Voies de fait graves : des marques au cou constituent de par leur nature des lésions corporelles confirmant l'emploi intentionnel de la force

N.D. c. R., 2006 QCCA 14

Lien vers la décision

[126]      Dans l’arrêt R. c. Cuerrier, la Cour suprême énonce les éléments essentiels de l’infraction de voies de fait graves :

Une telle accusation exige que le ministère public prouve, premièrement, que les actes de l’accusé ont mis en danger la vie du plaignant (par. 268(1)) et, deuxièmement, que l’accusé a, d’une manière intentionnelle, employé la force contre le plaignant sans son consentement (al. 265(1)a))[19].

[127]      En l’espèce, l’emploi de la force contre la plaignante ne pose pas problème. D’ailleurs, les marques au cou de la plaignante sont clairement des lésions corporelles de par leur nature.

Un animal, tel qu'un chien utilisé pour attaquer, correspond à la définition générale d'une « arme » au sens de l'article 2 du Code criminel

R. v. McLeod, 1993 CanLII 14674 (YK CA)

Lien vers la décision

There are three charges against the accused, two of common assault under s. 266, to which she entered a plea of guilty, and a third count that in committing the assault set out in count 1, that is, the assault on Karen Mary Woodcock, the accused used a weapon, her dog, contrary to the provision in the Criminal Code. The accused has admitted in an agreed statement of facts: first, that she had sicced her dog, a pit bull, upon a dog owned by the complainant. There was no evidence as to whether or not the dog heeded that command or did anything with respect to it; secondly, and I am going to read exactly what was said, "the accused told the dog to sic the complainant, and the dog then jumped at the complainant and bit the complainant's hand breaking the skin on the thumb and first finger". The dog did then follow the command given to it by its owner, the accused. I think I can take judicial notice of the fact that when a dog is sicced upon another person (I do not know whether "sic" is even a word that the English dictionaries recognize, but it is recognized in everyday common language), it means to, in effect, attack the person to whom the dog is directed. 

The question then arises, and it is the sole question for determination, whether or not a dog is a weapon as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The word "weapon" is described as being. 

"(a) anything used or intended for use in causing death or injury to persons 

whether designed for that purpose or not, or 

(b) anything used or intended for use for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person." 

There is no question that the complainant was injured. Whether she was threatened or intimidated, I do not know because there is nothing to indicate that she was, and that really is not in issue here. 

The Crown's position is that the words "whether designed for that purpose or not" must include an animate object such as this dog which, in the Crown's opinion, becomes an extension of the owner of the animal, who commands that the animal attack, which this animal did. 

Ms. Blakley's position is that this definition in the Code does not include an animate object, and that animate objects cannot and are not weapons which fall within the definition, and that the word "anything" does not include an animate object such as an animal or the dog in question. She says her submission is strengthened by the words which follow the last word in para. (b) of the definition: "... and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm as defined in s. 84". 

As far as I am aware, and as far as counsel are aware, this is the first occasion that a court has been faced with the question as to whether or not a dog, used in the manner it was by Ms. McLeod, is a weapon. The dog did respond to the command. Mr. Aubé says that command was given by a moral person, able to exercise judgment and able to give commands of the type the dog was given. 

Ms. Blakley asks a rather pertinent question, and that is, is the dog, in fact, as Mr. Aubé would suggest, an extension of the will of the accused? I have looked at the word "anything" as defined in the Oxford dictionary, I have looked at the word "weapon" as defined in both the Oxford dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, and I am not quite sure they help me in this particular problem. I think I can say, however, that had Parliament, when defining the word "weapon" as it appears in the Criminal Code, intended that a weapon include an animate object such as a dog, it would have, and should have, said so in clear and unambiguous terms. 

Mr. Aubé provided a picture of dogs being used to control crowds; dogs trained for the purpose of controlling crowds, and that these dogs can, I think from what we know and from what we have seen and heard, inflict injury and harm. But that being the case, is the dog an extension of the individual who is controlling the dog? I do not think so. I think the dog is trained for the particular purpose and follows the commands given to it, but I go back to say that if Parliament had intended animate objects such as dog be included in the definition of the word "weapon", it would have said so in, and I repeat, clear and unambiguous terms, and having failed to do so, I cannot read into the definition of the word "weapon" the animate object of a dog. 

Having so found, Ms. McLeod is, of course, acquitted on count 2 of the indictment. 

The offence created by s. 267(1)(a) is a more serious offence than simple assault envisaged in s. 266 where the maximum penalty is only five years. Section 267(1) reads: 

267(1) Every one who, in committing an assault, 

(a) carries, uses or threatens to use a weapon or an imitation thereof, 

or 

(b) causes bodily harm to the complainant, 

is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. 

(Emphasis added.) A "weapon" used in s. 267(1)(a) is defined in 

s. 2 in these words: 

"weapon" means 

(a) anything used or intended for use in causing death or injury to 

persons whether designed for that purpose or not, or 

(b) anything used or intended for use for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person, and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm as defined in section 84; 

(Emphasis added.) 

I have taken the liberty of underlining what I consider to be the operative words of both sections of the Code. 

In the case at bar the parties agreed on the facts. It has been clearly established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused used her dog to cause injury to the complainant victim. 

In her factum and argument before this court, Crown counsel urged us to find that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the applicable law. She submitted that a dog fell within the definition of the word "weapon", as it was encompassed in the general expression "anything used ... in causing ... injury to persons". 

In his factum and argument, counsel for the accused submitted that the trial judge was correct in interpreting the word "anything" as excluding animate objects such as dogs. He submitted that, historically, a dog was not considered to be a weapon. In his submission, he reviewed the history of the definition of "weapon" back to Canada s first Criminal Code. In s. 3 of the Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29, the term "offensive weapon" is defined in these words: 

3(r) The expression "offensive weapon" includes any gun or other firearm, 

or air-gun, or any part thereof, or any sword, sword blade, bayonet, pike, 

pike-head, spear, spear-head, dirk, dagger, knife, or other instrument intended 

for cutting or stabbing, or any metal knuckles, or other deadly or dangerous 

weapon, and any instrument or thing intended to be used as a weapon, and all 

ammunition which may be used with or for any weapon; 

If this definition was operative today, I would, applying the ejusdem generis rule, accede to the argument that animate beings do not fall within it. 

