Si un témoin utilise des notes pour se rafraîchir la mémoire pendant son témoignage, il est évident que l'avocat de la partie adverse a le droit de consulter les documents sur lesquels il s'appuie

R. v. Slater, 2014 ONSC 1518

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[9]               At common law, if a witness uses notes to refresh his memory while testifying, it is clear that counsel for the other party is entitled to inspect the record that is being relied on.[2]

[10]           While there is some controversy over when counsel for the opposing party should be entitled to get the notes for review, the prevailing position in Ontario is that counsel should receive the notes in advance of the witness testifying.  In Cornerstone, the court held:

In my view, counsel cross-examining a witness is entitled to production of any document or notes (or item) that was reviewed (or examined) by the witness to refresh his or her memory before going into the box. It does not matter whether the act of refreshing occurred minutes, hours, days or months before testifying. Cross-examining counsel is entitled to production for the purpose of testing the reliability and truthfulness of the witness.[3]

 

[11]           Consequently, Defence has the right to receive and review all the notes of Dr. Flewelling in advance of him testifying.

Le juge doit prendre la mesure du rafraichissement de la mémoire du témoin dans sa décision de permettre ou non à la partie adverse de prendre connaissance du document utilisé à cette fin

R. v. Fast, 2009 BCSC 1671

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[16]           In order to decide this question, I will address two arguments by the appellant. First, whether it was open to the judge to find the appellant had in fact refreshed his memory, given that he did not refer to his notes on the stand or shortly before (“timing of the refresh”). Second, whether there was insufficient evidence to find that the appellant had refreshed his memory (“the degree of the refresh”).

[17]           Counsel for the respondent submits that the appellant did not really refresh his memory from the refresh document because he did not need to refer to it while testifying. He submits that the evidence must show that the witness requires the notes when testifying or just before to testifying. He relies on R. v. Kerenko, Cohen and Stewart (1964), 1964 CanLII 492 (MB CA), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 760, 51 W.W.R. 53 (Man. C.A.) [Kerenko] [Kerenko cited to W.W.R.], which he submits is the governing authority. In Kerenko, a police constable refreshed his memory from his notes at an unspecified time before trial. The Court of Appeal concluded at 54 that the constable did not have to produce the notes because he didn’t need them when giving testimony:

The police officer freely admitted in cross-examination that he had referred to his notes to refresh his memory but gave no indication when he did so. …The notes were not used when the constable gave his testimony and he is not bound to produce them under such circumstances. The opposite would lead to the situation that every time notes in writing have been prepared, the party who prepared them would be bound to produce them if requested because, obviously, he may have made use of them at some time to refresh his memory. It is only when the witness requires his notes to refresh his memory at trial that he may be called upon to produce them, and this to test his accuracy and credibility since he was unable to give his evidence without the use of same.

[Emphasis added]

 

[18]           The Appellant further submits that I should follow Kerenko and distinguish the appellant’s case from both R. v. Musterer (1967), 1967 CanLII 817 (BC PC), 61 W.W.R. 63, [1967] B.C.J. No. 36 (Mag. Ct.) (QL) [Musterer] [Musterer cited to QL], and R. v. Lewis (1968), 1968 CanLII 830 (BC SC), 67 W.W.R. 243, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 235 (B.C.S.C.) [Lewis] [Lewis cited to W.W.R.]. In Musterer, a Crown witness refreshed his memory just two and a half hours before testifying and, in Lewis, mere moments before. In both cases, the court ordered that the witness produce the notes to defence counsel for the purpose of cross-examination. The appellant submits that the timing of the witness’s review of the notes is the decisive factor when deciding whether the witness has refreshed; that is, the witness must review the notes while testifying or very close to that time before this can amount to a “refresh”. In the case at bar, the appellant testified that he had reviewed the notes “in the past few days,” timing that counsel submits is simply not contemporaneous enough to his testimony at trial to constitute a “refresh”. I cannot agree that this interval is too long to permit a finding that the appellant had refreshed.

[19]           The court in Lewis explains that the decision as to whether notes must be produced in order to test the credibility of a witness turns on the individual facts of the case and lies within the discretion of the trial judge. The court also found that the trial judge unnecessarily fettered his discretion in finding that he could order production of the notes only if the witness required them during his testimony, pointing out at 245 that there is no less a need to test the credibility and reliability of a witness who has refreshed their memory just before trial than during it:

Obviously a witness who has paced up and down the corridor refreshing his memory from notes immediately prior to going into court is just as much refreshing his memory "at trial," as when he produces those notes in court.

