Il est désormais acquis que pour déterminer si un objet est conçu pour être utilisé comme arme, il convient de se concentrer sur ses caractéristiques physiques objectives

R v Vader, 2018 ABCA 71

Lien vers la décision

[1]               The applicant was arrested while driving a truck. The handle of a machete was protruding from under the driver’s floor mat and a filleting knife was located in an uncovered cubbyhole on the lower part of the driver’s door. At the time of his arrest, the applicant was on interim judicial release and subject to the terms of a recognizance which prohibited him from possessing any type of weapon. The trial judge concluded that the applicant was in possession of the machete and the filleting knife and that they were weapons. He convicted the appellant on one count of breach of the recognizance. The applicant’s summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

[2]               The applicant seeks leave to appeal to this Court on the following ground:

Did the learned summary conviction court judge err in failing to find that the learned trial judge committed reversible error in applying the wrong legal test to the words “designed to be used” as contained in the definition of “weapon” in s. 2 of the Criminal Code?

Leave to appeal may be granted on a reasonably arguable question of law of sufficient importance.

[3]               The applicant argues that the test for determining whether an item is designed to be used as a weapon requires clarification by this Court. The trial judge adopted the two-step test proposed in R v DAC, 2007 ABPC 171 at para 78, 428 AR 355:

1)      Is the object’s design such that it could be readily usable to cause death or injury to any person or to threaten or intimidate any person?

 2)      In all of the circumstances, would the carrying of the concealed object cause the reasonable person to fear for his own safety or for the public safety, if he were aware of the presence of the object?

[4]               The summary conviction appeal judge was of the view that the trial judge concluded, without expressly saying so, that the only reasonable inference was that the applicant intended to use the items as weapons. There was no error in that conclusion, so the appeal failed. The summary conviction appeal judge proceeded, in obiter, to consider the test for the words “designed to be used” as a weapon. In his view, it was not the manufacturer’s design of the item or the modification of it performed by others which determined the character of the item. Rather, it was the accused’s design which was determinative. The summary conviction appeal judge said (R v Vader, 2018 ABQB 1 at paras 18 – 20):

. . . the test I have proposed places greater emphasize [sic] on the objective factors associated with the accused’s possession and the nature of the item. . . .

In summary, then: an item which has been found to have been objectively designed to use as a weapon, and which has no other use, is a weapon.

An item which is both violent and non-violent in potential use will be found to be a weapon where the context supports the inference that that was the accused’s design and the context does not support any other reasonable possibility.

[5]               The applicant submits that leave to appeal should be granted to allow this Court to consider the correct test to be applied to the words “designed to be used” as a weapon. If leave is granted, he proposes to argue that the focus of the test should be upon the actual design features of the item and whether or not those features objectively reveal that the item was designed to be used as a weapon, or for some non-violent purpose.

[6]               Near the time the application for leave to appeal was filed, this Court released its decision in R v Fuhr, 2018 ABCA 15. In that case, the appellant’s conviction for breach of a recognizance condition prohibiting possession of a weapon arose from the presence of a sword, about four feet long, made of heavy steel, of considerable weight, with edges that were not sharp but a point that was extremely sharp. This Court dismissed the appeal because the trial judge drew an inference, available on the record, from the physical characteristics of the sword that it was designed to be used as a weapon. Therefore, it is now clear that in determining whether an item is designed to be used as a weapon, the focus is on the objective physical characteristics of the item. This is very similar to the focus suggested by the applicant.

[7]               I am not satisfied that the applicant has raised a reasonably arguable question of law of sufficient importance. This Court has already addressed the correct approach to be taken by a trial judge in considering the words “designed to be used” as a weapon in R v Fuhr, and it is not reasonably arguable that the application of that approach to the facts of this case would result in a successful appeal.

La fragilité de la preuve d'identification oculaire et l'appréciation de celle-ci lorsqu'elle est basée sur une connaissance préalable du prévenu

R. v. M.B., 2017 ONCA 653

Lien vers la décision

(a)         Frailty of eyewitness identification

[29]      Eyewitness identification is inherently unreliable. It is difficult to assess, is often deceptively reliable because it comes from credible and convincing witnesses, and is difficult to discredit on cross-examination for those same reasons. Studies have shown that triers of fact place undue reliance on such testimony when compared to other types of evidence. As a result, many wrongful convictions result from faulty, albeit convincing, eyewitness testimony, even in cases where multiple witnesses identify the same person. See R. v. Miaponoose (1996), 1996 CanLII 1268 (ON CA), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 445 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 450-451, and R. v. A. (F.) (2004), 2004 CanLII 10491 (ON CA), 183 C.C.C. (3d) 518 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 39.

