La doctrine de la possession récente repose sur l'existence d'une proximité temporelle entre la possession par l'accusé et le moment du vol. La force de la déduction que peut tirer le juge des faits dépend de la récence de la possession, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est proportionnelle à la brièveté de l'intervalle écoulé depuis le vol

R. v. Morgan, 2013 ONSC 1522

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[51]      In R. v. Gagnon, supra, Hamilton J.A., outlined the considerations that can be taken into account in determining whether the items were “recently” stolen:

12     The requirement that the Crown prove that the goods were recently stolen relates to when the underlying offence occurred. Any number of factors can be considered in determining whether a possession is recent including the nature of the object, its rareness, the readiness in which it can, and is likely to, pass to another and the ease of identification. See Saieva v. The Queen, 1982 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 897.

 

13     When deciding whether to infer only possession of the stolen goods or to infer the underlying offence, the trier of fact must consider all the circumstances. See Kowlyk and R. v. Abernathy (J.C.) 2002 BCCA 8, 161 B.C.A.C. 247. Common sense factors to be considered include how close in time to the theft or robbery are the goods in possession of the accused and the nature of the stolen goods. Obviously, the closer in time possession is to the underlying offence, the more likely it is that the trier of fact will draw the inference of guilt on the underlying offence. However, a longer period of time does not prevent the inference. This is evident in Kowlyk where the break-ins occurred on June 1, 6, and 8 and on July 11, but it was not until August 27th that the goods were found in the possession of the accused. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions on the underlying offences.

 

14     Ultimately, the trier of fact, upon a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, will decide which inference is to be drawn. That is a question of fact. As such, deference is owed to such finding. See, for example, H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, and R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621.

 

 

[52]      In R. v. Bakos, 2008 ONCA 712, [2008] O.J. No. 4067, the Court of Appeal accepted that four months between theft and possession could constitute recent possession:

21     In support of their argument, the appellants rely on Saieva v. The Queen (1982), 1982 CanLII 51 (SCC), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 97, in which the Supreme Court of Canada considered "recency" on the basis of the relevant factors, including the rareness of the object, the readiness with which it is likely to pass from hand to hand, its transferability and its ease of identification. However, Saieva involved different circumstances and raised different issues than those present in this case. Moreover, the theft in Saieva could have occurred 50 to 55 weeks before the possession. Also in Saieva, there was no evidence about the date of theft and, in order to establish a date, it was necessary to consider "intricate facts" about how the stolen property was used before the theft.

 

22     In this case, there was no dispute about when and where the theft occurred. Here, the possession of the stolen components by the appellants was alleged to be within four and a half months of the theft. The date when the components came into Mr. Stewart's possession was also clear. Indeed, the gap between the theft and the appellants' possession is shorter than the four plus months described because the appellants must have had the components at an earlier time in order to incorporate them into the Stewart motorcycle and advertise it for sale.

 

23     In any event, while Saieva required the trial judge to provide the jury with the criteria for determining "recency", in my view those criteria were adequately delivered to the jury in this case when the charge is considered as a whole. The jury had extensive evidence about the Chinery sale, the Dennis theft, the amalgamation of the two motorcycles into the Stewart motorcycle, the possible use made of the Dennis motorcycle in the summer of 2004 and the appellants' possession of the components for a period of time before the sale to Stewart.

 

24     The nature of the issues in this trial and the components of the offences were clear to the jury. The factual issues and the applicable law were reviewed in detail in the trial judge's charge. This was not a complicated trial requiring a detailed explanation of "recent": see also Watt at pp. 649-58. Further, in my view, the Crown was not compelled, as suggested in oral argument, to call expert evidence, if such evidence was available, on the transferability in practice of stolen motorcycle components when taken by a dealer for inclusion in a rebuilt motorcycle. I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.

 

 

[53]      Accordingly, in order to determine recency, the court is entitled to consider a variety of factors including, but not limited to:

(1)         Rareness and nature of the object,

 

(2)         Readiness with which it is likely to pass from hand to hand,

 

(3)         Its transferability,

 

(4)         Its ease of identification.

 

[54]      The authors of McWilliams, in Canadian Criminal Evidence, (3^rd edition), at pp. 5-14 refer to the Cockins Case (1836), 168 E.R. 1139, where the trial judge instructed the jury, with respect to a charge of theft of socks found in the accused’s possession twenty days after they were missed, that:

If I was to lose my watch and in a few minutes it was to be found on the person one of you, it would afford the strongest ground for presuming that you had stolen it; but if a month hence it were to be found in your possession, the presumption of your having stolen it would be greatly weakened because stolen property passes through many hands.

