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jeudi 24 juillet 2025

Le document en possession de l'accusé et sa reconnaissance ou son adoption par ce dernier

R. v. Kalai, 2020 NSSC 351

Lien vers la décision


   Documents in Possession

[28]         Documents in the accused’s possession are generally admissible in proof of the accused’s knowledge of their contents,  pursuant to the “documents in possession” doctrine.  Additionally, they may be admissible as proof of the truth of their contents where the accused “has recognized, adopted or acted upon” the documents.[3]  The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal summarized the doctrine in R. v. Wood2001 NSCA 38, at para. 114:

114      There are three elements of the doctrine. First, it must be shown that the document was actually or constructively in the possession of the accused. Second, if such possession is established, the document will be admissible to show the accused's knowledge of its contents, his connection with and state of mind with respect to the transaction to which it relates. Third, if it is established that the accused has recognized, adopted or acted on the document, it becomes admissible for the truth of its contents under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule...

[29]         Pursuant to s. 4(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, a person “has anything in possession when he has it in his personal possession or knowingly (i) has it in the actual possession or custody of another person, or (ii) has it in any place, whether or not that place belongs to or is occupied by him, for the use or benefit of himself or of another person.”   

[30]         The Crown says the accused’s possession of the documents is established by their presence on the computer in his home, so that “the contents of the documents are admissible to connect him circumstantially to the transaction in issue.  This is the first permissible use of documents in possession, as “circumstantial evidence of the accused’s involvement in the transactions to which they relate.” (see R. v. Black2014 BCCA 192, at para. 40).  

[31]         As the Ontario Court of Appeal said in R. v. Bridgman2017 ONCA 940, in respect of text messages:

[72]      If a document found in possession is elicited for a non-hearsay purpose – as original circumstantial evidence showing the accused’s connection to or complicity in a matter – then the hearsay rule is not activated ... This is true even where documents may contain out-of-court statements that can be understood as express or implied assertions if tendered for the truth of the assertion.

....

[76]      Of course, resort to this doctrine cannot constitute an end-run-around the hearsay rule. If the circumstantial value of the evidence turns on the truth of the assertion made by the non-testifying texter, then the traditional hearsay concerns will be present.

[77]      If, though, the relevance of the evidence does not depend on the truth of the assertion, the text messages may be admitted on the basis that they constitute original circumstantial evidence relevant to an issue at trial. By way of example only, text messages may constitute original circumstantial evidence connecting the accused to a location, transactions, or people, or demonstrating knowledge, state of mind and so on. I emphasize that these are only examples and should not be considered a complete or aspirational list.

[36]         Ahmad supports the view that possession can be established by the document’s presence on a storage device, such as a computer, in the accused’s home.  R. v. Hersi, 2014 ONSC 1368, stands for the same principle.  In Hersi, the Court said:

[29]      Mr. Hersi does not dispute that the documents in issue were on his computer, or that he had the computer with him when he was arrested at Pearson Airport. However, he does not admit knowledge of the contents of the documents, or that he was even aware of their presence on his computer. And he specifically does not admit transferring various documents from his computer to a USB key which he then gave to the undercover officer.

[30]      In my view, whether Mr. Hersi had knowledge of the contents of the computer and what weight, if any, is to be given them is for the jury to decide. At the very least, the evidence is capable of supporting the inference that he was in possession of the documents and that he conducted the internet searches. He had the laptop with him when he was arrested. It revealed a user profile for “Mohamed Hersi”, along with a spreadsheet titled “Hersi” that contained a worksheet of hours worked and pay received. Several of the documents found on the computer are identical to the documents Mr. Hersi copied onto a USB key for the officer. Although Mr. Hersi maintains ... that other people had access to the computer and therefore he may not have been aware of all its contents, there is no

 

evidence before me to that effect. The evidence that does exist strongly suggests the opposite, i.e. it was he and he alone who used the laptop. See Ahmad, paras. 18-23.

                                                                                                [Emphasis added]

As such, the documents were admissible for the non-hearsay purpose as documents in possession, subject to relevance.

[37]         In summary, the defence position is that possession has not been proven, and therefore admissibility as circumstantial evidence of knowledge of the contents is not established.

[38]         Based on the authorities, I find that the presence of documents on a computer in the accused’s home (some of which referenced the accused) is sufficient to connect him to their contents for the purpose of admissibility as documents in possession.  

                  Recognized, Adopted, or Acted Upon

[39]         The Crown seeks to use the documents not only for the non-hearsay purpose of connecting the accused to the transfer, but for the hearsay purpose of proving the occurrence of the transfer itself.  The Crown stated frankly in the hearing that there is no other evidence of the transaction. The Crown must therefore establish that the accused recognized, adopted, or acted upon the documents.

