La possession récente est une fiction juridique qui permet de conclure à une preuve suffisante du vol lorsque la possession du bien volé possède un caractère récent

Ramkaran c. R., 2009 QCCA 852

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[39]           La possession récente est une fiction juridique qui permet de conclure à une preuve suffisante du vol lorsque la possession du bien volé possède un caractère récent : R. c. Kowlyk, 1988 CanLII 50 (CSC), [1988] 2 R.C.S. 59.

[40]           En outre, la possession récente peut relier le possesseur d'un objet volé à d'autres crimes que le vol. Dans l'arrêt Coffin c. La Reine, 1956 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1956] R.C.S. 191, c'est la possession d'objets ayant appartenu aux victimes qui reliait l'accusé au meurtre des trois chasseurs.

[41]           Dans R. c. Chatten, [1988] O.J. no 831, une affaire où un des accusés avait en sa possession un collier qui appartenait à la victime d'un meurtre, le juge Finlayson de la Cour d'appel d'Ontario écrit pour la cour que la possession est un élément de preuve pouvant relier l'accusé au crime sans toutefois que cela conduise nécessairement à une condamnation pour meurtre au premier degré. Il écrit ceci :

The law as stated in the Coffin case is that if, after the commission of the crime, a person is found in possession of stolen goods associated with the crime, that person is called upon to account for the possession and must give an explanation which is not unreasonable or improbable. It does not follow that if the jury rejects the explanation they must find, as they did in the case on appeal, that such person was guilty of first degree murder. He might have had an involvement in the crime, but it would have been more appropriate if the trial judge had restricted himself to stating to the jury that their disbelief or any explanation that Leonard Chatten gave as to how he came to be in possession of the necklace could be confirmatory of the evidence of Lillicrap and that the necklace evidence was significant material evidence which they could use to link Leonard Chatten with the crime with which he was charged.

[Je souligne.]

La possession récente

R. c. Ross, 2019 QCCA 614

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[7]           L’appelante a tort sur ce point. L’arrêt Kowlyk[1] explique que la possession récente n’est pas vraiment une théorie « car on n'y enseigne rien et on ne peut, à bon droit, dire qu'elle vise une présomption qui découle de la possession inexpliquée de biens volés, étant donné qu'aucune conclusion n'en découle nécessairement »[2]. S’il est vrai que la possession inexpliquée de biens récemment volés permet d'arriver à une conclusion de culpabilité soit de vol ou de recel, elle ne l’impose jamais; le juge doit aussi examiner, le cas échéant, les autres éléments de preuve pertinents à la question de la culpabilité ou de l'innocence[3]. L’appelant ne démontre aucune erreur déterminante dans l’évaluation de cette preuve.

La théorie de la possession récente - facteurs à prendre en compte dans l'appréciation de cette présomption de fait

R. v. Gagnon, 2006 MBCA 125

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9                    As explained in the text of The Honourable Mr. Justice S. Casey Hill et al., McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, looseleaf, 4^th ed. vol. 2 (Aurora:  Canada Law Book, 2003), the doctrine of recent possession refers to the inferences that may be made by the trier of fact (in this case the judge) in certain circumstances of possession of stolen goods (at para. 28:60.10):

 

The doctrine of recent possession is a presumption of fact, not of law.  It is a convenient way of compendiously referring to the inferences which arise from the unexplained possession of property which it is proved had been recently stolen.  One inference is that the possessor was a thief; another that he was the receiver.  … It depends on the surrounding circumstances whether the accused is guilty of theft or receiving.  …

 

10               For the doctrine to apply, the Crown must prove not only that the accused was found in possession of goods but that the goods were recently stolen. See the leading decision of R. v. Kowlyk, 1988 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 59.  In R. v. Cuming (2001), 2001 CanLII 24118 (ON CA), 158 C.C.C. (3d) 433 (Ont. C.A), Charron J.A. (as she then was) described the following statement of McIntyre J. in Kowlyk, as “[a] succinct statement” of the doctrine of recent possession (at para. 33):

 

In summary, then, it is my view, based on the cases, both English and Canadian, which I have referred to, that what has been called the doctrine of recent possession may be succinctly stated in the following terms. Upon proof of the unexplained possession of recently stolen property, the trier of fact may – but not must – draw an inference of guilt of theft or of offences incidental thereto. Where the circumstances are such that a question could arise as to whether the accused was a thief or merely a possessor, it will be for the trier of fact upon a consideration of all the circumstances to decide which, if either, inference should be drawn. In all recent possession cases the inference of guilt is permissive, not mandatory, and when an explanation is offered which might reasonably be true, even though the trier of fact is not satisfied of its truth, the doctrine will not apply.

