Un échantillon aléatoire pris d'une drogue permet de tirer l'inférence que le reste de la substance est de même nature

R. v. Frost, 2020 NSPC 6 

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[53]        Although only three random samples were tested and proven to be cocaine, I accept this random sampling and I draw the inference that the balance of the samples contained cocaine: R. v. Herman, [1966] O.J. No. 188 (C.A.); R. v. Cripps (1969), 1969 CanLII 1123 (BC CA), 68 W.W.R. 456 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Flett (1970), 1970 CanLII 1175 (BC CA), 73 W.W.R. 699 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Malenfant, [2015] B.C.J. NO. 2595 (S.C.).  There is no other evidence that could raise a reasonable doubt as to the nature of the substances not analyzed. 

La prise d'un petit échantillon de drogue aux fins d'analyse peut faire la preuve l'entièreté de la même substance retrouvée lors de la transaction criminelle

R v Nyuon, 2014 ABCA 130

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[20]            The substance sold to the undercover officer was analysed and the certificate of analysis confirmed that it was cocaine. However, as none of the substance which remained on the table was seized, there was no analysis of it. The appellant says that in the absence of a certificate of analysis, the Crown has not proved that the substance was cocaine. The appellant relies on a passage from this court’s decision in R v Grant, 2001 ABCA 252 where an officer’s description of a substance was found to be insufficient proof. The court warned against the danger of permitting lay identification of illegal substances and stated that such practice should not be encouraged. It further observed that if it were to uphold that course of identification, the certificate of analysis practice would be at risk in the future.

[21]           In our view the fears expressed in Grant are simply not present here. There was an analysis of the substance sold to the undercover officer and it was found to be crack cocaine. It was similar to the routine practice of testing a small sample of a larger amount. In addition the undercover officer testified that the substance he observed on the table appeared to him to be crack cocaine, and that the chip trafficked to him was very similar to those on the table. There was the evidence of known drug users attending the room for short periods of time while the appellant and Santino were in the room. Finally, the expert testified that drugs are often not packaged because users may want different amounts. There was ample evidence on this record to enable the trier of fact to infer that what was left on the table was the same substance. The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in his conclusion that the substance was cocaine. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

Le certificat de l'analyste n'est pas la seule façon de faire la preuve d'une drogue

R v Khalif, 2014 SKQB 165

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[40]                 In R. v. Grant, 2001 ABCA 252, [2001] A.J. No. 1257 (QL), the Alberta Court of Appeal stated as follows:

 

2   We will deal with this case on the certificate issue alone. A proper scientific analysis of a suspected substance is essential. Granted that a lay person can recognize various things such as smell, sights, sounds and speeds, and that such evidence may be admitted, the danger of permitting lay identification of an allegedly illegal substance is manifest and ought not to be encouraged. The chemical or scientific analysis of an illegal substance may well provide, and normally does provide, the court with reliable and trustworthy evidence that the substance was actually illegal according to its components. The certificate of analysis conveys just that. In practice, the certificate ends any debate about what was seized. Were we to uphold the course followed here the certificate of analysis practice will be at risk in future. The police will rely on nothing but opinion evidence given by themselves. That is a step that should only be permitted by Parliament by way of the repeal of the analysis legislation. The use of the certificate has long been entrenched in the Statute, and for good reason, and can only be replaced by expert testimony by a qualified analyst.

 

 

[41]                 This three-paragraph decision provides no details of the facts or circumstances relating to the case, the alleged substance in question. In Bruce A. MacFarlane, Robert J. Frater & Chantal Proulx, Drug Offences in Canada, 3^rd ed., looseleaf, vol. 2 (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2013) at page 13-35, the authors indicate that while not apparent from the courts reasons, what was at issue was the opinion of an officer involved in the seizure of 180 growing marijuana plants. It is to be noted that the Court of Appeal stated in the third and final paragraph of its decision that “we are not to be taken as foreclosing proof by other means in every possible case.”

