La preuve pour inférer la possession en vue du trafic d'une drogue peut reposer sur une preuve d'expert

R. v. Naugler, 1994 ABCA 110

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[7]                           The issue whether the quantity of drugs in question was sufficient to support a finding that the possession was for the purpose of trafficking was never placed before the learned trial judge. At trial, defence counsel admitted that the only issue before the Court was the question of the legality of search and seizure. After cross-examining the experts in the context of the voir dire on the issue of their opinion as to the purpose of the possession, defence counsel advised the Court that he had no submissions to make on the question of the conviction.

[8]                           In any event, there is more than ample evidence to support the finding that the drugs were in the possession of the appellant for the purpose of trafficking. There is nothing in the evidence of either expert to support the suggestion of counsel for the appellant that the experts based their opinions on the contents of the statement of the accused which was not admitted in evidence. In any event the witnesses were in the courtroom with the express consent of counsel for the defence. Both testified as to the basis of their opinion and this basis was the quantity of the drugs found in the possession of the appellant being 60.8 grams, with a value, in their opinion, between $6,000 to $9,000. This amounted to a 173-day supply of the drug for the ordinary user. A qualitative analysis in these circumstances was not necessary to establish value.

Dès qu'une drogue illicite est livrée ou remise à une autre personne, l'infraction de trafic est établie. La réception d'argent ne constitue pas un élément constitutif de l'infraction de trafic

R. v. Falahatchian, 1995 CanLII 941 (ON CA)

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Falahatchian's initial premise is that the acquisition of proceeds from a narcotic transaction is part of the elements of the offence of trafficking in a narcotic.  We do not agree.  Section 2 of the Narcotic Control Act  states:

 

"traffic" means

 

(a)      to manufacture, sell, give, administer, transport, send, deliver or distribute, or

 

(b)      to offer to do anything referred to in paragraph (a)

 

Once a prohibited drug is delivered or given to another person, the offence of trafficking is proven.  The receipt of  money is not an element of the offence of trafficking: R. v. Lauze (1980), 1980 CanLII 2935 (QC CA), 17 C.R. (3d) 90 (Que. C.A.);  R. v. Khouri (1995),  a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, March 29, 1995.   When Falahatchian gave the heroin to Akbari, the offence of trafficking was complete.  

La quantité importante de stupéfiants saisis – qu'il s'agisse du poids, de la valeur ou du nombre de doses – constitue un facteur déterminant dans l'appréciation de la Cour à savoir si la possession l'est à des fins de trafic

R. v. Adelberg, 2001 BCCA 637

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[7]         The appellant was convicted by the Honourable Judge DeCouto of having in his possession for the purpose of trafficking the heroin that was seized from him.  That heroin consisted of three flaps of a total quantity of somewhere in the order of .6 or .8 grams.  It was said by an expert to be sufficient, normally, to look after an addict’s needs for something in the order of two to three days.  That was a material consideration that was before the judge for him to consider in deciding whether or not the Crown had made out a case beyond a reasonable doubt on Count 2 of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

[13]   This is a case that is circumstantial in nature, and it was, I suggest, not improper for the trier of fact to refer to the proposition that in certain circumstances if the proof of a case has reached a certain stage, then in the absence of any evidence that would lead to another conclusion, the conclusion proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt follows because the evidence bears only that construction and supports that conclusion.  It seems to me that in general that was what the learned trial judge was stating in the passage that I have referred to. 

