La théorie de l'objet à vue (plain view)

R. c. McGregor, 2023 CSC 4 

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[37]                        L’admission des éléments de preuve inattendus découverts pendant le processus de triage ne contrevient pas non plus aux droits que l’art. 8 garantit au caporal McGregor. L’élément clé de mon raisonnement est l’application de la théorie des objets bien en vue aux fichiers révélant la preuve de l’agression sexuelle. Cette théorie de common law repousse la présomption selon laquelle les saisies doivent être autorisées par voie judiciaire. La jurisprudence de notre Cour nous enseigne que deux exigences doivent être remplies pour que la théorie des objets bien en vue s’applique : (1) les policiers doivent avoir été « préalablement justifié[s] [pour une raison légitime] de s’introduire dans les lieux où ont été saisis les objets “bien en vue” » (R. c. Buhay, 2003 CSC 30, [2003] 1 R.C.S. 631, par. 37); et (2) la preuve incriminante doit être bien en vue en ce qu’elle est « immédiatement apparente » et « découverte par inadvertance » par les policiers (R. c. Law, 2002 CSC 10, [2002] 1 R.C.S. 227, par. 27; voir aussi Buhay, par. 37). Des auteurs ont exprimé des réserves sur la théorie des objets bien en vue dans le contexte des saisies d’appareils électroniques (p. ex., L. Jørgensen, « In Plain View?: R v Jones and the Challenge of Protecting Privacy Rights in an Era of Computer Search » (2013), 46 U.B.C. L. Rev. 791). Vu la façon dont la présente affaire a été plaidée, j’estime qu’il n’est pas nécessaire d’exprimer une opinion définitive sur les limites de la théorie. Toutefois, je suis convaincue qu’elle s’applique sous une forme ou une autre aux appareils électroniques (R. c. Jones, 2011 ONCA 632, 107 O.R. (3d) 241). En l’espèce, il ne fait aucun doute que la théorie s’applique.

Le droit applicable à l’exécution d’un mandat de perquisition

Barthelus c. R., 2024 QCCQ 6646

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[57]      Des arrêts McGregor[71], Vu[72] et Cornell[73] le Tribunal retient ce qui suit quant au droit applicable à l’exécution d’un mandat de perquisition validement obtenu alléguée comme étant abusive:

1.   Les faits entourant l’exécution d’un mandat de perquisition doivent se situer dans le contexte général de l’enquête dans laquelle elle s’inscrit[74];

2.   La façon dont les policiers exécutent un mandat de perquisition doit être jugée en fonction de ce qu’ils savaient ou de ce qu’ils auraient raisonnablement dû savoir à l’époque, et non en fonction de ce qui s’est effectivement produit ou de ce que l’on sait aujourd’hui[75];

3.   Puisque les policiers doivent exercer leur jugement et leur pouvoir d'appréciation dans des circonstances difficiles et changeantes, ils doivent pouvoir jouir d’une certaine latitude en ce qui concerne la manière dont ils décident de pénétrer dans un lieu[76];

4.   Lors de l’examen de l’exécution du mandat de perquisition, le rôle du juge consiste, non pas à se poser en gérant d’estrade, mais à trouver un juste équilibre entre, d’une part, les droits des suspects et, d’autre part, les exigences que comporte la prise de mesures efficaces et sans danger visant à assurer le respect de la loi[77];

5.   La question à laquelle le juge doit répondre n’est pas celle de savoir si chacun des détails de la perquisition, considérés isolément, était justifié, mais bien de savoir si, dans l’ensemble et compte tenu des faits raisonnablement connus des policiers, la perquisition était ou non abusive[78];

6.   Une fois munis d’un mandat de perquisition, les policiers ne sont pas pour autant autorisés à fouiller le lieu investi sans discernement et demeurent tenus de se conformer à la règle requérant que la manière de procéder à la perquisition ne soit pas abusive[79];

7.   En conséquence, si au cours de l’exécution du mandat de perquisition, les policiers se rendent compte qu’il n’existait, en fait, aucune raison de poursuivre la fouille, le droit relatif aux fouilles, perquisitions et saisies exigent qu’ils s’abstiennent de le faire[80];

8.   En effet, un mandat, en soi, ne constitue pas un pouvoir de chercher tout ce qui pourrait servir de preuve à l'égard de toute infraction que ce soit, ou de saisir de tels éléments; la théorie des objets bien en vue ou l'art. 489 du C.cr. peut autoriser de telles saisies, mais seulement si les exigences relatives à celles-ci sont respectées[81].