 

[42]                 Cannabis or marijuana has been proven to be a controlled substance on the basis of circumstantial evidence surrounding the circumstances of seizure of the substance and evidence relating to the appearance of the substance by persons claiming familiarity with the product. See: R. v. Labine (1975), 1975 CanLII 1403 (ON CA), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 567, [1975] O.J. No. 235 (QL) (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 13-15, and Marin c. R., 2012 QCCA 254, [2012] J.Q. no 905 (QL), at paras. 45-46. Marijuana being an unrefined botanical product is obviously much more susceptible to lay person identification than a refined product such as crack cocaine. But, in R. v. Campbell, [1998] O.J. No. 2332 (QL) (Ont. C.A.), circumstantial evidence was held sufficient to justify a finding that the substance in question was cocaine. See paras. 7-8.

 

[43]                 In R. v. Grunwald, 2008 BCSC 1738, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2464 (QL), affirmed at 2010 BCCA 288, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 53, leave denied [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 299 (QL) (S.C.C.), the court stated:

 

37   I am of the view that while a certificate of analysis provides the simplest, most convenient and most satisfactory method of proof, the nature of the substance that was seized can be established by other means, particularly when the substance in question is marihuana as opposed to some liquid or powder which may have no identifiable, unique characteristics other than chemical composition.

 

38   There are cases that have held that in the absence of a certificate of analysis or other form of scientific evidence the trier of fact is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence when determining whether the Crown has proven that the substance in question is that alleged in the indictment.

 

 

Then, after referring to Grant, said at para. 43:

 

43   This statement is not in accord with the other authorities and in my respectful view, it goes too far. While the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act provides a convenient method of proof by means of a certificate of analysis, I can see nothing in the statute that makes a certificate mandatory or precludes proof by other means. I do not share the concern that accepting other evidence in proof of the nature of the substance in a proper case will lead to a practice of not obtaining certificates of analysis. I do not believe the police would be foolish enough to adopt a practice of dispensing with the best method of proving the identity of a controlled substance.

 

 

[44]                 This decision was followed up by Lee J. in R. v. Do, 2011 ABQB 135, [2011] A.J. No. 630 (QL), where he held the following:

 

44  Defence counsel relied on R. v. Grant, 2001 ABCA 252, in which McClung J.A. held that a proper scientific analysis of a suspected substance is essential. However, McClung J.A. also indicated that the Court was not to be taken as foreclosing proof by other means in every possible case. Joyce J. in R. v. Grunwald, 2008 BCSC 1738, aff’d 2010 BCCA 288, leave denied [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 299 opined that McClung J.A.’s statement went too far in that while the CDSA provides a convenient method of proof by means of a certificate of analysis, nothing in the statute makes a certificate mandatory or precludes proof by other means. I do agree with Defence counsel that caution must be exercised with respect to drawing analogies with cases where other means have been relied upon to establish that a substance was marijuana.

 

45  It is trite that in order to convict on circumstantial evidence, a court must be satisfied that guilt is the only reasonable and rational inference to be drawn from the proven facts: R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 42 at para. 33. This is a very exacting test. In the present case, the two items given to Cst. Smith were selected by Nguyen from a larger group of spitballs in his hand. Cst. Smith was not able to observe where Nguyen obtained the spitballs, nor where he put them after the deal was complete. The only spitballs found in the car or on Nguyen or the Accused shortly after the transaction were the 40 spitballs in the Juicy Fruit container located in Nguyen’s vest pocket. I am satisfied that the analysis of the two pieces selected from the 40 in the container support the inference that the 40 pieces in the Juicy Fruit container were spitballs of cocaine. The two items sold to Cst. Smith were virtually indistinguishable from the spitballs of cocaine in the Juicy Fruit container. Det. Pilon testified that cocaine dial-a-dopers commonly put their cocaine in containers like the Juicy Fruit container in this case. The cocaine transaction in this case was a dial-a-doper transaction. The items found in the Honda indicate an active dial-a-doper trafficking operation.

 

 

[45]                 In R. v. Nyuon, 2014 ABCA 130, [2014] A.J. No. 384 (QL), the Alberta Court of Appeal held as follows:

 

Was the substance cocaine?