 

[Emphasis added]

 

11               Earlier in Kowlyk, McIntyre J. made it clear that the unexplained recent possession of stolen goods, by itself, permits (but does not require) the trier of fact to infer that the possessor stole the goods (at p. 72):

 

The question which arises here is whether the unexplained recent possession of stolen goods, standing alone, will also warrant an inference of guilt of breaking and entering and theft of the goods…  .  It is my view that this question must be answered in favour of the Crown.  …

 

12               The requirement that the Crown prove that the goods were recently stolen relates to when the underlying offence occurred.  Any number of factors can be considered in determining whether a possession is recent including the nature of the object, its rareness, the readiness in which it can, and is likely to, pass to another and  the ease of identification.  See Saieva v. The Queen, 1982 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 897.  

13               When deciding whether to infer only possession of the stolen goods or to infer the underlying offence, the trier of fact must consider all the circumstances. See Kowlyk and R. v. Abernathy (J.C.) 2002 BCCA 8, 161 B.C.A.C. 247,.  Common sense factors to be considered include how close in time to the theft or robbery are the goods in possession of the accused and the nature of the stolen goods.  Obviously, the closer in time possession is to the underlying offence, the more likely it is that the trier of fact will draw the inference of guilt on the underlying offence.  However, a longer period of time does not prevent the inference.  This is evident in Kowlyk where the break-ins occurred on June 1, 6, and 8 and on July 11, but it was not until August 27^th that the goods were found in the possession of the accused.  The Supreme Court upheld the convictions on the underlying offences.

14               Ultimately, the trier of fact, upon a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, will decide which inference is to be drawn. That is a question of fact.  As such, deference is owed to such finding.  See, for example, H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, and R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621.

Il est impossible de voler des données informatiques

R v Maurer, 2014 SKPC 118

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1.  Can the “data” be the object of theft under the Criminal Code?

 

[18]                          The Crown is required to prove the offence particularized in the charge.^[2]  In the present case, the Crown alleges in both count one and count two that the accused stole data belonging to Christine Lee, and posted it online without her permission. It is the alleged theft of the data that gives rise to the charge of unauthorized use of a computer with intent to commit mischief in count one, and the charge of mischief in relation to data in count two.

 

[19]           The “data”, in this case, is the nude images quarantined onto the accused’s computer when he transferred the data from the complainant’s broken computer and completed the virus scan.

 

[20]           Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines the word “steal” as “to commit theft.” The offence of theft is set out in s. 322 (1) of the Criminal Code as follows:                      

 

322 (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything whether animate or inanimate, with intent,

 

(a)  to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it of the thing or of his property or interest in it;

…

(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted.

 

[21]           In Stewart, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether personal information of employees could be the object of theft under the Criminal Code.  It was agreed that no physical object would have been taken and that the information was confidential information per se, a pure intangible. Upon reviewing the wording of the theft provision in the Criminal Code, Lamer J., as he then was, concluded that the meaning of “anything” is restricted in two ways.  First, whether tangible or intangible, “anything” must be of such a nature that it can be the subject of a proprietary right. Second, the property must be capable of being taken or converted in a manner that results in the deprivation of the victim. He determined that confidential information is not property for the purposes of theft under the Criminal Code and stated further that:

 

To the extent that protection is warranted for confidential information it should be granted through legislative enactment and not through judicial extension of the concept of property or of the scope of the theft provision under the Criminal Code.

 

[22]                          The case of R. v. Alexander^[3], involved a charge similar to the wording in count one of this case, alleging that the accused did:

fraudulently and without colour of right obtain, directly or indirectly a computer service to wit: the Royal Bank Financial Group computer system with intent to commit the offence of mischief contrary to s. 430 of the Criminal Code by willfully stealing client data from the band data base, contrary to the Criminal Code.

