Le droit relatif à la possession et les modes de participation à l'infraction vus par la Cour d'appel de l'Alberta

R v Anny, 2021 ABCA 394

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[29]           Personal possession and joint possession are defined in ss. 4(3)(a) and 4(3)(b) of the Criminal Code:

4(3) For the purposes of this Act,

(a) a person has anything in possession when he has it in his personal possession or …

(b) where one of two or more persons, with the knowledge and consent of the rest, has anything in his custody or possession, it shall be deemed to be in the custody and possession of each and all of them.

See R v Bird, 2020 ABCA 236 at para 9, citing R v Dipnarine, 2014 ABCA 328 at para 2.

[30]           To be deemed in possession of an object pursuant to s. 4(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, an accused must have actual knowledge of, or be wilfully blind to, another person’s custody or possession of that object: R v Harms, 2020 BCCA 242 at para 30, citing R v Vinokurov, 2001 ABCA 113 at paras 11-14.  

[31]           The accused must also consent to the other person’s custody or possession of the object.

[32]           Consent requires the co-existence of some measure of control over the object because “the power to consent necessarily implies the power to refuse and vice versa”: Harms at para 30; R v Nyuon, 2014 ABCA 130 at para 16. Mere indifference or passive acquiescence is not enough: R v Piaskoski (1979), 52 CCC (2d) 316 (ONCA) at 318, 1979 CanLII 2920 (ON CA).

[33]           The requisite measure of control is made out where it is proved that the accused had some “power or authority” over the object in question, whether that power was exercised or not: R v Savory (1996), 1996 CanLII 2001 (ON CA), 94 OAC 318 (CA), [1996] OJ No 3811 (QL) at para 7, leave to appeal to SCC ref’d [1997] SCCA No 189; R v Mohamad (2004), 2004 CanLII 9378 (ON CA), 69 OR (3d) 481 (CA), [2004] OJ No 279 (QL) at para 61; Bird at para 15. Put another way by this Court in Dipnarine, a measure of control exists when the accused is in a position to exercise some “directing or restraining power” over the object: at para 18.

Section 21

[34]           Section 21 of the Criminal Code codifies what modes of participation in an unlawful activity lead to criminal liability:

21(1) Every one is a party to an offence who

(a) actually commits it;

(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or

(c) abets any person in committing it.

(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.

[35]           As explained by Lebel J. in R v Pickton, 2010 SCC 32 at para 53, “Section 21 makes it clear that an accused cannot escape liability simply because one or more other persons could also be found liable for the same offence.”

[36]           Under s. 21(1)(a), a person who commits all of the elements of an offence will face criminal liability as a co-principal along with any others who also commit all elements of that offence: Pickton at para 53. Co-principal criminal liability also arises where two or more people together form an intention to commit an offence, are present at its commission, and contribute to the crime, although they do not personally commit all of the essential elements of the offence: Pickton at para 63. See also R v Strathdee, 2021 SCC 40, [2021] SCJ No 40 (QL) at para 4.

[37]           Sections 21(1)(b) and 21(1)(c) provide additional paths to criminal liability where the evidence proves that:

…  [a] person — armed with knowledge of the principal’s intention to commit the crime and with the intention of assisting the principal in its commission — does (or, in some circumstances, omits to do) something that assists or encourages the principal in the commission of the offence… [emphasis in original]

R v Vu, 2012 SCC 40 at para 58, citing R v Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 at paras 14-18.

Lorsqu’une personne occupe une chambre, un appartement ou une maison où des stupéfiants sont retrouvés, le juge des faits peut être justifié d’inférer, au regard de l’ensemble des circonstances, que cette personne savait que des stupéfiants s’y trouvaient et qu’elle exerçait des mesures de contrôle sur ceux-ci

Desbiens c. R., 2025 QCCA 1070

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[114]   Par ailleurs, comme le soulignent les auteurs, lorsqu’une personne occupe une chambre, un appartement ou une maison où des stupéfiants sont retrouvés, le juge des faits peut être justifié d’inférer, au regard de l’ensemble des circonstances, que cette personne savait que des stupéfiants s’y trouvaient et qu’elle exerçait des mesures de contrôle sur ceux-ci au sens du sous-paragraphe 4(3)a)(ii) C.cr. :

4:51 The Essential Elements

[…]

Fundamentally, the subsection is directed to situations where the suspect does not have physical custody of the drug. Rather, […] the suspect has placed them in a secure location so the s/he can deal with them at some later time.