I do not consider it necessary to trace in detail the Criminal Code amendments between 1892 and the present. To the extent it is helpful, the legislative history suggests that in 1985, when the present definition was enacted by virtue of s. 2(8) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1985, c. 19, Parliament intended to enlarge the scope of the definition. To illustrate this I reproduce, for purposes of comparison, the definition found in s. 2 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, in its amended form immediately prior to the 1985 amendment, followed by the definition of "weapon" as it now stands and with which we are concerned on this appeal. 

"offensive weapon" or "weapon" means 

(a) anything that is designed to be used as a weapon, or 

(b) anything that a person uses or intends to use as a weapon, whether 

or not it is designed to be used as a weapon, 

and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm as defined in section 82; 

"weapon" means 

(a) anything used or intended for use in causing death or injury to 

persons whether designed for that purpose or not, or 

(b) anything used or intended for use for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person, and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes any firearm as defined in section 84; 

It will be seen the present definition is no longer confined to anything designed to be used as a weapon or anything used or intended to be used as a weapon. The meaning of the word "weapon" within the prior definition has become irrelevant and cases such as R. v. Laidley (1978), 39 C.C.C. (2d) 406 (Ont. C.A.), where the Ontario Court of Appeal considered this question are of no assistance in construing the present definition. 

The focus of the definition has been shifted from the character of the instrumentality in question to the result of its use or the purpose for which it was used. 

Counsel for the accused further drew to our attention a definition of the word "weapon" in a publication of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal Law (1987), and a revised definition of "weapon" enacted in 1991, c. 40, s. 1, which was not proclaimed in force until August 1, 1992. I do not consider it appropriate or helpful in the task at hand to consider either the Law Reform Commission's proposal or legislation that was not in force at the time that this alleged offence occurred. 

Counsel for the accused's concluding submission on statutory interpretation was this: 

The definition of "weapon" has evolved from providing a list of standard offensive weapons which would commonly be used in an assault type situation to its current more general definition. However, it is submitted that the evolution of the definition of "weapons" has not become so encompassing that one can imply that Parliament has, in the progression of the definition, expressly included animate objects such as canines. 

Counsel for the accused sought to uphold this acquittal on an alternative basis. His submission was that there was little or no evidence to suggest that the accused had had appropriate control or decision-making capacity over the dog. Because there was a reasonable doubt as to the dog's level of compliance and training, the accused should be entitled to the benefit of doubt. In view of the stance taken by counsel for the accused at trial, where all the essential ingredients of the offence were admitted except the question of law as to whether a dog could be a weapon, I do not propose to address that additional issue. That problem may arise in some other case and will be more appropriately dealt with in light of facts supporting such an argument. 

I turn now to consider the appropriate interpretation of "weapon" as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. 

I am in agreement with the trial judge that this case appears to be the first time the current definition of "weapon" has been considered by a Canadian court. Crown counsel referred us to a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal, R. v. G. (ill.C.), appeal No. 10213Y0, pronounced June 21, 1988 [summarized 5 W.C.B. (2d) 402]. That was a sentence appeal by the Crown on a charge under s. 245.1(1)(a) (now s. 267(1)(a)), where the Court of Appeal increased a young offender's sentence. I have obtained the record of those proceedings and determined that the young offender pleaded guilty, before His Honour Judge Fitch of the Provincial Court, to a charge of committing an assault while carrying, using or threatening to use a weapon, to wit a dog. Accordingly, there were no judicial pronouncements on the definition of "weapon" in that case. 

Research for English and Commonwealth authorities has been unproductive. However, there are decisions in the United States where dogs have been held at law to be dangerous weapons. The first of those cases is Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 326 N.E. 2d 710 (Massachusetts A.C., 1975). In that case, the accused was convicted of armed robbery. He was accompanied on the robbery by a German shepherd dog. The victim perceived the dog to be a threat. 

There is an annotation on the subject of dogs as weapons reported at 7 A.L.R. (4th) 607. It deals with seven other dog cases emanating from various other jurisdictions in the United States. I do not propose to consider these cases as each has different statutory and common law considerations irrelevant to the statutory interpretation problem I have to consider. 

The approach I take is to determine, if possible, the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words in the definition of the word "weapon" in s. 2. The key to the resolution of the problem is whether a dog or other animate being falls within the concept of "anything". The trial judge concluded that a dog did not. "Anything" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary has two meanings: 

1. A combination of ANY and THING in the widest sense of the latter. 

2. Thing of any kind. 

Unlike the trial judge, I am unable to discern that the definition of "anything" is restricted to inanimate items, or, excludes animate ones. 

As "anything" is a composite word, I turn next to the Shorter Oxford meanings given for the word "thing". I do not propose to reproduce all possible meanings of the word, save to observe that its scope is very, very broad. Included in those meanings are these at: 

3. Applied (usu. with qualifying word) to a living being or creature; occas. to a plant 0E. 4. Applied to a person, now only in contempt, reproach, pity, or affection; formerly also in commendation or honour ME. 

5. A material object, a body; a being or entity consisting of matter, or occupying space 0E. 

From those meanings, I conclude that when Parliament employed the word "anything", that word included both animate and inanimate bodies. Accordingly, a dog can be used, or intended to be used, as a weapon. 

The concept of an animate thing used to cause injury or to threaten is not inherently absurd. To handle a poisonous snake in a manner intended to threaten or intimidate or to use a living thing to inflict actual injury are but two examples. 

In the case at bar the animate thing was a dog whose use was effective only if it obeyed instructions. The evidence admits of no doubt: the accused intended the result which followed her command to the dog. The constituent elements of s. 267(1)(a) are made out. The accused, in the course of committing an assault, used a "weapon", namely, an animate thing, thereby causing injury to the victim. 

I am, therefore, of the view that this appeal must be allowed and the acquittal set aside and a conviction entered. The matter will be remitted to the Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory for sentencing. 

Braquer une arme à feu sur un invité pour l'intimider et l'expulser suffit à constituer des voies de fait armées, même sans intention d'employer la force physique

R. c. Thibeault, 2015 QCCA 400 

Lien vers la décision

[7]         Celui qui, désirant expulser de chez lui un invité récalcitrant, va chercher un fusil de calibre 12 qu’il porte ostensiblement à son retour crée, par sa seule présence armée, la menace ou la tentative de menace que sanctionne l’alinéa 265(1)b) C.cr. Cette disposition ne requiert pas la preuve que l’accusé avait l’intention d’employer la force contre une autre personne; la menace ou même la tentative de le faire suffit[2].