[14]   The significant factor in this case that leads me to conclude that this was not an unsafe or unreasonable conviction is that, viewed in its totality, the evidence, it seems to me, was only consistent with the proposition that the appellant had that drug in his possession for the purpose of trafficking and not for personal use.  What I view as of particular significance is the fact that the flaps that were found on the person of the appellant bore the same characteristics as the heroin that was discovered in the apartment occupied by himself and Ms. Akapew.  It seems to me that there is considerable force in the argument advanced by counsel for the respondent that it was certainly an inference that was open to the judge that in light of the circumstance that Adelberg, the appellant, had access to those drugs in the apartment, that it was not requisite for him to be carrying about on his person any substantial quantity of drugs for his own personal use.  To me that is a significant factor that in this case tips the scale to the conclusion that the Crown had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was in possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

[15]   The expert had testified that the amount that he had was entirely consistent with that.  This is not a situation where an individual is found with a relatively modest quantity of drugs, which I would call this, but in this case the person who is found with that quantity of drugs, which is tied back to another larger quantity of drugs is present in his household.  It seems to me that that circumstance bears powerfully in this case in favour of the proposition that those drugs seized from Mr. Adelberg were possessed by him for the purpose of trafficking.

[16]   In my view, it was certainly a conclusion that was open to the learned trial judge to conclude on the evidence as he did that it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that those drugs were possessed for the purpose of trafficking.  I do not consider that he imposed a burden on the appellant to testify, but he was merely in the passage in the judgment that I have referred to merely adverting to the proposition that considered in its totality the evidence of the Crown led to no other rational conclusion, and he being satisfied to the requisite degree that this was so, I do not consider that any error has been demonstrated in his conclusion adverse to the appellant that the appellant was guilty of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

[17]   I accordingly would not accede to the arguments advanced on the appeal, and I consider that the appeal should be dismissed.  Before leaving the matter I should simply like to observe that both counsel, I consider, advanced helpful arguments and we are indebted to them for rational and competent arguments.

Pour déterminer l’intention de trafiquer, le Tribunal peut tirer des inférences des quantités découvertes et des autres indices pertinents; la quantité constitue un facteur important à prendre en considération

R. v. Le, 2001 BCCA 658

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[27]   The respondent’s position is that in the circumstances of this case, which involved a location being used for the active trafficking of narcotics, it was not necessary for the police to have previously identified all the persons involved in the drug trafficking activities to ground a reasonable belief that those persons inside the premises were involved.  In the respondent’s submission, this case is distinguishable from those situations where the police execute a search warrant at the residence of a named person and an unknown visitor is found in the residence.

[28]   On the evidence in this case, I am of the view that the information the police had prior to the search of the appellant would have provided reasonable grounds upon which to arrest the appellant at the time the police entered the premises. 

[29]   Based on the surveillance evidence and the drug purchase by Constable Robbins, it was clear that there was a brisk drug trafficking operation being conducted from the upper rear suite at 334 East Hastings Street immediately before the police executed the search warrant on 12 August 1999.

[30]   From the buy made by Constable Robbins and the number of people Detective Deagua observed quickly going into and coming out the premises, it would be reasonable to infer that those purchasing drugs were not going into the suite itself and would not likely be found in it.

[31]   That drug dealing and drug use are common in the area in which the searched premises are located is a notorious fact. 

[32]   Taking into account the information the police had to which I have already referred and the nature of the area in which the premises was located, it would also be reasonable to infer that the premises were probably not being used as a residence but as a place from which those in the premises were able to conduct a drug dealing business.

[33]   In the circumstances I have just described, I am of the opinion that the police did have reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant, and could therefore search him as an incident of his lawful arrest.  Accordingly, I would dismiss the appellant’s first ground of appeal.

[34]   The appellant’s second ground of appeal is that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence.

[35]   During the search of the premises, the police found large quantities of cocaine, heroin and cannabis resin in a locked room described as the north east bedroom.  Paraphernalia related to the preparation of controlled substances for resale were found in the kitchen.  These included a coffee grinder and a microwave plate apparently covered with white powder, scales, a booklet containing figures apparently pertaining to drug sales, and significant quantities of baking soda, a common cutting agent.

[36]   In the search of the appellant, the police seized the following items: a key to the front door of the suite at 334  East Hastings Street, $2840 in cash from his front pocket including the $140  “buy money” used by Constable Robbins, cash in his wallet of $465, and a book containing only handwritten figures and calculations.