 

[23]           The “data” in Alexander involved information about credit cards that were not received by the cardholder and were fraudulently activated or used.  The accused was committed to stand trial on a charge of unauthorized use of a computer with the intent to commit mischief, contrary to s. 342.1 of the Criminal Code, resulting in an application for certiorari to quash her committal.

[24]           The hearing judge noted that, although stealing is not an essential element of the offence created by s. 342.1 (c) or by s. 430 (1.1), the Crown is required to prove the charge as alleged. Since the Crown alleged theft, the Court found that the Crown is required to prove it.  Granting the application for certiorari, the judge concluded that:  “the mere accessing and sharing of such data cannot constitute “stealing” given that s.2 of the Criminal Code defines the word steal as “to commit theft” and R. v. Stewart (1988), 41 C.C.C (3d0 481 (S.C.C.) makes it clear that accessing confidential information does not constitute theft.”

 

[25]                          Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Stewart, and considering its application in Alexander, I find that the “data” in this case does not fall within the meaning of “anything” as that word is used in s. 322(1) of the Criminal Code. The data is not capable of being taken or converted in a manner that results in the deprivation of the victim.

 

[26]         If, for the sake of argument, the data was considered property capable of theft, section 322(1) dictates that a theft is committed when a person “converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything whether animate or inanimate, with intent” (a) to deprive temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it or (d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted”.  The accused did not intend to deprive the complainant  of her property interest in the data, nor did he intend  to deal with the data  in a manner that it could not be restored to the condition it was in at the time it was taken or converted.  By posting the data on the Internet, the accused intended to put the data in the public realm, and thereby humiliate and  embarrass the complainant and punish her for perceived bad behaviour.

 

[27]                          As the particulars in both counts stipulate that it is the act of theft that gives rise to the substantive charge, I must find the accused not guilty of both counts.

 

[28]           In Stewart , the Court observed that there should be specific legislative enactment to deal with the sharing of confidential information, rather than a judicial overextension of the Criminal Code’s definition of theft.

[29]           Bill C-13 has been drafted by Parliament to address a gap in the legislation concerning the non-consensual distribution of intimate images.  Bill C-13 proposes to amend the Criminal Code by creating the following new offence:

 

162.1 (1) Everyone who knowingly publishes, distributes, transmits, sells, makes available or advertises an intimate image of a person knowing that the person depicted in the image did not give their consent to that conduct, or being reckless as to whether or not that person gave their consent to that conduct, is guilty:

 

(a)                 of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or

(b)             of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

 

[30]           However, this provision has not yet been enacted and the charge as drafted is an inappropriate substitute based on the above jurisprudence.

 

[31]           The accused’s conduct in this case is despicable; however, for the reasons stated above, it  does not establish the charges set out in the Information.

Un accusé peut être condamné pour vol à l'étalage même s'il n'a pas quitté le commerce où il a volé le bien

R. v. Beales, 2012 CanLII 582 (NL PC)

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[20]   The evidence establishes that on April 9, 2011, Ms. Beales walked out of the Zellers store with a stroller which belonged to Zellers and which she had neglected to pay for.  A judge can draw an inference that leaving a store with an unpaid item illustrates intent to deprive the store of its property.  However, the offence of theft can be established without an accused person leaving the premises of a store (see section 322(2) of the Criminal Code) if the Crown can prove that the accused took or converted an item with the intent to deprive the store of its property.  As we have seen, such a deprivation does not have to be a permanent one.

[21]   In this case, it seems reasonable to conclude that Ms. Beales, having arrived at Zellers without a stroller and having left with one, must have known she had not paid for it.  In addition, using a stroller which was for sale to push your child around a store is a peculiar option to resort to in order to calm an upset child.  However, people do not always act reasonably.  Mistakes can and do happen.  Peculiar actions are not unheard of.  Though it is appropriate for a trial judge to use, in part, an objective test in assessing the reasonableness of an accused person’s actions it is important that such an approach not be taken too far.  An accused person’s actions must ultimately be assessed on a subjective basis with all of the weaknesses and peculiarities of the specific accused being weighed   Acting unreasonably or peculiarly is not the same as acting unlawfully. 

