Le simple passage du temps ne rend pas automatiquement une information périmée, car sa pertinence doit être évaluée de manière contextuelle en tenant compte notamment de la nature continue des activités criminelles visées

R. v. James, 2019 ONCA 288

Lien vers la décision

[55] There is no rule as to how recent information has to be in order to be relevant: R. v. Dionisi, [2012] A.J. No. 65, 2012 ABCA 20, 285 C.C.C. (3d) 502, at para. 22. In my view, the trial judge fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the offences being investigated and the respondent's possible involvement in them. The information from the investigation showed that Primo was not some low level drug dealer operating in small quantities that might be sold on a street corner or in a back alley. Rather, the information showed that Primo was dealing in much larger quantities of cocaine, up to the kilogram level. The activities of large-scale drug dealers are not transitory.

[57] Not only do these events support this conclusion, so too does the criminal record of the respondent. Prior criminal activity -- including prior involvement in the drug trade -- is a relevant factor in determining whether there are reasonable and probable grounds for a search: R. v. Pasian, [2017] O.J. No. 2858, 2017 ONCA 451, 349 C.C.C. (3d) 144, at para. 6.

[60] Against that background, and the contemporaneous evidence regarding the drug activity involving the respondent and MD, the affiant's failure to mention that the April 2012 charges were stayed is an entirely minor error that does not, in any way, detract from the overall picture presented to the authorizing justice. It certainly would not have unduly influenced the justice of the peace in terms of whether or not to issue the search warrant. And, on review, whether you excise the April 2012 charges, or amplify the record by including the stay of those charges, neither would result in a conclusion that the justice of the peace could not have issued the search warrant.

[61] Returning to the issue of the currency of the information, the only authority to which the trial judge made reference on the issue of stale-dated information was R. v. Silveira (1995), 1995 CanLII 89 (SCC), 23 O.R. (3d) 256, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38. It is not clear how that authority would assist on the issue here since that case [page338] dealt with a search in exigent circumstances. I do note, however, that Cory J., speaking for the majority, discussed the problem that the police had in terms of whether they could obtain a search warrant in the exigent circumstances that they were confronted with. He suggested that one solution to the problem would have been for the police to have obtained the search warrant based on information that they had from a week or so earlier. In making that suggestion, Cory J. made the following observation, at para. 154, which is particularly apt to the situation here:

In this case, evidence existed upon which a search warrant might have been obtained before the arrests were made. It may be that it would have been preferable for the police to have obtained a search warrant based on the earlier transactions prior to that made on the day of the arrests . . . At the time of trial, if the search warrant was attacked on the grounds that it was outdated, evidence could be adduced of the difficulty of providing up-to-date material in circumstances like these and that, in light of the necessity of protecting the evidence, the police found it necessary to obtain a warrant based on the earlier transactions and observations. In the absence of an unreasonable delay between the observations and the application, it would be difficult to imagine that the warrant could be successfully attacked on the grounds that it was stale-dated. That is the way the police should have proceeded.

[62] A more pertinent authority on this subject is this court's decision in R. v. Breton, 1994 CanLII 939 (ON CA), [1994] O.J. No. 2097, 74 O.A.C. 99, 93 C.C.C. (3d) 171 (C.A.). In that case, there had been drug transactions in an apartment on September 16 and October 8. A search warrant was executed on October 15. One of the challenges to the warrant was that there was no information to believe that drugs would be found in the apartment on October 15. While that argument found favour with the trial judge, it did not find favour with this court. This court concluded that it was open to the issuing justice to infer from the earlier transactions that there was a probability that drugs would be found in the apartment on the later date. In so concluding, this court made reference to an earlier decision where a search warrant was issued on July 12 based on a drug transaction from May 3.¹ This court noted that, in that earlier case, "[n]otwithstanding the time lapse this court held that the information was sufficient": Breton, at para. 48.