 

 

[55]      Further, the McWilliams’ authors write that the “strength of the presumption depends on how recent the possession is, that is, in proportion to the shortness of the interval since the theft. It also depends on the nature of the possession, whether it is open or avowed or secret and concealed and the nature of the account given of it: R. v. Exall [citation omitted]”.     

[56]      Recency has been held to be established in the following circumstances: (1) money stolen from a bank robbery four hours earlier  (R. v. Dionne [2005] S.C.J. No. 27); (2) guns stolen 17 days earlier (R. v. Choquette [2007] O. J. No. 3137 (C.A.)); (3) truck with significant alterations stolen 56 days earlier (R. v. MacNair [2006] O.J. No. 2430 (C.A.)); (4) bank card stolen 72 hours earlier (R. v. Barrett [2011] (S.C.J.); horse stolen 3 days earlier; Clement’s case (1830), 168 E.R. 980 – see R. v. Kowlyk).

[57]      In dealing with a stolen radio, the Court of Appeal indicated in R. v. Cousineau, 1982 CanLII 3720 (ON CA), [1982] O.J. No. 150 (C.A.), at para. 14:

…Although the date of the theft is unknown, the interval between the theft and the sale was less than one month. While it is true that the presumption of knowledge from recent possession does not apply where common, easily transferable articles are held for a long period, I know of no authority which would compel me to find that the presumption could not apply where the period is less than one month. The decisions on this issue show that the operation of the presumption turns on the facts of each case.

La doctrine de la possession récente peut permettre au juge des faits d'inférer la connaissance que l'objet est volé, mais peut aussi permettre de conclure à la participation à la commission de l'infraction

R. v. Ricciardi, 2017 ONSC 5562

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[26]      This finding does not end matters. The common law doctrine of recent possession permits an inference of guilt in circumstances where an accused person is found in the unexplained possession of recently stolen property: see R. v. Kowlyk, 1988 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1988] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 12. The inference is permissive, not mandatory. It is not a presumption. The inference of guilt may relate to knowledge that the items are stolen, but it may also relate to participation in a related offence such as theft, break and enter, and even murder: see R. v. Morgan, 2013 ONSC 1522 and R. v. Hubler, 2013 ABCA 31.

Le droit relatif à la possession et les modes de participation à l'infraction vus par la Cour d'appel de l'Alberta

R v Anny, 2021 ABCA 394

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[29]           Personal possession and joint possession are defined in ss. 4(3)(a) and 4(3)(b) of the Criminal Code:

4(3) For the purposes of this Act,

(a) a person has anything in possession when he has it in his personal possession or …

(b) where one of two or more persons, with the knowledge and consent of the rest, has anything in his custody or possession, it shall be deemed to be in the custody and possession of each and all of them.

See R v Bird, 2020 ABCA 236 at para 9, citing R v Dipnarine, 2014 ABCA 328 at para 2.

[30]           To be deemed in possession of an object pursuant to s. 4(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, an accused must have actual knowledge of, or be wilfully blind to, another person’s custody or possession of that object: R v Harms, 2020 BCCA 242 at para 30, citing R v Vinokurov, 2001 ABCA 113 at paras 11-14.  

[31]           The accused must also consent to the other person’s custody or possession of the object.

[32]           Consent requires the co-existence of some measure of control over the object because “the power to consent necessarily implies the power to refuse and vice versa”: Harms at para 30; R v Nyuon, 2014 ABCA 130 at para 16. Mere indifference or passive acquiescence is not enough: R v Piaskoski (1979), 52 CCC (2d) 316 (ONCA) at 318, 1979 CanLII 2920 (ON CA).

[33]           The requisite measure of control is made out where it is proved that the accused had some “power or authority” over the object in question, whether that power was exercised or not: R v Savory (1996), 1996 CanLII 2001 (ON CA), 94 OAC 318 (CA), [1996] OJ No 3811 (QL) at para 7, leave to appeal to SCC ref’d [1997] SCCA No 189; R v Mohamad (2004), 2004 CanLII 9378 (ON CA), 69 OR (3d) 481 (CA), [2004] OJ No 279 (QL) at para 61; Bird at para 15. Put another way by this Court in Dipnarine, a measure of control exists when the accused is in a position to exercise some “directing or restraining power” over the object: at para 18.