[…]

4:53 The Essential Elements – Application of These Principles

[…]

When assessing whether guilt is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence said to establish constructive possession, the trier of fact is not expected to treat real-life cases as a completely intellectual exercise demanding certainty.

[…]

4:55 Possession in a residence   

Where a person occupies a room, apartment or house, a trier of fact may be entitled to infer that the occupant was aware of the presence of and had a measure of control over drugs found within those premises. Just how strong that inference is, and whether it should be drawn at all, depends very much on the full factual matrix before the court.[145]

[Caractère gras et italiques dans l’original; soulignements ajoutés; renvois omis]

[115]   En l’espèce, la juge analyse la preuve circonstancielle et conclut qu’aucune inférence raisonnable autre que la possession de l’appelant ne peut en être tirée.

[116]   Dans l’arrêt Grenier c. R.[146], la Cour rappelait les principes qui s’imposent à elle lors de l’analyse d’un moyen d’appel mettant en cause l’appréciation de la preuve circonstancielle par le juge des faits :

[7] Certes, en matière de preuve circonstancielle une lacune dans la preuve peut fonder d’autres inférences que la culpabilité. Toutefois, ces inférences favorables à l’accusé doivent être raisonnables compte tenu de l’appréciation logique de la preuve, ou de l’absence de preuve, et suivant l’expérience humaine et le bon sens. Ces inférences autres que la culpabilité ne sauraient donc participer de simples hypothèses ou de conjectures. Comme la Cour le rappelait dans l’arrêt Bouzaiene‑Kais c. R. : « Une inférence possible constitue en effet une simple possibilité théorique, ou de la spéculation, et ne peut donc soulever un doute raisonnable. ». Il appartient par ailleurs fondamentalement au juge des faits de tracer dans chaque cas la ligne de démarcation entre le doute raisonnable et les conjectures, cette appréciation ne pouvant être écartée que si elle est déraisonnable.[147]

[Soulignement ajouté; renvois omis]

Lorsqu’une personne est l’occupant d’une chambre, un appartement où une maison où des stupéfiants sont retrouvés, un juge peut être justifié d’inférer que cette personne connaissait la présence des stupéfiants et qu’il exerçait des mesures de contrôle sur ceux-ci, selon l’ensemble des circonstances mis en preuve

Brideau c. R., 2022 QCCA 452

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[7]         Selon le juge, les appelants avaient la possession conjointe des roches de crack[7]. Pour le juge, conclure que Mme Trottier avait la possession des stupéfiants à l’exclusion de M. Brideau, ou l’inverse, étaient des inférences possibles, mais non  raisonnables[8].

[8]         Ainsi, le juge est d’avis que la seule inférence raisonnable étayée par la preuve circonstancielle est la culpabilité des appelants[9], qui sont déclarés coupables[10].

[9]         Le juge applique les enseignements de l’arrêt Landry c. R.[11] où notre Cour écrit ce qui suit :

[8]           Comme le souligne les auteurs MacFarlane, Frater et Proulx, lorsqu’une personne est l’occupant d’une chambre, un appartement où une maison où des stupéfiants sont retrouvés, un juge peut être justifié d’inférer que cette personne connaissait la présence des stupéfiants et qu’il exerçait des mesures de contrôle sur ceux-ci, selon l’ensemble des circonstances mis en preuve :

4.3700   Where a person occupies a room, apartment or house, a trier of fact may be entitled to infer that the occupant was aware of the presence of and had a measure of control over drugs found within those premises. Just how strong that inference is, and whether it should be drawn at all, depends very much on the full factual matrix before the court.

