Principes généraux relatifs aux déclarations spontanées (res gestae)

R v Badger, 2021 SKCA 118 

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[27]           Out-of-court statements are presumptively inadmissible for the truth of their contents: R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40 at para 162, [2000] 2 SCR 144; R v Durocher, 2019 SKCA 97 at paras 56–57, 380 CCC (3d) 511; and R v Bear, 2020 SKCA 86 at para 51, 389 CCC (3d) 437. One of the exceptions to this rule is res gestae, with its most common category more modernly and usefully referred to as spontaneous utterance: R v Nurse, 2019 ONCA 260 at paras 58–59 and 78, 145 OR (3d) 241; R v Hall, 2018 MBCA 122 at para 41, [2019] 1 WWR 612 [Hall]; R v Head, 2014 MBCA 59 at para 25, 310 CCC (3d) 474; and R v Khan, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 531 at 540.

[28]           The general nature and test for admissibility of a spontaneous utterance was described in Hall as follows:

[41] A spontaneous (or excited) utterance is one of the categories of res gestae recognised to be a traditional exception to the hearsay rule … . A spontaneous utterance resulting from a startling event is admissible if the circumstances in which it was made exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion and there are no special features of the case that give rise to a real possibility of error … . The circumstances of the making of the statement provide the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness to alleviate any hearsay danger … .

[42] Consideration of this traditional exception is not a mechanical process. Rather, a functional analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the statement should be undertaken … .

…

[58] While hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible, if the evidence meets the criteria of a traditional exception to the hearsay rule, it is presumptively admissible because the traditional exceptions “incorporate an inherent reliability component”… .

…

[63] Under the principled approach, questions of admissibility focus on threshold reliability as opposed to the ultimate reliability of the statement which is for the trier of fact to decide. The requirement of reliability is about ensuring the integrity of the trial process. The trial judge must decide whether the given circumstances “sufficiently overcome” the inability to test the hearsay evidence in the regular way … .

[29]           A further description of the exception for spontaneous utterances, with an expansion of the analysis to be applied regarding the necessary contemporaneity, is set out in R v Mullin, 2019 ONCA 890, 383 CCC (3d) 16:

[41] The law permits the introduction of excited or spontaneous utterances as an exception to the rule against hearsay: a “statement relating to a startling event or condition … may be admitted to prove the truth of its contents if it is made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement cause by the event or condition”: David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 7th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015), at p. 191. In order for a statement to be admissible, “[t]he stress or pressure of the act or event must be such that the possibility of concoction or deception can be safely discounted. The statement need not be made strictly contemporaneous to the occurrence so long as the stress or pressure created by it is ongoing and the statement is made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent”: R v. Khan (1988), 1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 197 (Ont. C.A.), at 207 … .

[30]           The authors of McWilliams’ list two key criteria for admission: “(1) that the statement be made contemporaneous to an unusual, overwhelming event that (2) left the declarant (at the time of the declaration) under pressure or emotional intensity which would give the guarantee of reliability” (footnotes omitted, at para 7:120.20).

[31]           For a spontaneous utterance to be admissible, the circumstances in which the statement was made must be carefully examined in order to determine if the statement in question meets the test of threshold reliability. Trial judges should ask themselves whether the event was so unusual or startling that it would dominate the thoughts and expressions of the person making the utterance. Exact contemporaneity of the startling event or condition is not required, as spontaneity resides on a spectrum and is dependent on the circumstances, but it must be reasonably contemporaneous and the nature of the event must be such that it would still be dominating the mind of the declarant when the statement is made. Some of the cases also require that there be an absence of special features that could likely result in an error by the declarant. For these principles, I rely on the above noted authorities, plus R v Khan, 2017 ONCA 114 at para 15, 45 CCC (3d) 419, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2017 CanLII 49991; R v Liard, 2015 ONCA 414 at paras 63–64, 327 CCC (3d) 126, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2016 CanLII 13758; and R v Andrews, [1987] 2 WLR 413 (HL) at 424 [Andrews].

