L’accusé qui accepte le dépôt en preuve du rapport prépénal sans en contester le contenu consent à ce que le juge utilise les renseignements qu’il contient pour la détermination de la peine

Serra c. R., 2014 QCCA 1894

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[10]        D’une part, selon la jurisprudence, l’accusé qui accepte le dépôt en preuve du rapport prépénal sans en contester le contenu consent à ce que le juge utilise les renseignements qu’il contient pour la détermination de la peine[2]. En l’espèce, non seulement l’avocat de l’appelant n’a-t-il pas contesté le contenu du rapport lors de l’audience de première instance, mais il y a lui-même référé à plusieurs reprises, notamment pour concéder que le fait que son client minimise son implication constitue un élément négatif au rapport.

[11]        D’autre part, les tribunaux considèrent que le fait pour l’accusé de minimiser sa participation au crime est un facteur pertinent à la détermination de la peine[3], ce qui laisse notamment voir un risque de récidive[4]. Par ailleurs, le juge n’a pas considéré cet élément ni celui relatif au fait que l’appelant n’avait pas informé ses parents, révélant ainsi sa difficulté à assumer les conséquences de ses gestes, parmi les facteurs aggravants qu’il a retenus contre l’appelant. Ce moyen doit être rejeté.

La preuve du contexte social peut guider le tribunal dans la détermination de la responsabilité morale d'un accusé à l’égard de l’infraction

R. c. S.B., 2025 CSC 24

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[64]                        S.B. soutient que la Cour d’appel a commis une erreur dans son évaluation du RPDE, puisque le rapport démontrait que sa culpabilité morale était moins élevée (m.a., par. 111‑113). Lors d’une demande d’assujettissement à la peine applicable aux adultes dans le cadre du deuxième volet du par. 72(1), la preuve du contexte social peut en effet guider le tribunal pour adolescents dans la détermination de la responsabilité morale de l’adolescent à l’égard de l’infraction, et l’aidera à analyser la durée de la peine qui obligera celui-ci à répondre de ses actes (I.M., par. 179; voir aussi R. c. Hills, 2023 CSC 2, par. 58). Cela doit être distingué de la gravité objective de l’infraction au sens général, qui est déterminée à l’aune de son [traduction] « caractère fautif normatif » et des conséquences du comportement sur les victimes et la société dans les circonstances d’un cas donné (Morris, par. 13; voir aussi Hills, par. 58).

[65]                        En l’espèce, la Cour d’appel s’est livrée à une mise en balance des facteurs pertinents, notamment la situation personnelle de S.B., guidée par la preuve du contexte social. La Cour d’appel était bien au fait de cette situation, qui avait été précédemment détaillée en ce qui concerne la présomption. La cour a en outre souligné que [traduction] « [l]e fait de vivre dans une communauté minée par la drogue et les gangs a incontestablement eu une incidence sur la trajectoire de vie de SB, d’autant plus qu’il a été exposé à de telles influences à un âge formatif » (par. 71).

[66]                        Je reconnais que le RPDE donne des indications sur les forces personnelles, sociales et systémiques qui ont façonné la vie et la situation de S.B. Toutefois, je suis d’accord avec l’intimé pour dire qu’en l’espèce, le RPDE ne fournit pas d’explication de la perpétration de l’infraction — soit pourquoi S.B. a tué un adolescent qu’il ne connaissait pas, à la façon d’une exécution (voir le m.i., par. 113; voir aussi Morris, par. 100). L’auteur du rapport a expressément refusé d’aborder la question, affirmant, dans une partie du rapport qui indique ses limites, que celui-ci [traduction] « ne donne aucune indication sur [. . .] la dynamique qui a précipité la perpétration de l’infraction » (d.a., vol. I, p. 67).

[67]                        Je ne vois aucune erreur révisable dans l’examen du RPDE par la Cour d’appel lorsqu’elle a procédé à la nouvelle détermination de la peine de S.B. Je ne modifierais pas l’utilisation qu’a faite la cour de cette preuve en tirant sa conclusion selon laquelle la peine applicable aux adultes était nécessaire pour obliger S.B. à répondre de ses actes. L’appréciation et la mise en balance des facteurs pertinents, dont la réadaptation, la réinsertion sociale et la protection du public, commandent la déférence de notre Cour (Lacasse, par. 49; R. c. Nasogaluak, 2010 CSC 6, [2010] 1 R.C.S. 206, par. 46).