 

20 The substance sold to the undercover officer was analyzed and the certificate of analysis confirmed that it was cocaine. However, as none of the substance which remained on the table was seized, there was no analysis of it. The appellant says that in the absence of a certificate of analysis, the Crown has not proved that the substance was cocaine. The appellant relies on a passage from this court’s decision in R. v. Grant, 2001 ABCA 252 where an officer’s description of a substance was found to be insufficient proof. The court warned against the danger of permitting lay identification of illegal substances and stated that such practice should not be encouraged. It further observed that if it were to uphold that course of identification, the certificate of analysis practice would be at risk in the future.

 

21 In our view the fears expressed in Grant are simply not present here. There was an analysis of the substance sold to the undercover officer and it was found to be crack cocaine. It was similar to the routine practice of testing a small sample of a larger amount. In addition the undercover officer testified that the substance he observed on the table appeared to him to be crack cocaine, and that the chip trafficked to him was very similar to those on the table. There was the evidence of known drug users attending the room for short periods of time while the appellant and Santino were in the room. Finally, the expert testified that drugs are often not packaged because users may want different amounts. There was ample evidence on this record to enable the trier of fact to infer that what was left on the table was the same substance. The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in his conclusion that the substance was cocaine. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

Celui qui propose d'acheter une arme à feu ou de la drogue ne peut pas être reconnu coupable de trafic de cette chose

R. v. Bienvenue, 2016 ONCA 865

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[5]         In Greyeyes v. The Queen (1997), 1997 CanLII 313 (SCC), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 334 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court held that Parliament intends to distinguish between traffickers and mere purchasers of illegal drugs and that purchasing an illegal drug does not constitute trafficking for the purpose of s. 2(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19.  The definition of “transfer” in s. 84(1) of the Criminal Code and the definition of “traffic” in the CDSA are substantially similar. Moreover, in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at paras. 141-147, the Supreme Court characterized  s. 99 of the Criminal Code as a “weapons trafficking” offence The reasoning in Greyeyes supports the conclusion that “transfer”  in s. 84(1) does not include “offer to purchase” a firearm.

Revue du droit par la Cour d'Appel de l'Ontario quant à l'infraction de trafic de drogue

R. v. Murdock, 2003 CanLII 4306 (ON CA)

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[9]               Provincial appellate courts have repeatedly held that where an accused is charged with trafficking by offer, the Crown is not required to prove that the accused actually intended to go through with the offer and sell or otherwise provide the offered narcotic: R. v. Petrie, [1947] O.W.N. 601 at 603 (C.A.);  R. v. Sherman (1977), 1977 CanLII 1908 (BC CA), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 207 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 17 N.R. 178n;  R. v. Mamchur, 1978 CanLII 1813 (SK CA), [1978] 4 W.W.R. 481 (Sask. C.A.);  R. v. Mancuso (1989), 1989 CanLII 7227 (QC CA), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 380 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused (1990) 58 C.C.C. (3d) vi;  R. v. Reid (1996), 1996 NSCA 265 (CanLII), 155 N.S.R. (2d) 368 at 370 (C.A.).

[10]         In Sherman, supra, at p. 208, the trial judge said:

Now, in my reading of the cases an offer to sell or deliver a narcotic is complete once the offer is put forward by the accused in a serious manner intending to induce officer White [the undercover officer] to act upon it and to accept it as an offer. … [emphasis added].

[11]          MacFarlane J.A. agreed with the trial judge and added at p. 208:

I accept the argument made by counsel for the Crown that the actus reus in this case is the making of an offer.  There can be no doubt that the appellant intended to make an offer to sell or deliver heroin and that provides in my opinion, the mens rea necessary to prove the offence.

[12]         In Mancuso, supra, at pp. 389-90, the Quebec Court of Appeal approved of a jury instruction in these terms:

[I]f I offer to you to provide you, to sell you cocaine, whether or not the transaction goes through I made the offer, therefore I have trafficked in cocaine.  The offence was complete with my offer and I gave you reason to believe that I was serious in that offer to provide you with cocaine.  I trafficked by making that offer, … [emphasis added].

