider the following framework to govern the application before us:

•         After conviction and during the appeal process, the Crown is duty-bound to disclose to an appellant any records in its possession or control where there is a reasonable possibility the information may assist the appellant in the prosecution of their appeal.

R. v. Trotta (2004), 2004 CanLII 60014 (ON CA), 23 C.R. (6th) 261 at para. 25 (Ont. C.A.); McNeil at para. 17; R. v. Johnston, 2019 BCCA 107 at paras. 47, 59–60, 66 [Johnston (2019)]; R. v. Moazami, 2020 BCCA 3 at paras. 37, 48; R. v. Orr, 2020 BCCA 319 at para. 23.

•         This is a first party disclosure obligation. It subsists throughout the appeal proceedings. New information that falls in its scope must be disclosed when received. The Crown’s duty to disclose first party records is triggered upon request and there is no requirement that the appellant apply to the appeal court for disclosure.

Gubbins at para. 19.

•         For the purpose of first party disclosure, the Crown is the prosecuting Crown. All other federal and provincial Crown entities, including police agencies, are third parties.

R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46 at para. 11.

•         However, police agencies have a corollary disclosure obligation to provide the Crown with the “fruits of the investigation” that led to the convictions at issue in the appeal, as well as any additional information that is “obviously relevant” to the appeal.

McNeil at paras. 14, 23–24; Gubbins at para. 23; R. v. Pascal, 2020 ONCA 287 at para. 106.

•         Consequently, when the Crown becomes aware of information in the possession of a police agency or other public entity that is potentially relevant to the appeal, it has a duty to make reasonable inquiries of that agency or entity and to obtain the information, where reasonably feasible, for the purpose of assessing whether it constitutes first party disclosure and must be provided to the appellant.

McNeil at paras. 49–50; Quesnelle at paras. 12, 18; R. v. McKay, 2016 BCCA 391 at para. 50, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37315 (20 April 2017); Gubbins at para. 21; Moazami at para. 50.

•         First party disclosure includes the “fruits of the investigation”, as well as any records beyond the original investigative file that are “obviously relevant” to the appeal. Operational records or background information generally do not fall in scope.

McNeil at paras. 53–54; Gubbins at paras. 22–23; Johnston (2019) at para. 36(e)(ii).

•         The Crown is entitled to withhold first party records if the records are clearly irrelevant, privileged or their disclosure is otherwise governed by law. When first party records are withheld, the appellant can apply for production under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The Crown bears the onus of justifying the non-disclosure.

McNeil at para. 18; World Bank Group v. Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 at paras. 114–115; Gubbins at para. 19.

•         First party records sought in support of a fresh evidence application that are neither subject to a statutory prohibition on disclosure nor privileged can only be justifiably withheld on the basis of irrelevance. The Crown must show there is no reasonable possibility the records could assist on the application to introduce fresh evidence, and no reasonable possibility the records may be received as fresh evidence in the appeal.

Trotta at paras. 25–28; Johnston (2019) at para. 80.

•         Assessing whether records constitute first party records is context-sensitive. In the appeal context, this assessment must be informed by the possible uses of the records in support of an appellant’s grounds of appeal.

McKay at para. 103; Johnston (2019) at paras. 43, 61–65, 80; Moazami at para. 50; Orr at paras. 3, 23–24; R. v. Johnston, 2021 BCCA 34 at para. 340 [Johnston (2021)], leave to appeal to SCC granted, 39635 (2 December 2021).

•         If the material requested by an appellant consists of third party records, the onus is reversed. The Crown has no obligation to produce this material and the appellant can only establish an entitlement to production if they show that the records are “likely relevant” to the appeal.

O’Connor; McNeil at para. 28; Johnston (2019) at paras. 42, 132.

•         The assessment of “likely relevance” in the appeal context must be informed by the possible uses of the records in support of an appellant’s grounds of appeal.

Johnston (2019) at para. 80; Orr at paras. 3, 23–24; Johnston (2021) at para. 340.

•         To meet this test in support of a fresh evidence application, the appellant must show there is a reasonable possibility the records could assist on the application to introduce fresh evidence, and a reasonable possibility the records may be received as fresh evidence in the appeal.

Trotta at paras. 25–28.

•         In assessing “likely relevance”, the Court does not determine whether the records would be admissible as fresh evidence; rather, at the production stage, the assessment is focused on the reasonable possibility of admissibility. The latter threshold is necessary to prevent fishing expeditions.

Gubbins at para. 28.

