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[10] In my view the defence position is not supported by the prevailing rules of statutory construction. It is now well established that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (R. v. Clark, 2005 SCC 2 (CanLII), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 6 at para. 43, quoting other sources.)
[11] The purpose of s. 140 is not difficult to ascertain; it is intended to protect innocent persons “from the grievous and fearful consequences that can flow from false accusations” (R. v. J. (J.)), supra. The various subsections merely describe different ways in which such accusations may be made, ranging from words to actions or some combination of the two.
[12] The term “reporting” is not defined in this section of the Code or in the case law. In this situation the normal practice is to apply the ordinary meaning. The concise Oxford English Dictionary includes the following definitions of the verb “report”:
• Give a spoken or written account of something;
• Make a formal complaint or statement about;
• Cover an event or subject as a journalist or reporter;
[13] Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. defines “report” simply as “to give an account of, to relate, to tell, to convey or disseminate information”. On this basis the Crown argues that merely telling someone that a crime occurred is sufficient; nothing more formal is required and it certainly need not be made to the police.
[14] I recognize that the ordinary meaning of a disputed term will often vary with the context in which it is being used. In this case, it is arguable that because different language is used among the various subsections, different meanings must also apply. To the extent that the term “reporting” should be given a more exalted meaning than “making a false statement” or “making it known”, I take it, at its highest, to involve making a formal complaint or statement. That is one of the more rigorous “ordinary” meanings available, and therefore accords with the well known principle of statutory interpretation that where two interpretations of a provision which affects the liberty of an individual are available, the court should adopt the one more favourable to him: R. v. C.D.; R.v. C.D.K., 2005 SCC 78 (CanLII), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668, para. 50.
[15] However, there is no justification to add the requirement that the report must be made to police. The section does not say that. While it does require that the report “causes a peace officer” to investigate, and further requires that the defendant “inten[d] to mislead”, to import the requirement that the report must be made to police blurs the distinction among those essential elements. The report can be made to some other entity, such as a prison official or the Children’s Aid; should they in turn refer the report to the police and the defendant intends that the police act upon it, then all those essential elements have been met. Otherwise, a person who deliberately planted a false allegation with a third party who he reasonably knew would trigger a police investigation can escape liability. That cannot be right.