[13]         The appellate authorities referred to above were cited with approval in R. v. Shirose, 1999 CanLII 676 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565.  In Shirose, the lawfulness of a “reverse sting” operation conducted by undercover police officers was in issue.  During that operation, the undercover officers had offered to sell narcotics to the accused.  The officers did not intend to go through with the sale, but intended to arrest the accused when they attended to make the purchase.  Binnie J. observed at para. 25:

The conclusion that the RCMP acted in a manner facially prohibited by the Act is inescapable …  The actus reus of the offence of trafficking is the making of an offer, and when accompanied by intent to do so, the necessary mens rea is made out:  see R. v. Mancuso (1989), 1989 CanLII 7227 (QC CA), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 380 (Que. C.A.) at p. 390, leave to appeal refused, [1990] 2 S.C.R. viii, 58 C.C.C. (3d) vi.  There is no need to prove both the intent to make the offer to sell and the intent to carry out the offer:  see R. v. Mamchur, 1978 CanLII 1813 (SK CA), [1978] 4 W.W.R. 481 (Sask. C.A.).  See also, e.g., R. v. Sherman (1977), 1977 CanLII 1908 (BC CA), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 207 (B.C.C.A.) at p. 208, upholding a conviction where there was evidence that the accused had offered to sell heroin to a person he knew was an undercover police officer, with a view to “rip off” the officer and not complete the sale.  Sherman was later followed on this point in Mancuso, supra, at pp. 389-90, where the accused argued unsuccessfully that he did not intend actually to sell narcotics to a police informer, but really wished to steal his money [emphasis added].

[14]         On these authorities, the offence of trafficking by offer is made out if the accused:

•        offers to traffic in a narcotic [the actus reus]; and

•        intends to make an offer that will be taken as a genuine offer by the recipient [the mens rea].[2]

La réception d'une somme d'argent n'est pas un élément constitutif de l'infraction de trafic de drogue

R. v. Falahatchian, 1995 CanLII 941 (ON CA)

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Once a prohibited drug is delivered or given to another person, the offence of trafficking is proven.  The receipt of  money is not an element of the offence of trafficking: R. v. Lauze (1980), 1980 CanLII 2935 (QC CA), 17 C.R. (3d) 90 (Que. C.A.);  R. v. Khouri (1995),  a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, March 29, 1995.   When Falahatchian gave the heroin to Akbari, the offence of trafficking was complete.  

Il n'existe aucune présomption légale à l'effet que la seule quantité d'une drogue est un indice de trafic ou de possession en vue de trafic

R. v. McCallum, 2006 SKQB 287

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[28]                                 I am not aware of any presumption in law that quantity alone is indicia of trafficking or possession for the purpose of trafficking. Staff Sergeant McStay was a credible witness and I am suspicious that the accused did not have two ounces of cocaine on his person solely for personal use. The standard of proof, however, is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There will be cases where due either to the quantity of drugs or the circumstances surrounding the possession that reasonable doubt that possession was for the purpose of trafficking will disappear. This is not one of those cases. I find the accused, Frank Charles McCallum, not guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking, but guilty of simple possession of cocaine within the meaning of s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Le fait de retrouver une somme d'argent substantielle sur les lieux liés aux suspect ou sur sa personne peut permettre d'inférer que la possession d'une drogue l'est à des fins de trafic

R. v. Alberts, 1999 CanLII 2246 (ON CA)

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[1]  There was ample evidence to support the committal of 

the appellant Tracie Alberts and the committal judge made no

error in so doing. In particular he was justified on this

record in finding that it was open to a trier of fact to

infer that the substantial amounts of cash in her purse and

elsewhere in the house were the product of a significant

trafficking operation. 

La possession d'une quantité de drogue plus grande que pour usage personnel est une assise permettant au juge de conclure à la possession en vue de trafic / se débarrasser de la drogue via une toilette ne permet pas de conclure à la possession en vue de trafic de ladite substance

R. v. Scharf, 2017 ONCA 794

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[9]         Although not the subject of submissions by the appellant, we do not agree with the trial judge’s determination that the act of flushing the cocaine down the toilet amounted to trafficking: R. v. MacDonald, 1963 CanLII 675 (BC CA), [1963] B.C.J. No. 98; R. v. Pappin (1970) 12 C.R.N.S. 287. However, the trial judge found as fact that the appellant was in possession of the cocaine in a quantity greater than for personal use. The trafficking offence was therefore made out.