Section 21

[34]           Section 21 of the Criminal Code codifies what modes of participation in an unlawful activity lead to criminal liability:

21(1) Every one is a party to an offence who

(a) actually commits it;

(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or

(c) abets any person in committing it.

(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.

[35]           As explained by Lebel J. in R v Pickton, 2010 SCC 32 at para 53, “Section 21 makes it clear that an accused cannot escape liability simply because one or more other persons could also be found liable for the same offence.”

[36]           Under s. 21(1)(a), a person who commits all of the elements of an offence will face criminal liability as a co-principal along with any others who also commit all elements of that offence: Pickton at para 53. Co-principal criminal liability also arises where two or more people together form an intention to commit an offence, are present at its commission, and contribute to the crime, although they do not personally commit all of the essential elements of the offence: Pickton at para 63. See also R v Strathdee, 2021 SCC 40, [2021] SCJ No 40 (QL) at para 4.

[37]           Sections 21(1)(b) and 21(1)(c) provide additional paths to criminal liability where the evidence proves that:

…  [a] person — armed with knowledge of the principal’s intention to commit the crime and with the intention of assisting the principal in its commission — does (or, in some circumstances, omits to do) something that assists or encourages the principal in the commission of the offence… [emphasis in original]

R v Vu, 2012 SCC 40 at para 58, citing R v Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 at paras 14-18.

Lorsqu’une personne occupe une chambre, un appartement ou une maison où des stupéfiants sont retrouvés, le juge des faits peut être justifié d’inférer, au regard de l’ensemble des circonstances, que cette personne savait que des stupéfiants s’y trouvaient et qu’elle exerçait des mesures de contrôle sur ceux-ci

Desbiens c. R., 2025 QCCA 1070

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[114]   Par ailleurs, comme le soulignent les auteurs, lorsqu’une personne occupe une chambre, un appartement ou une maison où des stupéfiants sont retrouvés, le juge des faits peut être justifié d’inférer, au regard de l’ensemble des circonstances, que cette personne savait que des stupéfiants s’y trouvaient et qu’elle exerçait des mesures de contrôle sur ceux-ci au sens du sous-paragraphe 4(3)a)(ii) C.cr. :

4:51 The Essential Elements

[…]

Fundamentally, the subsection is directed to situations where the suspect does not have physical custody of the drug. Rather, […] the suspect has placed them in a secure location so the s/he can deal with them at some later time.

[…]

4:53 The Essential Elements – Application of These Principles

[…]

When assessing whether guilt is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence said to establish constructive possession, the trier of fact is not expected to treat real-life cases as a completely intellectual exercise demanding certainty.

[…]

4:55 Possession in a residence   

Where a person occupies a room, apartment or house, a trier of fact may be entitled to infer that the occupant was aware of the presence of and had a measure of control over drugs found within those premises. Just how strong that inference is, and whether it should be drawn at all, depends very much on the full factual matrix before the court.[145]

[Caractère gras et italiques dans l’original; soulignements ajoutés; renvois omis]

[115]   En l’espèce, la juge analyse la preuve circonstancielle et conclut qu’aucune inférence raisonnable autre que la possession de l’appelant ne peut en être tirée.

[116]   Dans l’arrêt Grenier c. R.[146], la Cour rappelait les principes qui s’imposent à elle lors de l’analyse d’un moyen d’appel mettant en cause l’appréciation de la preuve circonstancielle par le juge des faits :

[7] Certes, en matière de preuve circonstancielle une lacune dans la preuve peut fonder d’autres inférences que la culpabilité. Toutefois, ces inférences favorables à l’accusé doivent être raisonnables compte tenu de l’appréciation logique de la preuve, ou de l’absence de preuve, et suivant l’expérience humaine et le bon sens. Ces inférences autres que la culpabilité ne sauraient donc participer de simples hypothèses ou de conjectures. Comme la Cour le rappelait dans l’arrêt Bouzaiene‑Kais c. R. : « Une inférence possible constitue en effet une simple possibilité théorique, ou de la spéculation, et ne peut donc soulever un doute raisonnable. ». Il appartient par ailleurs fondamentalement au juge des faits de tracer dans chaque cas la ligne de démarcation entre le doute raisonnable et les conjectures, cette appréciation ne pouvant être écartée que si elle est déraisonnable.[147]