[30]      For these reasons, although identification is a matter of fact, appellate courts will subject such findings to closer scrutiny than other findings of fact. Justice Doherty summarized this approach in the context of an unreasonable verdict argument in R. v. Tat (1997), 1997 CanLII 2234 (ON CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 99-100, where he said:

While recognizing the limited review permitted under s. 686(1)(a)(i), convictions based on eyewitness identification evidence are particularly well suited to review under that section. This is so because of the well-recognized potential for injustice in such cases and the suitability of the appellate review process to cases which turn primarily on the reliability of eyewitness evidence and not the credibility of the eyewitness.

[31]      As stated by Charron J.A. (as she then was) in Miaponoose, at p. 422: “Eyewitness testimony is in effect opinion evidence, the basis of which is very difficult to assess. The witness' opinion when she says ‘that is the man’ is partly based on a host of psychological and physiological factors, many of which are not well understood by jurists.” Justice Charron goes on to quote from the Law Reform Commission of Canada Study Paper on Pretrial Eyewitness Identification Procedures (1983), at p. 10:

Simply by way of illustration, psychologists have shown that much of what one thinks one saw is really perpetual filling-in. Contrary to the belief of most laymen, and indeed some judges, the signals received by the sense organs and transmitted to the brain do not constitute photographic representations of reality. The work of psychologists has shown that the process whereby sensory stimuli are converted into conscious experience is prone to error, because it is impossible for the brain to receive a total picture of any event. Since perception and memory are selective processes, viewers are inclined to fill in perceived events with other details, a process which enables them to create a logical sequence. The details people add to their actual perception of an event are largely governed by past experience and personal expectations. Thus the final recreation of the event in the observer's mind may be quite different from reality.

Witnesses are often completely unaware of the interpretive process whereby they fill in the necessary but missing data. They will relate their testimony in good faith, and as honestly as possible, without realizing the extent to which it has been distorted by their cognitive interpretive processes. Thus, although most eyewitnesses are not dishonest, they may nevertheless be grossly mistaken in their identification. [Emphasis added.]

Justice Charron continues: “While the circumstances surrounding the witness' identification can be subject to scrutiny in cross-examination, many of the more subjective processes that have led to it are impossible to expose in this fashion.”

[32]      Witness identification based on video recordings can under certain circumstances be more reliable as it allows repeated and unhurried consideration. For example, R. v. Nikolovski, 1996 CanLII 158 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, at para. 23, contemplates a videotape of “sufficient clarity and quality” that it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to use it as the sole basis for identifying the accused:

It is precisely because videotape evidence can present such very clear and convincing evidence of identification that triers of fact can use it as the sole basis for the identification of the accused before them as the perpetrator of the crime. It is clear that a trier of fact may, despite all the potential frailties, find an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimony of a single eyewitness. It follows that the same result may be reached with even greater certainty upon the basis of good quality video evidence. Surely, if a jury had only the videotape and the accused before them, they would be at liberty to find that the accused they see in the box was the person shown in the videotape at the scene of the crime committing the offence. If an appellate court, upon a review of the tape, is satisfied that it is of sufficient clarity and quality that it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to identify the accused as the person in the tape beyond any reasonable doubt then that decision should not be disturbed. Similarly, a judge sitting alone can identify the accused as the person depicted in the videotape. [Emphasis added.]

The kind of clear video recording described in Nikolovski, however, sharply contrasts with the video recording in this case. The trier of fact must use greater caution where the video or photo quality is poor: R. v. Cuming (2001), 2001 CanLII 24118 (ON CA), 158 C.C.C. (3d) 433 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 19.

(b)         Recognition evidence as a subset of eyewitness identification

[33]      Recognition evidence is a subset of eyewitness identification evidence, in which the eyewitness’ identification is based on prior acquaintance. The recognition witness may, or as in this case may not, have been present at the scene of the crime.

[34]      Hourigan J.A. stated in Olliffe at para. 39, “recognition evidence is merely a form of identification evidence”. As such, “[t]he same concerns apply and the same caution must be taken in considering its reliability as in dealing with any other identification evidence.”