 

[20]           In coming to this conclusion, the court in Lewis agreed with the following comments of Levey P.M. in Musterer:

[4]        I do not suggest that on each and every occasion notes in writing have to be produced, but in the instant case where the evidence clearly shows that a witness has refreshed his memory immediately prior to the giving of the evidence then he has obviously used the notes to aid himself in giving that evidence. It is analogous to the situation where a witness during a short adjournment during the course of a trial could go outside the courtroom to refresh his memory from the notes and then come back in and not use the notes. Quite obviously he has, in the latter instance, utilized the notes. A direction to produce notes to assist in cross-examination of a witness is, in my view, a matter of discretion for the trial Judge or magistrate, based on the witness' evidence as to when he refreshed his memory in relation to the trial, and in the instant case, I do readily distinguish, on the evidence, the case at bar from that of Reg. v. Kerenko referred to above.

[Emphasis added.]

 

[21]           Levey P.M distinguishes Kerenko because in that case there was no evidence before the court as to when the witnesses had refreshed their memories; whereas, on the facts before Levey P.M. in Musterer, the evidence showed the officer had refreshed his memory two and a half hours before testifying.

[22]           I respectfully disagree with Levey P.M.’s comment, if meant to suggest that the exercise of the judge’s discretion is based only on when the witness says he refreshed his memory. When evidence shows that a witness has relied on notes or some other document to refresh their memory before testifying at trial, they have placed in issue the degree to which their testimony relies upon the refresh document that is not in evidence. Therefore, the credibility and reliability of their evidence is in question. A witness who has refreshed their memory may display a command of critical events that gives a misleading impression of what they actually recall, and consequently unjustifiably enhance their credibility and reliability as a witness in the eyes of the court.

[23]           Insofar as timing of the refresh is concerned, one witness might not refresh until a month before trial, but take a lot of time and trouble doing it, while another witness might simply glance at the same document for a few seconds before testifying. As a result, the time and trouble taken to refresh is more significant than when the refresh occurred. The underlying objective is that the court receives the best possible facsimile of the witness’s memory, not that of the refresh document.

[24]           In my view, when a witness refreshes, evidence about the degree to which their reading of the document has refreshed (or influenced) their memory is the governing question for the exercise of the judge’s discretion on the question of whether the witness has refreshed their memory. Evidence about when the witness reviewed the document is an important consideration in deciding that question, but it is not conclusive, and the timing of the refresh is only one factor, albeit an important one, to consider. Restricting the question to the timing of the refresh unduly fetters the evaluative exercise of the judge’s discretion. As such, and in light of Lewis, it appears that Kerenko is not good law in British Columbia, at least insofar as it holds that a witness must require their refresh notes when testifying before the judge can order the witness to produce them. Cornerstone Co-Operative Homes Inc. v. Spilchuk (2004), 2004 CanLII 32328 (ON SC), 72 O.R. (3d) 103, [2004] O.J. No. 4049 (Sup. Ct.) (QL) [cited to QL] has restricted the application of Kerenko in Ontario:

[13]      The statement in R. v. Kerenko, Cohen and Stewart ... that “it is only where the witness requires his notes to refresh his memory at trial that he may be called upon to produce them” ... would not seem to be good law, at least in Ontario.

[25]           It is also important that the judge be able to assess the credibility of a witness where a document they have reviewed might have modified or influenced their testimony (rather than just refreshing their memory). Finch J.A., as he then was, explains this in Vancouver Community College v. Phillips, Barratt (1988), 28 C.L.R. 277, [1988] B.C.J. No. 980 (S.C.) (QL) where defence counsel and the defendant had made handwritten notes on a draft of an expert’s report, potentially modifying the expert’s opinion. The court found that, by calling the expert, the defendant had waived privilege over the document. Finch J.A. noted the importance of reviewing the marked up version of the expert’s draft report at 281:

I am interested in the witness' opinion and the weight which I may properly attach to it. If his opinion has been modified in some way by communications from others, then I think I ought to be told all that there is to know about such modifications, no matter whether the communications which led to those changes or the notes which might serve to refresh the witness' recollection of such communications are recorded in his own hand or that of the lawyer or the party who hired him.

[Emphasis added.]

[26]           As I understand this statement, a judge may need to decide whether the document has modified or influenced the witness’s recollection and, if so, the extent of that modification or influence. The ultimate objective is to ensure that the trier of facts receives the closest possible facsimile of the witness’s own memory and knowledge.

[27]           In the case at bar, the learned trial judge should have first evaluated the degree to which the appellant had actually refreshed his memory from the document and had to rely on it for his testimonial memory before ordering him to produce it, even if he had concluded that privilege did not protect the document, as discussed below. Unfortunately, there was little evidence presented about the degree to which the appellant had actually refreshed his memory, or needed to rely on the refresh document in order to testify.