[8]         Lorsqu’il pointe l’arme à bout touchant sur le menton de sa victime, l’infraction est aggravée et il commet alors le crime prévu à l’article 267(a) C.cr.

[9]         Le fait que l’intimé ait braqué l’arme à feu constitue une menace d’employer la force contre le plaignant, en utilisant son arme pour l’expulser de sa maison. La preuve révèle par ailleurs de façon satisfaisante qu’il était alors en mesure d’accomplir son dessein.

[10]      Il s’agit alors de voies de fait armées au sens de l’affaire Hovington c. R.[3] :

[60]      Le juge explique clairement la nécessité d’un acte ou d’un geste posé dans les circonstances prévues par la loi. Il explique également la nécessité de l’intention d’aider ou d’encourager pour être complice. Il les applique aux faits de l’espèce et le jury est maintenant en mesure de savoir à quel moment débutent les voies de fait, c’est-à-dire, en ce qui a trait au cinquième chef, au moment où le policier menace, par un acte ou un geste, d’employer la force en utilisant le bâton. Je m’attarderai plus loin davantage sur la question du caractère raisonnable des verdicts de culpabilité sur ce chef, mais il me paraît nécessaire de souligner immédiatement que la preuve permettait de conclure que l’infraction de voies de fait armées avait été commise, sans toutefois, pour le moment, m’interroger sur l’identification des auteurs de l’infraction. Une preuve selon laquelle trois policiers attendent, debout, côte à côte, un détenu menotté et soumis au pouvoir de la police, près de la porte où il sera conduit, sans raison d’y être eux-mêmes, alors que l’un d’eux tient ostensiblement un bâton dans ses mains et dit, de manière menaçante, : « C’est toi ça, t’aimes ça battre les polices », permet de soutenir que des voies de fait armées « par menace » ont été perpétrées. Le fait de tenir de façon évidente un bâton de type « manche à balai », et non pas le bâton parfois utilisé par les policiers, dans les circonstances décrites précédemment, satisfait les exigences de la loi et constitue un acte ou un geste menaçant pouvant constituer des voies de fait armées.

[11]      Finalement, les parties conviennent que la peine prononcée par le juge est adéquate, compte tenu du profil de l’intimé et des circonstances de la perpétration des voies de fait armées. Il n’y a donc pas lieu de retourner le dossier en Cour du Québec pour qu’une nouvelle peine soit prononcée.

La Cour d'appel du Québec confirme qu'un évanouissement provoqué par une douche froide forcée n'est pas une blessure banale et constitue bel et bien une « lésion corporelle » justifiant une condamnation pour négligence criminelle

A.N. c. R., 2015 QCCA 1109

Lien vers la décision

[98]        The error of law in this regard had no bearing on the result. Given the overwhelming evidence and the inevitable conclusion that anyone who cut a pant leg with a sizeable kitchen knife whilst the victim was wearing the trousers has markedly and significantly departed beyond any norm of conduct acceptable to a reasonable person in the circumstances. Thus, despite the error of law, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred. As urged by the Respondent, Section 686(1)(b)(iii) Cr.C. will be applied and the appeal on this point will be dismissed.

[99]        The other argument raised in this ground is that the conviction of Appellant under Count 14 for negligence causing bodily harm because he forced X under a cold shower for a prolonged period of time, causing him to lose consciousness is tainted with an error of law since fainting does not constitute bodily harm. The judge said this:

[839]   (…) Le concept juridique de « lésions corporelles » prévu à l’art 2 du Code criminel exige que la lésion en cause ne soit pas de nature passagère, mais dans le contexte particulier de cette cause, je considère que les éléments constitutifs requis ont été prouvés, et ce, hors de tout doute raisonnable.

The Crown agrees that this part of the judgment should be reversed and that an acquittal be entered. The Court however is not bound by the Crown’s position.[44] I think it is wrong; fainting can be “bodily harm” in my opinion.

[100]     The definition of bodily harm in the Criminal Code is as follows:

2. In this Act, (…)  “bodily harm” means any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or comfort of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature;

2. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. [...] « lésions corporelles » Blessure qui nuit à la santé ou au bien-être d’une personne et qui n’est pas de nature passagère ou sans importance.

[101]     Despite some ambiguity, in the foregoing quote from paragraph 839 of the judgment, the judge arrived at the conclusion that the elements of the offence were proved. In this regard she found that:

i)            the cold shower caused hurt or injury to X;

ii)            that the hurt or injury interfered with X’s health or comfort; and

iii)           that the hurt or injury was not trifling or was not transient.

[102]     The facts found by the judge are not challenged. Rather, Appellant argues that fainting cannot constitute bodily harm.

[103]     Bodily harm is not restricted to cuts, bruises, scratches or other injuries which are readily visible on the victim’s body.[45]

[104]     The ultimate issue in this case is the manner in which “transient or trifling” in the definition of bodily harm should be read. Otherwise stated, is the definition met where (in this case) the hurt is more than merely transitory or more than merely trifling?[46] At Common Law, the definition was “more than merely transitory and trifling”. The “and” became an “or” on codification.

[105]     The Ontario Court of Appeal examined the definition of bodily harm in R. v. J.A.[47] and although the observations are largely obiter[48] they are applicable to the present issue and I agree with them. In R. v. J.A., Simmons J.A., writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal, preferred a “positive” interpretation because of:

i)            the wording which focuses on what constitutes bodily harm rather than what is excluded;

ii)            the legislative history which does not indicate that Parliament intended to change the meaning of the Common Law formulation, and

iii)           the fact that injuries of short duration are recognized by the courts as being sufficiently serious to constitute bodily harm.[49] For example, one can lose consciousness upon receiving an electric shock from a taser. The fact that one shortly regains consciousness may make the injury transient but hardly trifling. Is this not bodily harm? The answer is self-evident.

[106]     In this case, the fainting of X was certainly not trifling even though it may have been transient. The fainting constitutes bodily harm and is an indication that the act (the cold shower) caused such interference with X’s health by an effect (hypothermia) on his system which resulted in a loss of consciousness. There was no expert evidence. However, the facts speak for themselves as to the causal link between the cold shower and the loss of consciousness.