Les principes pertinents en matière de racisme systémique lors de la détermination de la peine

R. c. Robertson, 2024 QCCS 823

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[27]   Defence counsel did raise the issue of racial discrimination in general terms through the reliance on the case of R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, and the production of various reports[2]. Three points arise from a reading of Morris.

[28]   First, whether through judicial notice or evidence led at court, proof of systemic anti-Black racism in society and the criminal justice system is relevant on sentencing.

[29]   Second, the gravity or seriousness of the crimes under study is not diminished by such evidence.

[30]   Third:

76.  Evidence that an offender’s choices were limited or influenced by his disadvantaged circumstances, however, speaks to the offender’s moral responsibility for his acts and not to the seriousness of the crimes (…)

(…)

79.  The social context evidence can, however, provide a basis upon which a trial judge concludes that the fundamental purpose of sentencing, as outlined in s.718, is better served by a sentence which, while recognizing the seriousness of the offence, gives less weight to the specific deterrence of the offender and greater weight to the rehabilitation of the offender through a sentence that addresses the societal disadvantages caused to the offender by factors such as systemic racism.

[31]   Returning to Mr. Robertson’s case, there was no social context evidence presented on his behalf. Coupled with his implied position that he was not involved in the crimes nor any evidence to explain his acting out if he was, the systemic racial bias argument carries no weight with the Court. Mr. Robertson’s cognitive challenges and personality, however, are considered important elements on sentence.

Pour qu’une telle réalité sociale puisse être considérée lors de la détermination de la peine, il faut la preuve d’un certain lien avec le délinquant ou l’infraction

R. c. Domerçant-Barosy, 2025 QCCS 176

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[16]      Les trois accusés sont des jeunes hommes noirs qui sont dans la vingtaine. Le Tribunal n’ignore pas les réalités sociales, incluant le racisme qui affecte les personnes noires. Toutefois, pour qu’une telle réalité sociale puisse être considérée lors de la détermination de la peine, il faut la preuve d’un certain lien avec le délinquant ou l’infraction. Aucune preuve de la sorte n’a été présentée dans la présente instance (R. c. Anderson, 2021 NSCA 62, par. 114-118, R c Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, par. 1, 13 et 87-97; R. c. K.A., 2023 ABCA 333, par. 14; R. c. Omer, 2022 SKCA 147, par. 34; R. c. Croxen, 2023 QCCS 3485, par. 39; R. c. Hills, 2023 CSC 2, par. 55).

[28]      Pour rendre jugement, le Tribunal doit appliquer les principes de détermination de la peine qui ont été développés par les Tribunaux et le Parlement. Le principe cardinal en matière de peine est la proportionnalité eu égard à la gravité du crime et au degré de responsabilité morale du délinquant. La peine doit être individualisée. La peine doit tenir compte des circonstances aggravantes et atténuantes liées au crime et au délinquant. Les facteurs aggravants doivent être établis hors de tout doute raisonnable. Ensuite, l’objectif fondamental recherché en fixant la peine est la protection de la société et le maintien d’une société juste, paisible et sure, et ce, en visant la dénonciation du crime, la dissuasion individuelle et générale, la réparation des torts causés aux victimes et à la collectivité, la responsabilisation du délinquant et, dans la mesure du possible, favoriser la réhabilitation du délinquant. En somme, la détermination de la peine est un exercice d’équilibre et de pondération qui tient compte de multiples facteurs et considérations liés au crime et au délinquant pour rendre une sanction juste et appropriée. Voir : art. 718-718.2, 724 (3) e) du Code criminel; R. c. Hills, 2023 CSC 2, par. 53-61; R. c. Bissonnette, 2022 CSC 23, par. 45-53; R. c. Lacasse, 2015 CSC 64, par. 5-6, 12 49-50, 78; R. c. V.L., 2023 QCCA 449, par. 53-59; Lacelle Belec c. R., 2019 QCCA 711, par. 27-30.