[37]   As there was ample circumstantial evidence from which the trial judge could conclude to the requisite criminal standard that the appellant was in possession of the controlled substances for the purposes of trafficking, I would dismiss this ground as well.

La nature et la quantité des drogues saisies peuvent amener le juge des faits à conclure que la seule inférence raisonnable est que l’accusé les avait en sa possession en vue d’en faire le trafic

Têtu c. R., 2025 QCCA 400

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[36]      Selon l’appelant, la juge du procès ne pouvait conclure hors de tout doute raisonnable qu’il avait l’intention de faire le trafic des drogues saisies en sa possession sans recourir à un témoin expert. S’il est vrai qu’il peut être utile de recourir à un témoin expert pour ce genre de questions, il n’existe aucune proposition générale interdisant au juge des faits de tirer une inférence d’intention à partir d’une preuve circonstancielle. Il va de soi qu’une preuve d’expert sera autorisée si le juge des faits a besoin d’une telle assistance pour bien apprécier la preuve qui lui est soumise[34].

[37]      En l’espèce, sans l’aide d’une preuve d’expert, la juge du procès conclut que la nature et la quantité des drogues saisies, entre autres indications circonstancielles^[35], commandent la conclusion que la seule inférence raisonnable est que l’appelant les avait en sa possession en vue d’en faire le trafic. Ce faisant, la juge se livre à une appréciation de la preuve circonstancielle qui est cohérente avec les principes établis^[36] et elle explique d’ailleurs cette appréciation de façon détaillée.

L'aide ou l'encouragement en matière de trafic de drogues

R v Alcantara, 2015 ABCA 258 

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[8]               Party liability arises under s 21 of the Criminal Code. Section 21(1) provides:

21(1)   Every one is a party to an offence who

(a)   actually commits it;

(b)   does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or

(c)   abets any person in committing it.

[9]               To aid means to assist or help the person who commits the offence. To abet includes encouraging, instigating, promoting or procuring the offence to be committed: R v Greyeyes 1997 CanLII 313 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 825, 214 NR 43, para 26. The act of aiding or abetting must be provided to a person: Criminal Code, s 21. “Person” includes an organization: Criminal Code, s 2 (“every one”, “person” and “owner”, and similar expressions, include Her Majesty and an organization).

[10]           The relevant offence in this case is trafficking in cocaine. “Traffic” means “to sell, administer, give, transfer, transport, send or deliver”, and the definition of “sell” includes “offer for sale, expose for sale, have in possession for sale and distribute”: Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19, s 2(1). The trial judge found that Mr. Caines operated a cocaine distribution business (paras 513, 932, 1000) and that there was evidence of instances of trafficking by Mr. Caines and his group within the definition of trafficking (para 944).

[11]           While there must be a connection between the offence and the acts of aiding or abetting, the connection need not be causative. “Any act or omission that occurs before or during the commission of the crime, and which somehow and to some extent furthers, facilitates, promotes, assists or encourages the perpetrator in the commission of the crime will suffice, irrespective of any causative role in the commission of the crime.”: R v Dooley, 2009 ONCA 910, 257 OAC 150, para 123, leave den 410 NR 393n (SCC).

[12]           A lookout can aid or abet an offender if the lookout’s presence helps the offender commit the offence, even if the lookout is not required to perform any active role: Dooley, para 124. Similarly, “an act which tends to prevent or hinder interference with accomplishment of the criminal act” may be sufficient to establish party liability: Dunlop and Sylvester v The Queen 1979 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 881, 891, 27 NR 153, para 12.

[13]           The respondents argue on appeal, as they did at trial, that party liability can only attach to them if they are proven to have aided or abetted a specific instance of trafficking by Mr. Caines or his group. The trial judge adopted that argument in acquitting the respondents. However, that proposition reveals an unnecessarily narrow and incorrect application of the legal principles to the facts as found by the trial judge.