[107]     I should not be taken to say that every loss of consciousness will satisfy the definition of bodily harm since not every loss of consciousness stems from an injury (for example sleeping). However, in this case, since the judge’s factual findings are not put in issue and because I disagree with the parties’ submission that fainting does not, per se, in law, constitute bodily harm, I see no reason to interfere with the finding of guilt on count 14. The issue is one of mixed fact and law and as can be seen in the foregoing analysis, I find no error in the judge’s conclusion.

La Cour d'appel de l'Alberta confirme le faible seuil requis pour établir des « lésions corporelles », statuant que l'inconfort de la victime peut être directement déduit de ses blessures visibles sans nécessiter de preuve médicale explicite quant à leur durée ou à la douleur

R v Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251

Lien vers la décision

[42]           The appellants say that the trial judge erred in law by finding that Keepness’s injuries constitute bodily harm. Drawing from section 2 of the Criminal Code, they stress that “bodily harm” requires (1) hurt or injury; (2) that interferes with health or causes discomfort; and (3) is not “transient or trifling” (meaning, they say, that it is not of a very short duration or of a very minor degree). The main argument here is that the degree and duration of Keepness’s injuries were insufficient to qualify as bodily harm, since the trial judge made no finding about the duration of his injuries, and the injuries were very minor in degree. The appellants also argue that Keepness’s injuries cannot qualify without a finding (or evidence) that they interfered with his health or caused him discomfort.

[43]           The Crown’s response to the appellant’s main argument is that Keepness’s injuries (multiple abrasions, cuts, lacerations, swelling to his cheek), which caused bleeding from the head and neck and necessitated a trip to hospital, the application of Steri-Strips and a tetanus injection, are serious enough to qualify. The Crown also says that there was an implicit durational dimension to the trial judge’s findings (since Keepness’s injuries lasted at least from the time of his attack to his treatment in hospital). No direct response to the appellants’ argument regarding health/discomfort is offered, and we assume that the Crown’s view is that Keepness’s discomfort would have been so obvious as not to require an explicit finding by the trial judge.

[44]           Section 2’s definition of “bodily harm” states a low threshold: R v Dorscheid, 1994 ABCA 18 at para 11, [1994] AJ No 56 (CA). It means something more than “a very short time period and an injury of very minor degree which results in a very minor degree of distress”: R v Dixon (1988), 1988 CanLII 2824 (BC CA), 42 CCC (3d) 318 at 332, [1988] 5 WWR 577 (Esson JA, as he then was, concurring). Not surprisingly, then, indisputably minor injuries have been found to constitute “bodily harm”: R v Rabieifar, [2003] OJ No 3833 (QL) (CA) (scratches and abrasions of less than one inch on the complainant’s body, and some bruising and swelling on her face, thigh and hand); R v CK, 2001 BCCA 379 at para 3, [2001] BCJ No 1119 (QL) (small bruise on the complainant’s right calf, a small anal tear, and a deviated septum that resulted in some bruising and swelling, all of which was said by a physician to be “not serious and … expected to resolve itself within a few days”); R v Moquin, 2010 MBCA 22 at paras 32-33, 251 Man R (2d) 160 (several bruises lasting 11 days, a sore hand and a sore throat); and Dorscheid (scrapes, lacerations and bruises).

[45]           These injuries are variously similar to those sustained by Keepness. The appellants, however, point out that the trial judge had no evidence before her regarding the duration of those injuries. It is not necessary, however, for the Crown to call physicians to testify to an injury’s less-than-fleeting effects. In Dixon (at 332), Esson JA was content to observe that “[f]rom the time of the assault at least until the medical treatment was completed, it is clear that the victim must have been deprived of any sense of comfort which she might have had before being assaulted.” That observation is equally apposite here. Nor is it necessary for the Crown to have adduced direct evidence of pain or discomfort from Keepness or from a treating practitioner. It is hardly blazing new territory for a court to infer discomfort from such obvious considerations as the victim’s injuries. Again, in Dixon, Esson JA said (at 332, emphasis added) that “it is clear that the victim must have been deprived of any sense of comfort which she might have had before being assaulted”. Similarly, this Court said in Dorscheid (at para 11, emphasis added) that “[s]ignificant bruising will obviously cause discomfort ….”

[46]           In short, we see no error in the trial judge’s handling of the question of bodily harm. Keepness was attacked and beaten by three fellow inmates in an exercise yard. His sustained visible wounds clearly constitute “bodily harm”, which required treatment at the hospital and post-treatment monitoring and would also obviously have caused discomfort. It would have defied good sense for the trial judge to have concluded otherwise.

L'application du principe de l'arrêt Kienapple permet d'ordonner l'arrêt conditionnel des procédures pour une agression armée factuellement subsumée dans une accusation de voies de fait graves découlant d'un geste unique

Dubourg c. R., 2018 QCCA 1999

Lien vers la décision

[25]        L’appelant soutient que la juge du procès a erré en droit en le déclarant coupable à la fois de voies de fait graves et d’agression armée [12]. Il estime que vu le principe interdisant les condamnations multiples dégagé dans l’arrêt Kienapple[13], la juge aurait dû prononcer un arrêt conditionnel des procédures sur le chef le moins grave, soit celui d’agression armée. L’intimée soumet que le principe de l’arrêt Kienapple ne devrait pas trouver application vu l’absence d’un lien légal suffisant entre les éléments des deux infractions.

[26]        Le critère original permettant de décider s’il y a lieu de prononcer un arrêt conditionnel pour éviter des condamnations multiples pour un seul geste « est de savoir si la même cause ou chose (plutôt que la même infraction) se trouve comprise dans deux infractions ou plus », c’est-à-dire que le même comportement ou délit correspond à plusieurs infractions différentes[14]. Il doit également exister un lien juridique suffisant entre les infractions en cause[15].  Il est entendu qu’une volonté claire du Parlement de créer deux infractions distinctes qui devront se cumuler fait obstacle à l’application de la règle interdisant les condamnations multiples[16].