Lorsqu’un témoin utilise un document pour se rafraîchir la mémoire lorsqu’il témoigne devant le tribunal, la partie adverse est en droit d’obtenir ce dit document pour l’inspecter et contre-interroger le témoin sur celui-ci (rafraîchissement de la mémoire d’un témoin lors d’une audience)

9148-8114 Québec inc. c. Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales, 2024 QCCS 1617

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[45]        Il est reconnu en droit canadien qu’un témoin peut recourir à tout moyen en vue de se rafraîchir la mémoire[36] :

A forgetful witness may rely on any means to jar or spark a memory. What triggers recollection is not significant. In this way, the witness’ memory is presently revived in the witness box and he or she can then give oral testimony of the remembered event present memory revived. Although not the only way, the usual means to revive memory is by reference to a written document made at an earlier time by the witness.

[Référence omise]

[46]        En l’espèce, il appert que Chevalier a eu recours à des notes personnelles lors de son témoignage, afin de se replacer à travers la séquence des événements. C’est d’ailleurs ce que souligne la juge d’instance[37] :

[150] Les propriétaires ont témoigné de façon claire, précise, et sans esquiver les questions ni les réponses, malgré que Mme Chevalier désirait parfois consulter ses notes personnelles, lorsque confrontées à se remémorer les dates précises des travaux et des versements.

[47]        À la lecture des notes sténographiques[38], le Tribunal est à même de constater que la juge d’instance aurait pu mieux baliser le recours aux notes par la témoin, en ce que c’est le procureur de l’appelante qui a d’abord relevé cette utilisation[39], avant même qu’une demande de permission ne soit faite par la procureure de l’intimé en première instance[40].

[48]        Elle ne s’est également pas questionnée sur la qualification de ces notes au regard de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine portant sur le rafraîchissement de la mémoire d’un témoin lors d’une audience.

[49]        Il ressort des arguments soumis par l’appelante que ce recours à des notes personnelles aurait affecté la fiabilité et la crédibilité de Chevalier, sans pour autant fournir d’argument spécifique au soutien d’une telle assertion. Or, dans le jugement entrepris, la juge d’instance, plutôt que de simplement affirmer qu’elle croit Chevalier, y va d’une analyse plus étoffée abordant de front ces questions[41] :

[151] Cependant, vu le nombre de pièces, le tribunal ne considère pas qu'elle a perdu de la crédibilité pour autant et que la fiabilité de sa mémoire était défaillante. Elle s'est référée à ses notes quelques fois seulement, sans les lire et sur permission, et le tribunal comprend qu'elles avaient étés [sic] confectionnées pour être en mesure de se rappeler de la séquence d'évènements et des sommes versées.

[50]        Il est manifeste que la juge d’instance a été en mesure de constater les trous de mémoire de Chevalier lors de son témoignage et d’observer son recours à ses notes, qui n’auraient été consultées que « quelques fois seulement ». Malgré tout, elle affirme que cela n’a pas affecté sa crédibilité ni permis de remettre en cause la fiabilité de son témoignage.

[53]        Ce faisant, le Tribunal estime qu’il n’est pas en présence d’une erreur déterminante justifiant son intervention au regard de la décision de la juge d’instance de permettre à Chevalier de témoigner à l’aide de ses notes personnelles.

[54]        Au surplus, aucune intervention ne semble justifiée au regard de la question de la transmission au procureur de l’appelante des pages bleues qui aurait affecté l’équité des procédures, du fait que la juge d’instance a permis qu’il ait accès à une copie de ces pages bleues lors du contre-interrogatoire de Chevalier[43].

-      Les pages blanches

[55]        L’appelante conteste également la décision de la juge d’instance de refuser la transmission des pages blanches qu’avait Chevalier lors de son témoignage, mais auxquelles elle ne s’est pas référée, son procureur estimant devant la juge d’instance que la communication de la preuve a été tronquée[44].

[56]        Il n’est pas ici remis en cause que lorsqu’un témoin utilise un document pour se rafraîchir la mémoire lorsqu’il témoigne devant le tribunal, la partie adverse est en droit d’obtenir ce dit document pour l’inspecter et contre-interroger le témoin sur celui-ci[45].

[57]        Cependant, encore faut-il que ce document ait été utilisé pour rafraîchir la mémoire du témoin lors du procès. La Cour d’appel du Manitoba s’est en effet déjà prononcée à l’effet que des notes consultées à l’extérieur d’une salle d’audience n’avaient pas à être produites[46], alors que d’autres tribunaux ont plutôt conclu que la production de documents consultés hors de la présence du tribunal était sujette à la discrétion du juge entendant l’affaire[47].

[58]        En l’espèce, la juge d’instance refuse la transmission des pages blanches, soulignant que Chevalier ne s’y est jamais référée lors de son témoignage[48].

[59]        Le Tribunal ne voit pas ici d’erreur dans la conduite de la juge d’instance justifiant son intervention.