L'état du droit relatif aux déclarations spontanées (res gestae)

R. v. Head, 2014 MBCA 59

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[25]                    The res gestae categories of spontaneous (or excited) utterances and statements explaining acts are both traditionally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule (see Hodge M. Malek et al., eds., Phipson on Evidence, 18th ed. (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at paras. 31-01–31-04; and Hon. Mr. Justice S. Casey Hill, David M. Tanovich & Louis P. Strezos, eds. McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., looseleaf (Toronto:  Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2012) vol. 1, at para. 7:120:10).  In my view, the established hearsay exception best suited to the admissibility of the “gat” conversation is that of spontaneous (or excited) utterances.

[29]                    The traditional common-law test for the admission of a spontaneous (or excited) utterance as an exception to the hearsay rule was stated as follows by Lord Wilberforce in Ratten v. The Queen, [1972] A.C. 378 (P.C.) (at p. 391):

 

… [H]earsay evidence may be admitted if the statement providing it is made in such conditions (always being those of approximate but not exact contemporaneity) of involvement or pressure as to exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion to the advantage of the maker or the disadvantage of the accused.

 

(See R. v. Khan, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 at 540.)

[30]                    In my view, the judge erred in principle by focussing on the fact that the “gat” conversation was not exactly contemporaneous to the shooting.  While the location and timing of the declarant’s statement are relevant factors, they are not determinative (Ratten at p. 389).  A statement can be sufficiently contemporaneous even if made shortly after a declarant flees the scene of a crime (R. v. Grand-Pierre (1998), 1998 CanLII 13202 (QC CA), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 236 at 242-43 (Que. C.A.)).

[31]                    The analysis as to whether a declarant’s statement is sufficiently contemporaneous is functional. A circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness comes from the declarant being under such stress or pressure from the triggering event that the possibility of concoction or distortion when making the statement can safely be disregarded (R. v. Clark (1983), 1983 CanLII 1805 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (2d) 609 at 622 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, [1983] S.C.C.A. No. 253 (QL)).

[32]                    The judge should have weighed all of the surrounding circumstances of the “gat” conversation before deciding whether the possibility of concoction or distortion could be disregarded.  As a result of his error in principle, no deference is owed to his decision on this issue.

[33]                    I am satisfied, based on the record that was before the judge at the time of his decision, that the “gat” conversation was made sufficiently contemporaneous to a shocking and dramatic event: the unanticipated shooting of a rival gang member.  The possibility of concoction or distortion can safely be excluded in such a short period of time where the intervening events do not undermine the statement’s circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.  In my view, the “gat” conversation was admissible under the recognized hearsay exception of spontaneous (or excited) utterances.

[34]                    When hearsay evidence satisfies a traditional recognized exception to the hearsay rule, it is admissible unless it is a rare case where it does not satisfy the indicia of necessity and reliability required by the principled approach to the hearsay rule (Mapara at para. 15).  I do not see this as a rare case where there would be reason to not admit potentially exculpatory evidence that satisfied a traditional exception to the hearsay rule. 

Les critères d'admission des déclarations spontanées (res gestae) résumés par la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario

R. v. Nicholas, 2004 CanLII 13008 (ON CA)

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[88] In R. v. Dakin (1995), 1995 CanLII 1106 (ON CA), 80 O.A.C. 253, [1995] O.J. No. 944 (QL) (C.A.), the accused was charged with the murder of two women who died as a result of burns. The Crown sought to introduce statements made by one of the women an hour after the fire. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the statement under the spontaneous statements exception referred to in R. v. Clark (1983), 1983 CanLII 1805 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (2d) 609, 7 C.C.C. (3d) 46 (C.A.), citing R. v. Khan (1988), 1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 197, 27 O.A.C. 142 (C.A.) at p. 207 C.C.C.:

[A] spontaneous statement made under the stress or pressure of a dramatic or startling act or event and relating to such an occasion may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The stress or pressure of the act or event must be such that the possibility of concoction or deception can be safely discounted. The statement need not be made strictly contemporaneous to the occurrence so long as the stress or pressure created by it is ongoing and the statement is made before there has been time to contrive or misrepresent. The admissibility of such statements is dependent on the possibility of concoction or fabrication. Where the spontaneity of the statement is clear and the danger of fabrication is remote, the evidence should be received. [page23 ]

[89] In my view, the trial judge did not err in classifying the 911 call as falling within the res gestae exception. The call was made within ten minutes of the attack and there has been no suggestion that G.W. had any motive for misrepresenting what happened that night.