[27]        L’application de ce principe a priori simple a été et demeure source de controverse en jurisprudence. Une jurisprudence contradictoire existe actuellement au Canada quant à l’application de la règle interdisant les condamnations multiples entre les infractions de voies de fait graves et d’agression armée. Les cours d’appel du Québec[17], de l’Ontario[18] et de la Nouvelle-Écosse[19] se sont prononcées en faveur d’arrêts conditionnels, tandis que celles d’Alberta[20] et de Colombie-Britannique les ont refusés[21]. Ces divergences reposent sur une appréciation plus ou moins rigide du lien juridique requis entre les infractions en cause et sur des différences factuelles inévitables entre les cas à l’étude.

[28]        Je suis d’avis qu’il n’est ni nécessaire ni souhaitable de dégager une règle absolue pour toutes les situations où des accusations d’agression armée et de voies de fait graves (ou causant des lésions) sont portées conjointement contre le même accusé lorsqu’il s’agit d’un seul évènement avec une seule victime. Les faits de chaque cas et la finalité du principe ont une importance primordiale et doivent guider l’exercice.  Ici, l’intimée concède à juste titre qu’il existe un lien factuel suffisant entre les deux infractions. En effet, il est reproché à l’appelant d’avoir posé un seul geste en lançant un projectile vers la victime qui lui a causé des blessures en l’atteignant près de l’œil. C’est ce geste unique qui fonde les deux accusations. Le débat repose entièrement sur le lien juridique suffisant.

[29]        À mon avis et avec respect pour l’opinion contraire, l’approche stricte qui semble prévaloir en Alberta et en Colombie-Britannique est à défavoriser dans la plupart des situations. Il est indéniable que, par définition, les infractions d’agression armée et de voies de fait graves ou causant des lésions comprennent des éléments essentiels différents; néanmoins, dans plusieurs cas dont celui qui nous occupe, l’emploi de la force qui cause la conséquence requise pour les voies de fait graves est factuellement indissociable de l’utilisation de l’arme qui fonde l’accusation d’agression armée.

[30]        En effet, l’emploi de la force ici est prouvé par l’utilisation de l’arme, arme qui a blessé la victime. Un seul mouvement, impliquant l’arme, est à l’origine des blessures subies. Les voies de fait graves ici ont été commis en utilisant l’arme de manière non seulement concomitante, mais surtout causale à l’infliction des blessures. En somme, dans le présent dossier, l’infraction d’agression armée est subsumée dans celle de voies de fait graves. Aucun élément additionnel et distinct ne devait être prouvé pour établir la culpabilité de l’appelant quant au chef d’agression armée. Il n’y a pas de scénario dans lequel l’appelant pouvait être déclaré coupable d’une des accusations, mais pas de l’autre. Dans les circonstances particulières du présent dossier, ce moyen d’appel est bien fondé et un arrêt conditionnel des procédures devrait être prononcé sur le chef d’agression armée.

[31]        En conclusion, sur le principe dans l’arrêt Kienapple, la jurisprudence a toujours été divisée en deux courants dans son application. Selon un courant, les tribunaux semblent insister plutôt sur un critère d’identité formel entre les éléments de deux infractions. Selon l’autre, ils semblent insister sur une proximité fonctionnelle entre les éléments. Dans le premier, la jurisprudence souligne l’importance de faire preuve de déférence envers le législateur en ce qui a trait à la définition des éléments de culpabilité et des contours de la responsabilité criminelle. Cette approche est plus stricte et technique. Elle souligne également la déférence dont doivent faire montre les tribunaux face à la discrétion de la poursuite dans la sélection de chefs d’accusation. Dans le second courant, la jurisprudence souligne une finalité téléologique qui est d’éviter la redondance inutile dans les condamnations et l’administration de la peine. Cette approche est entièrement compatible avec la démonstration d’une déférence envers le législateur et envers la poursuite parce que dans son application le principe de l’arrêt Kienapple n’empêche pas une détermination de culpabilité sur plus d’un chef, mais plutôt l’imposition d’une peine sur un chef redondant et moins grave. Elle a également l’avantage d’être plus flexible. À mon avis, la jurisprudence actuelle au Québec et en Ontario s’inscrit de manière générale dans le second courant et donc suit le principe téléologique qui a pour finalité d’éviter la redondance dans l’imposition de la peine[22]. Cette approche est bien illustrée dans le présent dossier puisque la peine infligée sur les deux chefs était de quinze mois sur chacun d’eux à être purgée de façon concurrente.

Voies de fait armées et transfert d'intention : Analyse jurisprudentielle de l'utilisation d'un animal comme arme

R v Park, 2024 MBCA 93

Lien vers la décision

[25]                     The accused conceded at the appeal and at trial that courts have found the use of a dog to constitute a weapon as defined in section 267(a) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [the Code] (see R v B(T), 2003 CarswellOnt 8736, 2006 ONCJ 391 (ONCJ) [B(T)]).  The accused states that the issue is whether she intended to use the dog as a weapon in the assault against Ms. Neufeld. 

[26]                     She submits that even if she commanded the dog to attack Mr. Watt, this intent should not be transferred to Ms. Neufeld.  She underscores that there was no evidence that she commanded the dog to attack Ms. Neufeld.  She submits that the dog is animate rather than an inanimate object and that it was able to make decisions beyond her control.  She maintains that the dog was out of her control when it attacked Ms. Neufeld.  She argues that the trial judge accepted that she was yelling the dog’s name in an attempt to gain control over it and that he found that at the time it bit the accused, the dog was out of control.  She submits that these findings were inconsistent with transferred intent.

[27]                     Next, the accused argues that the incident with Mr. Watt was over.  She submits that it was separate and apart from the act involving Ms. Neufeld.  That is, these were two different acts and not the same act to which the doctrine of transferred intent could apply.

[28]                     The Crown argues that Deakin continues to be good law that applies or should be expanded to apply to the intent of the accused in assaulting Ms. Neufeld.

[29]                     Regarding the animate nature of the dog, the Crown submits that the trial judge’s decision was not inconsistent with his finding that once the accused caused the dog to be in attack mode, in the circumstances of this case, her initial intent was sufficient to support both convictions.  Furthermore, it submits that given that a dog can be a weapon for the purpose of the charge of assault with a weapon, the animate nature of it is irrelevant.  That is, if the accused had commanded the dog to attack Mr. Watt, but it instead attacked Ms. Neufeld, the doctrine of transferred intent would apply.