[14]           The trial judge found that both respondents took steps to facilitate the smooth operation of Mr. Caines’ cocaine distribution business (paras 908, 909). They provided protection and solved problems in order to allow the business to operate (para 1033). The business was cocaine distribution. Distribution is trafficking: Greyeyes, para 23; Marino and Yipp v The King 1931 CanLII 39 (SCC), [1931] SCR 482, 483, 56 CCC 136, 138-9; R v Christiansen (1973) 1973 CanLII 2365 (NB CA), 6 NBR (2d) 810, 13 CCC (2d) 504 (CA). Indeed, the trial judge found that actual instances of trafficking had occurred.

[15]           On the correct application of the legal principles to the facts found by the trial judge, it is an inescapable conclusion that the respondents aided and abetted the offence of trafficking through distribution. Their acts prevented or hindered interference with the accomplishment of a criminal act. In this way, the respondents provided assistance and encouragement to Mr. Caines in the commission of the offence of trafficking. There is a clear link between the respondents’ acts and the commission of the offence.

[16]           The respondents argue that if they contributed to the activities of a criminal organization, their culpability would arise under Criminal Code s 467.11 and not under s 21. The respondents were not charged with an offence under s 467.11. However, there is no prohibition against liability arising under more than one provision of the Criminal Code: Kienapple v R 1974 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 SCR 729, 748-52, 1 NR 322, paras 11-17; Criminal Code, s 12.

Un policier peut exercer, sans mandat, tous les pouvoirs prévus aux paragraphes 487(1) lorsque l’urgence de la situation rend difficilement réalisable l’obtention du mandat, sous réserve que les conditions de délivrance de celui-ci soient réunies

R. v. Capehart, 2025 ONSC 2557

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[32]      The power of police to engage in a warrantless search on the basis of “exigent circumstances” is well established in Canadian law. Section 487.11 of the Criminal Code provides one statutory avenue under which police may engage in a lawful, yet warrantless, search on the basis of “exigent circumstances”. Other statutory avenues for warrantless searches are available depending on the particular circumstances of a case. For example, ss. 117.02 or 117.04(2) of the Criminal Code, or s. 11(7) of the CDSA; however, these provisions are not applicable in this case.

 

[33]      Section 487.11 of the Criminal Code provides that where a peace officer, or a public officer who has been appointed or designated to administer or enforce any federal or provincial law and whose duties include the enforcement of this or any other Act of Parliament, may, in the course of his or her duties, exercise any of the powers described in subsection 487(1) or 492.1(1) without a warrant if the conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but by reason of exigent circumstances it would be impracticable to obtain a warrant. A warrantless search may be justified under section 487.11 where: a. The conditions for obtaining a normal search warrant exist [i.e., a warrant under ss.487(1) or 482(1)]; and b. It would be impracticable by reason of exigent circumstances to obtain that warrant.

 

[34]      “Exigent circumstances” and “impracticability” are not defined in section 487.11. In R. v. Paterson, 2017 SCC 15, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada considered the interpretation of “exigent circumstances” in relation to s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. In summary, the Court held that the search must be “compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police action to preserve evidence, officer safety or public safety,” and that “this urgency must be shown to have been such that taking the time to obtain a warrant would pose serious risk to those imperatives”.

[35]      While Paterson dealt with a different statutory authority (s.11(7) CDSA, vs. s.487.11 Criminal Code), I agree with the Crown that the language of the two provisions is so similar that there is no basis upon which to distinguish them. The interpretation of these terms in Paterson ought to apply equally to section 487.11 of the Code.