[40]         The “documents in possession” doctrine contemplates admissibility of documents in proof of the accused’s knowledge of their contents. It does not follow that such documents are admissible for the truth of their contents. This is only possible where the accused has “recognized, adopted or acted upon” the document, in which case the document is admissible under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule.[4] 

[41]         The question then becomes what constitutes “recognizing, adopting, or acting upon” a document?

[47]         In my view, the Crown has adduced little or no evidence to support admission of these documents under the “documents in possession hearsay exception”. Something more must be required for a document in possession to be admitted for its truth.

lundi 9 juin 2025

Le seul fait de regarder au moyen d’un navigateur Web une image stockée sur un site hébergé dans l’Internet ne permet pas d’établir le degré de contrôle nécessaire pour conclure à la possession

R. c. Morelli, 2010 CSC 8


[14] À mon avis, le seul fait de regarder au moyen d’un navigateur Web une image stockée sur un site hébergé dans l’Internet ne permet pas d’établir le degré de contrôle nécessaire pour conclure à la possession.  La possession d’images illicites exige qu’il y ait possession, d’une façon ou d’une autre, des fichiers de données sous‑jacents.  La simple visualisation d’images en ligne constitue le crime distinct d’accès à de la pornographie juvénile, créé par le législateur au par. 163.1(4.1) du Code criminel.

 

[15] Pour l’application du Code criminel, la « possession » définie au par. 4(3) s’entend de la possession personnelle, de la possession imputée et de la possession commune. Seules les deux premières de ces trois formes de possession fautive sont pertinentes en l’espèce.  Nul ne conteste que la connaissance et le contrôle constituent des éléments essentiels de ces deux types d’infraction.

 

[16] Dans le cas d’une allégation de possession personnelle, le critère de la connaissance est formé des deux éléments suivants : l’accusé doit savoir qu’il a la garde physique de la chose donnée et il doit connaître la nature de cette dernière. Il faut en outre que ces deux éléments soient conjugués à un acte de contrôle (qui ne procède pas d’un devoir civique) : Beaver c. The Queen1957 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1957] R.C.S. 531, p. 541‑542.

 


[17] Il y a possession imputée lorsque l’accusé n’a pas la garde physique de l’objet en question, mais qu’il l’a « en la possession ou garde réelle d’une autre personne » ou « en un lieu qui lui appartient ou non ou qu’[il] occupe ou non, pour son propre usage ou avantage ou celui d’une autre personne » (Code criminel, al. 4(3)a)).  Il y a donc possession imputée quand l’accusé : (1) a connaissance de la nature de l’objet, (2) met ou garde volontairement l’objet dans un lieu donné, que ce lieu lui appartienne ou non, et (3) a l’intention d’avoir l’objet dans ce lieu pour son « propre usage ou avantage » ou celui d’une autre personne.

[36] Selon moi, la mise en cache automatique d’un fichier sur le disque dur, sans plus, n’emporte pas la possession.  Bien que le fichier mis en cache soit en un « lieu » sous le contrôle de l’utilisateur, il faut aussi, pour prouver la possession, satisfaire aux exigences concernant la mens rea ou la faute.  Par conséquent, il faut démontrer que l’utilisateur a sciemment stocké et conservé le fichier dans la mémoire cache.

 


[37] En l’espèce, l’accusation ne repose pas sur la possession de pornographie juvénile dans la mémoire cache que l’accusé aurait utilisée à cette fin. Cela n’est guère surprenant, car la plupart des utilisateurs ne connaissent ni le contenu de la mémoire cache de leur ordinateur, ni son fonctionnement, ni même son existence.  Sans cette connaissance, ils n’ont pas l’élément mental ou fautif requis pour être reconnus coupables de la possession des images se trouvant dans la mémoire cache.  Cela dit, dans de rares cas, la mémoire cache pourrait être utilisée sciemment pour stocker des copies de fichiers images dans l’intention d’en conserver la possession.

 

[38] La juge Deschamps a présenté une conception plus large de la possession, selon laquelle il suffit, dans certains cas du moins, de regarder une image pour en avoir la possession. Comme je vais maintenant l’expliquer, même si l’on adoptait le point de vue de ma collègue, la dénonciation en l’espèce n’établit pas l’existence de motifs raisonnables et probables pouvant étayer la fouille contestée de l’ordinateur de l’appelant.