[30]                     The Crown concedes that this is not the typical situation as described above.  However, the Crown submits that the attacks on Mr. Watt and Ms. Neufeld were not separate events.  It argues that the two attacks were a single transaction.  In addition, it submits that the doctrine of transferred intent has been applied in cases where additional victims are injured along with the intended target (see R v LP, 2022 CanLII 97955 at paras 46-50 (NLPC) [LP]).

[31]                     In any event, the Crown argues that it is not necessary to resolve the issue as the appeal can be disposed of without reference to transferred intent because the accused had contemporaneous intent to commit the offence.  It relies on R v Buzzanga and Durocher, 1979 CarswellOnt 1502, 1979 CanLII 1927 (ONCA) [Buzzanga], as authority for the proposition that knowledge can be an adequate substitute for intent.  That is, “a person who foresees that a consequence is certain or substantially certain to result from an act which he does in order to achieve some other purpose, intends that consequence” (ibid at para 45).  The Crown submits that, given the accused’s knowledge of the dog and the circumstances of the situation, the accused was “certain or substantially certain” the dog would follow her lead in attacking Ms. Neufeld.

[32]                     In support of its argument, the Crown emphasizes that the trial judge found that the accused pinned down Ms. Neufeld while she was trying to call 911 and not because she was trying to stop the dog from attacking.  The trial judge accepted that the accused called out a different address while Ms. Neufeld was trying to give information to the 911 operator.  He also found that when the accused intentionally assaulted Ms. Neufeld, the dog “followed her lead”.

The Law—Intent, Recklessness and Transferred Intent

Intent

[34]                     An assault is committed when someone intentionally applies force to another person absent of their consent (see the Code, s 265(1)(a)).  

[35]                     An assault with a weapon is defined in section 267(a) of the Code.  It states:

       (Omis)

[36]                     Assault is a subjective mens rea or intent offence as opposed to a negligence-based offence.  This is evidenced by the use of the word “intentionally” in the definition of offence (ibid, s 265(1)(a)).  It is a general, as opposed to specific, intent offence.  In R v George, 1960 CanLII 45 at 890 (SCC) [George], Ritchie J provided the following guidance on the mental element of assault and the difference between general and specific intent crimes:

In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be drawn between “intention” as applied to acts done to achieve an immediate end on the one hand and acts done with the specific and ulterior motive and intention of furthering or achieving an illegal object on the other hand. Illegal acts of the former kind are done “intentionally” in the sense that they are not done by accident or through honest mistake, but acts of the latter kind are the product of preconception and are deliberate steps taken towards an illegal goal. The former acts may be the purely physical products of momentary passion, whereas the latter involve the mental process of formulating a specific intent. A man, far advanced in drink, may intentionally strike his fellow in the former sense at a time when his mind is so befogged with liquor as to be unable to formulate a specific intent in the latter sense. The offence of robbery, as defined by the Criminal Code, requires the presence of the kind of intent and purpose specified in ss. 269 and 288, but the use of the word “intentionally” in defining “common assault” in s. 230(a) [now s 265(1)] of the Criminal Code is exclusively referable to the physical act of applying force to the person of another.

 

[emphasis added]

 

[37]                     In R v Hominuk, 2019 MBCA 64 [Hominuk], this Court relied on George (among other authorities) in stating that a “finding that the accused was ‘hysterical’ or ‘out of control’ does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that she was unable to form the minimal intent required for assault” (Hominuk at para 7).  Rather, “such acts ‘may be the purely physical products of momentary passion”’ (ibid).

[38]                     As argued by the Crown, Buzzanga stands for the proposition that certainty or substantial certainty of the consequences of one’s actions may constitute intent.  This statement has been endorsed by courts throughout the country. 

[39]                     For example, in R v Chartrand, 1994 CarswellOnt 1161, 1994 CanLII 53 (SCC) [Chartrand], the trial judge allowed a motion for non-suit where the accused was charged with abducting a person under fourteen years of age, contrary to section 281 of the Code, which states:

              (Omis)

[40]                     The accused had met an eight-year-old boy in a park, convinced him to come in his car, and driven him to various locations to take pictures of him. They were intercepted by a police officer and the boy’s father.  The accused said he was taking photos of the boy as a surprise for his parents.  The trial judge concluded that the offence required an unlawful taking of the child from his parents, which he interpreted to mean an intentional deprivation.  The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that a properly instructed jury could not find intent to deprive the parents of possession of their child.

[41]                     The Supreme Court disagreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, writing for the Court, examined the mens rea required by section 281 of the Code.  In Chartrand at para 54, she wrote:

 

General principles of mens rea apply to the words “with intent to”, and, accordingly, in order to conclude that the mens rea of the offence under s. 281 has been made out, it is sufficient that the taker knows or foresees that his or her actions would be certain or substantially certain to result in the parents (guardians, etc.) being deprived of the ability to exercise control over the child.

 

[42]                     In support of her conclusion, she cited Buzzanga with approval, remarking that the Court had earlier endorsed it in R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 1990 CanLII 24 (SCC) (see Chartrand at para 55).  She added that in R v Olan, 1978 CanLII 9 (SCC), the Court noted that intent under section 380 of the Code (fraud) “may encompass a contemplated outcome distinct from the purpose of the conduct” (Chartrand at para 55).  Further, in R v Meddoui, 1990 ABCA 168, aff’d 1991 CanLII 42 (SCC), the Court concluded that it was open to the trial judge to infer the necessary intention from the facts; it was irrelevant whether the accused had an innocent motive (see Chartrand at para 56).

[43]                     Chartrand therefore also stands for the principle that motive and purpose are distinct from intent.  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concluded (ibid at para 61):

 

[T]he main body of jurisprudence and the academic commentaries support the view that the mens rea in offences such as s. 281 of the Code can also be proven by the mere fact of the deprivation of possession of the child from the child's parents (guardians, etc.) through a taking, as long as the trier of fact draws an inference that the consequences of that taking are foreseen by the accused as a certain or substantially certain result of the taking, independently of the purpose or motive for which such taking occurred.

 

[44]                     In R v Boone, 2019 ONCA 652 [Boone], Doherty JA described the meaning of intent as stated in Buzzanga as a “mental state predicated on a belief that a result is a virtually certain consequence of one’s action” (Boone at para 57), adding that “‘virtual certainty’ . . . connotes the very high degree of certainty required” (ibid at para 56; see also R v Barton, 2024 ABCA 34 at para 150; R v Ellis, 2023 NSCA 63 at para 47; R v Alsager, 2016 SKCA 91 at para 52).