 

[42]      Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.  Exigent circumstances only arise where there is a risk to public or officer safety or the destruction or loss of evidence: R. v. Kelsy, 2011 ONCA 605, at para. 24.  I can accept that there was sufficient exigency to download the data before the obtaining of a warrant to search the phones. The issue of greatest concern in the present case is the subsequent interval of six days between when the data was downloaded on October 1, and when a warrant was applied for and obtained on October 7.  This is too long.  It bespeaks a complacency on the part of the police regarding the accused’s s.8 Charter rights.   Exigent circumstances should be considered as extraordinary and treated as such.  They may be relied upon to justify an intrusion into privacy only where necessary.  Any less stringent test would have the effect of the police circumventing the need to obtain prior judicial authorization where it is merely inconvenient or not expedient:  R. v. Bakal, 2021 ONCA 584, at para. 19.  In this circumstance, while the police may have acted promptly to preserve the potential evidence by the download of data from the phone, they are not entitled to then adopt a leisurely approach to obtaining a warrant.  This was clearly not considered a priority.  I agree with Justice Brennan that exigent circumstances cannot be used as an excuse merely because it would be more convenient or expedient for the police.

Si une personne quitte son domicile et se livre ensuite à des transactions de stupéfiants, il y a de fortes chances pour qu'il y ait des stupéfiants dans son domicile

R. v. Gomboc, 2022 ONCA 885 

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[27]      We would similarly dismiss this ground of appeal. The appellant’s conduct established a credibility-based probability that he was engaged in drug trafficking – and, more importantly, that evidence would be found at his new residence. The trial judge’s reasons outlined this evidence in detail. The appellant had been seen leaving and returning to his former residence at 32 Royal Oak Drive after engaging in activities consistent with drug transactions. This pattern of conduct continued after the appellant moved to 6 Gibbon Drive on March 15, 2016. In addition, a confidential informant had informed the police that the appellant kept a cocaine press. As well, police observed the red cracker box being brought into the appellant’s new residence by Mr. Szymanski following a drug transaction.

[28]      The trial judge cited R v. Soto, 2011 ONCA 828, and R. v. Balouch, 2018 ONCA 770, for the proposition that if a person leaves his residence and subsequently engages in drug transactions, there is a good chance that there are drugs in his residence. In both Soto and Balouch, the totality of the evidence made this inference reasonable. In our view, there is ample evidence in the present case to support the same inference. As such, the trial judge did not err in finding that the search warrant for 6 Gibbon Drive was validly issued.

[29]      Moreover, we would not give effect to the appellant’s assertion that the trial judge applied a lower standard of reasonableness, i.e., “reasonable suspicion” instead of “reasonable and probable grounds”, to reference Officer Forest’s evidence. It is clear that Officer Forest subjectively believed, based on the observations at the appropriate times, that the appellant was involved in drug trafficking and that drug-related property would be found at 6 Gibbon Drive. Furthermore, the totality of the evidence objectively supports this belief. Viewed as a whole, the trial judge’s reasons showed that he appreciated and applied the proper legal standard, notwithstanding his use of the term “suspicion.”

L’inférence tirée par les policiers en matière d’enquête sur les réseaux de trafic de stupéfiants à partir de comportements observés des suspects est reconnue en jurisprudence

R. c. Guertin Moreau, 2023 QCCA 1638

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[37]      En l’espèce, le juge détermine qu’il existait des motifs de croire que l’intimé Phaneuf commettait une infraction en matière de trafic de stupéfiants[29]. Le véritable enjeu se résume donc à savoir si la dénonciation permettait d’établir des motifs raisonnables de croire que des éléments de preuve de l’infraction se trouvaient dans sa résidence située à Terrebonne.

[38]      Le juge conclut à la fiabilité de la source et n’expurge qu’un passage de la dénonciation attribuée à cette dernière dans la déclaration assermentée, puisqu’il reflète plutôt une conclusion des enquêteurs qu’un fait constaté. Les intimés ne contestent pas la fiabilité des allégations contenues dans la dénonciation (sub-facial validity), mais allèguent plutôt qu’elle était insuffisante pour fonder l’autorisation (facial validity)[30].

