Celui qui propose d'acheter une arme à feu ou de la drogue ne peut pas être reconnu coupable de trafic de cette chose

R. v. Bienvenue, 2016 ONCA 865

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[5]         In Greyeyes v. The Queen (1997), 1997 CanLII 313 (SCC), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 334 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court held that Parliament intends to distinguish between traffickers and mere purchasers of illegal drugs and that purchasing an illegal drug does not constitute trafficking for the purpose of s. 2(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19.  The definition of “transfer” in s. 84(1) of the Criminal Code and the definition of “traffic” in the CDSA are substantially similar. Moreover, in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at paras. 141-147, the Supreme Court characterized  s. 99 of the Criminal Code as a “weapons trafficking” offence The reasoning in Greyeyes supports the conclusion that “transfer”  in s. 84(1) does not include “offer to purchase” a firearm.

Revue du droit par la Cour d'Appel de l'Ontario quant à l'infraction de trafic de drogue

R. v. Murdock, 2003 CanLII 4306 (ON CA)

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[9]               Provincial appellate courts have repeatedly held that where an accused is charged with trafficking by offer, the Crown is not required to prove that the accused actually intended to go through with the offer and sell or otherwise provide the offered narcotic: R. v. Petrie, [1947] O.W.N. 601 at 603 (C.A.);  R. v. Sherman (1977), 1977 CanLII 1908 (BC CA), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 207 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 17 N.R. 178n;  R. v. Mamchur, 1978 CanLII 1813 (SK CA), [1978] 4 W.W.R. 481 (Sask. C.A.);  R. v. Mancuso (1989), 1989 CanLII 7227 (QC CA), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 380 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused (1990) 58 C.C.C. (3d) vi;  R. v. Reid (1996), 1996 NSCA 265 (CanLII), 155 N.S.R. (2d) 368 at 370 (C.A.).

[10]         In Sherman, supra, at p. 208, the trial judge said:

Now, in my reading of the cases an offer to sell or deliver a narcotic is complete once the offer is put forward by the accused in a serious manner intending to induce officer White [the undercover officer] to act upon it and to accept it as an offer. … [emphasis added].

[11]          MacFarlane J.A. agreed with the trial judge and added at p. 208:

I accept the argument made by counsel for the Crown that the actus reus in this case is the making of an offer.  There can be no doubt that the appellant intended to make an offer to sell or deliver heroin and that provides in my opinion, the mens rea necessary to prove the offence.

[12]         In Mancuso, supra, at pp. 389-90, the Quebec Court of Appeal approved of a jury instruction in these terms:

[I]f I offer to you to provide you, to sell you cocaine, whether or not the transaction goes through I made the offer, therefore I have trafficked in cocaine.  The offence was complete with my offer and I gave you reason to believe that I was serious in that offer to provide you with cocaine.  I trafficked by making that offer, … [emphasis added].

[13]         The appellate authorities referred to above were cited with approval in R. v. Shirose, 1999 CanLII 676 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565.  In Shirose, the lawfulness of a “reverse sting” operation conducted by undercover police officers was in issue.  During that operation, the undercover officers had offered to sell narcotics to the accused.  The officers did not intend to go through with the sale, but intended to arrest the accused when they attended to make the purchase.  Binnie J. observed at para. 25:

The conclusion that the RCMP acted in a manner facially prohibited by the Act is inescapable …  The actus reus of the offence of trafficking is the making of an offer, and when accompanied by intent to do so, the necessary mens rea is made out:  see R. v. Mancuso (1989), 1989 CanLII 7227 (QC CA), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 380 (Que. C.A.) at p. 390, leave to appeal refused, [1990] 2 S.C.R. viii, 58 C.C.C. (3d) vi.  There is no need to prove both the intent to make the offer to sell and the intent to carry out the offer:  see R. v. Mamchur, 1978 CanLII 1813 (SK CA), [1978] 4 W.W.R. 481 (Sask. C.A.).  See also, e.g., R. v. Sherman (1977), 1977 CanLII 1908 (BC CA), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 207 (B.C.C.A.) at p. 208, upholding a conviction where there was evidence that the accused had offered to sell heroin to a person he knew was an undercover police officer, with a view to “rip off” the officer and not complete the sale.  Sherman was later followed on this point in Mancuso, supra, at pp. 389-90, where the accused argued unsuccessfully that he did not intend actually to sell narcotics to a police informer, but really wished to steal his money [emphasis added].