Recklessness

[45]                     Courts have affirmed that the intent for assault also includes recklessness.  In the leading case of Sansregret v R, 1985 CanLII 79 at
para 16 (SCC) [Sansregret], McIntyre J, writing for the Court, described recklessness, distinguishing it from negligence:

 

The concept of recklessness as a basis for criminal liability has been the subject of much discussion. Negligence, the failure to take reasonable care, is a creature of the civil law and is not generally a concept having a place in determining criminal liability. Nevertheless, it is frequently confused with recklessness in the criminal sense and care should be taken to separate the two concepts. Negligence is tested by the objective standard of the reasonable man. A departure from his accustomed sober behaviour by an act or omission which reveals less than reasonable care will involve liability at civil law but forms no basis for the imposition of criminal penalties. In accordance with well-established principles for the determination of criminal liability, recklessness, to form a part of the criminal mens rea, must have an element of the subjective. It is found in the attitude of one who, aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk. It is, in other words, the conduct of one who sees the risk and who takes the chance. It is in this sense that the term ‘recklessness’ is used in the criminal law and it is clearly distinct from the concept of civil negligence.

[emphasis added]

[46]                     The Supreme Court continues to rely on Sansregret as an authoritative statement on the meaning of recklessness.  In R v Morrison, 2019 SCC 15 [Morrison], Moldaver J, for the majority, explained: “Recklessness refers to the state of mind of a person who, ‘aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk’” (at para 100, citing Sansregret at para 16; see also R v Hills, 2023 SCC 2 at paras 160, 193; R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at paras 117, 119). 

[47]                     This Court has applied the definition of recklessness in Sansregret in the cases of R v Barca, 2022 MBCA 80 at paras 78, 122 and R v Noble (PDJ), 2010 MBCA 60 at para 11.

[48]                     In Nagle v R, 2023 NBCA 35 at para 21, the Court described recklessness as it applies to the offence of assault as follows:

 

An assault, as defined in the Code, can occur only where, inter alia, the accused person intentionally applies force to another person, without that person’s consent (s. 265(1)). In the same context, the word “intentionally” has been interpreted to include recklessness (see R. v. D.J.W., 2011 BCCA 522, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2463 (QL), at para. 70, aff’d on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada at 2012 SCC 63, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 396, at para. 1). Consequently, an assault may occur where a person recklessly applies force to another person, without that person’s consent. A person engages in recklessness where they are subjectively aware of the risk associated with their actions and act in disregard of that risk (see Watts v. R., 2022 NBCA 34, [2022] N.B.J. No. 160 (QL), at para. 28).

 

[49]                     Courts have applied the definition of recklessness in Sansregret to the offence of assault with a weapon.  In R v Wesaquate, 2022 SKCA 101, the accused was convicted at trial of assault causing bodily harm, under section 267(b), and acquitted of several other charges, including assault with a weapon.  The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge erroneously failed to consider the three levels of mens rea, which Kalmakoff JA described as “knowledge, wilful blindness, and recklessness” (ibid at para 36).  At para 38, he cited Moldaver J’s description of recklessness found in Morrison at paras 98-101 (see also SH c R, 1987 CanLII 407 at
paras 9, 22 (QCCA)).

[50]                     Other cases have relied on proof of recklessness to satisfy the intent requirement for assault with a weapon without referring to Sansregret.  For example, in R v Dawydiuk, 2010 BCCA 162 [Dawydiuk], the accused drove his vehicle onto a crowded sidewalk, striking an innocent bystander.  He argued that he was in fear of being attacked and was trying to leave the scene but was boxed in by a taxi.  He said he made reasonable efforts to avoid hitting pedestrians.  Relying on George, the Court described the intent of assault with a weapon to mean “not done by accident or through honest mistake” (Dawydiuk at para 29).  This would encompass the conduct of someone who sees the risk and takes the chance (see also R v Zaworski, 2022 BCCA 144 at paras 41-46; R v DJW, 2011 BCCA 522 at para 70, aff’d 2012 SCC 63).

Transferred Intent

 

[52]                     As explained by Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed (London, UK: Stevens & Sons, 1961) at 126:

 

[W]hen an injury intended for one falls on another by accident. In other words, if the defendant intends a particular consequence, he is guilty of a crime of intention even though his act takes effect upon an object (whether person or property) that was not intended. His “malice” (i.e., his intention) is by a legal fiction transferred from the one object to the other. The defendant is then treated for legal purposes as though he had intended to hit the object that he did hit, though in fact he did not have the intent, nor even was reckless as to it.

 

[emphasis added; footnote omitted]

 

See also JC Smith & Brian Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th ed (London, UK: Butterworths, 1992) at 74-76; Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 8th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2020) at 287-88, for helpful descriptions of the doctrine.

[53]                     In Droste v R, 1984 CanLII 68 (SCC) [Droste], Dickson J further explained that there are two situations in which a wrong victim is harmed by the actions of the accused.  The first involves the mistaken identity of the victim.  For example, where a perpetrator shoots at X, but in fact he is Y.  The second has been referred to as a “mistake of the bullet” (ibid at 216).  In this scenario, “the perpetrator aims at X but by chance or lack of skill hits Y” (ibid).  In this case, the trial judge found the latter scenario applied to the accused.

[54]                     In Droste, the accused planned to kill his wife, but in carrying out his plan, killed his two young children instead.  While Dickson J condoned the common law doctrine of transferred intent, he found that he did not need to rely on it, applying sections 212(b) and 214(2) of the Code (now sections 229(b) and 231(2)), which provide a statutory basis for the application of transferred intent.  There is no such provision for the offences of assault or assault with a weapon.

[55]                     In Deakin, this Court applied the doctrine in a situation where an accused swung at his intended victim, Mr. Pelletier, but instead hit a glass ornament atop a television.  The glass shattered and struck Mrs. Pelletier, injuring her.  The trial judge found that the assault charge did not apply to a third party injured accidentally and acquitted the accused.  In overturning the acquittal and entering a conviction, Matas JA explained that, through the accused’s unlawful act of striking at Mr. Pelletier, he injured Mrs. Pelletier. Therefore, “[the] accused’s intention to strike Mr. Pelletier is deemed to have been directed (transferred) to the assault on Mrs. Pelletier” (ibid at para 37).  Further, he noted that “[l]ack of hostility toward Mrs. Pelletier, and lack of a specific intent to harm her, are irrelevant.  Nor is it of any significance that Deakin struck an object which injured Mrs. Pelletier” (ibid) [emphasis in original].