[29]      La peine maximale est très rarement appliquée, il demeure qu’elle n’est pas réservée « au scénario abstrait du pire crime commis dans les pires circonstances »; elle peut être infligée chaque fois que les circonstances le justifient (R. c. L.M., 2008 CSC 31, par. 22; R. c. Parranto, 2021 CSC 46, par. 100; R. c. Friesen, 2020 CSC 9, par. 114).

[30]      Le crime de tentative de meurtre comporte un élément de faute identique à celui de la forme la plus grave de meurtre, soit l’intention spécifique de tuer. La seule véritable différence entre le meurtre et la tentative de meurtre concerne la conséquence du crime. Dans le cas de la tentative de meurtre, le but de causer la mort est raté (R. c. Logan, 1990 CanLII 84 (CSC), [1990] 2 RCS 731, p. 742-743).

[31]      Un crime commis avec une arme à feu, considérant sa dangerosité, peut justifier une peine axée sur la dénonciation et la dissuasion (R. c. Hilbach, 2023 CSC 3, par. 73; R. c. Nur, 2015 CSC 15, par. 5).

[32]      L’arrêt récent Jean c. R., 2024 QCCA 1137 réitère ces principes. La Cour d’appel a confirmé une peine d’emprisonnement à perpétuité pour une tentative de meurtre commise avec une arme à feu, tout en rappelant que la peine doit toujours être proportionnelle et individualisée (par. 71-73). La Cour a également refusé de revoir à la hausse les fourchettes des peines en cette matière. Dans les affaires de tentative de meurtre les plus graves, les peines prononcées sont généralement supérieures à 15 ans d’emprisonnement (par. 62-68).

[33]      Par ailleurs, il est vrai, comme le souligne l’avocat de M. Choute, qu’un casier judiciaire comportant de nombreux antécédents pour des crimes violents est souvent un facteur considéré pour justifier les peines les plus sévères, allant jusqu’à l’emprisonnement à perpétuité, pour la tentative de meurtre (R. c. Jogiyat, 2024 ONSC 3498, par. 66; R. c May, 2017 BCSC 1971, par 49). Cependant, la détermination de la peine dépend toujours de l’ensemble des circonstances liées au crime et au délinquant.

[36]      La jeunesse des accusés n’est pas un facteur atténuant. Considérant les antécédents judiciaires des accusés et la gravité des crimes commis dans la présente affaire, on ne peut pas dire que les accusés ont on commit une erreur de jeunesse et qu’ils sont sur la voie de la réhabilitation (Jean c. R., 2024 QCCA 1137, par. 39).

[39]      Considérant le calcul des crédits pour les périodes de détention préventive applicables aux peines d’emprisonnement de durées déterminées, M. Domerçant-Barosy et M.Castor sont détenus depuis presque 40 mois et ils ont droit à un crédit de 60 mois selon le ratio d’un et demi pour un (R. c. Summers, 2014 CSC 26). Pour sa part, selon la compréhension du Tribunal, M. Choute a été, parallèlement aux présentes procédures, en détention provisoire puis il a commencé à purger une peine dans un autre dossier. M. Choute n’a donc pas droit à un crédit dans le présent dossier (Fortin c. R., 2023 QCCA 596, par. 44; Casseus c. R., 2021 QCCA 392, par. 50; R. c. Larrivée, 2020 QCCA 1774, par. 28; R. c. Barnett, 2017 ONCA 897, par. 30).

[40]      En somme, considérant l’extrême gravité des crimes commis, les circonstances très dangereuses de leur perpétration, les profils négatifs des accusés et leurs fautes morales hautement blâmables, les peines doivent en priorité protéger le public à l’égard d’individus dangereux, et ce, pour longtemps. Les peines doivent aussi exprimer, sans équivoque, la réprobation de la société et viser la dissuasion en matière de violence avec des armes à feu. La réhabilitation des accusés demeure un objectif à long terme.

