R. c. Lefebvre, 2011 QCCS 5278 (CanLII)
[8] CONSIDÉRANT que l'excuse légitime au sens de l'article 145.5.1 C.cr. constitue une question de fait laissée à l'appréciation du Tribunal;
24 Once the Crown proves the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, the onus shifts to the accused to provide a lawful excuse on a balance of probabilities. When the issue of lawful justification or excuse arises, "the trial Judge must consider if the accused has proved a defence of lawful justification or excuse by a preponderance of evidence." See R. v. Santeramo (1976), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 35 at 44 (Ont. C.A.), and The Queen v. Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 at 1319.
25 Courts generally take a hard look at the lawful excuses, and compliance must be virtually im-possible. So, for example, excuses for failing to attend court because of severe illness or bad wea-ther have been accepted. See R. v. Coe (1971), 4 C.C.C. (2d) 23 (Ont. H.C.J.), and R. v. Kennedy (1972), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 522 (Que. Q.B.). In any particular case, it would be a question of fact whe-ther, for example, the illness or the weather was bad enough to prevent the accused from attending court.
R. v. Joseph Daniel Custance, [2005] M.J. No. 30.
Aucun message portant le libellé Code criminel - Article 145. Afficher tous les messages
Aucun message portant le libellé Code criminel - Article 145. Afficher tous les messages
mardi 22 novembre 2011
vendredi 18 septembre 2009
La bonne conduite est assimilable au respect des lois
R. v. R. (D), 1999 CanLII 13903 (NL C.A.)
The obligation to keep the peace and be of good behaviour arises in a variety of contexts in the criminal law. (...) it has an equivalent for adult offenders under s. 732.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code and in respect of conditional sentences under s. 742.3(1)(a) of the Code. Furthermore, the obligation surfaces as a possible disposition as part of a bonding order under s. 810(3)(a) of the Code. It also is an optional condition that is frequently inserted as a condition in a recognizance entered into by an accused to secure his or her pretrial release from custody.
In R. v. Stone (1985), 22 C.C.0 (3d) 249 (Nfld. S.C.), the Trial Division of this Court held that being intoxicated in a restaurant and being unable to pay the bill amounted to a failure to be of good behaviour, thereby constituting a breach of probation notwithstanding the accused's acquittal of the charge of fraudulently obtaining food. Steele J. stated at p. 257:
... the conviction of an accused of a [breach of probation] offence is based on his conduct or behaviour and not merely on the conviction for an offence under a penal statute, federal, provincial or municipal.
Steele J. drew a distinction between the obligation to keep the peace and the obligation to be of good behaviour, in these terms, at p. 256:
A breach of the undertaking "to keep the peace" means a disruption or the upsetting of public order whereas a breach of a bond "to be of good behaviour" means some act or activity by an individual that fails to meet the fanciful standard of conduct expected of all law-abiding and decent citizens. It is quite possible ... that one can fail to be of good behaviour yet not commit a breach of the peace.
Although agreeing that breach of a federal, provincial or municipal statute would usually, but not necessarily, amount to a failure to be of good behaviour, it is clear that he was also of the view that other lawful conduct could also constitute the offence if it fell below the standard of behaviour expected of lawabiding and decent citizens. For Steele J. the focus should be on the nature of the behaviour, not on its criminal characterization as such.
The conclusion of Steele J. that the two terms "keep the peace" and "be of good behaviour" impose separate and distinct conditions was commented on, without disapproval, by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v Docherty 1989 CanLII 45 (S.C.C.), (1989), 72 C.R. (3d) 1, 51 C.C.C. (3d) 1, but, because it was not necessary to do so in that case, the Court did not purport to endorse Steele J.'s definition of the scope of the content of the notion of "good behaviour".
The approach in Stone has been followed in R. a Flynn reflex, (1995), 132 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 334 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.); R. a M (S.A.M.), [1994] S.J. No. 537 (QL) (Sask. Prov. Ct) [summarized 25 W.C.B. (2d) 383]; and R. a Johnston reflex, (1993), 90 Man. R. (2d) 43 (Q.B.). In the last case, Monnin J. expressed the view, in obiter, that a consensual fight, even though it might not amount to an offence, was "clearly not a behaviour pattern for adults that is condoned or sanctioned in a community of people living together" and hence would amount to a failure to be of good behaviour.
In Docherty, the Supreme Court held that the offence of breach of probation required proof of specific intent to breach the probation order. Wilson J. stated at p. 13:
... the mens rea of [the offence of breach of probation] requires that an accused intend to breach his probation order. This requires at a minimum proof that the accused knew that he was bound by the probation order and that there was a term in it which would be breached by his proposed conduct. The accused must be found to have gone ahead and engaged in the conduct regardless.
and at p. 15:
An accused cannot have wilfully breached his probation order through the commission of a criminal offence unless he knew that what he did constituted a criminal offence.