[35]      The test for admitting recognition evidence is established in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Leaney, 1989 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 393 and re-affirmed by Rosenberg J.A. in R. v. Brown, 2006 CanLII 42683 (ON CA), 215 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (Ont. C.A.). At para. 39 of Brown, Rosenberg J.A. stated that "this type of non-expert opinion evidence is admissible provided that the witness has a prior acquaintance with the accused and is thus in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the perpetrator".

[36]      In Berhe, this court considered the proposition that a recognition witness must be able to point to idiosyncrasies of physical appearance or movement peculiar to the person identified in order for his or her opinion to satisfy threshold admissibility. The proposition was asserted by Harradence J.A. in his dissent in Leaney, 1987 ABCA 206, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 263, at para. 40:

Notwithstanding this general principle of exclusion, there may be occasions when non-expert opinion evidence will be relevant and admissible. Where a witness is so familiar with the accused that he can identify idiosyncrasies of physical appearance or movement, not apparent to the trier of fact in the courtroom, that witness should be able to give his opinion. Two criteria must be satisfied. First the witness must be sufficiently familiar with the accused so as to be aware of the unique features which form the basis of the opinion. Second, the witness must be able to state with particularity what the idiosyncrasies are and show where and how they are revealed on the videotape. In this way the witness is contributing knowledge not otherwise available to the trier of fact. Consideration of these issues should take place within the context of a voir dire so the accused can challenge the evidence before it is admitted.

[37]       This court rejected the proposition as a requirement for threshold admissibility. The court in Berhe instead held at para. 22 that the identification of idiosyncrasies of physical appearance or movement were relevant when considering the ultimate reliability of the evidence. I will expand further on this below.

Comment établir la responsabilité criminelle d'un participant à l'infraction

R. c. Okojie, 2021 ONCA 773

Lien vers la décision

[54]      Pour établir les éléments essentiels de l’infraction, et donc la responsabilité criminelle de l’accusé relativement à sa perpétration, la Couronne présente une preuve qui est pertinente, importante et admissible. Cette preuve peut être directe ou circonstancielle, ou une combinaison de ces deux types de preuve.

[55]      La preuve circonstancielle donne lieu à des inférences, à des déductions de fait qui peuvent être logiquement et raisonnablement tirées d’un autre fait ou ensemble de faits constatés ou par ailleurs établis au cours de l’instruction de l’affaire.

[56]      Afin d’établir un fait, et donc un élément essentiel de l’infraction et, finalement, la culpabilité, la preuve circonstancielle peut ressortir d’un ou de plusieurs raisonnements :

•        prospectif, comme la preuve d’un mobile;

•        concomitant, comme la preuve d’opportunité, de moyens ou d’aptitude;

•        rétrospectif, comme la preuve relative au comportement après le fait.

[57]      La preuve relative au comportement après le fait est une preuve circonstancielle qui se fonde sur un raisonnement rétrospectif. D’après ce raisonnement, la survenance ultérieure d’un acte, d’un état d’esprit ou d’un état de choses justifie l’inférence selon laquelle un acte a été accompli, ou un état de choses ou d’esprit, existait à un moment en cause dans le passé, lorsque l’infraction reprochée aurait été commise (R. v. Adamson, 2018 ONCA 678, 364 C.C.C. (3d) 41, au par. 56).

[58]      Le processus de raisonnement qui s’applique à l’utilisation rétrospective de la preuve circonstancielle n’est pas propre à une infraction donnée ni limité à certaines infractions. Comme tout élément de preuve circonstancielle, la preuve relative au comportement après le fait est admissible si elle est pertinente, importante et conforme à toute règle d’admissibilité applicable (R. c. Calnen, 2019 CSC 6, [2019] 1 R.C.S. 301, au par. 107).

L'exception que constitue le témoignage d'opinion du témoin ordinaire

R v Parada, 2016 SKCA 102

Lien vers la décision

[25]           This exception, sometimes called the “compendious statement of facts exception”, refers to the rule that “lay witnesses” can give opinion evidence on issues that do not require special knowledge and where it is virtually impossible to separate the facts from the inferences based on those facts (Cyr at para 118). There is an unlimited number of categories of topics a lay witness can testify about, and it has been established that a lay witness may give opinion evidence as to the identification of handwriting, persons and things, apparent age, the bodily plight or condition of a person, the emotional state of a person, the condition of things, certain questions of value, and estimates of speed and distance (R v Graat, 1982 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 819 at 835 [Graat]). In particular, the Supreme Court in Graat ruled that non-expert witnesses may give evidence that someone was intoxicated, as it is not such an exceptional condition as would require a medical expert to diagnose it (at page 838).