[64] La présence des deux liens intitulés « Lolita » dans les favoris permet certainement l’inférence raisonnable que l’accusé a visité un site Web présentant des images à caractère sexuel explicite d’adolescentes de moins de 18 ans.  De plus, en l’absence de preuve contraire, il n’est pas déraisonnable de conclure de leur simple présence dans l’ordinateur de l’appelant que ces liens ont été ajoutés sciemment par lui.

 

[65] Une telle conclusion ne suffit toutefois pas à établir la possession.  Premièrement, comme je l’ai déjà expliqué, le simple fait de visiter un site Web ou de visualiser des images à l’écran n’emporte pas possession. De même, le fait de placer un signet dans l’ordinateur ne permet pas d’établir la possession du matériel contenu dans le site Web : les signets ne font que permettre un accès facile et rapide aux sites Web indiqués.  En effet, un clic sur un signet peut présenter du matériel ajouté ou ne rien donner d’autre qu’un message annonçant que le matériel précédemment affiché dans le site Web a été supprimé, que l’adresse du site Web n’est plus valide — ou que le site Web n’existe plus.

 

[66] Ainsi, pour être coupable de l’infraction de possession (contrairement à l’infraction d’accès), la personne doit sciemment acquérir les fichiers de données sous‑jacents et les garder dans un lieu sous son contrôle.  La présence des icônes est susceptible d’éveiller des soupçons quant à la possession, mais elle ne peut à elle seule étayer raisonnablement l’inférence selon laquelle l’appelant n’a pas seulement accédé au site Web et sciemment regardé des images illicites qui s’y trouvaient, mais a également pris le contrôle des fichiers de données sous‑jacents, notamment en les sauvegardant sur le disque dur de son ordinateur.

dimanche 8 juin 2025

La seule présence d'une image de pornographie juvénile dans un ordinateur d'un accusé ne permet pas en soi de conclure à sa possession

R. v. Garbett, 2008 ONCJ 97 

Lien vers la décision


[24]     Accordingly, the mere fact that an image was found on a computer’s hard drive does not lead inexorably to an inference that the user knew of its existence, or that the user had ever viewed it, intended to view it, intended to save it, or did anything to cause it to be saved. Constable Lancaster’s evidence makes clear that to support any of those inferences, there must be something more.

samedi 24 mai 2025

Revue des principes juridiques liées à la possession en vue de trafic d'une drogue

R. v. Huang, 2013 BCSC 2237

Lien vers la décision


[51]        Many of the applicable principles are summarized in R. v. Ngo2009 BCCA 301 at paras. 51-65:

         to succeed in a prosecution of possession for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had possession of the substance, that is knowledge of its existence and an element of control over it;

         possession is not an included offence in the offence of production or cultivation, the “gravamen” of which is the active participation in the growing of prohibited plants;

         a person may be convicted of production as either a principal or a party who aids or abets the principal. In a “grow op” case, an accused may have been found to have aided and abetted in the production of the marihuana by maintaining the environment in which the marihuana is produced, with the purpose or intent to assist in the crime;

         the Crown may prove the essential elements of the offences of possession and production by direct or circumstantial evidence or a combination of the two. Where the case rests on circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts;

         the criminal standard of proof is not to be applied to each piece of evidence. In considering whether the circumstantial evidence supports an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the trier of fact must not examine each piece of evidence in isolation. Instead, the proper approach is to consider whether all the evidence, taken together, establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and is inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion; and

         as far as competing inferences from circumstantial evidence that might be open to a trial judge are concerned, he/she is not expected to:

… treat real life cases as a completely intellectual exercise where no conclusion can be reached if there is the slightest competing possibility. The criminal law requires a very high degree of proof, especially for inferences consistent with guilt, but it does not demand certainty.

[R. v. To (1992), 1992 CanLII 913 (BC CA), 16 B.C.A.C. 223 at para. 41 (C.A.), McEachern C.J.B.C., cited with approval in Ngo at para. 55.]

[52]        In addition to the above, the following principles also apply:

         possession may be personal, constructive or joint. To establish constructive possession, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the presence of the substance and he had some measure of control over its location: R. v. Fisher2005 BCCA 444 at paras. 20-24;

         constructive possession is complete “where the accused: (1) has knowledge of the character of the object, (2) knowingly puts or keeps the object in a particular place, whether or not that place belongs to him, and (3) intends to have the object in the particular place for his ‘use or benefit’ or that of another person”: R. v. Morelli2010 SCC 8 at para. 17, Fish J.;