•         In recognition of the fact that the appellant will not have seen the records, the burden to show “likely relevance” is not onerous. However, the mere assertion that a third party record is relevant to the credibility or reliability of a witness at the trial will not suffice, even where that witness was not peripheral. Instead, the appellant must point to some case-specific evidence or information that objectively justifies the assertion of “likely relevance”. They must show that the sought-after records realistically carry the potential to assist on the application to introduce fresh evidence, and realistically carry the potential to be received as fresh evidence.

Gubbins at paras. 27–28; R. v. Dunbar, Pollard, Leiding and Kravit, 2003 BCCA 667 at para. 69, citing R. v. Batte (2000), 2000 CanLII 5751 (ON CA), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 449 at para. 75 (Ont. C.A.).

•         In an application for the production of third party records, an appellant must serve notice on the record holders, along with a subpoena (unless waived), requiring that the records be brought to court for possible production after a hearing.

O’Connor; McNeil at para. 27; Gubbins at para. 25; Johnston (2019) at para. 149; York (Regional Municipality) v. McGuigan, 2018 ONCA 1062 at para. 73.

•         If an appellant meets the test for “likely relevance”, the appeal court will proceed to review the records, assess their actual relevance and weigh relevant competing interests as engaged by the particular circumstances of the case, including assertions of legislated confidentiality or privilege.

Dunbar at paras. 48–70; McNeil at para. 35; World Bank at para. 113.

La Res gestae vue par la Cour d'appel du Manitoba

R v Hall, 2018 MBCA 122

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Discussion and Conclusion

Standard of Review—Hearsay Rulings

[40]                     Hearsay decisions, if informed by the correct principles of law and reasonably supported by the evidence, are entitled to deference on appeal (see Reg v Andrews (Donald), [1987] 1 AC 281 at 302 (HL (Eng)); R v Blackman, 2008 SCC 37 at para 36; R v Youvarajah, 2013 SCC 41 at para 31; and R v Head, 2014 MBCA 59 at para 24, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36036 (29 January, 2015)).

Spontaneous (or Excited) Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule

[41]                     A spontaneous (or excited) utterance is one of the categories of res gestae recognised to be a traditional exception to the hearsay rule (see Head at para 25; and S Casey Hill, David M Tanovich & Louis P Strezos, McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 5th ed (Toronto:  Thomson Reuters, 2013) (loose-leaf updated 2018, release 3), pt III, ch 7 at para 7:120.10 (online:  WLNext Can (date accessed 14 November 2018)).  A spontaneous utterance resulting from a startling event is admissible if the circumstances in which it was made exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion and there are no special features of the case that give rise to a real possibility of error (see Ratten v The Queen (1971), [1972] AC 378 at 388-91 (PC (Eng)); Andrews at pp 300-301; and Head at para 31).  The circumstances of the making of the statement provide the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness to alleviate any hearsay danger (see James H Chadbourn, ed, Wigmore on Evidence:  Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Boston:  Little, Brown and Company, 1976) vol 6 at para 1747; Sidney N Lederman, Alan W Bryant & Michelle K Fuerst, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant:  The Law of Evidence in Canada, 5th ed (Toronto:  LexisNexis, 2018) at paras 6.364-6.365; R v Khan, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 531 at 540; R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40 at para 212; and R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57 at paras 62-64).

[42]                     Consideration of this traditional exception is not a mechanical process.  Rather, a functional analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the statement should be undertaken (see R v Dakin, 1995 CanLII 1106 (ON CA), 1995 CarswellOnt 4827 at para 20 (CA); and Head at para 31).

Parfois, l’inaction ou le consentement de l’avocat de la défense face aux directives constitue une décision stratégique de laquelle ne découle aucun préjudice

Gaudreault-Morin c. R., 2022 QCCA 386

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[8]         L'appelant est représenté par une nouvelle avocate dans le cadre du présent pourvoi. Il soulève plusieurs récriminations en lien avec les directives données par le juge aux jurés ou encore concernant certaines décisions prises par le juge en cours de procès.

[9]         En ces matières, si la Cour d'appel peut et doit intervenir lorsqu'une directive ou une décision du juge est erronée en droit et de nature à affecter la validité du verdict[3], il reste que l'absence d'opposition ou le consentement aux directives ou à certaines mesures dans le cadre du procès de la part d'un avocat d'expérience peut être révélatrice quant à la justesse générale des directives au jury et des décisions prises par le juge[4].

[10]      Parfois, l’inaction ou le consentement de l’avocat de la défense constitue une décision stratégique de laquelle ne découle aucun préjudice[5]. En effet, le silence, l'absence d'opposition ou le consentement de la défense peuvent être indicatifs du caractère satisfaisant et correct des directives et décisions, de l'absence de gravité des omissions soulevées en appel et de l'inexistence d'un véritable préjudice[6]. Il ne convient pas à une Cour d'appel de s'immiscer a posteriori dans une stratégie réfléchie mise de l'avant par un avocat de défense expérimenté dans le cadre d'un procès devant jury.