Le fait qu'un appel passé depuis un téléphone portable soit susceptible d'être capté par l'antenne-relais la plus proche de l'appelant constitue une preuve factuelle, et non une opinion

R. v. Cyr, 2012 ONCA 919

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[100]   Evidence that a call from a cell phone is likely to register at the tower closest to the caller is evidence of fact, not of opinion: R. v. Hamilton, 2011 ONCA 399, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 208, at paras. 259, 277, and 279. This evidence is subject to limitations: it does not disclose the exact or precise location of a caller, only the general area from which the call originated. More precise evidence may require expert opinion: Hamilton, at para. 280; R. v. Ranger, 2010 ONCA 759, [2010] O.J. No. 4840, at para. 17.

Les témoignages des personnes travaillant pour des compagnies de téléphonie concernant les tours cellulaires sont considérés comme relevant des témoins de faits

R. v. Hamilton, 2011 ONCA 399

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[277]      However, we are satisfied that the evidence given by the three employees of the carrier companies was factual evidence, not opinion evidence.  Each of them, by reason of their knowledge, observation and experience in dealing with cell phones for their respective companies could give the testimony they provided without being qualified as experts. They could testify about the times each appellant’s cell phone registered, the number calling and the number called, the duration of the call and the location of the towers at which the calls registered.  These were factual details on which the carriers based their billing practices.  Further, these employees had the knowledge and experience to testify about the general rule and its exceptions.  They did not have to understand the scientific and technical underpinnings of the rule or have an engineering degree to give this evidence. 

[278]      It is perhaps understandable why some courts in years past treated this kind of evidence as opinion evidence.  The introduction of cell phone evidence in criminal trials was in its infancy. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that this evidence is routinely admitted: see, for example, R. v. Tomlinson, [2008] O.J. No. 817 (S.C.J.), R. v. H.B., [2009] O.J. No. 1088 (S.C.J.), R. v. Smith, [2009] O.J. No. 4544 (S.C.J.).

[279]      Even if evidence about the general rule and its exceptions could at one time have been considered opinion evidence, it is now simply factual evidence that witnesses with the knowledge and experience of Mr. Rickard, Mr. Iaccio and Ms. Hopper can testify about. They were not proffering a novel scientific or behavioral theory that was open to debate. They were testifying about uncontroversial facts related to the operation of cell phone networks. As the trial judge noted, their evidence was essentially the same as the evidence that could have been given by an engineer. Indeed, an engineer, Mr. Wang, gave largely the same evidence about the general rule at the preliminary inquiry. With the benefit of that testimony, no appellant insisted that an engineer give this evidence at trial. 

[280]      Importantly, none of the three cell phone witnesses was asked to give an opinion about the precise location of an appellant’s cell phone when a particular call was made or received. Evidence of that nature might well be opinion evidence and subject to the Mohan criteria: see R. v. Ranger, 2010 ONCA 759, at para. 17. Testimony about the general rule and its exceptions is not opinion evidence, and thus no voir dire was necessary. 

[281]       The Crown in closing submissions to the jury made it clear that the cell phone witnesses were not giving evidence of the precise location of a cell phone:

The evidence makes it clear, however, that there are significant limitations on the ability of records to precisely identify a phone’s location.  In substance, where the records indicate that a phone is registering on a particular cell tower, there is a probability but not a certainty that the phone is somewhere within the expected coverage area of the cell site. The general rule from all of – that we heard from Mike Rickard who represented Bell Mobility, Sal Iaccio who represented Telus Mobility, and Ms. Hopper who represented Rogers AT&T was that the phone registers on the tower with the strongest signal and that usually is the closest tower, but there are definite exceptions to that general rule, and in your experience and your common sense, general rules always have exceptions.

[282]      Additionally, the jury would have had no difficulty in understanding the cell phone location evidence, especially after it was summarized in a PowerPoint presentation.  That presentation undoubtedly clarified the evidence and put to rest any possibility the jury might have been confused by it.  The presentation of the cell phone evidence did take a fair amount of time, seven days.  But in the context of a four-month trial, this was not an overly long amount of time. 

[283]      Finally, the probative value of this evidence strongly favoured its admission.  In a case where identity was the key issue at trial, the cell phone evidence was highly probative circumstantial evidence of the general location of three of the appellants, Hamilton, Schloss and Davis, at the critical times.

Un témoin qui n’est pas qualifié d’expert peut relater des faits liés à un domaine scientifique, technique ou autrement spécialisé, dans la mesure où il se contente de relater des faits, sans émettre son opinion

R. c. Perras, 2015 QCCS 5827

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[10]        Un témoin qui n’est pas qualifié d’expert peut relater des faits liés à un domaine scientifique, technique ou autrement spécialisé, dans la mesure où il se contente de relater des faits, sans émettre son opinion. Dans les arrêts R. c. Hamilton, 2011 ONCA 399 et R. c. Cyr, 2012 ONCA 919, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a jugé que le type de preuve que la poursuite entend présenter en l’espèce ne constitue pas de la preuve d’opinion, mais bien de la preuve de fait. Le Tribunal est convaincu du bien-fondé de cette jurisprudence.