[63] Another example is found in R. v. Lucas (2014), 121 O.R. (3d) 303, [2014] O.J. No. 3471, 2014 ONCA 561, leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 460, 2015 CanLII 1812. In that case, there was a challenge to the ITO relied upon to obtain an authorization to intercept private communications. The target, Lucas, was believed to be trafficking in firearms. Lucas [page339] challenged the information in the ITO on the basis that it was stale because it referred to activities that had taken place some three years earlier. This court rejected that challenge. This court said, at para. 140:

[W]e agree with the trial judge that in this case, the fact that guns had allegedly been supplied to Lucas some years before the investigation into the offences referred to in the ITO did not undermine the grounds for issuing the authorization to intercept his communications. The ITO provided reasonable grounds to believe that Lucas had not disposed of all the guns delivered to him by Cooke, that he had supplied guns to the Doomstown Crips in the past, and the surveillance evidence from January 2006 indicated that Lucas may have been transporting firearms. The ITO thus provided reasonable grounds to believe that Lucas had been and continued to be involved in the organized trafficking of a substantial number of weapons.

(Emphasis added)

[64] The approach to the question of whether information is so dated such that it cannot be relied upon for the purpose of seeking a judicial authorization must be undertaken on a common sense and practical basis, taking all of the prevailing circumstances into account. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal observed in R. v. Ballendine, [2011] B.C.J. No. 838, 2011 BCCA 221, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 418, at para. 54:

Merely because information is "dated" does not mean it is "stale". While the length of time that has passed is to be taken into account in a reasonable-grounds determination, it is but one factor.

[65] As the court in Ballendine also observed, on these issues, a court is entitled to draw common sense inferences regarding the activities of persons: at paras. 53, 55, 57. That common sense point was echoed by this court in R. v. Beauchamp, [2015] O.J. No. 1939, 2015 ONCA 260, 326 C.C.C. (3d) 280, at para. 113:

[I]t would have been open to the authorizing judge to infer current criminality from past criminality in the circumstances disclosed by the evidence in the affidavit. In considering the capacity of the evidentiary predicate to ground a finding of probable cause, it is important to keep in mind the investigative objective and the nature of the alleged criminality involved. Ongoing criminal enterprises do not come into existence, nor do they disappear overnight. Information that seems dated at first blush can retain its relevance.

(Emphasis added)

[66] The suggestion, implicit in the respondent's position, that three weeks after the respondent was observed driving from London to Windsor in order to deliver a significant quantity of cocaine to MD, he became disassociated from, and unconnected with, drug trafficking finds no common sense foundation.

[67] In support of his position, the respondent relies on the decision in R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [page340] 2010 SCC 8, where a warrant to search for evidence of possession of child pornography based on four-month-old information was held to have been improperly issued. In my view, the decision in Morelli does not assist the respondent. The decision in that case is very much fact driven. A particularly salient fact is that the links on the accused's computer to two possible child-pornography websites, that a technician had noticed, were gone when the technician returned to view the computer the next day. As Fish J. said, at para. 95:

At best, this may be a ground for suspicion, but surely the deleted links afford no reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the appellant was in possession of child pornography, and still less that evidence of that crime would be found upon a search of his computer.

[68] The decision in Morelli does not preclude reliance on a pattern of behaviour as part of the evidentiary foundation for the issuance of a search warrant. It merely requires that there be sufficient facts to provide that foundation. In Morelli, the court found that there were not sufficient facts. Here, as I have already explained, there is a pattern of conduct by the respondent based on the information that the police had gained from their investigation and the criminal record of the respondent. Put simply, there was offence specific information establishing a pattern of drug dealing involving the respondent.

[69] My colleague draws support for the trial judge's conclusion from R. v. Rocha (2012), 112 O.R. (3d) 742, [2012] O.J. No. 4991, 2012 ONCA 707. However, that case also does not assist. Rocha involved the sufficiency of an ITO based on an informer's tip, and whether that tip was sufficiently credible and corroborated to tie drugs to a particular residence. The decision does not turn on whether the information was "dated", nor does it turn on any pattern of conduct.

[70] The trial judge also rejected the Crown's explanation for the delay in obtaining the warrant based on the fact that, had the police moved on the respondent's involvement earlier, it would have curtailed the broader ongoing police investigation. In response to this point, the trial judge said:

If they were after the bigger fish with respect to the firearms they should have left [the respondent] alone until they could achieve their purpose and go after him on the evidence that they had at the time.