[26]           After Graat, courts have greater freedom to receive lay witnesses’ opinions if:

(a)               the witness has personal knowledge of observed facts;

(b)               the witness is in a better position than the trier of fact to draw the inference;

(c)               the witness has the necessary experiential capacity to draw the inference; and

(d)               the opinion is a compendious mode of speaking and the witness could not as accurately, adequately, and with reasonable facility describe the facts he or she is testifying about.

(See Sidney N. Lederman, Alan W. Bryant and Michelle K. Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2014) at 774.)

L’adhésion aux mythes et préjugés sur l’agression sexuelle chez les Québécoises et Québécois de 15 ans et plus – Rapport synthèse

Baril, K., Trottier, D., Bergeron, M., et Ricci, S. (2025). L’adhésion aux mythes et préjugés sur l’agression sexuelle chez les Québécoises et Québécois de 15 ans et plus – Rapport synthèse. Montréal (Qc), Canada : Chaire de recherche sur les violences sexistes et sexuelles en milieu d’enseignement supérieur, Université du Québec à Montréal.  

Lien vers le rapport

Lien vers le rapport

La procédure de nolo contendere se distingue du plaidoyer de culpabilité en ce que l’accusé ne conteste pas, mais n’admet pas non plus, sa culpabilité en lien avec une infraction

R. c. Silva, 2022 QCCS 731

Lien vers la décision

[69]        De plus, la défense plaide que la procédure de nolo contendere prive l’accusé de possibles avantages stratégiques, puisque même en procédant devant un juge seul, il renonce à recevoir un jugement qui apprécie la preuve administrée. Ainsi, en appel, il ne pourra tirer bénéfice de l’analyse du juge des faits quant à, par exemple, la valeur probante de la preuve.

[70]        La poursuite plaide que la procédure de nolo contendere ne se compare pas au crédit de peine parfois appliqué suivant un plaidoyer de culpabilité. L’attribut principal du plaidoyer de culpabilité, soit la reconnaissance du comportement illégal et du tort causé, n’est pas au rendez-vous dans le scénario de nolo contendere. De plus, elle plaide que cette dernière procédure a été mise en place tardivement, alors que 80 % de la preuve à charge avait été présentée.

[71]        Incontestablement, la jurisprudence reconnaît la possibilité d’octroyer un crédit d’épreuve rattaché à l’inscription d’un plaidoyer de culpabilité. Le juge Martin Vauclair résume le droit applicable dans son Traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales :

24.46 Enfin, mentionnons que la jurisprudence a reconnu qu'un juge peut tenir compte, au moment d'imposer la peine, que l'accusé qui plaide coupable démontre un début de réhabilitation, ou tout au moins un espoir en ce sens. Dans l'arrêt Nicolucci, la Cour d'appel du Québec a tenu compte qu'en avouant sa culpabilité, un accusé épargne à la société un long débat judiciaire qui donne droit à un certain allégement de la peine.

24.47 Dans l'arrêt Lacelle Belec, la Cour d'appel du Québec a repris les principales considérations sur la question. Elle y a rappelé que « [d]e manière générale, deux facteurs expliquent la valeur atténuante qu'on accorde à un plaidoyer de culpabilité: (1) il est la manifestation des remords de l'accusé qui avoue sa participation à l'infraction et (2) il contribue à une saine administration de la justice. » « On présume donc que le plaidoyer est motivé par des remords et on lui attribue un avantage, la simplification de l'administration de la justice. » Par conséquent, même si « l'évaluation n'est pas mathématique, on peut concevoir que la valeur du plaidoyer diminue avec l'importance des ressources requises pour terminer l'affaire ». Il faut aussi tenir compte du fait que dans certains cas, la preuve est à ce point écrasante que le plaidoyer de culpabilité a une valeur relative. Cependant, le plaidoyer conserve toujours une valeur atténuante, même diminuée. La tardiveté du plaidoyer est également un facteur pertinent, notamment lorsque les victimes ont déjà été contraintes de témoigner […].