[11]        Dans la présente affaire, où la question de l’identité du coupable est en litige, la preuve proposée est pertinente et probante car, avec d’autres éléments de preuve, elle forme une preuve circonstancielle des déplacements de l’accusé.

[12]        Il est vrai que cette preuve considérée isolément présente des limites en ce qu’elle peut tout au plus donner des informations d’ordre général reliées à l’emplacement du téléphone cellulaire utilisé par l’accusé. Toutefois, le jury sera en mesure d’apprécier la force ou la faiblesse de cette preuve. Il y aura lieu, au moyen d’une directive, d’expliquer la portée et les limites de cette preuve.

Le cadre juridique applicable au ouï-dire et à ses exceptions, vu par la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario

R. v. MacKinnon, 2022 ONCA 811

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The Framework for the Admission of Hearsay Evidence

[27]           Hearsay is an out-of-court statement tendered for the truth of its contents. In a jury trial, the trial judge decides whether the hearsay statement should be admitted into evidence (threshold reliability). If the hearsay statement is admitted, the jury then considers whether the hearsay statement is to be believed and if so, what weight, if any, should be attributed to it in the context of the entire evidentiary record (ultimate reliability): R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, 2 S.C.R. 787, at paras. 3, 50.

[28]           It is important to remember that in a jury trial, at the admission stage, the trial judge’s role is limited to deciding whether to admit the hearsay statement, not whether the statement should ultimately be relied on and what its probative value is: R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, [2017] 1 SCR 865, at para. 41.

[29]           In a criminal jury trial, it is “constitutionally imperative” that questions of ultimate reliability be left for the jury: Khelawon, at para. 50; Bradshaw, at para. 114. This is because, “[w]here the criteria of necessity and reliability are satisfied, the lack of testing by cross-examination goes to weight, not admissibility, and a properly cautioned jury should be able to evaluate the evidence on that basis.”: R. v. Smith, 1992 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, at p. 9.

[30]           Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible because it is difficult for the trier of fact to assess its truth when the circumstances under which it was made may not be clear, and the person who gave the statement is not available for cross-examination, cannot be observed by the trier of fact, and did not testify under oath when giving the statement: Bradshaw, at para. 20.

[31]           However, courts have recognized that in some circumstances, hearsay evidence should be admitted at trial for the jury’s consideration.

[32]           First, statements falling within traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as spontaneous utterances, are presumptively admissible: R. v. Schneider, 2022 SCC 34, at para. 51; R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, at para. 212; and R. v. Nurse, 2019 ONCA 260, 145 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 61. In “rare cases” however, evidence falling within a traditional exception may be excluded where the indicia of necessity and reliability are lacking in the particular case: R. v. Mapara, 2005 SCC 23, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 358, at para. 15; Schneider, at para. 51.

[33]           Second, even if hearsay evidence does not fall under a traditional exception, it may still be admitted under the “principled approach” provided that the statement is both necessary and sufficiently reliable such that it “presents minimal dangers and its exclusion, rather than its admission, would impede accurate fact finding”: Khelawon, at para. 2; Bradshaw, at para. 24.

[34]           The traditional hearsay exceptions and the principled approach are generally informed by the same reliability considerations. Save for certain exceptions with “unique doctrinal roots”, such as party admissions, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the traditional exceptions inherently embody a reliability component either because “many of the traditional dangers associated with hearsay are not present”, as in the case of statements made in former proceedings, or because “the statement provides circumstantial guarantees of reliability”, as in the case of spontaneous utterances, dying declarations and statements against interest: Starr, at para. 212; Khelawon, at para. 6. For discussion of party admissions exception, see Schneider, at para. 53; R. v. Foreman (2002), 2002 CanLII 6305 (ON CA), 62 O.R. (3d) 204 (C.A.), at para 37; and R. v. Evans, 1993 CanLII 86 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, at p. 664.

[35]           In Mapara, at para. 24, McLachlin C.J. specifically recognized that in the case of spontaneous utterances, the “surrounding context furnishes circumstantial indicators of reliability.”

[36]           In R. v. Youvarajah, 2013 SCC 4, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 720, at para. 20, Karakatsanis J. further elaborated that the traditional exceptions were developed over time for “statements carrying certain guarantees of inherent trustworthiness, often because of the circumstances in which they were made” such that it may be “safe” to admit these statements. Later in Bradshaw, at para. 22, Karakatsanis J. called the traditional exceptions the “types of hearsay statements that were considered necessary and reliable”.