[39]      Je crois que le juge commet une erreur en ne considérant pas les divers éléments dans leur ensemble afin d’analyser la preuve globalement[31]. Le juge décortique un à un les éléments qui convergent vers l’inférence des policiers selon laquelle Phaneuf jouait le rôle de fournisseur. Cette inférence, basée sur des éléments de preuve concrets, existe au moment où le juge autorisateur délivre le mandat et établit une connexion entre le réseau de trafic et la résidence de l’intimé Phaneuf. L’unique élément que le juge expurge de la dénonciation se rapporte davantage à la commission de l’infraction qu’au lien entre le réseau de trafic et la résidence de l’intimé Phaneuf.

[40]      Prenant la dénonciation comme un tout, on sait que l’intimé Phaneuf, qui a des antécédents judiciaires de trafic de stupéfiants[32], a été vu à plusieurs reprises se rendre les mercredis par les enquêteurs chez Drasse et Boucher qui se livrent au trafic de stupéfiants, comme le confirme le juge[33]. Alors qu’il retourne chez lui, les enquêteurs l’observent exécuter des manœuvres de contre-filature[34], ce qui, selon leur expérience, infèrent que le sujet est impliqué dans le trafic de stupéfiants. Le juge conclut qu’il y a des motifs de croire que Phaneuf est impliqué dans le trafic de stupéfiants, mais il ne voit aucun lien entre le lieu des opérations et sa résidence. Par contre, chaque visite chez Drasse et Boucher commence et se termine à sa résidence et, selon les observations de surveillance, sans un arrêt en cours de route.

[41]      Tout comme dans R. c. Hayouna, le juge commet l’erreur de ne pas donner d’importance à l’expérience de l’enquêteur principal dans le présent dossier[35]. Au stade de l’analyse des motifs raisonnables de croire que des éléments de preuve se trouveraient à la résidence de l’intimé Phaneuf, le juge souligne l’absence de comportements suspects ainsi qu’une observation d’échange de stupéfiants, plus particulièrement quand celui-ci entre et sort de chez lui[36]. Il observe que « la seule présence chez Drasse et Boucher ne constitue certainement pas un comportement suspect »[37]. Or, le constat du juge qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire que l’intimé Phaneuf est impliqué dans le trafic de stupéfiants a un impact sur la probabilité qu’il existe un lien entre sa résidence et le réseau de trafic de stupéfiants. En effet, l’implication et le rôle que joue l’intimé Phaneuf ne font qu’un. C’est à titre de fournisseur qu’il était suspecté de participer au trafic de stupéfiants et non pas à titre de vendeur au bas de l’échelle du réseau. En concluant à l’implication de l’intimé Phaneuf, en constatant ses trajets aller-retour réguliers entre sa résidence et celles de Drasse et Boucher accompagnés de manœuvres de contre-filature, il est raisonnable d’inférer qu’il agissait comme fournisseur de Drasse et Boucher et, contrairement aux conclusions du juge, qu’il est raisonnablement probable qu’il utilisait sa résidence comme point d’inventaire.

[42]      De plus, l’inférence négative que le juge tire du fait que « [c]e dernier réside à Terrebonne alors que la dénonciation mentionne que le réseau de trafic de stupéfiants opère sur la rive-sud » excède le rôle qui lui est attribué, car il remplace les inférences tirées par le juge autorisateur par les siennes. L’inférence en faveur de la délivrance du mandat – selon laquelle l’intimé se déplaçait aussi loin justement pour fournir les stupéfiants – bien que n’étant pas la seule possible, n’était pas déraisonnable.