(Martin Vauclair et Tristan Desjardins, Béliveau‑Vauclair :
Traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales,
 28^e éd., Montréal, Yvon Blais, 2021, pp. 775-776,
no 24.46 et 24.47; citations omises)

[72]        Sur le plan juridique, bien que la procédure de nolo contendere ait été décrite comme étant « the functional equivalent of a plea of guilty » (Watt J.A. dans R. c. G.(D.M.), 2011 ONCA 343, par. 60), il existe des distinctions importantes entre celle-ci et un plaidoyer de culpabilité.

[73]        Quant au plaidoyer de culpabilité, le juge Watt précise que :

A plea of guilty is a formal admission of guilt and constitutes a waiver, not only of an accused’s right to require the Crown to prove its case by admissible evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but also of various related procedural safeguards, including those constitutionally protected: R. v. T. (R.) (1992), 1992 CanLII 2834 (ON CA), 10 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at p. 519; Korponay v. Canada (Attorney General), 1982 CanLII 12 (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41, at p. 49.

(R. c. R.P., 2013 ONCA 53, par. 39;
voir également R. c. G.(D.M.), par. 41)

[74]        Il s’agit de l’un des deux plaidoyers reconnus dans le Code criminel, soit le plaidoyer de culpabilité et le plaidoyer de non-culpabilité (art. 606(1) C.cr.). C’est pour cette raison que le juge Watt affirme que :

Section 606(1) describes the pleas available to an accused who is called upon to plead. The section makes it clear that, apart from the general pleas of guilty and not guilty and the special pleas authorized by Part XX, no other pleas are available. Thus, a formal plea of nolo contendere, literally “I am unwilling to contest”, is not available under our procedural law.

(R. c. R.P., par. 38; voir également
R. c. Coderre, 2013 QCCA 1434, par. 30)

[75]        La procédure de nolo contendere se distingue du plaidoyer de culpabilité en ce que l’accusé ne conteste pas, mais n’admet pas non plus, sa culpabilité en lien avec une infraction (R. c. G.(D.M.), par. 44). Sa principale raison d’être est la préservation du droit d’ester en appel relativement à l’issue de diverses requêtes préliminaires. Les éléments constitutifs de cette procédure sont décrits par le juge Watt en ces termes :

(i)  a plea of not guilty;

(ii)  an Agreed Statement of Facts establishing the essential elements of the offence(s) charged;

(iii)  no submissions on proof of guilt by the accused; and

(iv)  entry of a conviction.

(R. c. Lo, 2020 ONCA 622, par. 75; voir également Coderre, par. 30)

[76]        Finalement, cette procédure permet à un juge de déclarer l’accusé coupable d’une infraction criminelle par une reconnaissance factuelle que le ministère public est en mesure de prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable, chacun des éléments essentiels d’une infraction.

[77]        On ne saurait appliquer mutatis mutandis la jurisprudence des peines atténuées tributaire d’un plaidoyer de culpabilité à la mise en application de la procédure de nolo contendere. Les concepts sont bien différents et ces différences sont significatives en matière de détermination d’une peine.

[78]        Dans l’arrêt Fegan, le juge Finlayson de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario illustre bien ces différences :

A plea of guilty is intended to signal the termination of the trial as it relates to conviction. It is considered by the sentencing judge as an expression of remorse. By expressing finality to the conviction process, it invites leniency in the sentencing portion of the trial. A conditional plea [c’est-à-dire, la procédure de nolo contendere] does none of these things. 

(R. c. Fegan, 1993 CanLII 8607 (ON CA), [1993] O.J. No. 733, par. 11)

[79]        Une reconnaissance de culpabilité signale un début de réhabilitation du fait que l’accusé reconnaît sa responsabilité dans la commission d’une infraction. Elle fait foi d’un degré de remords.

[80]        Le plaidoyer de culpabilité met définitivement fin à un dossier judiciaire. Il est donc une source d’économie de ressources judiciaires, surtout lorsqu’il survient au début des procédures judiciaires.

[81]        La procédure de nolo contendere peut aussi être source d’économies pour les ressources judiciaires. 

[82]        À cet égard, le juge Watt observe dans l’arrêt Faulkner :

This procedure [de nolo contendere] preserves the right of an appellant to challenge the correctness of a pre-trial ruling. It does not waste valuable and limited court resources where it is clear that the admissibility of the evidence is dispositive of guilt. And it expedites appellate review.

(R. c. Faulkner, 2018 ONCA 174, par. 104;
voir également les commentaires du
 juge Finlayson dans Fegan, par. 9)