R. v. Alexander, 2016 BCSC 873
[20] I turn to the merits. Mr. Mills argues that Judge Wishart became seized of this matter when she began to hear submissions on sentencing in July 2015. He relies on the reasoning of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R. v. Cataract, 1994 SKCA 4616 (CanLII), [1994] S.J. No. 524. That case involved an accused who pleaded guilty before one Provincial Court judge and was sentenced by another. At paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal dissected the process surrounding a guilty plea in this way, and I quote:
21 The steps involved in a summary conviction proceeding where an accused offers a guilty plea, as those steps are gleaned from Adgey [that is, Adgey v. The Queen] and Corkum [R. v. Corkum] may be summarized as follows:
1. The charge is read to the accused who enters ("offers" or "tenders") the guilty plea.
2. The judge hears the Crown's version of what occurred to give rise to the charge, that is, hears the foundational facts.
3. The accused accepts or explains those facts.
4. The judge exercises a discretion (the "first adjudication") whether or not to accept the guilty plea.
5. If the plea is not accepted, the judge decides whether or not to proceed with an inquiry and a more formal "hearing of the evidence".
6. If he or she decides to embark upon such an inquiry, the judge "hears evidence".
7. The judge exercises a discretion the second time (the "second adjudication") whether or not to accept the plea.
8. If the plea is accepted, the judge decides to do one of two things required by s. 801(2) of the Code.
At paragraph 29 of Cataract the court said:
It is axiomatic that the judge who accepts the plea and directs a conviction is also the judge who has jurisdiction to impose the sentence. The imposition of the sentence is simply the continuation of the trial at which the accused was convicted …