[43]      En dernière analyse, il ne considère jamais si le juge autorisateur pouvait inférer une connexion entre le réseau de trafic de stupéfiants et la résidence de Phaneuf. Il ressort de son jugement qu’il aurait préféré des explications anodines et n’aurait pas délivré le mandat[38]. Or, le juge réviseur, avant d’intervenir, doit être convaincu au regard de l’ensemble de la preuve qu’aucun fondement ne justifiait la délivrance du mandat[39]. Un tel fondement peut être schématique, pourvu qu’il soit appuyé par de l’information digne de foi[40], ce qui est le cas en l’espèce. La conclusion qu’il existait des motifs raisonnables de croire que l’intimé Phaneuf était impliqué dans le trafic de stupéfiants ne pouvait entièrement se dissocier du modus operandi établi par les policiers en vertu duquel l’intimé Phaneuf était le fournisseur. Conjugué aux faits précis que l’intimé Phaneuf est régulièrement en présence de deux vendeurs, aux heures indiquées par la source, qu’il correspond à la description donnée par la source du fournisseur de stupéfiants aux vendeurs[41], il était raisonnable pour le juge autorisateur de déterminer que l’intimé Phaneuf se livrait à une infraction en lien avec le trafic de stupéfiants. À la même enseigne, il est raisonnable d’inférer qu’il agissait à titre de fournisseur, avec pour base sa résidence[42]. Une preuve directe, que semble pourtant exiger le juge, de la probabilité de la présence de drogues dans sa résidence n’était pas requise pour la délivrance de l’autorisation judiciaire[43].

[44]      L’inférence tirée par les policiers en matière d’enquête sur les réseaux de trafic de stupéfiants à partir de comportements observés des suspects est reconnue en jurisprudence. Dans Simon c. R., l’expérience de l’enquêtrice principale inférait que l’appelant se livrait à du trafic de stupéfiants à partir des courtes rencontres avec des individus ayant des antécédents judiciaires en la matière. Comme en l’espèce, on était aussi en présence d’informations communiquées par une source fiable. Même si l’appelant avait alors plaidé qu’il n’y avait rien d’anormal à ce qu’un individu débute sa journée en quittant son domicile, la juge Hogue conclut qu’il existait un « lien entre le trafic de stupéfiants et la résidence de l’appelant à la lumière du fait qu’il a quitté sa résidence à de multiples reprises pour se rendre directement à de très brèves rencontres se tenant principalement dans son véhicule et généralement dans des stationnements (ce qui suggère sa participation à un trafic de stupéfiants) »[44].

[45]      Dans Latendresse c. R., le même lien a été établi alors que « les nombreux va-et-vient de l’appelant entre sa résidence et les lieux de rencontres constituaient des motifs raisonnables de croire que des éléments de preuve s’y trouvaient »[45].

[46]      Le fait que ces deux jugements mettent en cause un vendeur plutôt qu’un fournisseur ne change en rien cette conclusion juridique.

[47]      C’est avec raison que l’appelant assimile les circonstances du présent dossier à celles de l’affaire R. c. James[46], dans laquelle la question fondamentale était de savoir s’il existait un lien entre la résidence de l’accusé et le réseau de trafic de stupéfiants[47]. Le juge de première instance avait alors « fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the offences being investigated and the respondent's possible involvement in them », alors que l’individu « was not some low level drug dealer operating in small quantities that might be sold on a street corner or in a back alley »[48]. Comme en l’espèce, le prévenu avait un historique en matière de trafic de stupéfiants et le modus operandi rapporté dans la dénonciation avait été confirmé par une source confidentielle.

[48]      Ainsi, l’identification du modus operandi d’un réseau de trafic de stupéfiants s’appuie en partie sur l’expérience policière qui permet de tirer des inférences raisonnables des éléments de preuve et pour établir, le cas échéant, un lien entre les opérations du réseau et la résidence d’un individu membre du réseau. Compte tenu notamment de sa conduite, les policiers possédaient des motifs de croire que l’intimé Phaneuf, lorsqu’il quittait sa résidence, partait réapprovisionner Drasse et Boucher en stupéfiants[49]. Même si l’expérience policière n’est pas en soi déterminante, les inférences que tirent les policiers à partir des faits observés ne devraient pas être mises de côté, comme le juge l’a fait.