[71] It is unclear to me what the trial judge meant by "on the evidence that they had at the time". The evidence that the police had was the evidence they put in the ITO. If the trial judge meant that, if the police had nothing further regarding the respondent when they moved on the broader investigation, they ought to have [page341] left the respondent alone, then that view reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of large-scale police investigations, and an extremely problematic one at that.

[72] As numerous large-scale police investigations have demonstrated, such investigations take time. During the course of those investigations, different individuals committing different offences may be identified at different times. It is common practice to address all such individuals, and all such offences, at the time that the broader investigation is completed -- the so-called "take-down day". This is done as a practical matter to avoid undermining the broader investigation. This necessary approach does not, of course, remove the need for the police to have the requisite grounds for the authorization at the time that they obtain it.

[73] If the thrust of the trial judge's decision here is, as I fear, that the police must either move immediately, when each of those offenders and offences is identified, or otherwise walk away from the prosecution of such persons, the result will seriously undermine the effectiveness, indeed the viability, of these types of investigations. The police will be left with the insolvable dilemma of either moving on the more peripheral but still serious offences immediately, and thus risk disrupting the larger investigation that often reflects more widespread and ongoing offences, or complete their investigation and walk away from the earlier offences revealed. Neither of those results is palatable in terms of public safety or proper law enforcement. With respect, no evidence is required to take into account such common sense real-world considerations.

[74] Further, any suggestion that the police should act on such offences and just hope that doing so will not jeopardize the larger investigation, imposes on the police a requirement to assume an unacceptable risk. It also potentially involves placing any police agents and undercover officers who might be involved in the investigation, as was the case here, at risk for their safety. No proper interpretation of s. 8 Charter rights compels such intolerable choices.

*** Note de l'auteur de ce blog: cette dissidence de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario est avalisée par la Cour suprême - voir R. c. James, 2019 CSC 52 ***

La pertinence d'une information à la base de motifs raisonnables d'un policier n'est soumise à aucune règle stricte de récence

R. v. Dionisi, 2012 ABCA 20

Lien vers la décision

[20]           We conclude that the trial judge erred in her approach as to whether there was a section 8 Charter breach in the first place. In a voir dire as to a section 8 Charter breach, the onus is not upon the claimant to merely show that there were defects in the ITO, the claimant must establish the breach of section 8 on a balance of probabilities. This can be done only by showing that it is likely that the search warrant would not have issued based upon the content of the ITO. It is not enough to persuade the trial judge that she would not have been inclined to issue the warrant on the grounds thus provided. The trial judge must be satisfied that the warrant is invalid, not that the trial judge would not have authorized it. The trial judge does not re-try the warrant: R v Schindler, 2001 ABCA 22, 277 AR 98 at para 18, citing R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 992.

 

[21]           Even if it is established that there are flaws in the ITO, such as that information is inaccurate, or a material fact is not disclosed, this will not necessarily detract from the existence of the statutory pre-conditions: see R v Pires, 2005 SCC 66 at para 30, [2005] 3 SCR 343. As the trial judge noted, the fact that the confirmatory information in the ITO related to details other than the actual observations of drugs in the house or the fact of appellant’s trafficking, that confirmation still has value on the totality of the circumstances: R v Caissey, 2007 ABCA 380 at para 23, 227 CCC (3d) 322, aff’d 2008 SCC 65, [2008] 3 SCR 451; R v Hillgardener, 2010 ABCA 80, 252 CCC (3d) 486. Here the ITO said that the informant had provided reliable information in the past and that he had been compensated for it, and also that he had a relationship with the handler. The fact that the informant had given specific details about non-offence particulars was still consistent with the informant providing information on which reliance could be placed. There would in such a context be support for the idea that the informant had no grudge against the appellant but a motive to work with the police.

 

[22]           The trial judge appears to have felt that the information from the informant might have been dated. There is no rule as to how recent information has to be in order to be relevant. In any event, the ITO alleged the information in the present tense. These averments provided no room for the conjecture that the information provided was not recent enough to be relevant. The trial judge also speculated as to whether the information provided by the ITO was information that the informant learned rather than seeing personally. An ITO is to be read in a practical, non-technical, common-sense basis: see R v Whitaker, 2008 BCCA 174 at paras 41-42, 254 BCAC 234, leave refused [2008] 3 SCR x. There was no foothold for the assumption that the information was second-hand. Even if it were second-hand, the police experience with the informant was such that his information had been found to be reliable in the past.