Comment apprécier le remède approprié face à un appel contre un verdict d’acquittement

R. c. Veillette, 2018 QCCA 419

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[16]        Vu qu’il s’agit d’un appel contre des verdicts d’acquittement[9], il faut se pencher sur le remède approprié.  Si l’appelante démontre que le juge de première instance a erré en droit, et que, sans cette erreur, le verdict n’aurait pas été nécessairement le même, un nouveau procès s’impose, sauf dans le cas où les conclusions de fait actuellement retenues par le juge de procès, hors de tout doute raisonnable, sont elles-mêmes suffisantes pour déclarer l’intimé coupable.

[17]        Une cour d’appel n’a pas la compétence de tirer ses propres conclusions sur des éléments de preuve factuelle qui étaient devant le juge de première instance lorsque le juge n’a pas fait cet exercice. Elle est tenue d’identifier et d’accepter les conclusions de fait du juge.  Par conséquent, elle ne peut substituer une déclaration de culpabilité que si ces conclusions factuelles avaient justifié une telle déclaration en l’absence de l’erreur de droit. Une cour d’appel a la compétence de substituer un verdict de culpabilité strictement sur les conclusions de fait tirées par le juge de première instance[10]. En l’espèce, et nonobstant la force accablante de la preuve administrée, les conclusions de fait du juge en première instance ne permettent pas à la Cour de substituer une déclaration de culpabilité.

[18]        Dans les circonstances, il faut annuler les verdicts d’acquittement rendus et ordonner un nouveau procès pour qu’une véritable appréciation de la preuve soit faite et des verdicts rendus en conséquence.

Quel poids doit-on accorder à un ''endorsement'' d'une Cour d'appel?

R. v. Martin, 2016 ONCA 840

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[18]      I also agree that reasons given by way of endorsement are mainly directed at giving the immediate parties an understanding of why the court disposed of the appeal as it did. Jurisprudential principles intended to be articulated for the first time take the form of written judgments. Care must be taken not to construe an endorsement as supporting broad principles that were not specifically addressed: see R. v. Singh, 2014 ONCA 293, 120 O.R. (3d) 76, at para. 12; R. v. Timminco Ltd., (2001), 2001 CanLII 3494 (ON CA), 54 O.R. (3d) 21, 42 C.R. (5th) 279 (C.A.), at paras. 35-36.

[19]      That said, the weight to be given to an endorsement will vary widely. Sometimes the general principles of law have already been established by full written reasons in prior cases and it is only necessary for the Court to apply those principles to the case before it. Sometimes the jurisprudential heavy lifting in the particular case has been done by the court at first instance and there is little, if anything, for the appellate court to add apart from its agreement with that reasoning.

Les principes généraux relatifs aux plaidoyers de culpabilité & quant à la représentation inadéquate de l'avocat

R. v Symonds, 2018 NSCA 34 

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[20]         In R. v. Henneberry, 2017 NSCA 71, this Court recently re-iterated a number of general principles relating to guilty pleas in the context of an appellant’s request to have her plea set aside.  In paragraphs 12 through 20, Justice Beveridge noted

•                    A guilty plea in open court is a formal admission of the essential elements of an offence;

•                    A trial judge can, but need not, conduct an inquiry regarding the validity of a guilty plea prior to acceptance.  Although s. 606 of the Code encourages inquiry, failure to do so does not invalidate the plea;

•                    Before sentence is passed, a trial judge has a discretion to permit an accused to withdraw a guilty plea;

•                    An appellate court can, for “valid grounds”, permit an appellant to withdraw a guilty plea.  The circumstances which may give rise to valid grounds are broad, but absent a legal error in a withdrawal application before a trial judge, the power of an appeal court to permit withdrawal is tied to a prevention of a miscarriage of justice (s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Code);

•                    The onus is on the appellant to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that their plea was invalid.  To be valid, a plea must be voluntary, informed and unequivocal.   In R. v. T.(R.). (1992), 1992 CanLII 2834 (ON CA), 10 O.R. (3d) 514, Justice Doherty of the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote:

[14]  To constitute a valid guilty plea, the plea must be voluntary and unequivocal. The plea must also be informed, that is the accused must be aware of the nature of the allegations made against him, the effect of his plea, and the consequence of his plea: R. v. Lyons, 1987 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 at p. 371, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at p. 52; Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper No. 63, "Double Jeopardy Pleas and Verdicts" (1991) at p. 30.