[90] Nor do I see any error in the trial judge's finding that the statements she made in the 911 call or in her videotaped statement were necessary and reliable.

[91] With respect to reliability, the 911 call was made approximately ten minutes after the attack, indicating that there was little time to fabricate. It was audiotaped and the police statement was videotaped. The police statement, although not under oath, was not elicited by leading questions. The location of the statement, taken at the police station and made to a person in authority is also indicative of reliability (see R. v. Fleet (2001), 2001 NSCA 158 (CanLII), 48 C.R. (5th) 28, 198 N.S.R. (2d) 228 (C.A.)). The trial judge found that G.W.'s demeanour was credible. Perhaps most significantly, he found an absence of any motive to fabricate and that G.W.'s statement was not consistent with other hypotheses. (See Justice David Watt, Watt's Manual of Criminal Evidence (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at pp. 368-72).

L’obligation de prendre des notes des policiers, leur impact sur l’évaluation du témoignage du policier et l'impact de l’absence de notes sur le procès

Makhoulian c. R., 2024 QCCQ 4432

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2.1.1   L’obligation de prendre des notes

[101]   La prise de notes, sans distinction, par les policiers n’est pas, en soi, une obligation constitutionnelle[168].

[102]   Toutefois, un policier agissant dans le cadre de ses fonctions, a l’obligation générale de prendre des notes[169].

[103]   En fait, les notes policières s’avèrent aussi cruciales à l’administration de la justice criminelle que les dossiers médicaux le sont dans le domaine médical[170].

[104]     De même, les notes policières sont cruciales pour permettre aux tribunaux d’examiner utilement la façon dont les policiers ont exercé leurs pouvoirs sans autorisation judiciaire préalable, y compris leur pouvoir d’arrestation[171].

[105]     Cette obligation de rédiger des notes constitue, à tout le moins, un aspect implicite de l’obligation qu’a tout policier de faciliter le dépôt d’accusations et le déroulement des poursuites[172].

[106]     Dit autrement, les policiers ont l’obligation de rédiger des notes exactes, détaillées et exhaustives dès que possible après l’enquête[173] et de conserver les éléments recueillis[174].

2.1.2   L’impact sur l’évaluation du témoignage d’un policier

[107]   Les notes policières constituent souvent la première source d’éléments de preuve et leur teneur se rapproche possiblement le plus de ce qu’un témoin a effectivement vu ou vécu[175].

[108]   En règle générale, lorsque plusieurs policiers participent à un évènement, ceux-ci devraient rédiger des notes indépendantes, et non pas rédiger des notes collectives résultant d’un « debriefing » de groupe[176].

[109]   Le défaut de tenir des notes indépendantes, contemporaines, complètes et exactes, constitue toujours un élément pertinent dans l’évaluation de la crédibilité et de la fiabilité de la preuve soumise par un policier[177]. Ce silence du policier peut laisser place à la critique et même devenir suspect[178]. Les obligations quant aux notes policières varient suivant le contexte et le rôle occupé par chaque policier[179].

[110]   La prise de notes partielle, brève, tardive ou l’absence de notes quant à certains aspects est à proscrire, mais ne fait pas nécessairement obstacle à la fiabilité du témoignage d’un policier. Il s’agit plutôt d’évaluer la pertinence de ces notes face aux questions en litige[180]. Toute explication fournie pour justifier un tel manquement doit faire l’objet d’un examen contextuel qui tient compte de l’ensemble de la preuve[181].

2.1.3   L’impact de l’absence de notes sur le procès

[111]   Le défaut de respecter cette obligation n’a pas forcément un impact sur le procès. Tout dépend de l’évaluation propre à chaque affaire[182]. Cependant, il est possible que l’omission par un policier de rédiger des notes puisse, dans certaines circonstances, porter atteinte à l’équité du procès ou à l’intégrité du système de justice[183].

[112]   De même, l’absence de prise de notes ne constitue pas, en soi, une violation de la Charte, à moins que celle-ci soit délibérée[184].

[113]   Les policiers n’ayant pas l’obligation de tout noter, l’absence de notes ne pourra exiger une réparation que dans les cas où un préjudice est démontré[185].