[23]           More generally, it would not be correct for a trial judge to assume that any observations made by that trial judge as to possible questions about the content of the ITO from looking at the text would be such as would have escaped the notice of the authorizing judge. For example, at one point she questioned whether the grammar in the ITO was identifying more than one informant. This court does not share her concern in that respect, but in any event the law does not assume that the trial judge is smarter than the authorizing judge in that sense. Rather, the search warrant is presumed to be valid: R v Pitre, 2011 NBCA 106 at para 34 citing Quebec (Attorney General) v Laroche, 2002 SCC 72 at para 68, [2002] 3 SCR 708.

 

[24]           The case law has said repeatedly that the function of the trial judge is not to substitute her opinion for that of the authorizing judge: R v Campbell, 2011 SCC 32 at para 14, [2011] 2 SCR 549 (“The question for a reviewing court is ‘not whether the reviewing court would itself have issued the warrant, but whether there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence’ to permit an issuing justice to authorize the warrant (Morelli, at para. 40).”). Also see R v Lee, 2011 ABCA 310 at para 14 (“ The function of the reviewing judge is not to conduct a rehearing; rather, that judge should not interfere if the authorizing judge could have granted the authorization: R v Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421 at 1452, 60 CCC (3d) 161; R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 SCR 992 at 1016‑1017.”).

 

[25]           A search warrant should issue only on a credibly-based probability, having regard to the whole of the circumstances, but as pointed out in Lee:

 

15        The proof sufficient to meet the standard of credibly based probability is whether the totality of the relevant circumstances support the inference. Here the appellant invites us to examine individual circumstances in isolation, and suggests other inferences are possible. We are satisfied that a collective assessment of the circumstances supports the finding of the reviewing judge that there was sufficient evidence that the authorizing judge could properly have granted the search warrant in this case.

 

[26]           The Court in Pitre explained that it is not for the trial judge to decide if the warrant would have necessarily issued on the ITO, but whether it could have been authorized by a judge acting judicially: see likewise R v Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851, 249 CCC (3d) 29 at paras 21, 33. (Ebanks was applied by ONCA majority in its decision later affirmed in Campbell.) It is apparent from the reasons of the trial judge, notably at paras 35 to 37, that she adopted a totality test, contended for by counsel for the appellant, that the ITO had to provide “compelling” information. Her concerns about the conclusory nature of what the ITO contained overlooked the specific detail of the manner and price at which the appellant allegedly was selling cocaine. The suggestion that this may be “mere rumour or gossip” is not grounded in anything but the argument of counsel. She dismissed the averments about the 2004 incident as unhelpful. She concluded her analysis with the observation that “I find that the edited ITO contains insufficient grounds ...” by reference to the “compelling” test. That was not the question. The question was whether no judge, acting judicially, could have chosen to grant the authorization on the information remaining after redaction.

Comparution au-delà de 24 heures : une détention arbitraire qui ne justifie toutefois pas l'arrêt des procédures si l'équité du procès demeure intacte (il faut voir si l’État a profité ou non de ce délai pour améliorer sa capacité de prouver la culpabilité de l'accusé)

R. c. Teran Flores, 2020 QCCS 2437

Lien vers la décision

[25]        Voici la description que formulent les auteurs de l’ouvrage Charter Remedies in Canadian Criminal Cases de la jurisprudence à l’égard de ces problématiques :

There is authority for finding an abuse of process that justifies a stay of proceedings where the accused’s right against arbitrary detention under section 9 has been breached by egregious “over-holding”- that is, detaining the accused in police custody, post-arrest, for longer than is reasonable or longer than is permitted by the relevant provisions of the Code. In R v Simpson, the Supreme Court reinstated a stay granted by a provincial court judge where the police had failed to comply with section 503(1)(a), which requires that "where a justice is available" an accused is to be brought before a justice "without unreasonable delay and in any event within [24 hours]." However, in R v Mangat, the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned a stay that had been granted where the accused was held at the station for nearly 26 hours before being taken to court for a bail hearing. A sentence reduction has sometimes been held to be an adequate lesser remedy.