Comment un juge réviseur doit se diriger dans l'appréciation d'une requête attaquant la validité du mandat

R. v. James, 2019 ONCA 288

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[19] I extract the following principles from Watt J.A.'s decision in R. v. Sadikov, [2014] O.J. No. 376, 2014 ONCA 72, 305 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at paras. 83-84 and 89:

(1)   Warrant review begins from a premise of presumed validity. The onus of establishing invalidity falls on the person who asserts it.

(2)   The scope of warrant review is narrow. The review is not a de novo hearing of the ex parte application. The reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view for that of the issuing judge.

(3)   The standard is whether there is sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place of search. Was there reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the warrant could have issued? [page329]

(4)   An appellate court owes deference to the findings of the reviewing judge in his or her assessment of the record. Absent an error of law, a misapprehension of evidence, or a failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court should decline to interfere with the reviewing judge's decision.

La norme applicable à l’examen d’un mandat, notamment en vertu de l’article 11 de la LRCDAS

R. c. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72

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La norme qui régit la délivrance de mandats en vertu de l’article 11 de la LRCDAS

[80]   Le juge de paix saisi d’une demande ex parte de mandat de perquisition, présentée en vertu du paragraphe 11(1) de la LRCDAS, doit être convaincu sur la foi du contenu de la dénonciation qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire à la présence, en un lieu décrit dans le mandat, d’un ou de plusieurs des articles suivants :

i.      une substance désignée ou un précurseur ayant donné lieu à une infraction à la LRCDAS;

ii.      une chose qui contient ou recèle une substance désignée;

iii.     un bien infractionnel;

iv.     une chose qui servira de preuve relativement à une infraction à la LRCDAS ou un produit de la criminalité connexe.

[81]   La norme prévue par la loi — les « motifs raisonnables de croire » — n’exige pas une preuve selon la prépondérance des probabilités, encore moins une preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable. La norme légale et constitutionnelle est celle de la probabilité fondée sur la crédibilité (Hunter c. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (CSC), [1984] 2 R.C.S. 145, p. 167; R. v. Law, 2002 BCCA 594, 171 C.C.C. (3d) 219, par. 7). La dénonciation doit démontrer l’existence de motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une infraction a été commise et que des éléments de preuve se trouvent à l’endroit de la perquisition projetée (Hunter, p. 168). Si les inférences de comportement criminel et la découverte d’éléments de preuve sont raisonnables selon les faits présentés dans la dénonciation, le mandat peut être délivré (R. v. Jacobson (2006), 2006 CanLII 12292 (ONCA), 207 C.C.C. (3d) 270 (C.A. Ont.), par. 22).

[82]   Le juge de paix saisi de la demande d’autorisation décide si un mandat doit être délivré ou non à partir de la preuve contenue dans l’ensemble de la dénonciation, en procédant à l’évaluation selon une approche logique, pratique et non formaliste. Tout comme le juge des faits au procès, il peut tirer des inférences raisonnables de la preuve présentée dans la dénonciation (R. c. Vu, 2013 CSC 60, par. 16; R. v. Shiers, 2003 NSCA 138, 219 N.S.R. (2d) 196, par. 13; Wilson, par. 52).

La norme applicable à l’examen d’un mandat

[83]   La prémisse de la validité présumée est ce qui sous-tend l’examen d’un mandat (Wilson, par. 63; R. v. Campbell, 2010 ONCA 588, 261 C.C.C. (3d) 1, par. 45, conf. par 2011 CSC 32, [2011] 2 R.C.S. 549). Cette présomption de validité a pour effet d’imposer le fardeau de démontrer l’invalidité à la partie qui l’invoque, soit Sadikov en l’espèce.