Rien dans l’arrêt Gladue n’indique que les facteurs historiques et systémiques ne devraient pas également être pris en considération dans le cas d’autres délinquants, non autochtones »

R. c. C.K., 2022 QCCA 539

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[22]         En l’espèce, non seulement l’intimé plaide-t-il coupable à l’égard de Y, mais il se dénonce dans le cas de X ; de même il est habité, selon le rapport présentenciel, par des remords, des regrets et de la honte. Le juge soulève aussi, à juste titre[16], les efforts de réhabilitation et les thérapies suivies par l’intimé depuis sa première sentence reçue en 2016. Enfin, il tient compte du « parcours singulier » de l’intimé, lequel, écrit-il, a été déshumanisé par les horreurs de la guerre, proposant alors une analogie avec la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême applicable au délinquant autochtone. Encore là, et contrairement à ce que fait valoir l’appelante, il ne s’agit pas d’une erreur de principe. La Cour suprême a en effet reconnu dans Friesen que la situation personnelle du délinquant pouvait avoir un effet atténuant sur la culpabilité morale[17], en plus d’affirmer dans l’arrêt Ipeelee « […] que rien dans l’arrêt Gladue n’indique que les facteurs historiques et systémiques ne devraient pas également être pris en considération dans le cas d’autres délinquants, non autochtones »[18]. Tout revient donc à l’individualisation de la peine et à la pondération de tous ces facteurs ce qui, en soi, ne suffit pas pour constituer une erreur révisable.

Arrêt de principe quant à la prise en compte du racisme systémique lors de la détermination de la peine d'une contrevenant afrodescendant

R. v. Anderson, 2021 NSCA 62

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[3]            Directly relevant to this appeal is the now widely accepted fact that certain groups in society are disproportionately incarcerated, notably Indigenous offenders[2] and Black offenders.[3] Parliament introduced the conditional sentencing regime in an “attempt to remedy the problem of overincarceration”.[4]

[4]            As the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in Borde nearly twenty years ago, the underlying reasons for the over-representation of Indigenous offenders in Canada’s prisons – poverty, substance abuse, lack of education, lack of employment opportunities, and vulnerable, marginalized communities – are also factors in the over-representation of offenders of African descent.

[5]            We are now well aware that the disproportionate incarceration of Black offenders reflects the systemic discrimination and racism that permeates the criminal justice system. As the Supreme Court of Canada very recently noted, since R. v. Parks[5], “courts have acknowledged the wide range of ways the criminal justice system can disproportionately affect accused persons” who are Indigenous or racialized.[6]

[6]            In Parks, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted the existence of anti-Black racism in Nova Scotia as identified by the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution:

Examination of racism as it impacts specifically on black persons suggests that they are prime victims of racial prejudice. In Nova Scotia, anti-black racism has been described by both blacks and non-blacks as “pervasive”: W. Head & D.H. Clairmont, Discrimination Against Blacks in Nova Scotia: The Criminal Justice System, A Research Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution, 1989) at pp. 43-47; see also Nova Scotia Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution, Findings and Recommendations, vol. 1 (Halifax: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution, 1989) (Chair: T.A. Hickman C.J.N.S.) at pp. 148-84…[7]

[7]            Anti-Black racism was described in Parks as a pervasive societal phenomenon: “Furthermore, our institutions, including the criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative stereotypes”. Black people were identified as “among the primary victims” of the “evil of racism”. Systemic racism was identified in Mr. Anderson’s experience: the judge heard evidence about it and, as I will describe, its reality was reflected in her approach to his sentence.

[8]            The experience of African Nova Scotian offenders like Mr. Anderson must be better reflected than it has been in the sentencing process and outcomes. In its intervention the Criminal Lawyers’ Association has said: “…it is time that the distinct mistreatment of Black people in society be given its due recognition in criminal sentencing”.

[9]            This appeal gives us the opportunity to take up the challenge set by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Friesen for appellate courts to “set a new direction, bringing the law into harmony with a new societal understanding of the gravity of certain offences or the degree of responsibility of certain offenders…”[8] Appellate courts have a responsibility in such circumstances to equip  judges sentencing offenders of African descent with the tools to craft fit sentences. Where current sentencing practices in relation to African Nova Scotian offenders do not further the objectives of sentencing to “effectively deter criminality and rehabilitate offenders”, then “those practices must change”[9] in order to meet the needs of those offenders and their communities.

Impact of Race and Culture Assessments (IRCAs)

[92]         As I noted at the start of these reasons, judges have recognized that, while the history of Indigenous people in Canada is distinct, as is their place in our legal and constitutional framework, African Canadians have experienced many of the same effects of discrimination and marginalization.