La doctrine et la jurisprudence reconnaissent qu’un appel au 911 est une exception à la règle du ouï-dire

R. c. Hudon-Barbeau, 2017 QCCS 5853

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[16]   La doctrine et la jurisprudence reconnaissent qu’un appel au 9-1-1 est une exception à la règle du ouï-dire. L’appel au 9-1-1 fait partie de la res gestae et fait preuve de son contenu :

7:120.20.10 – Contemporaneity

[…]

A common form of res gestae statements is 911 calls made during or following the commission of a crime.

[…]

7:120.20.50 – Whose Declaration

The statement can be made by any person who perceived the dramatic event and need not involve a victim-declarant. The rationale for admission is not based on the status of the witness in respect of the offence or the trial, but rather on the reliability of the statement as it arises out of the impact of the "overpowering event"[3].

[17]   Dans l’arrêt R. v. Sylvain, 2014 ABCA 153, la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta réitère que les appels faits au 9-1-1 ont souvent été admis en vertu de la règle de la res gestae qui est une exception à la règle du ouï-dire et souligne aussi que les appels au 9-1-1 au milieu d’un crime sont souvent des appels à l’aide à une tierce personne qui, en l’occurrence, est la répartitrice au 9-1-1 :

 [34]     A review of the case law confirms that 911 calls have often been admitted under the  res gestae exception to hearsay […] In today’s information technology world, a 911 call in the middle of a crime is akin to a cry for help heard by someone nearby. In these circumstances, the someone nearby happens to be the 911 operator. 

[…]

[40]      When considering the particular issues underlying this appeal, the ultimate issue is not whether the 911 call is admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, as we have found, but rather the use to which it can be put once admitted.  Res gestae statements are admitted for the truth of their contents […] Certainly, a 911 call qualifying as  res gestae may be relevant to the time and place of the events, or the emotional state of those involved […] To this we would add that a 911 call may also be relevant to the physical state of the person making the call. In this case, the only issue was consent, and the emotional state of the complainant, as revealed in the 911 call, was evidence on that point […] The 911 call was also evidence of the sequence of events and the physical state of the complainant at the time of the call.

[18]   Dans l’arrêt R. c. Head, 2014 MBCA 59, la Cour d’appel du Manitoba mentionne qu’une déclaration est suffisamment contemporaine même si elle est faite peu de temps après la fuite des lieux du déclarant. De plus, la garantie de fiabilité d’une déclaration peut provenir de la situation elle-même. En effet, si le déclarant est soumis à un tel stress ou à une telle pression liée aux évènements, il se peut que le risque qu’il puisse avoir inventé ou déformé la réalité soit écarté :

[31]      The analysis as to whether a declarant’s statement if sufficiently contemporaneous is functional. A circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness comes from the declarant being under such stress of pressure from the triggering event that the possibility of concoction or distortion when making the statement can safely be disregard (R. v. Clark (1983), 1983 CanLII 1805 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (2d) 609 at 622 (C.A.), leave to appeal to C.C.C. ref’d, [1983] S.C.C.A. No. 253 (QL)).

[34]      When hearsay evidence satisfies a traditional recognized exception to the hearsay rule, it is admissible unless it is a rare case where it does not satisfy the indicia of necessity and reliability required by the principled approach to the hearsay rule (Mapara at para. 15).

[19]   L’arrêt R. v. Moore and Williams, 2014 ONSC 650 est au même effet aux par. 16 et 17 :

[16]      One of the traditional exception is the exception for spontaneous declarations, which applies « if the statement was made by a person so emotionally overpowered by a contemporaneous event that the possibility of concoction or distortion can be disregarded. »

[17]      Professor Wigmore explained the principle underlying this exception as follows:

The general principle is based on the experience that, under certain circumstances of physical shock, s stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since the utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness) and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.

[20]   L’appel au 9-1-1 est ainsi admissible.

[21]   À cet égard, la Défense n’attaque pas la validité de la règle de la res gestae en soi. Comme le note la Cour suprême, ce n’est que dans des « rares cas » que la preuve relevant d’une exception existante et valide à l’exclusion du ouï-dire ne présentera pas les indices de nécessité et de fiabilité requis[4].

[22]   Les arguments de la Défense, selon lesquels l’appel 9-1-1 n’est pas admissible parce qu’il n’a pas été fait par la victime et parce qu’il a été fait hors la présence de l’accusé, ne sont pas étayés par la jurisprudence[5].