…

[16]  I will first address the voluntariness of the appellant's guilty pleas. A voluntary plea refers to the conscious volitional decision of the accused to plead guilty for reasons which he or she regards as appropriate: R. v. Rosen, 1979 CanLII 59 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 961 at p. 974, 51 C.C.C. (2d) 65 at p. 75. A guilty plea entered in open court will be presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary is shown: Fitzgerald, The Guilty Plea and Summary Justice, supra, at p. 71.

[17]  Several factors may affect the voluntariness of a guilty plea. None are present in this case. The appellant was not pressured in any way to enter guilty pleas. Quite the contrary, he was urged by duty counsel not to plead but to accept an adjournment. No person in authority coerced or oppressed the appellant. He was not offered a "plea bargain" or any other inducement. He was not under the effect of any drug. There is no evidence of any mental disorder which could have impaired his decision-making processes. He is not a person of limited intelligence.

[18]  In his affidavit the appellant asserts that he was anxious and felt himself under pressure when he entered his pleas. No doubt most accused faced with serious charges and the prospect of a substantial jail term have those same feelings. Absent credible and competent testimony that those emotions reached a level where they impaired the appellant's ability to make a conscious volitional choice, the mere presence of these emotions does not render the pleas involuntary. (Emphasis added)

•                    A voluntary plea is also one that is not coerced, rather arrived at by the accused’s free will.  It is a plea untainted by improper threats, bullying or any improper inducement to plead guilty.

[21]         It is further uncontested that to be informed, a guilty plea must be based upon the accused understanding the nature of the charges faced, the legal effect of a guilty plea and the consequences arising therefrom.

         Ineffective assistance of counsel

[22]         The principles relating to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are also not in dispute.  These were set out by Saunders, J.A. in R. v. West, 2010 NSCA 16:

[268]   The principles to be applied when considering a complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel, are well known.  Absent a miscarriage of justice, the question of counsel’s competence is a matter of professional ethics and is not normally something to be considered by the courts.  Incompetence is measured by applying a reasonableness standard.  There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable, professional assistance.  There is a heavy burden upon the appellant to show that counsel’s acts or omissions did not meet a standard of reasonable, professional judgment.  Claims of ineffective representation are approached with caution by appellate courts.  Appeals are not intended to serve as a kind of forensic autopsy of defence counsel’s performance at trial.  See for example, B.(G.D.), supra; R. v. Joanisse (1995), 1995 CanLII 3507 (ON CA), 102 C.C.C. (3d) 35 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal ref’d [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 347; and R. v. M.B., 2009 ONCA 524. 

[269]   One takes a two-step approach when assessing trial counsel’s competence: first, the appellant must demonstrate that the conduct or omissions amount to incompetence, and second, that the incompetence resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  As Major J., observed in B.(G.D.), supra, at ¶ 26-29, in most cases it is best to begin with an inquiry into the prejudice component.  If the appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice resulting from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, it will be unnecessary to address the issue of the competence. (Emphasis added)

See also R. v. Fraser, 2011 NSCA 70, R. v. Gogan, 2011 NSCA 105, R. v. G.K.N. 2016 NSCA 29.

         Receipt of Fresh Evidence

[23]         Typically, when an appellant makes an allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it is accompanied by a motion to adduce fresh evidence.  The test for the admission of fresh evidence is well-known.  Section 683(1) of the Code allows this Court to accept fresh evidence “where it considers it in the interests of justice” to do so.  In R. v. Palmer, 1979 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759 the Supreme Court set out four factors which govern that analysis:

1.  The evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases.

2.  The evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial.

3.  The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief.

4.  It must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.

[24]         It is also well-established that where an appellant’s complaints are focused on the fairness of the trial process itself, that fresh evidence may be accepted for that purpose.  This was explained by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Truscott (Re), 2007 ONCA 575:

[85]     The second category of fresh evidence that may be tendered on appeal is not directed at re-litigating factual findings made at trial, but instead is directed at the fairness of the process that produced those findings. Where an appellant proffers this kind of evidence on appeal, he or she attempts to demonstrate that something happened in the trial process that materially interfered with his or her ability to make full answer and defence. An appellant claims that the verdict is rendered unreliable because the unfairness of the process denied the appellant the opportunity to fully and effectively present a defence and to challenge the Crown's case. When this kind of fresh evidence is received and acted on in the court of appeal, the conviction is quashed as a miscarriage of justice. The miscarriage of justice lies in the unreliability of a verdict produced by a fatally flawed process.

See also R. v. Assoun, 2006 NSCA 47 and R. v. Ross, 2012 NSCA 56.