[Renvoi omis]

[10]      À cet égard, les auteurs de l’ouvrage Drugs Offences in Canada cité par la Cour énoncent certains facteurs qui peuvent encadrer l’analyse de la possession de drogues saisies dans une résidence :

Whether and to what extent any particular accused can be tied to drugs found in residential premises will depend on a range of factors, including: whether the accused lived there or regularly stayed over; whether others lived there or stayed over, and the frequency; clothing and other indicia of living arrangements; who paid the rent or mortgage; in whose name are the various utility accounts; frequency of attendance based on surveillance; and relationship between individuals appearing to live in the premises. This is not, of course, an exhaustive list. For example, knowledge and control over openly visible drugs can and often will be inferred where the accused are the only ones living in the premises[12]

[Renvois omis]

[11]      L’analyse du juge reflète la prise en compte de plusieurs de ces facteurs.

[12]      Les principes entourant l’évaluation d’un moyen soulevant le verdict déraisonnable ne sont pas controversés.

[13]      Il s’agit de déterminer si les conclusions tirées de la preuve circonstancielle par le juge des faits et la conclusion que la seule inférence raisonnable est celle de la culpabilité sont raisonnables[13]. 

[14]      Dans le cas d’une déclaration de culpabilité rendue par un juge seul, une cour d’appel peut tenir compte de ses motifs pour se prononcer sur le caractère raisonnable du verdict[14].

[15]      Comme l’expliquait récemment le juge Moore dans l’arrêt Vernelus, le rôle de notre Cour n’est pas de se substituer au juge des faits « mais de vérifier si la détermination de celle-ci est elle-même raisonnable, même si un autre juge aurait pu tirer une conclusion différente »[15].

[16]      Il appartient « au juge des faits de tracer dans chaque cas la ligne de démarcation entre le doute raisonnable et les conjectures »[16]. L’appréciation du juge des faits « ne peut être écartée que si elle est déraisonnable »[17].

[17]      Une cour d'appel ne pourra intervenir que si la conclusion du juge du procès selon laquelle la preuve circonstancielle excluait toute autre conclusion raisonnable est elle-même déraisonnable[18].

[18]      Les appelants devaient convaincre la Cour non pas qu’un autre juge aurait pu rendre une décision différente, mais que la conclusion du juge était déraisonnable.  Ils n’ont pas  réussi.

[19]      Finalement, soulignons qu’une cour d’appel peut tenir compte du fait que l’accusé, lorsque la preuve le plaçait dans la position de devoir la réfuter, n’a pas témoigné[19].  C’est le cas en l’espèce.

Le document en possession de l'accusé et sa reconnaissance ou son adoption par ce dernier

R. v. Kalai, 2020 NSSC 351

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   Documents in Possession

[28]         Documents in the accused’s possession are generally admissible in proof of the accused’s knowledge of their contents,  pursuant to the “documents in possession” doctrine.  Additionally, they may be admissible as proof of the truth of their contents where the accused “has recognized, adopted or acted upon” the documents.[3]  The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal summarized the doctrine in R. v. Wood, 2001 NSCA 38, at para. 114:

114      There are three elements of the doctrine. First, it must be shown that the document was actually or constructively in the possession of the accused. Second, if such possession is established, the document will be admissible to show the accused's knowledge of its contents, his connection with and state of mind with respect to the transaction to which it relates. Third, if it is established that the accused has recognized, adopted or acted on the document, it becomes admissible for the truth of its contents under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule...

[29]         Pursuant to s. 4(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, a person “has anything in possession when he has it in his personal possession or knowingly (i) has it in the actual possession or custody of another person, or (ii) has it in any place, whether or not that place belongs to or is occupied by him, for the use or benefit of himself or of another person.”   