[37]           To be admissible, hearsay statements under both exceptions must be “trustworthy”. However, this does not require that reliability of the perception, memory, narration or sincerity of the declarant be established with absolute certainty since this would go to ultimate reliability. The trial judge must, however, be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the statement is “so reliable that contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant would add little if anything to the process”: Bradshaw, at paras. 23, 30-32; R. v. Carroll, 2014 ONCA 2, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 252, at para. 111.

[38]           The major difference between the two exceptions is that once the requirements of a traditional exception are established, the hearsay statement is presumed to be admissible, absent a “rare cases” exception: Starr, at para. 212. By contrast, in the case of a principled exception, there is no presumption of admissibility. Indeed, the starting presumption is that the hearsay statement is inadmissible, and the analysis of reliability and necessity must be conducted in full: Khelawon, at paras. 47-48; Bradshaw, at para. 23.

[39]           Whether a hearsay statement ought to be admitted is a question of law judged on a correctness standard. However, factual findings that feed that determination are entitled to deference on appeal. “[A]bsent an error in principle, the trial judge’s determination of threshold reliability is entitled to deference”: R. v. Youvarajah, 2013 SCC 41, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 720, at para. 31; see also R. v. Young, 2021 ONCA 535, 407 C.C.C. (3d) 265, at para. 30.

            i.        The Traditional Hearsay Exception for Spontaneous Utterances

[40]           One of the traditional exceptions to the general rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible is the exception for spontaneous declarations. The requirement that the statement be made spontaneously under the pressure of a dramatic event is specifically geared to minimize the danger of fabrication or distortion because the declarant’s faculty is so overcome by the harrowing event that there is no opportunity for reflection, speculation or concoction. “Statements made under pressure or emotional intensity give the guarantee of reliability upon which the spontaneous declaration rule has traditionally rested”: R. v. Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 278, at para. 145, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 365; R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 521, at p. 540; and S. Casey Hill, David M. Tanovich and Louis P. Strezos, 5th ed., McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2022), at § 7:59.

[41]           Spontaneity and contemporaneity of the utterance are the guarantors of reliability: R. v. Andrews, [1987] A.C. 281, [1987] 1 All E.R. 513 (H.L.), at pp. 300-1; R. v. Alexander, 2012 ONSC 5873, at paras. 26-27; R. v. Camara, 2021 ONCA 79, 400 C.C.C. (3d) 490, at paras. 78, 83-85; and David M. Paciocco, Palma Paciocco and Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 8th ed., (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2020), at p. 231.

[42]           Exact contemporaneity is not required, as spontaneity depends on the circumstances, but the statement and the event must be reasonably contemporaneous such that the event would still be dominating the mind of the declarant when the statement is made: R. v. Badger, 2021 SKCA 118, 468 D.L.R. (4th) 610, at para. 31, aff’d 2022 SCC 20, 468 D.L.R. (4th) 607; R. v. Khan, 2017 ONCA 114, 136 O.R. (3d) 520, at para. 15, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 139; and Nurse, at paras. 80-81.

[43]           The question is whether the event was so unusual or startling that it would “dominate the thoughts and expressions of the person making the utterance”, such that there is no real risk of concoction or distortion: Badger, at para. 31; see also, Camara, at para. 85.

[44]           In some cases, a spontaneous utterance should not be admitted if there are “special features” that could give rise to an error by the declarant: Badger, at para. 31; see also, Andrews, at p. 301; R. v. Hall, 2018 MBCA 122, at paras. 41, 53-55. Courts have also recognized that, in “rare cases”, even traditional exceptions to hearsay – including spontaneous utterances – can be challenged on the basis that, in a particular case, the indicia of necessity and reliability are lacking Starr, at para. 214; Mapara, at para. 15; and Khelawon, at para. 42; see also, Nurse, at para. 92. Given the potential overlap of these inquiries and the fact that they are both directed at ensuring the reliability of a statement, the “special features” of a case are, in my view, best considered together with the analysis of whether the “rare case” exception applies. Stated otherwise, in rare cases, special features may render a statement considered under the traditional exception for spontaneous utterances unreliable and therefore inadmissible.

[45]           Such cases are expected to be few and far between, as evidence that satisfies the requirements of a traditional exception is presumptively admissible precisely because these exceptions “traditionally incorporate an inherent reliability component”: Starr, at para. 212; Nurse, at paras. 63, 89.

[46]           Despite its well-established acceptance, there has been little guidance as to what constitutes a “rare case”. Andrews provides that “special features” are “circumstances of particular difficulty” beyond the ordinary fallibility of human recollection: at p. 301.