[14]         On these authorities, the offence of trafficking by offer is made out if the accused:

•        offers to traffic in a narcotic [the actus reus]; and

•        intends to make an offer that will be taken as a genuine offer by the recipient [the mens rea].[2]

La réception d'une somme d'argent n'est pas un élément constitutif de l'infraction de trafic de drogue

R. v. Falahatchian, 1995 CanLII 941 (ON CA)

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Once a prohibited drug is delivered or given to another person, the offence of trafficking is proven.  The receipt of  money is not an element of the offence of trafficking: R. v. Lauze (1980), 1980 CanLII 2935 (QC CA), 17 C.R. (3d) 90 (Que. C.A.);  R. v. Khouri (1995),  a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, March 29, 1995.   When Falahatchian gave the heroin to Akbari, the offence of trafficking was complete.  

Il n'existe aucune présomption légale à l'effet que la seule quantité d'une drogue est un indice de trafic ou de possession en vue de trafic

R. v. McCallum, 2006 SKQB 287

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[28]                                 I am not aware of any presumption in law that quantity alone is indicia of trafficking or possession for the purpose of trafficking. Staff Sergeant McStay was a credible witness and I am suspicious that the accused did not have two ounces of cocaine on his person solely for personal use. The standard of proof, however, is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There will be cases where due either to the quantity of drugs or the circumstances surrounding the possession that reasonable doubt that possession was for the purpose of trafficking will disappear. This is not one of those cases. I find the accused, Frank Charles McCallum, not guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking, but guilty of simple possession of cocaine within the meaning of s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Le fait de retrouver une somme d'argent substantielle sur les lieux liés aux suspect ou sur sa personne peut permettre d'inférer que la possession d'une drogue l'est à des fins de trafic

R. v. Alberts, 1999 CanLII 2246 (ON CA)

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[1]  There was ample evidence to support the committal of 

the appellant Tracie Alberts and the committal judge made no

error in so doing. In particular he was justified on this

record in finding that it was open to a trier of fact to

infer that the substantial amounts of cash in her purse and

elsewhere in the house were the product of a significant

trafficking operation. 

La possession d'une quantité de drogue plus grande que pour usage personnel est une assise permettant au juge de conclure à la possession en vue de trafic / se débarrasser de la drogue via une toilette ne permet pas de conclure à la possession en vue de trafic de ladite substance

R. v. Scharf, 2017 ONCA 794

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[9]         Although not the subject of submissions by the appellant, we do not agree with the trial judge’s determination that the act of flushing the cocaine down the toilet amounted to trafficking: R. v. MacDonald, 1963 CanLII 675 (BC CA), [1963] B.C.J. No. 98; R. v. Pappin (1970) 12 C.R.N.S. 287. However, the trial judge found as fact that the appellant was in possession of the cocaine in a quantity greater than for personal use. The trafficking offence was therefore made out.

Les connaissances et l'expérience d'un témoin peuvent être suffisantes pour lui permettre d’établir la nature d'une drogue

Marin c. R., 2012 QCCA 254

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[38]           L’appelant insiste davantage sur le deuxième moyen d’appel. Il plaide que les déclarations de culpabilité sont déraisonnables, car elles ne peuvent pas reposer sur la preuve présentée au procès. Il souligne d’abord que la nature des substances n’a pas été prouvée et qu’il n’a jamais admis la chaîne de possession. C’est le sergent-détective Pinel qui a témoigné croire qu’il s’agissait de cannabis. Or, lors du contre-interrogatoire, il aurait avoué ne pas connaître la différence entre le chanvre et le cannabis, ce qui démontrerait son manque de connaissance en la matière.

[39]           Le ministère public reconnaît qu’aucun certificat d’analyse n’a été produit pour prouver que les substances saisies étaient du cannabis. Toutefois, il plaide que le témoignage d’un policier d’expérience peut servir à établir la nature des substances.

[40]           Le sergent-détective Pinel pouvait témoigner sur cette question. En effet, il ne s’agit pas ici de drogue chimique, mais bien de plants de cannabis. Or, le sergent-détective travaillait depuis six ans pour le Service de police de Québec au moment des événements et il était enquêteur pour la section des stupéfiants depuis trois ans et demi environ. Ses connaissances et son expérience en cette matière étaient suffisantes pour lui permettre d’établir la nature des substances, comme l’a mentionné la Cour dans O’Brien c. R. :

Clearly, the certificate of analysis referred to in section 9 of the Narcotic Control Act is not the only possible evidence of the nature of a substance.  The testimony of an arresting officer or other eye-witness may also, at least if he has some familiarity with narcotics, constitute such evidence: […] The weight of all such other evidence is, of course, a matter for determination by the trial judge: […] [4]