The over-holding issue has often arisen in alcohol-driving prosecutions, where the accused was held in custody at the police station after failing a breath test even though they wished to leave and had a responsible adult available to pick them up. Holding a person in custody overnight solely on the basis of a high blood-alcohol level without considering other factors favouring release will likely amount to a breach of the section 9 right against arbitrary detention. However, courts have generally been reluctant to grant stays of proceedings in these circumstances. Sometimes exclusion of the breath-sample evidence collected during the accused's detention has been found to be the appropriate remedy.

It has been held that a police policy requiring all persons charged with domestic assaults to be held for a bail hearing rather than being released from the station amounted to a "systemic abdication" of the responsibility to apply section 498 of the Code and a serious breach of the Charter. However, the appellate courts held that the trial judge properly exercised his remedial discretion in granting "4 for 1" credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody rather than a stay of proceedings. Likewise, the failure to release from the police station because of non-residency in the jurisdiction has been held to violate section 9. Where this was shown to have been the result of a systemic training issue, a stay of proceedings was granted.

Relatedly, the abuse of process doctrine has also been invoked where the accused has been brought to court in a timely fashion but the court has failed to proceed with the bail hearing within a reasonable time. Lesser remedies, such as costs awards or enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, will usually be preferred to the drastic remedy of a stay[5].

[Le soulignement est ajouté] [Les appels de notes sont supprimés]

 

[26]        Par ailleurs, dans son ouvrage Constitutional Remedies in Canada, le professeur Roach écrit :

The use of a stay of proceedings as a remedy for violations of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter has been controversial.  This issue typically arises when an unconstitutional search or detention does not produce evidence that can be excluded under s. 24(2)[6].

[Le soulignement est ajouté]

[30]        Tout prévenu doit comparaître dans un délai de 24 heures.

[31]        Dans l’arrêt R. c. Storrey[7], le juge Cory doit déterminer si la détention de 18 heures de l’accusé dans cette affaire était arbitraire, il adopte l’interprétation du juge Martin de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans l’arrêt R. v. Koszulap[8] selon lequel l’art. 503 « impose à la police l'obligation de conduire la personne devant un juge de paix sans retard injustifié et […] les 24 heures représentent simplement la durée maximale du retard »[9].

[32]        Dans l’arrêt R. c. Reilly[10], la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta formule la même conclusion :

[6]        Section 503(1)(a) provides a dual time limit for the holding of the bail hearing. The detained person must be taken before a justice a) without unreasonable delay, and b) in any event no later than 24 hours after the person was arrested. As will be seen (infra, para. 9) the respondent was detained for approximately 35 hours before he was taken before a justice, resulting in his application for a stay of proceedings.

[7]        Section 503(1)(a) does not provide that the police can always hold a detained person for 24 hours; that is just the outside limit of what is “unreasonable delay”: R. v E.W., 2002 NFCA 49 at paras. 13-5, 168 CCC (3d) 38; R. v Precourt (1976), , 1976 CanLII 692 (ON CA), 18 OR (2d) 714 at p. 722 (CA). […]

[33]      Dans l’arrêt R. v. Poirier[11], la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario décrit l’objet poursuivi par l’article 503 du Code criminel et souligne l’importance de la supervision judiciaire qu’entraîne la comparution selon le délai de 24 heures prévu dans cet article :

[51]      Section 503(1) of the Criminal Code requires a peace officer who arrests a person, with or without a warrant, to bring the person before a justice of the peace, where a justice is available, without unreasonable delay or in any event within 24 hours of arrest.