[47]           In the context of the spontaneous utterance exception, “rare cases” may include circumstances of gross intoxication, highly impaired vision, and exceptionally difficult viewing conditions. When there is evidence strongly pointing to the presence of such circumstances, trial judges cannot exclude the real possibility of error and inaccuracy, and the hearsay statement will not meet the threshold reliability requirement under the principled approach: see Andrews, at pp. 300-301; R. v. Hall, 2011 ONSC 5628, at paras. 29, 58-62; Badger, at paras. 34, 37 and 40-42; Hall (MBCA), at paras. 53-54, 96, 98 and 118-19; and McWilliams, at § 7:59.

[48]           However, “special features” or “rare case” exceptions should not include factors that may give rise to concerns about the declarant’s honesty or sincerity. Although the House of Lords in Andrews considered malice as a potential “special feature”, which might give rise to the possibility of concoction or distortion, this consideration has formed part of the determination of whether the statement is admissible as a spontaneous utterance wherein spontaneity and contemporaneity are guarantors of the statement’s reliability: Nurse, at para. 63; R. v. Clark (1983), 1983 CanLII 1805 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (2d) 609, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1983] S.C.C.A. No. 253.

[49]           In other words, any reliability concern relating to truthfulness is inherently captured and addressed in the requirements of the spontaneous utterance exception and, in light of the principled approach jurisprudence, cannot form the basis for exclusion under the “rare case” exception. The “rare case” exception must extend beyond the reliability concerns inherently captured in the traditional hearsay exception to be unique to the case at hand: Mapara, at para.36; Nurse, at para. 92.

[50]           Nor does the “rare case” exception include weaknesses that go to the ultimate weight of the evidence, which is for the jury to decide.

[51]           The onus is on the party wishing to invoke the “rare case” exception to demonstrate that there are special features in a given case such that the presumptively admissible hearsay evidence does not meet the principled requirements of necessity and reliability: Mapara, at paras. 15, 37; Nurse, at para. 91. There is a high threshold to be met by a party seeking to exclude evidence on this basis: see Starr, at paras. 212, 214; R. v. Kler, 2017 ONCA 64, 345 C.C.C (3d) 467, at para. 79; and Nurse, at para. 91.

            ii.        The Principled Exception for Admission of Hearsay Evidence

[52]           If hearsay evidence does not fall under a traditional hearsay exception, such as spontaneous utterance, it may still be admitted as a principled exception if sufficient indicia of necessity and threshold reliability are established on a balance of probabilities: Bradshaw, at para. 23; R. v. Blackman, 2008 SCC 37, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 298, at para. 33.

[53]           Necessity is established, for instance, where the declarant is dead: Blackman, at para. 34; R. v. Candir, 2009 ONCA 915, 250 C.C.C. (3d) 139, at para. 57, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 8.

[54]           Threshold reliability can be established through:

     i.        adequate substitutes for testing the truth and accuracy of the statement (procedural reliability);

   ii.        circumstantial or evidentiary guarantees that the statement is inherently trustworthy (substantive reliability); or

   iii.         a combination of elements of both procedural and substantive reliability: Bradshaw, at paras. 27, 30 and 40; McMorris, at paras. 26-27. The trial judge must identify the specific hearsay dangers presented by the statement, consider how they can be overcome, and decide whether the hearsay is “sufficiently reliable to overcome the dangers arising from the difficulty of testing it”: Khelawon, at para. 49; Bradshaw, at para. 26.

[55]           If the hearsay danger relates to the declarant’s sincerity, truthfulness will be the issue; if the hearsay danger is memory, narration, or perception, accuracy will be the issue: Bradshaw, at para. 44. The trial judge must be able to rule out any plausible alternative explanations for the hearsay statement on a balance of probabilities: Bradshaw, at para. 49.

[56]           The statement must be “so reliable that contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant would add little if anything to the process”: Bradshaw, at para. 31, citing Khelawon, at para. 49.

[57]           In Bradshaw, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of when corroborative evidence can be relied on by a trial judge in deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence under the principled exception. Justice Karakatsanis, for the majority, held that “[t]o determine whether the statement is inherently trustworthy, the trial judge can consider the circumstances in which it was made and evidence (if any) that corroborates or conflicts with the statement”: Bradshaw, at para. 30.

[58]           The circumstances in which a hearsay statement was made may, on their own, enable the trial judge to rule out any plausible alternative explanations for the statement on a balance of probabilities, bearing in mind the specific hearsay dangers associated with the statement: see Bradshaw, at paras. 3, 44 and 47. In such cases, extrinsic evidence need not be considered to determine admissibility because substantive reliability has been established and the statement is admissible. Any other extrinsic evidence that tends to corroborate (or contradict) the hearsay statement, if admissible, will go to ultimate reliability, not threshold reliability. It is for the trier of fact to decide how much reliance is to be placed on the hearsay statement in the context of the entire evidence which may include evidence that supports or undermines the proffered truth in the hearsay statement: Khelawon, at para. 50.