Le certificat de l'analyste n'est pas le seul moyen de démontrer validement la nature d'une drogue

R v Khalif, 2014 SKQB 165

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[40]                 In R. v. Grant, 2001 ABCA 252, [2001] A.J. No. 1257 (QL), the Alberta Court of Appeal stated as follows:

 

2   We will deal with this case on the certificate issue alone. A proper scientific analysis of a suspected substance is essential. Granted that a lay person can recognize various things such as smell, sights, sounds and speeds, and that such evidence may be admitted, the danger of permitting lay identification of an allegedly illegal substance is manifest and ought not to be encouraged. The chemical or scientific analysis of an illegal substance may well provide, and normally does provide, the court with reliable and trustworthy evidence that the substance was actually illegal according to its components. The certificate of analysis conveys just that. In practice, the certificate ends any debate about what was seized. Were we to uphold the course followed here the certificate of analysis practice will be at risk in future. The police will rely on nothing but opinion evidence given by themselves. That is a step that should only be permitted by Parliament by way of the repeal of the analysis legislation. The use of the certificate has long been entrenched in the Statute, and for good reason, and can only be replaced by expert testimony by a qualified analyst.

 

 

[41]                 This three-paragraph decision provides no details of the facts or circumstances relating to the case, the alleged substance in question. In Bruce A. MacFarlane, Robert J. Frater & Chantal Proulx, Drug Offences in Canada, 3^rd ed., looseleaf, vol. 2 (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2013) at page 13-35, the authors indicate that while not apparent from the courts reasons, what was at issue was the opinion of an officer involved in the seizure of 180 growing marijuana plants. It is to be noted that the Court of Appeal stated in the third and final paragraph of its decision that “we are not to be taken as foreclosing proof by other means in every possible case.”

 

[42]                 Cannabis or marijuana has been proven to be a controlled substance on the basis of circumstantial evidence surrounding the circumstances of seizure of the substance and evidence relating to the appearance of the substance by persons claiming familiarity with the product. See: R. v. Labine (1975), 1975 CanLII 1403 (ON CA), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 567, [1975] O.J. No. 235 (QL) (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 13-15, and Marin c. R., 2012 QCCA 254, [2012] J.Q. no 905 (QL), at paras. 45-46. Marijuana being an unrefined botanical product is obviously much more susceptible to lay person identification than a refined product such as crack cocaine. But, in R. v. Campbell, [1998] O.J. No. 2332 (QL) (Ont. C.A.), circumstantial evidence was held sufficient to justify a finding that the substance in question was cocaine. See paras. 7-8.

 

[43]                 In R. v. Grunwald, 2008 BCSC 1738, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2464 (QL), affirmed at 2010 BCCA 288, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 53, leave denied [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 299 (QL) (S.C.C.), the court stated:

 

37   I am of the view that while a certificate of analysis provides the simplest, most convenient and most satisfactory method of proof, the nature of the substance that was seized can be established by other means, particularly when the substance in question is marihuana as opposed to some liquid or powder which may have no identifiable, unique characteristics other than chemical composition.

 

38   There are cases that have held that in the absence of a certificate of analysis or other form of scientific evidence the trier of fact is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence when determining whether the Crown has proven that the substance in question is that alleged in the indictment.

 

 

Then, after referring to Grant, said at para. 43:

 

43   This statement is not in accord with the other authorities and in my respectful view, it goes too far. While the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act provides a convenient method of proof by means of a certificate of analysis, I can see nothing in the statute that makes a certificate mandatory or precludes proof by other means. I do not share the concern that accepting other evidence in proof of the nature of the substance in a proper case will lead to a practice of not obtaining certificates of analysis. I do not believe the police would be foolish enough to adopt a practice of dispensing with the best method of proving the identity of a controlled substance.

 

 

[44]                 This decision was followed up by Lee J. in R. v. Do, 2011 ABQB 135, [2011] A.J. No. 630 (QL), where he held the following:

 

44  Defence counsel relied on R. v. Grant, 2001 ABCA 252, in which McClung J.A. held that a proper scientific analysis of a suspected substance is essential. However, McClung J.A. also indicated that the Court was not to be taken as foreclosing proof by other means in every possible case. Joyce J. in R. v. Grunwald, 2008 BCSC 1738, aff’d 2010 BCCA 288, leave denied [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 299 opined that McClung J.A.’s statement went too far in that while the CDSA provides a convenient method of proof by means of a certificate of analysis, nothing in the statute makes a certificate mandatory or precludes proof by other means. I do agree with Defence counsel that caution must be exercised with respect to drawing analogies with cases where other means have been relied upon to establish that a substance was marijuana.