[…]

[57]      Section 503 reflects an important fundamental right in our society, namely, the liberty of the subject, which is not to be taken away except in accordance with the law: R. v. Simpson (1994), 1994 CanLII 4528 (NL CA), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 377 (N.L.C.A.), at p. 386-87, rev’d on other grounds, 1995 CanLII 120 (CSC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 449. In holding that the accused’s detention was arbitrary in R. v. Truchanek (1984), 1984 CanLII 5683 (BC SC), 39 C.R. (3d) 137 (B.C. Co. Ct.), Hogarth Co. Ct. J. stated, at pp. 170-71 :

[E]ven if the detention was but for hours, even if the detention was to obtain evidence of the commission of a serious crime, the deliberate illegal refusal to present [the accused] according to law was in my view a matter of vital importance for the people of this community, as it opens up to the police the idea that any one of us who has the misfortune to be arrested could be held for any length of time in order to extract a confession, to locate evidence and, for that matter, for any other purpose at their whim.

[58]      Compliance with s. 503 is not simply a matter of form. Nor does it matter that the appellant may not likely have been released by a justice of the peace while the bedpan vigil search was being conducted. If the police had complied with s. 503, the manner in which the appellant continued to be detained would have been subject to court supervision. The appellant’s detention would have changed from being a detention pursuant to the execution of the general warrant to a court monitored detention that ensured the ongoing protection of the appellant’s Charter rights.

[Le soulignement est ajouté]

[34]        Dans l’arrêt R. v. Reilly[12], la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta réfère dans un premier temps aux observations du juge en chef Wagner dans l’arrêt Myers où celui-ci souligne que « [l]es retards dans les affaires ordinaires de détention et de mise en liberté sous caution sont une manifestation de la culture de complaisance que notre Cour a dénoncée dans l’arrêt Jordan et il faut y remédier »[13].

[35]        La Cour d’appel de l’Alberta ajoute que les exigences de l’article 503 doivent être respectées en tout temps :

The time limits in the Criminal Code must be met on time, every time, for every detained person. The government must indeed design a system that is able to handle “any bail volume” at any time. Section 503(1) of the Criminal Code and s. 9 of the Charter do not say that they only apply “when funding permits”, or that they are inapplicable during the implementation of new procedures. The government should also recall that not only must all detainees be taken before a justice within 24 hours, they must also be given a hearing “without unreasonable delay”. Consistently meeting the 24 hour limit is a good starting point, but the government’s work will not necessarily end when that is accomplished[14].

[36]        La détention du prévenu qui ne survient pas durant la limite maximale de 24 heures fixée par l’art. 503 est arbitraire au sens de l’article 9 de la Charte, car une détention illégale est nécessairement arbitraire[15].

[37]        Cela dit, si la détention arbitraire, qui résulte de la non-comparution d’un prévenu durant le délai de 24 heures, ne permet pas à l’État de recueillir des éléments de preuve qui exige que les tribunaux se dissocient du fruit de cette conduite illégale et arbitraire en excluant les éléments de preuve ainsi acquis, il faut reconnaître qu’une telle détention ne met pas en cause le droit à une défense pleine et entière et l’équité du procès d’un accusé.

[38]        Certes, la détention arbitraire qui découle d’une violation systémique et connue des carences du système de comparution des prévenus qui ne respecte pas le délai prévu par le Code criminel révèle, comme l’affirme le juge en chef Wagner dans l’arrêt Myers, une culture de complaisance à l’égard de ces retards et délais.

[39]        La banalisation de ces retards depuis plusieurs années s’avère extrêmement préoccupante. 

[40]        Toutefois, dans la présente affaire, la capacité de l’État d’établir la culpabilité de M. Flores n’est pas affectée par le retard de celui-ci à comparaître.

[41]        Comme l’explique la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta dans l’arrêt Reilly, l’équité du procès et le droit à une défense pleine et entière ne sont pas en cause, car la tenue du procès ne perpétue pas la nature de la violation qui découle du délai de comparution et elle ne l’aggrave pas non plus :

[30]      The first branch of the Babos test is not engaged here, because the respondent’s right to a fair trial is not jeopardized, and holding a trial will not perpetuate the breach. The breach arising from the respondent’s detention for longer than 24 hours will also not be aggravated by the trial.

[42]        En bref, aussi choquante et intolérable que soit la comparution tardive des prévenus, un problème identifié depuis plusieurs années, celle-ci ne met pas en cause le sens du franc-jeu des poursuites criminelles si l’État n’a pas profité de ce délai pour améliorer sa capacité de prouver la culpabilité de M. Flores.