As Berg notes in his previously cited article at p. 476: "If a condition is vague, a probationer cannot determine when his conduct is at risk of breaching that condition. Thus, analytically, vagueness negates the nexus between the condition and the wilful breach thereof — the knowledge of the condition and the knowledge of what constitutes a breach of that condition do not meet. In that context, intent cannot be said to exist."
I conclude, therefore, that the principle that a person is entitled to know in advance whether his or her specific conduct is illegal before engaging in the activity that leads to his or her being charged with an offence (here, breach of probation) is a strong argument for limiting the content of the obligation to be of good behaviour to an obligation to comply with existing laws or orders. A person is deemed to know the law and, hence, holding a probationer accountable for breach of the obligation of good behaviour on the basis of breach of a statutory provision or an order specifically applicable to him or her does not offend the principle in question.
The obligation to keep the peace and be of good behaviour arises in a variety of contexts in the criminal law. (...) it has an equivalent for adult offenders under s. 732.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code and in respect of conditional sentences under s. 742.3(1)(a) of the Code. Furthermore, the obligation surfaces as a possible disposition as part of a bonding order under s. 810(3)(a) of the Code. It also is an optional condition that is frequently inserted as a condition in a recognizance entered into by an accused to secure his or her pretrial release from custody.
In R. v. Stone (1985), 22 C.C.0 (3d) 249 (Nfld. S.C.), the Trial Division of this Court held that being intoxicated in a restaurant and being unable to pay the bill amounted to a failure to be of good behaviour, thereby constituting a breach of probation notwithstanding the accused's acquittal of the charge of fraudulently obtaining food. Steele J. stated at p. 257:
... the conviction of an accused of a [breach of probation] offence is based on his conduct or behaviour and not merely on the conviction for an offence under a penal statute, federal, provincial or municipal.
Steele J. drew a distinction between the obligation to keep the peace and the obligation to be of good behaviour, in these terms, at p. 256:
A breach of the undertaking "to keep the peace" means a disruption or the upsetting of public order whereas a breach of a bond "to be of good behaviour" means some act or activity by an individual that fails to meet the fanciful standard of conduct expected of all law-abiding and decent citizens. It is quite possible ... that one can fail to be of good behaviour yet not commit a breach of the peace.
Although agreeing that breach of a federal, provincial or municipal statute would usually, but not necessarily, amount to a failure to be of good behaviour, it is clear that he was also of the view that other lawful conduct could also constitute the offence if it fell below the standard of behaviour expected of lawabiding and decent citizens. For Steele J. the focus should be on the nature of the behaviour, not on its criminal characterization as such.
The conclusion of Steele J. that the two terms "keep the peace" and "be of good behaviour" impose separate and distinct conditions was commented on, without disapproval, by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v Docherty 1989 CanLII 45 (S.C.C.), (1989), 72 C.R. (3d) 1, 51 C.C.C. (3d) 1, but, because it was not necessary to do so in that case, the Court did not purport to endorse Steele J.'s definition of the scope of the content of the notion of "good behaviour".
The approach in Stone has been followed in R. a Flynn reflex, (1995), 132 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 334 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.); R. a M (S.A.M.), [1994] S.J. No. 537 (QL) (Sask. Prov. Ct) [summarized 25 W.C.B. (2d) 383]; and R. a Johnston reflex, (1993), 90 Man. R. (2d) 43 (Q.B.). In the last case, Monnin J. expressed the view, in obiter, that a consensual fight, even though it might not amount to an offence, was "clearly not a behaviour pattern for adults that is condoned or sanctioned in a community of people living together" and hence would amount to a failure to be of good behaviour.
In Docherty, the Supreme Court held that the offence of breach of probation required proof of specific intent to breach the probation order. Wilson J. stated at p. 13:
... the mens rea of [the offence of breach of probation] requires that an accused intend to breach his probation order. This requires at a minimum proof that the accused knew that he was bound by the probation order and that there was a term in it which would be breached by his proposed conduct. The accused must be found to have gone ahead and engaged in the conduct regardless.
and at p. 15:
An accused cannot have wilfully breached his probation order through the commission of a criminal offence unless he knew that what he did constituted a criminal offence.
As Berg notes in his previously cited article at p. 476: "If a condition is vague, a probationer cannot determine when his conduct is at risk of breaching that condition. Thus, analytically, vagueness negates the nexus between the condition and the wilful breach thereof — the knowledge of the condition and the knowledge of what constitutes a breach of that condition do not meet. In that context, intent cannot be said to exist."