[30]         The Crown says the accused’s possession of the documents is established by their presence on the computer in his home, so that “the contents of the documents are admissible to connect him circumstantially to the transaction in issue.  This is the first permissible use of documents in possession, as “circumstantial evidence of the accused’s involvement in the transactions to which they relate.” (see R. v. Black, 2014 BCCA 192, at para. 40).  

[31]         As the Ontario Court of Appeal said in R. v. Bridgman, 2017 ONCA 940, in respect of text messages:

[72]      If a document found in possession is elicited for a non-hearsay purpose – as original circumstantial evidence showing the accused’s connection to or complicity in a matter – then the hearsay rule is not activated ... This is true even where documents may contain out-of-court statements that can be understood as express or implied assertions if tendered for the truth of the assertion.

....

[76]      Of course, resort to this doctrine cannot constitute an end-run-around the hearsay rule. If the circumstantial value of the evidence turns on the truth of the assertion made by the non-testifying texter, then the traditional hearsay concerns will be present.

[77]      If, though, the relevance of the evidence does not depend on the truth of the assertion, the text messages may be admitted on the basis that they constitute original circumstantial evidence relevant to an issue at trial. By way of example only, text messages may constitute original circumstantial evidence connecting the accused to a location, transactions, or people, or demonstrating knowledge, state of mind and so on. I emphasize that these are only examples and should not be considered a complete or aspirational list.

[36]         Ahmad supports the view that possession can be established by the document’s presence on a storage device, such as a computer, in the accused’s home.  R. v. Hersi, 2014 ONSC 1368, stands for the same principle.  In Hersi, the Court said:

[29]      Mr. Hersi does not dispute that the documents in issue were on his computer, or that he had the computer with him when he was arrested at Pearson Airport. However, he does not admit knowledge of the contents of the documents, or that he was even aware of their presence on his computer. And he specifically does not admit transferring various documents from his computer to a USB key which he then gave to the undercover officer.

[30]      In my view, whether Mr. Hersi had knowledge of the contents of the computer and what weight, if any, is to be given them is for the jury to decide. At the very least, the evidence is capable of supporting the inference that he was in possession of the documents and that he conducted the internet searches. He had the laptop with him when he was arrested. It revealed a user profile for “Mohamed Hersi”, along with a spreadsheet titled “Hersi” that contained a worksheet of hours worked and pay received. Several of the documents found on the computer are identical to the documents Mr. Hersi copied onto a USB key for the officer. Although Mr. Hersi maintains ... that other people had access to the computer and therefore he may not have been aware of all its contents, there is no

 

evidence before me to that effect. The evidence that does exist strongly suggests the opposite, i.e. it was he and he alone who used the laptop. See Ahmad, paras. 18-23.

                                                                                                [Emphasis added]

As such, the documents were admissible for the non-hearsay purpose as documents in possession, subject to relevance.

[37]         In summary, the defence position is that possession has not been proven, and therefore admissibility as circumstantial evidence of knowledge of the contents is not established.

[38]         Based on the authorities, I find that the presence of documents on a computer in the accused’s home (some of which referenced the accused) is sufficient to connect him to their contents for the purpose of admissibility as documents in possession.  

                  Recognized, Adopted, or Acted Upon

[39]         The Crown seeks to use the documents not only for the non-hearsay purpose of connecting the accused to the transfer, but for the hearsay purpose of proving the occurrence of the transfer itself.  The Crown stated frankly in the hearing that there is no other evidence of the transaction. The Crown must therefore establish that the accused recognized, adopted, or acted upon the documents.

[40]         The “documents in possession” doctrine contemplates admissibility of documents in proof of the accused’s knowledge of their contents. It does not follow that such documents are admissible for the truth of their contents. This is only possible where the accused has “recognized, adopted or acted upon” the document, in which case the document is admissible under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule.[4] 

[41]         The question then becomes what constitutes “recognizing, adopting, or acting upon” a document?

[47]         In my view, the Crown has adduced little or no evidence to support admission of these documents under the “documents in possession hearsay exception”. Something more must be required for a document in possession to be admitted for its truth.