[22]   The evidence presented here is not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Beales had the necessary intent to commit the offence of theft.  Ms. Beales testified in a clear, direct and compelling fashion.  I accept her evidence as being accurate and truthful.  I conclude that she made a mistake and that she never intended to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, Zellers of its stroller. Her child’s behaviour caused her to lose her focus and led to an honest mistake occurring.  This conclusion must result in an acquittal being entered.

L'utilisation à des fins personnelles par un accusé d'une somme d'argent destinée à la compagnie dont il est propriétaire constitue une infraction

R. c. Verville, 1999 CanLII 13272 (QC CA)

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Éléments constitutifs du crime de vol:

 

Selon l’appelant, l’un des éléments essentiels du crime de vol par conversion d’argent n’aurait pas été prouvé. En effet, s’il admet que l’argent de Constructions Verville lui a été remis, il nie l’avoir utilisé pour son usage personnel. Il affirme plutôt qu’il l’a dépensé au profit de la société commerciale. Donc, selon l’appelant, la Couronne n’a pas établi que l’argent a servi à son usage personnel.

 

J’estime que l’appelant a tort. Le juge de première instance a conclu que l’argent dérobé par l’appelant a servi à maintenir son niveau de vie. L’appelant n’a démontré aucune erreur dans cette conclusion de fait du juge de première instance qui permettrait l’intervention de notre Cour. D’ailleurs, le poursuivant n’avait pas le fardeau d’établir à quel usage précis l’appelant a consacré l’argent dérobé. En l’espèce, la preuve permettait de conclure, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que l’argent de Constructions Verville a été remis à l’appelant et que celui-ci ne l’a pas utilisé au bénéfice de Constructions Verville.

 

Dans un autre ordre d’idées, l’appelant invoque la défense d’apparence de droit pour justifier l’appropriation des biens de Constructions Verville. Cette défense repose sur «la croyance honnête dans un état de faits qui, s’il avait réellement existé, se justifierait en droit ou excuserait l’acte commis; il faut de plus que la croyance honnête soit erronée quant à un droit légal et non quant à un droit moral».^([5])

 

À mon avis, cet argument ne pouvait être retenu, en l’espèce, parce que l’appelant n’a jamais prétendu que l’argent lui appartenait ni qu’il l’a pris parce qu’il croyait honnêtement qu’il était à lui. Sa défense consistait à dire qu’il n’avait pas volé l’argent de Constructions Verville, mais que l’argent avait servi à payer comptant ses fournisseurs, ses employés...

Absence de preuve de fraude à l’égard des créanciers de Constructions Verville

 

Les reproches formulés par l’appelant à ce chapitre sont de deux ordres: 1°) le juge de première instance aurait tenu compte des faits entourant la faillite de Constructions Verville contrairement à ce qu’il aurait affirmé durant le procès et 2°) la preuve n’aurait pas établi une fraude envers les créanciers.

 

Le juge de première instance était tenu de considérer tous les faits pertinents aux actes d’accusation dont la preuve était admissible, suivant les règles de preuve applicables. En l’espèce, il a simplement affirmé, à juste titre, qu’il n’était pas lié par le jugement de la Cour supérieure en matière de faillite ou encore par l’avis du syndic sur le caractère frauduleux ou non des agissements de l’appelant.

 

Par ailleurs, à l’égard de la suffisance de la preuve de la commission du crime de fraude, il y a lieu de rappeler les éléments constitutifs de cette infraction: l’actus reus sera établi par la preuve du moyen dolosif et de la privation qu’il a causée, soit une perte ou la mise en péril des intérêts pécuniaires de la victime; la mens rea de l’infraction est établie par la connaissance subjective de l’acte prohibé et du fait qu’il pourrait causer une privation de la victime.^([6])

 

En l’espèce, le juge a tenu compte de deux éléments pour conclure à la culpabilité de l’appelant: la subtilisation de plus de 180 000 $ à Constructions Verville et la distraction de certains biens de l’actif de la faillite.

 

J’estime que c’est à juste titre que l’appelant a été reconnu coupable de fraude envers les créanciers de Constructions Verville. En effet, il a conçu un moyen dolosif qui a compromis les intérêts pécuniaires de l’entreprise dont il était propriétaire. En outre, même si l’appelant ne souhaitait pas la déconfiture de Constructions Verville, il savait qu’en ponctionnant les revenus de Constructions Verville, il mettait en péril ses intérêts pécuniaires et ceux de ses créanciers.