 

45  It is trite that in order to convict on circumstantial evidence, a court must be satisfied that guilt is the only reasonable and rational inference to be drawn from the proven facts: R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 42 at para. 33. This is a very exacting test. In the present case, the two items given to Cst. Smith were selected by Nguyen from a larger group of spitballs in his hand. Cst. Smith was not able to observe where Nguyen obtained the spitballs, nor where he put them after the deal was complete. The only spitballs found in the car or on Nguyen or the Accused shortly after the transaction were the 40 spitballs in the Juicy Fruit container located in Nguyen’s vest pocket. I am satisfied that the analysis of the two pieces selected from the 40 in the container support the inference that the 40 pieces in the Juicy Fruit container were spitballs of cocaine. The two items sold to Cst. Smith were virtually indistinguishable from the spitballs of cocaine in the Juicy Fruit container. Det. Pilon testified that cocaine dial-a-dopers commonly put their cocaine in containers like the Juicy Fruit container in this case. The cocaine transaction in this case was a dial-a-doper transaction. The items found in the Honda indicate an active dial-a-doper trafficking operation.

 

 

[45]                 In R. v. Nyuon, 2014 ABCA 130, [2014] A.J. No. 384 (QL), the Alberta Court of Appeal held as follows:

Was the substance cocaine?

 

20 The substance sold to the undercover officer was analyzed and the certificate of analysis confirmed that it was cocaine. However, as none of the substance which remained on the table was seized, there was no analysis of it. The appellant says that in the absence of a certificate of analysis, the Crown has not proved that the substance was cocaine. The appellant relies on a passage from this court’s decision in R. v. Grant, 2001 ABCA 252 where an officer’s description of a substance was found to be insufficient proof. The court warned against the danger of permitting lay identification of illegal substances and stated that such practice should not be encouraged. It further observed that if it were to uphold that course of identification, the certificate of analysis practice would be at risk in the future.

 

21 In our view the fears expressed in Grant are simply not present here. There was an analysis of the substance sold to the undercover officer and it was found to be crack cocaine. It was similar to the routine practice of testing a small sample of a larger amount. In addition the undercover officer testified that the substance he observed on the table appeared to him to be crack cocaine, and that the chip trafficked to him was very similar to those on the table. There was the evidence of known drug users attending the room for short periods of time while the appellant and Santino were in the room. Finally, the expert testified that drugs are often not packaged because users may want different amounts. There was ample evidence on this record to enable the trier of fact to infer that what was left on the table was the same substance. The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in his conclusion that the substance was cocaine. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

On peut se rabattre sur le témoignage d'un témoin compétent ou sur une preuve circonstancielle pour attester de la nature d'une drogue

Young c. R., 2018 QCCS 4277

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[58]        A number of courts have held that the trier of fact is entitled to rely upon circumstantial evidence when determining whether the Crown’s evidence has identified a substance[9].

[59]        In R. v. O’Brien[10], the Court of Appeal of Quebec stated:

Clearly, the certificate of analysis referred to in section 9 of the Narcotic Control Act is not the only possible evidence of the nature of a substance.  The testimony of an arresting officer or other eye-witness may also, at least if he has some familiarity with narcotics, constitute such evidence: […] The weight of all such other evidence is, of course, a matter for determination by the trial judge: […]

[60]        In Leboeuf v. R.[11], it was argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, because there was a total absence of evidence on the nature of the substance contained in a parcel found where an alleged drug traffic had taken place.

The Court of Appeal of Quebec concluded as follows:

[10]   Les policiers décrivent ainsi les caractéristiques des divers colis qu’ils ont examinés et manipulés et qui leur permettent d’affirmer qu’ils sont similaires : ils pèsent tous environ une livre, mesurent approximativement huit pouces de longueur par huit pouces de largeur et deux pouces d’épaisseur, sont recouverts de ruban gommé gris, les quatre coins du paquet sont ramenés en pointes, la texture et la densité sont les mêmes (une substance granuleuse qui résiste d’abord et cède ensuite sous la pression du doigt) et le même bruit est perçu lorsque le paquet est ainsi manipulé. [11]   De plus, le policier Côté, qui a examiné et palpé le colis du 18 janvier, est impliqué dans des enquêtes reliées aux stupéfiants depuis 1994.  Il a vu et manipulé de la cocaïne à plusieurs reprises et il a affirmé que, selon lui, vu les circonstances, le colis contenait une telle substance. [12]   En résumé, la preuve circonstancielle autorisait le jury à conclure que le colis du 18 janvier 2002 contenait de la cocaïne.  En effet, ce colis, similaire sinon identique à tous les autres, fut livré et récupéré dans des circonstances analogues aux autres colis, particulièrement à celui du 22 novembre, et dans le cadre d’une transaction impliquant Sylvain Lamontagne qui lui-même était relié aux divers événements relatés précédemment.  Le juge de première instance était donc fondé de rejeter la requête pour verdict dirigé d’acquittement.