[Soulignement ajouté; renvois omis]

Lorsqu’une personne est l’occupant d’une chambre, un appartement où une maison où des stupéfiants sont retrouvés, un juge peut être justifié d’inférer que cette personne connaissait la présence des stupéfiants et qu’il exerçait des mesures de contrôle sur ceux-ci, selon l’ensemble des circonstances mis en preuve

Brideau c. R., 2022 QCCA 452

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[7]         Selon le juge, les appelants avaient la possession conjointe des roches de crack[7]. Pour le juge, conclure que Mme Trottier avait la possession des stupéfiants à l’exclusion de M. Brideau, ou l’inverse, étaient des inférences possibles, mais non  raisonnables[8].

[8]         Ainsi, le juge est d’avis que la seule inférence raisonnable étayée par la preuve circonstancielle est la culpabilité des appelants[9], qui sont déclarés coupables[10].

[9]         Le juge applique les enseignements de l’arrêt Landry c. R.[11] où notre Cour écrit ce qui suit :

[8]           Comme le souligne les auteurs MacFarlane, Frater et Proulx, lorsqu’une personne est l’occupant d’une chambre, un appartement où une maison où des stupéfiants sont retrouvés, un juge peut être justifié d’inférer que cette personne connaissait la présence des stupéfiants et qu’il exerçait des mesures de contrôle sur ceux-ci, selon l’ensemble des circonstances mis en preuve :

4.3700   Where a person occupies a room, apartment or house, a trier of fact may be entitled to infer that the occupant was aware of the presence of and had a measure of control over drugs found within those premises. Just how strong that inference is, and whether it should be drawn at all, depends very much on the full factual matrix before the court.

[Renvoi omis]

[10]      À cet égard, les auteurs de l’ouvrage Drugs Offences in Canada cité par la Cour énoncent certains facteurs qui peuvent encadrer l’analyse de la possession de drogues saisies dans une résidence :

Whether and to what extent any particular accused can be tied to drugs found in residential premises will depend on a range of factors, including: whether the accused lived there or regularly stayed over; whether others lived there or stayed over, and the frequency; clothing and other indicia of living arrangements; who paid the rent or mortgage; in whose name are the various utility accounts; frequency of attendance based on surveillance; and relationship between individuals appearing to live in the premises. This is not, of course, an exhaustive list. For example, knowledge and control over openly visible drugs can and often will be inferred where the accused are the only ones living in the premises[12]

[Renvois omis]

[11]      L’analyse du juge reflète la prise en compte de plusieurs de ces facteurs.

[12]      Les principes entourant l’évaluation d’un moyen soulevant le verdict déraisonnable ne sont pas controversés.

[13]      Il s’agit de déterminer si les conclusions tirées de la preuve circonstancielle par le juge des faits et la conclusion que la seule inférence raisonnable est celle de la culpabilité sont raisonnables[13]. 

[14]      Dans le cas d’une déclaration de culpabilité rendue par un juge seul, une cour d’appel peut tenir compte de ses motifs pour se prononcer sur le caractère raisonnable du verdict[14].

[15]      Comme l’expliquait récemment le juge Moore dans l’arrêt Vernelus, le rôle de notre Cour n’est pas de se substituer au juge des faits « mais de vérifier si la détermination de celle-ci est elle-même raisonnable, même si un autre juge aurait pu tirer une conclusion différente »[15].

[16]      Il appartient « au juge des faits de tracer dans chaque cas la ligne de démarcation entre le doute raisonnable et les conjectures »[16]. L’appréciation du juge des faits « ne peut être écartée que si elle est déraisonnable »[17].

[17]      Une cour d'appel ne pourra intervenir que si la conclusion du juge du procès selon laquelle la preuve circonstancielle excluait toute autre conclusion raisonnable est elle-même déraisonnable[18].

[18]      Les appelants devaient convaincre la Cour non pas qu’un autre juge aurait pu rendre une décision différente, mais que la conclusion du juge était déraisonnable.  Ils n’ont pas  réussi.

[19]      Finalement, soulignons qu’une cour d’appel peut tenir compte du fait que l’accusé, lorsque la preuve le plaçait dans la position de devoir la réfuter, n’a pas témoigné[19].  C’est le cas en l’espèce.