I conclude, therefore, that the principle that a person is entitled to know in advance whether his or her specific conduct is illegal before engaging in the activity that leads to his or her being charged with an offence (here, breach of probation) is a strong argument for limiting the content of the obligation to be of good behaviour to an obligation to comply with existing laws or orders. A person is deemed to know the law and, hence, holding a probationer accountable for breach of the obligation of good behaviour on the basis of breach of a statutory provision or an order specifically applicable to him or her does not offend the principle in question.
mercredi 26 août 2009
Éléments constitutifs de l'infraction de bris de condition / Moyen de défense
R. c. Guillen, 2009 CanLII 27034 (QC C.M.)
[159] L’article 145 (3) et (5.1) du Code criminel stipule que l’omission de se conformer sans excuse légitime à une telle condition ou ordonnance ou d’une promesse de comparaître, constitue l’infraction de défaut de se conformer à une telle condition ou engagement, le fardeau de la preuve de l’excuse raisonnable reposant sur les épaules du défendeur.
[160] Dans R. c. Custance[R. v. Custance, 2005 MBCA 23 (CanLII)], la Cour d’appel du Manitoba a précisé les éléments essentiels à prouver, soit :
1e l’accusé devait se conformer aux conditions d’une promesse ou d’un engagement ;
2e l’accusé a fait un geste qui est interdit par la promesse ou l’engagement ou a omis de faire un geste qu’il devait faire pour se conformer à la promesse ou à l’engagement ;
3e l’accusé a consciemment et volontairement fait ou omis de faire les actes qui constituent l’élément matériel de l’infraction. L’insouciance étant reconnue comme une intention coupable la mens rea requise pour justifier une condamnation, les auteurs Cournoyer et Ouimet reconnaissant que la négligence ou l’imprudence ne suffisent pas.
[161] De plus, la poursuite doit établir que le défendeur a volontairement violé un engagement contracté, sachant que sa conduite violait cet engagement, la Cour supérieure l’ayant reconnu dans R. c. Monrose, la croyance sincère du défendeur qui soulève un doute raisonnable constituant une défense recevable.
[162] Lorsque la plainte porte sur une violation d’un engagement signé conformément à une ordonnance rendue sous l’article 810 du Code criminel, la Cour d’appel d’Ontario a cependant reconnu qu’il fallait appliquer l’article 811 du Code et non pas les dispositions de l’article 145 (3) du Code, cependant il n’y a pas lieu en l’espèce d’appliquer la règle du stare decisis, ce jugement d’une Cour supérieure d’une autre province n’ayant pas cette autorité et, avec respect et déférence, le présent Tribunal ne se sentant pas lié par ce jugement pour le bris de condition d’engagement sur une promesse de comparaître.
[159] L’article 145 (3) et (5.1) du Code criminel stipule que l’omission de se conformer sans excuse légitime à une telle condition ou ordonnance ou d’une promesse de comparaître, constitue l’infraction de défaut de se conformer à une telle condition ou engagement, le fardeau de la preuve de l’excuse raisonnable reposant sur les épaules du défendeur.
[160] Dans R. c. Custance[R. v. Custance, 2005 MBCA 23 (CanLII)], la Cour d’appel du Manitoba a précisé les éléments essentiels à prouver, soit :
1e l’accusé devait se conformer aux conditions d’une promesse ou d’un engagement ;
2e l’accusé a fait un geste qui est interdit par la promesse ou l’engagement ou a omis de faire un geste qu’il devait faire pour se conformer à la promesse ou à l’engagement ;
3e l’accusé a consciemment et volontairement fait ou omis de faire les actes qui constituent l’élément matériel de l’infraction. L’insouciance étant reconnue comme une intention coupable la mens rea requise pour justifier une condamnation, les auteurs Cournoyer et Ouimet reconnaissant que la négligence ou l’imprudence ne suffisent pas.
[161] De plus, la poursuite doit établir que le défendeur a volontairement violé un engagement contracté, sachant que sa conduite violait cet engagement, la Cour supérieure l’ayant reconnu dans R. c. Monrose, la croyance sincère du défendeur qui soulève un doute raisonnable constituant une défense recevable.
[162] Lorsque la plainte porte sur une violation d’un engagement signé conformément à une ordonnance rendue sous l’article 810 du Code criminel, la Cour d’appel d’Ontario a cependant reconnu qu’il fallait appliquer l’article 811 du Code et non pas les dispositions de l’article 145 (3) du Code, cependant il n’y a pas lieu en l’espèce d’appliquer la règle du stare decisis, ce jugement d’une Cour supérieure d’une autre province n’ayant pas cette autorité et, avec respect et déférence, le présent Tribunal ne se sentant pas lié par ce jugement pour le bris de condition d’engagement sur une promesse de comparaître.
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