[93]         Background and systemic factors are therefore similarly relevant to sentencing offenders of African descent. Ipeelee held there is “nothing in the Gladue decision which would indicate that background and systemic factors should not also be taken into account for other, non-Aboriginal offenders”.[30] In R. v. Morris[31], Justice Nakatsuru observed:

[9]        … The criminal law has recognized that there are cases where, in order to determine a fit and proportionate sentence, consideration must be given to an individual’s systemic and social circumstances. These circumstances may extend beyond a person who is being sentenced to include factors such a systemic discrimination and historical injustice. This has been recognized by the criminal courts, particularly in the case of Indigenous offenders. While the distinct history of colonial violence endured by Indigenous peoples cannot simply be analogized to Black Canadians, I found that the ability to consider social context in a sentencing decision is extended to all under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code…

[94]         African Nova Scotians have a distinct history reflected in how they arrived here and their experience over the past 400 years. This history is rooted in systemic and institutionalized racism and injustice.

 The Evolution of IRCAs

[104]   The first known IRCA[38] was deployed in R. v. “X”, the sentencing in the Youth Justice Court of Nova Scotia of a Black youth for attempted murder. It contributed to the dismissal of the Crown’s application for “X” to be sentenced as an adult. The IRCA in “X” was authored by Robert Wright. It provided “a more textured, multi-dimensional framework for understanding “X”, his background and his behaviours”[39].

[105]   Subsequently, IRCAs have been considered in a number of sentencings in this province, such as: R. v. Elliott[40], R. v. Desmond [41], Gabriel[42], R. v. Perry[43], and R. v. N.W.[44] (a sentencing for first-degree murder under the Youth Criminal Justice Act). IRCAs also featured in Justice Nakatsuru’s decisions in R. v. Jackson[45] and R. v. Morris[46].

[106]   Sentencing places unique and exacting demands on judges. An IRCA offers insights not otherwise available about the social determinants that disproportionately impact African Nova Scotian/African Canadian individuals and communities. In Desmond, the sentencing judge lamented the lack of an IRCA to assist her:

[28]      It would have been helpful to have an IRCA prepared. It would have been of assistance for the parties and the Court to more thoroughly connect the issues of Anti-Black racism, over-incarceration of African Canadians, and historical and systemic injustices committed to the issues before this Court and the charge Mr. Desmond pleaded to.

[107]   In Gabriel, the issue confronting the sentencing judge was the determination of parole ineligibility following a conviction for second-degree murder. Justice Campbell saw the value in IRCAs:

[51]     Some of the principles from Gladue are applicable to a racial and cultural group that has been the subject of such notorious centuries long systemic discrimination. It is important to know about the systemic and background factors that bring any person before the court for sentencing. That is particularly so when they relate to members of a group that is disproportionately represented in the prison population, disproportionately economically disadvantaged, disproportionately disadvantaged in education, and disproportionately disadvantaged in health outcomes.

[108]   He recognized how IRCAs can inform the task of sentencing and the person performing it:

[57]     Sentencing judges struggle to understand the context of the crime and person being sentenced. To do that judges rely on our own common sense and understanding of human nature. Sometimes that isn’t enough. Our common sense and our understanding of human nature are products of our own background and experiences. An individual judge’s common sense and understanding of human nature may offer little insight into the actions of a young African Nova Scotian male. The Cultural Impact Assessment serves as a reminder of the fallibility of some assumptions based on an entirely different life experience.

[109]   To be a credible resource for the courts, IRCAs need to be prepared to a high professional and authoritative standard. The ANSDPAD Coalition notes that the IRCA ordered for the sentencing in R. v. Boutilier[47] was to be “completed by an individual or individuals with specialized knowledge, education and experience in the completion of such reports relating to systemic and background factors affecting the African-Nova Scotian Community”.[48]  The court order sought to have the IRCA examine factors such as poverty/low income, poor educational outcomes, community fragmentation, historical and contemporary impacts of racialized and intergenerational trauma, and overrepresentation of African Nova Scotians in the criminal justice system, where there remains little to no culturally relevant programming. In Boutilier, some portions of the IRCA, an opinion that the offender had a traumatic brain injury, were excluded from consideration as outside the expertise of the author.[49]

[110]   I conclude this survey on IRCAs with some comments about judicial notice. In his submissions, Mr. Burrill suggested the calling of evidence, as was done at Mr. Anderson’s sentencing hearing, should not have to be undertaken in every case. The judge, without objection from the Crown or defence, sought to hear from witnesses about the effects of systemic racism and disadvantage on Mr. Anderson. While this approach is at the judge’s discretion or may be necessary if a qualifications voir dire is required[50], it should not be taken as creating a prerequisite for reliance on the contents of an IRCA. The sentencing judge is best positioned to determine how the sentencing should be conducted.