[56]                     In Hominuk, this Court referred to Deakin in upholding the conviction of an accused who, while being placed in a restraining chair, deliberately spit in the air at the officers, hitting one of them. 

[57]                     In LP, the accused was convicted of two counts of assault with a weapon.  The accused purposefully discharged a can of bear spray into the face of one person, CC, and the spray spread to a second person, BB, standing nearby (see ibid at para 1).  The trial judge concluded that the accused had intentionally sprayed CC and BB, the latter through the doctrine of transferred intent (see ibid at para 9).

[58]                     However, the doctrine of transferred intent has been subject to scrutiny and criticism as articulated by Stuart at 290:

 

The doctrine of transferred malice should be rejected in Canada. The two statutory instances [murder and the former aggravated assault provision] should be repealed and the common law doctrine not followed. The doctrine is an historical aberration from the fundamental principle that mens rea be in respect of the prohibited consequence and/or circumstances. The danger is that we might end up punishing a mere accident in circumstances far more sympathetic than those in Deakin and Droste. There is simply no need for an automatic, harsh and arbitrary rule that withdraws this issue from the trier of fact. In the area of murder, for example, where a bullet aimed at someone penetrates a partition wall and kills another innocently seated on the other side, where a suicide attempt involves the accused in a head-on collision in which he kills another motorist, or where poison deliberately left for the occupier of an apartment is swallowed by a burglar who dies, there may be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a sufficient mens rea. But this is a matter for the jury. In such cases, even if acquitted of murder, the accused may be guilty of the serious offence of attempted murder of the intended victim or of manslaughter. Deakin was clearly guilty of attempted assault of [Mr.] Pelletier. The only basis on which he should have been convicted of assaulting Mrs. Pelletier, as he did not intend to harm her, was if he was subjectively reckless toward her.

 

[footnotes omitted]

 

[59]                     Canadian courts have refused to expand the application of the doctrine to certain specific intent offences.  For example, in Whittaker, Nakatsuru J rejected the notion that the doctrine should be applied to the specific intent offence of attempted murder where the accused fired shots into a bar, hitting unintended victims.  He distinguished Deakin on the basis that assault is a general intent offence.  In reaching his conclusion, he referred to Stuart’s criticism of the doctrine (see also R v Santhankumar, 1992 CarswellOnt 3722, [1992] OJ No 818 at paras 50-52 (ONCJ (PC))).

[60]                     As well, this Court has refused to apply the provision in circumstances where the original intent was not to commit the resultant criminal act.  In R v Fontaine, 2002 MBCA 107 [Fontaine], the accused, intending to kill himself during a high-speed chase, deliberately drove his car into a parked semi-trailer.  While the accused survived, his passenger was killed.  Justice Steel, writing for the Court, held that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on the doctrine as set out in section 229(b) of the Code in a murder trial.  She explained (Fontaine at paras 14-15):

 

In both the cases of R. v. Deakin (1974), 1974 CanLII 1464 (MB CA), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (Man. C.A.), and Droste v. The Queen, 1984 CanLII 68 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 208, the courts refer to legal texts with approval on the issue that transferred intent only applies within the same crime.  That is, it only applies where the harm that follows is of the same legal kind as that intended.  

 

In order to determine whether an intent to commit suicide is properly transferred pursuant to s. 229(b) of the Criminal Code, it will be necessary to examine the nature of suicide and how it differs, conceptually, from murder.

 

[emphasis in original]

 

[61]                     Justice Steel concluded that the doctrine should not apply as suicide is legal.  Conversely, murder is “the most serious crime in our Criminal Code” (Fontaine at para 85).

[62]                     Similarly, courts have avoided the application of the doctrine to general intent offences when guilt can be determined on the issue of actual intent.  In R v Irwin, 1998 CarswellOnt 716, 1998 CanLII 2957 (ONCA) [Irwin], the accused and Graham got into an altercation on a crowded patio. As they grappled, they knocked Behling to the floor and he was seriously injured.  Behling was an innocent bystander and the accused did not mean to apply force to him.  The trial judge convicted the accused of assault causing bodily harm by applying the doctrine of transferred intent. 

[63]                     On appeal, Doherty JA, stated that, Stuart “persuasively marshalled” the arguments against the application of the doctrine of transferred intent (see Irwin at para 6, n 1).  Citing Stuart, Doherty JA commented that “[t]he application of the common law doctrine of transferred intent to the charge of assault causing bodily harm and to these facts raises difficult problems” (ibid at para 6).  Rather than uphold the conviction on the basis of transferred intent, he found that the Court of Appeal had the authority to amend the indictment to charge the accused with unlawfully causing bodily harm to Behling, pursuant to section 269 of the Code.  In doing so, he upheld the conviction while avoiding the application of the doctrine.

[64]                     Finally, in R v Delaney, 1989 CarswellYukon 10, [1989] YJ No 182 at para 19 (TK Terr Ct) [Delaney], Lilles TCJ refused to apply the doctrine of transferred intent to the charge of assault with a weapon.  In that case, the accused stabbed Mr. Titus and in the course of doing so, accidentally cut Mr. Marada (see ibid at paras 2, 11).  Citing Deakin, the Crown relied on transferred intent in arguing for a conviction of assault with a weapon against the complainant, Mr. Marada (see Delaney at para 15).

[65]                     Citing Stuart, Lilles TCJ concluded that Deakin was incorrectly decided and should not be followed.  He found that the doctrine of transferred intent should not apply to the charge of assault.  Despite Stuart’s suggestion above—that assault could be grounded on recklessness—he also concluded that recklessness should not ground a conviction for assault.  The accused was therefore found not guilty of assault with a weapon against Mr. Marada.

[66]                     Deakin remains good law in Manitoba.  Nonetheless, the doctrine of transferred intent has a checkered history in Canada and continues to be debated by judges, lawyers and academics.  Courts have limited its application and have sought to avoid reliance on it where possible.  As I will explain, the doctrine does not apply in this case.