[84]   L’examen d’un mandat revêt une portée limitée. Son but n’est pas de procéder à l’audition de novo de la demande ex parte. Le juge qui siège en révision ne substitue pas son opinion à celle du juge saisi de la demande de mandat (Garofoli, p. 1452; R. v. Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851, 97 O.R. (3d) 721, par. 20, autorisation de pourvoi à la CSC refusée, [2010] 1 R.C.S. ix; R. c. Morelli, 2010 CSC 8, [2010] 1 R.C.S. 253, par. 40). La norme consiste à déterminer s’il existe suffisamment d’éléments de preuve crédibles et fiables pour permettre au juge de paix de conclure à l’existence de motifs raisonnables et probables de croire qu’une infraction a été commise et que des éléments de preuve touchant la perpétration de cette infraction seraient découverts au moment et au lieu de perquisition précisés (Morelli, par. 40). Autrement dit, le critère consiste à déterminer s’il existait quelque élément de preuve fiable auquel le juge aurait pu — et non pouvait — raisonnablement ajouter foi pour délivrer le mandat (Morelli, par. 40; Araujo, par. 54; Garofoli, p. 1452).

[85]   Le tribunal siégeant en révision n’entreprend pas cet examen en se fondant simplement sur la dénonciation telle qu’elle a été présentée au juge saisi de la demande de mandat. Il doit faire abstraction des renseignements inexacts figurant dans la dénonciation initiale et peut avoir recours, dans les limites permises, à d’autres éléments de preuve présentés lors du voir‑dire pour corriger les erreurs mineures figurant dans la dénonciation. Ces preuves complémentaires permettent de corriger des erreurs commises de bonne foi par la police lors de la préparation de la dénonciation, et non des tentatives délibérées d’induire en erreur le juge saisi de la demande d’autorisation (Morelli, par. 41; Araujo, par. 58). Les preuves avancées pour étoffer le dossier doivent être des renseignements dont disposaient les enquêteurs lors de la signature de la dénonciation, et non des renseignements acquis ultérieurement (Morelli, par. 43).

[86]   L’examen d’un mandat fait partie intégrante — constitue une première étape — de l’analyse visant à déterminer l’admissibilité des éléments de preuve qu’on projette d’obtenir. Ce n’est pas un procès, et il ne doit pas revêtir les aspects d’un procès au cours duquel la véracité des allégations contenues dans l’acte d’accusation est examinée (Ebanks, par. 21). Lors de l’établissement du dossier pour les besoins de l’examen, il convient de retrancher de la dénonciation les renseignements erronés, et non ceux qui sont exacts, les renseignements qui en contredisent d’autres ou ceux avec lesquels le juge qui siège en révision est en désaccord (Ebanks, par. 21).

[87]   L’examen d’un mandat exige une analyse contextuelle. Les erreurs dans la dénonciation ne constituent pas, à elles seules, un fondement suffisant pour conclure à la mauvaise foi ou à l’intention d’induire en erreur, et encore moins pour annuler le mandat (Araujo, par. 54). La fraude, la non‑divulgation, les éléments de preuve trompeurs et les nouveaux éléments de preuve sont tous des aspects pertinents, mais ils ne sont pas nécessaires à l’examen ni déterminants (Garofoli, p. 1452; Ebanks, par. 20).

[88]   Il n’appartient pas au juge qui siège en révision de déterminer s’il délivrerait le mandat sur la foi du dossier étoffé. Il ne lui appartient pas non plus de tirer des inférences ou d’en privilégier une plutôt qu’une autre. L’analyse commence et se termine par une évaluation visant à déterminer si le dossier étoffé contient quelque élément de preuve fiable auquel le juge aurait pu raisonnablement ajouter foi pour délivrer le mandat (Morelli, par. 40).

[89]   Un dernier point. La cour d’appel doit faire preuve de retenue à l’égard des conclusions du juge siégeant en révision, tant dans son évaluation du dossier étoffé pour les besoins de l’examen que dans sa décision concernant la demande présentée au titre de l’article 8. En l’absence d’une erreur de droit, d’une interprétation erronée de la preuve ou du défaut de tenir compte d’éléments de preuve pertinents, la cour d’appel devrait refuser d’intervenir dans la décision du juge qui siège en révision (Ebanks, par. 22; et R. v. Grant (1999), 1999 CanLII 3694 (ONCA), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 531 (C.A. Ont.), par. 18, autorisation de pourvoi à la CSC refusée, 150 C.C.C. (3d) vi).