[111]   Certain aspects of an IRCA, however, should not be subject to challenge. Like racial prejudice, acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Spence as “notorious and indisputable”[51], the existence of anti-Black racism can be admitted on the basis of judicial notice without the need for evidence[52]. Judges are entitled to take notice of racism in Nova Scotia and have done so.[53] There is no justification for requiring offenders to produce viva voce evidence of this pernicious historical reality.[54] That said, including in an IRCA the history of slavery and systemic racism in Nova Scotia and its effects on African Nova Scotian communities is indispensable. It will contribute to deepening the awareness and understanding of judges, Crown prosecutors, defence counsel, probation officers, correctional officials, parole officers and others who are dealing with the offender.    

How Should IRCAs Inform the Sentencing of African Nova Scotian Offenders?

[112]   The Crown shared common ground in this appeal with the Respondent and the Intervenors that IRCAs can be a valuable resource for sentencing judges. The Crown’s support for IRCAs generally and its application in Mr. Anderson’s case is explicitly recognized in its factum:

…African Nova Scotians are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Their historical and continued marginalization is an undeniable, albeit brutally sad, fact. In this regard, the sentencing Judge was correct to rely heavily on the contents of the IRCA in considering a proportionate sentence for Mr. Anderson.

[113]   At the appeal hearing, Mr. Scott emphasized the Crown’s support for IRCAs, acknowledging them to be valuable conduits of information about the history of colonialism, anti-Black discrimination and its effects. He confirmed the Crown’s wholesale approval with how the judge employed the IRCA in sentencing Mr. Anderson.

[114]   Taking account of IRCA evidence ensures relevant systemic and background factors are integrated in the crafting of a fit sentence, one that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the moral culpability of the offender. In its factum, the ANSDPAD Coalition quoted from Professor Maria Dugas’ article, “Committing to Justice: The Case for Impact of Race and Culture Assessments in Sentencing African Canadian Offenders” where she discussed the role IRCAs are designed to play in sentencing:

IRCAs operate from the assumption that a person’s race and culture are important factors in crafting a fit sentence. They provide the court with necessary information about the effect of systemic anti-Black racism on people of African descent. They connect this information to the individual’s lived experience, articulating how the experience of racism has informed the circumstances of the offender, the offence, and how it might inform the offender’s experience of the carceral state.[55]

[115]   Sentencing is an inherently individualized process.[56] It is a fundamental duty of a sentencing judge to pay close attention to the circumstances of all offenders in order to craft a sentence that is genuinely fit and proper. What is required in the sentencing of Indigenous offenders applies to offenders of African descent who are also entitled to “an individualized assessment of all of the relevant factors and circumstances, including the status and life experiences…”[57]

[116]   Sentencing judges play a significant role in how offenders are punished and rehabilitated through the criminal justice system. As in the case of Indigenous offenders, they decide whether an offender of African descent is incarcerated or receives a sentence that can play “a stronger role in restoring a sense of balance to the offender, victim, and community, and in preventing future crime”.[58] Notwithstanding that sentencing judges are far downstream from the forces that have contributed to bringing offenders before them, they are influential at a critical juncture: they determine if incarceration and separation from society is the course to be followed or if a remedial option can serve the objectives of sentencing and achieve a just outcome.