[59]           However, if substantive reliability is not met after examining the circumstances in which the statement was made, trial judges may turn to corroborative evidence to establish substantive reliability provided that the corroborative evidence is “trustworthy” and shows that “the only likely explanation for the hearsay statement is the declarant’s truthfulness about, or the accuracy of, the material aspects of the statement”: Bradshaw, at paras. 38, 44, and 50.

[60]           In other words, while corroborative evidence may provide trial judges with additional evidentiary guarantees of the statement’s inherent trustworthiness, it is not a prerequisite and its absence does not, by itself, raise a concern about the substantive reliability of the statement. Another appellate court has drawn a similar conclusion: see Hall (MBCA), at paras. 79-85.

[61]           There are strong policy reasons for limiting the use of corroborative evidence in this manner. For example, as noted by the court in Bradshaw, if a trial judge is entitled to consider any extrinsic evidence that corroborates any part of a hearsay statement when assessing its threshold reliability, the voir dire could become an unwieldy trial within a trial. There is also a risk that flawed inculpatory hearsay evidence could be admitted simply because there is strong evidence of the accused’s guilt: Bradshaw, at para. 42; R. v. Laure, 2018 YKCA 9, 47 C.R. (7th) 133, at para. 93, aff’d 2019 SCC 25, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 398.

[62]           To summarize, the focus at the admissibility stage is on threshold, not ultimate reliability. The Starr/Mapara framework for determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence may be further developed as follows:

     i.        Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless it falls under an exception to the hearsay rule. The onus is on the party tendering the evidence to show that it meets the requirements of a traditional exception or the principled approach.

   ii.        Evidence that falls under a traditional exception to the hearsay rule is presumptively admissible as traditional exceptions embody circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. (In the case of a spontaneous utterance exception, the inherent reliability stems from the requirement that the statement was made contemporaneously with a startling event that dominates the mind.)

a.            In “rare cases” however, evidence falling within an existing traditional exception may be excluded because there are “special features” such that the hearsay statement does not meet the requirements of the principled approach in the particular circumstances of the case. The onus rests on the party resisting admission.

b.            In the context of the spontaneous utterance exception, the basis for asserting a “rare cases” exception includes circumstances of gross intoxication, highly impaired vision, and exceptionally difficult viewing conditions, which are sufficiently grave that the trial judge cannot exclude the possibility of error or inaccuracy on a balance of probabilities. However, the “rare cases” exception does not include weaknesses that go to the ultimate reliability of the evidence or reliability concerns that are inherent in the traditional exception.

   iii.         Hearsay evidence that does not fall under a traditional exception may still be admitted under the principled approach if sufficient indicia of necessity and threshold reliability are established on a voir dire on a balance of probabilities. This is established by satisfying the following criteria:

a.           Threshold reliability (or reliability for the purpose of admission into evidence only) may be established through procedural reliability, substantive reliability, or both.

b.            To establish procedural reliability, there must be adequate substitutes for testing the evidence and negating the hearsay dangers arising from a lack of oath, presence, and cross-examination. Procedural reliability is concerned with whether there is a satisfactory basis to rationally evaluate the statement.

c.            To establish substantive reliability, the circumstances surrounding the statement itself must provide sufficient circumstantial or evidentiary guarantees that the statement is inherently trustworthy. This is a functional inquiry. Substantive reliability is concerned with whether there is a rational basis to reject alternative explanations for the statement, other than the declarant’s truthfulness or accuracy. Where hearsay evidence has sufficient features of substantive reliability, there is no need to consider any extrinsic evidence that corroborates or conflicts with the statement. Courts should be wary not to turn the principled approach into a “rigid pigeon-holing analysis”: Khelawon, at paras. 44-45.

d.            If substantive reliability is still lacking after examining the circumstances surrounding the statement, trial judges can rely on corroborative evidence to establish substantive reliability only if the corroborative evidence meets the criteria set out by the Supreme Court in Bradshaw.

e.            The process set out in Bradshaw is as follows: (i) identify the material aspects of the hearsay statement tendered for its truth, (ii) identify the hearsay dangers raised, (iii) consider alternative, even speculative, explanations for the statement, and (iv) determine whether the corroborative evidence led at the voir dire rules out these alternative explanations such that the only remaining likely explanation for the statement is the declarant’s truthfulness about, or the accuracy of, the material aspects of the statement.

Assessing the Adequacy of the Jury Instruction

[63]           A jury instruction must be assessed using a contextual approach to determine whether there were deficiencies in the charge which may have led to a miscarriage of justice. The test is whether the instruction was adequate: R. v. Calnen, 2019 SCC 6, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 301, at paras. 8-9, 39-40.

[64]           No specific formula or wording is required: R. v. Hay, 2013 SCC 61, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 694, at para. 48; R. v. McFarlane, 2020 ONCA 548, 393 C.C.C. (3d) 253, at para. 79.