         mere presence, that is what certain of the authorities refer to as being a “found-in”, is not sufficient to establish guilt. This is because mere presence at the scene of a crime is not necessarily proof of guilt: R. v. Jackson2007 SCC 52 at paras. 3, 9, and R. v. Sylvestre and Dunlop1979 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 881, both cited in R. v. Liu2011 BCSC 1269 at paras. 28-29;

         in some cases, in the absence of a credible explanation, an inference of knowledge may properly be drawn from the circumstantial evidence: R. v. To, supra, cited with approval in R. v. Vu2002 BCCA 659 at para. 25;

         where an alternative inference is asserted, there needs to be some evidence to support it: R. v. Vusupra, at para. 26;

         the trial judge is entitled to apply ordinary human experience and common sense in his/her assessment of the evidence. He/she should not apply speculative reasoning: R. v. Bi2011 BCCA 10 at paras. 15-16; and

         while it is true that an accused is not called upon to explain suspicious things, “there comes a time when, circumstantial evidence having enveloped a man in a strong and cogent network of inculpatory facts, that man is bound to make some explanation or stand condemned”: R. v. Jenkins (1908), 1908 CanLII 243 (BC SC), 14 C.C.C. 221, cited with approval in R. v. Dae2010 BCCA 486 at para. 20.

dimanche 18 mai 2025

L'admissibilité du document trouvé en possession de l'accusé

R. v. Hersi, 2014 ONSC 1368

Lien vers la décision


[25]      The “Document in Possession” doctrine stipulates that if the Crown can prove that a document was in the actual or constructive possession of an accused, inferences can be drawn concerning his knowledge or intent. Moreover, if the accused has acted on the document, by recognizing or adopting it in some way, then it is admissible for its truth. In R. v. Turlon, 1989 CanLII 7206 (ON CA)[1989] O.J. No. 524 (C.A.), at p. 4, the court adopted the following passage from M.N. Howard et al., eds., Phipson on Evidence, 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), at para. 30-10:

Documents which are, or have been in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognized, adopted or acted upon them.

                                                [Footnotes omitted, emphasis in original]

 

[26]      See also R. v. Savory (1996), 1996 CanLII 2001 (ON CA)94 OAC 318 (C.A.)R. v Emes 2001 CanLII 3973 (ON CA)157 C.C.C. (3d) 124 (Ont.C.A.)R. v. Ahmad, 2009 CanLII 84777 (ON SC)[2009] O.J. No. 6154 (Dawson J.), paras. 12- 38.

 

[27]      More recently, in Ahmad, Dawson J. admitted into evidence numerous articles, documents and videos, many of which were found on the computers of individuals charged with terrorism offences. Justice Dawson concluded (at para. 17) that whether an accused had knowledge of the contents of a document is for the jury to decide. It is not an admissibility issue:

 

In my view, once possession of the item is established (which in the case of a document requires proof of knowledge of the item but not of its contents) the doctrine provides that knowledge of the contents of the item may be inferred by the trier of fact based on a consideration of all the evidence. However, this is permissive not mandatory and the trier of fact is free to reject such an inference if they decide it is not warranted: Ewart, pp. 245-246, 255-256.  [emphasis added]

 

[28]      Consequently, knowledge of the contents of a document is not a precondition to its admissibility. Once the Crown has established possession of the document (i.e. proof of knowledge of the item but not of its contents), knowledge of the contents of the document may be inferred by the trier of fact from all the evidence.  In a criminal context, possession of the item is governed by the definition of possession found in s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code: J. Douglas Ewart, Documentary Evidence in Canada (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1984) at p. 232 – 236.

[29]      Mr. Hersi does not dispute that the documents in issue were on his computer, or that he had the computer with him when he was arrested at Pearson Airport. However, he does not admit knowledge of the contents of the documents, or that he was even aware of their presence on his computer. And he specifically does not admit transferring various documents from his computer to a USB key which he then gave to the undercover officer.

[30]      In my view, whether Mr. Hersi had knowledge of the contents of the computer and what weight, if any, is to be given them is for the jury to decide. At the very least, the evidence is capable of supporting the inference that he was in possession of the documents and that he conducted the internet searches. He had the laptop with him when he was arrested. It revealed a user profile for “Mohamed Hersi”, along with a spreadsheet titled “Hersi” that contained a worksheet of hours worked and pay received. Several of the documents found on the computer are identical to the documents Mr. Hersi copied onto a USB key for the officer. Although Mr. Hersi maintains (through his counsel) that other people had access to the computer and therefore he may not have been aware of all its contents, there is no evidence before me to that effect. The evidence that does exist strongly suggests the opposite, i.e. it was he and he alone who used the laptop. See Ahmad, paras. 18-23.

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