[117]   The deference afforded sentencing judges by appeal courts is intended to respect the individualization of sentences “both in method and outcome”. Friesen held that:

[38]      …Sentencing judges have considerable scope to apply the principles of sentencing in any manner that suits the features of a particular case. Different methods may even be required to account properly for relevant systemic and background factors (Ipeelee, at para. 59). Similarly, a particular combination of aggravating and mitigating factors may call for a sentence that lies…outside any range. (cites omitted)

[118]   The “method” employed for sentencing African Nova Scotian offenders should carefully consider the systemic and background factors detailed in an IRCA. It may amount to an error of law for a sentencing judge to ignore or fail to inquire into these factors. A judge does not have to be satisfied a causal link has been established “between the systemic and background factors and commission of the offence…” These principles parallel the requirements in law established by the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to Gladue factors in the sentencing of Indigenous offenders.[59] As with Indigenous offenders, while an African Nova Scotian offender can decide not to request an IRCA, a sentencing judge cannot preclude comparable information being offered, or fail to consider an offender’s background and circumstances in relation to the systemic factors of racism and marginalization. To do so may amount to an error of law.[60]

[119]   As in Mr. Anderson’s case, an IRCA can deliver the specific information relevant to the judge’s obligation to determine an individualized sentence. However it is the content not the form that is critical. While the required information does not have to be presented in an IRCA, like Gladue reports for Indigenous offenders, IRCAs deliver the “indispensable” content[61]   comprehensively and efficiently. IRCAs have become a familiar method for placing systemic and individualized information about African Nova Scotian offenders before sentencing courts in Nova Scotia.

[120]   IRCAs can support the use of rehabilitation in sentencing, “One of the main objectives of Canadian criminal law…” and “one of the fundamental moral values that distinguish Canadian society from the societies of many other nations in the world…”.[62]  IRCAs can provide a foundation on which to build alternatives to incarceration for Black offenders and reduce the over-reliance on imprisonment.

[121]   As the ANSDPAD Coalition asked this Court to recognize, the social context information supplied by an IRCA can assist in:

•        Contextualizing the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

•        Revealing the existence of mitigating factors or explaining their absence.

•        Addressing aggravating factors and offering a deeper explanation for them.

•        Informing the principles of sentencing and the weight to be accorded to denunciation and deterrence.

•        Identifying rehabilitative and restorative options for the offender and appropriate opportunities for reparations by the offender to the victim and the community.

•        Strengthening the offender’s engagement with their community.

•        Informing the application of the parity principle. “Courts must ensure that a formalistic approach to parity in sentencing does not undermine the remedial purpose of s. 718.2(e)”.[63]

•        Reducing reliance on incarceration.

[122]   The Crown’s roadmap analysis aligns with the ANSDPAD Coalition’s holistic application for IRCAs. It is an approach this Court endorses. IRCAs can enrich and guide the application of sentencing principles to Black offenders. The systemic factors described by the IRCA in Mr. Anderson’s case and his experiences as an African Nova Scotian navigating racism and marginalization are not unique. IRCAs should be available to assist judges in any sentencing involving an offender of African descent. IRCAs can ensure judges, when engaged in “one of the most delicate stages of the criminal justice process in Canada”[64], are equipped to view the offender through a sharply focused lens.

[123]   In explaining their sentences, judges should make more than passing reference to the background of an African Nova Scotian offender. It may not be enough to simply describe the offender’s history in great detail. It should be possible on appeal for the court to determine, based on the record or the judge’s reasons, that proper attention was given to the circumstances of the offender. Where this cannot be discerned, appellate intervention may be warranted.

[124]   The role of IRCAs in the sentencing of African Nova Scotian offenders will serve to enhance the credibility of the criminal justice system in the eyes of a broad and diverse public by increasing the likelihood of the sentences imposed being seen as just and appropriate. Respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society is not achieved by putting disproportionate numbers of Black and Indigenous offenders behind bars having left unaddressed, in the context of sentencing, the deeply entrenched historical disadvantage and systemic racism that more than likely had a hand in bringing them before the courts. 

[125]   The historic discrimination and racism to which African Nova Scotians have been subjected is antithetical to societal values of equality and inclusion. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v Nasogaluak, addressing, in the context of sentencing, the impact of a Charter breach, recognized the role of the Charter in the sentencing regime: “A sentence cannot be “fit” if it does not respect the fundamental values enshrined in the Charter”.[65] This principle is to be applied purposively. The sentencing process as a whole must accord with Charter values, including the right to equality before and under the law. Differential treatment may be needed in order to serve the goals of substantive equality[66] otherwise how are historic inequalities confronted and addressed, ongoing systemic discrimination ameliorated, and continued disadvantage avoided?