[61]        In Marin v. R.[12], the Court of Appeal of Quebec also stated :

[39]   Le ministère public reconnaît qu’aucun certificat d’analyse n’a été produit pour prouver que les substances saisies étaient du cannabis. Toutefois, il plaide que le témoignage d’un policier d’expérience peut servir à établir la nature des substances. [40]   Le sergent-détective Pinel pouvait témoigner sur cette question. En effet, il ne s’agit pas ici de drogue chimique, mais bien de plants de cannabis. Or, le sergent-détective travaillait depuis six ans pour le Service de police de Québec au moment des événements et il était enquêteur pour la section des stupéfiants depuis trois ans et demi environ. Ses connaissances et son expérience en cette matière étaient suffisantes pour lui permettre d’établir la nature des substances, comme l’a mentionné la Cour dans O’Brien c. R. : Clearly, the certificate of analysis referred to in section 9 of the Narcotic Control Act is not the only possible evidence of the nature of a substance.  The testimony of an arresting officer or other eye-witness may also, at least if he has some familiarity with narcotics, constitute such evidence: […] The weight of all such other evidence is, of course, a matter for determination by the trial judge: […]

[62]        More recently, in R. v. Douglas[13], the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated the following:

[7]   The main issue on the conviction appeal is whether the trial judge erred in relying on lay opinion evidence from a police officer to establish that the balance of the substances in the room were cocaine when those substances had not been analyzed. In the alternative, if the trial judge was entitled to make that finding, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant was in possession of the balance of the substances in the room and proceeds of crime.   [8]   The appellant contends that while it may be possible in some cases to prove a substance is a narcotic without a certificate of analysis, this is not one of those cases. In this case, there were differences in the colour, texture and packaging of the balance of the substances in the room as compared to the substances found on the two other occupants of the room that were subjected to analysis. The police officer who testified he believed the balance of the substances were cocaine is not a chemist was not in a position to positively confirm their character.   […]

[11]   Although we think it should be the rare case in which a trial judge makes a finding that a substance is a particular narcotic in the absence of a certificate of analysis, we are satisfied, based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence in this case, that it was open to the trial judge to do so.   [12]   As we have said, samples of the substances found on the two other occupants of the motel room were confirmed to be cocaine by certificates of analysis. A police officer who had participated in more than 100 undercover cocaine purchases testified that the non-tested substances smelled like cocaine and had the appearance, texture(s) and colours for cocaine and were packaged as cocaine often is, in ziplock bags. Based on the whole of the evidence, including the surveillance evidence that placed the appellant in the motel room for more than a fleeting period; the evidence of the comings and goings to the room; the presence of what appeared to be drugs and drug-related paraphernalia throughout the room; the experienced police officer's lay opinion concerning the nature of the balance of the substances in the room; and the cash in each of the occupant’s pockets; it was open to the trial judge to conclude, as he did, that the occupants of the room, including the appellant, were part of a drug-dealing enterprise and that the substance they were dealing was cocaine. This same evidence and this finding supported the trial judge's further finding that the appellant was in possession of the balance of the substances in the room.   [13]   Viewed as a whole, the record provided a sufficient basis for the trial judge to make the findings of guilt.

[63]        Finally, the Court notes that in R. v. Grant[14], relied upon in part by the Applicant, the Court of Appeal of Alberta stated:

3     In allowing this appeal, which we do, we are not to be taken as foreclosing proof by other means in every possible case. This case could not serve as such an exception. We allow the appeal, set aside the conviction, and direct the entry of an acquittal. [Our emphasis]

[64]        The Court is of the view that, if circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to determine the nature of substances such as cannabis or cocaine, it can certainly be relied upon for tobacco, since this product is much more common.

[65]        As stated in R. v. O’Brien[15], the weight of such evidence is a matter for determination by the trial judge.