Si le mandat prévoit des heures pour effectuer la perquisition, cela ne s'applique à la fouille des données un coup qu'elles sont saisies

R. v. Nurse and Plummer, 2014 ONSC 1779

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[24]           Counsel argues that the warrant only authorized a physical transfer of the phones from the OPP Vault to the OPP ECrimes Unit for an initial visual inspection to determine what could be done with the phones.   Once it was determined that the OPP would not able to conduct an analysis on the password protected phones, a justice would have to be informed that the phones were password protected because it engaged additional privacy interests and a second warrant was required for the RCMP to break through this password and extract the data from these phones.

[34]           Mr. Battigaglia, relies on Hill J.’s comments in R. v. N.N.M.[11], in that case Hill J. was faced with this same problem in the case of a warrant to seize firearms.  The Crown urged the court to apply the doctrine of severability to uphold the warrant but Hill J. refused, citing the decision in Branton.  At para. 335 he held:

I am not inclined to do so for the following reasons.  The court in Branton did not raise the prospect of curing such a facial validity defect by severance. Authorized searchers read the Form 5 warrant not the ITO.  Apparent conferral of searching and seizing authority exceeding what is properly supported by grounds in the ITO improperly risks overly broad conduct at the scene of the search thereby implicating N.N.M.’s s.8 Charter right to be free from search by invalid court orders.[12]

[46]           I adopt the analysis of Paciocco J. in R. v. Barwell[13], which I find persuasive.   In Barwell, the police had seized hard drives as part of an investigation and were holding those items at a police lock-up.   The police sought a warrant to search the hard drives and obtained a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of the computer hard drives from the lock-up.

[47]           The search warrant authorized the police to "between the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., to enter and search for" the computer hard drives "and to bring them before me or some other Justice to be dealt with according to law."   The items were seized during the time frame specified but were not analyzed until the day after the period provided for in the warrant.

[48]           The accused argued that the examination had to be completed within the 15 hour window set out in the warrant, and breached his s. 8 rights.

[49]           Paciocco J. rejected this argument and held that the search and seizure authorized by this warrant occurred properly when the police assumed control over the computer hard drives from the lock up within the period specified for that search and seizure.   He held at para 17-18:

It was not required by the warrant that the forensic examination would take place during that same brief window. The time limits under the search warrant were not, therefore, dishonoured by Detective Thompson when he commenced the forensic search the next day. First, consider the implications of the argument that a forensic search of a seized chattel must be undertaken within the search period specified on the face of the warrant. Imagine, for the sake of the exercise, that the computer had been at Mr. Barwell's home, and that the warrant authorized the search and seizure to occur there. In order to minimize the intrusion Mr. Barwell's private dwelling, the warrant period would necessarily have been brief, to minimize the control the police could exercise over Mr. Barwell's home. The law would have required it, and so the search period on the face of the warrant would have been brief. Would the law, nonetheless require, in such circumstances, that any forensic examination of the computer would have to occur within that same brief search window on the face of the warrant? This would be unrealistic. Forensic examinations take time, and it would be counter-productive to the privacy interest to extend search and seizure periods for long periods of time in order to accommodate forensic examinations.

The flaw in this Charter challenge is that it fails to recognize that the law treats the initial search and seizure and subsequent forensic examinations separately. There are provisions authorizing the initial search and seizure of the item, such as Section 487 of the Criminal Code of Canada, relied upon to secure the warrant in this case. There are other separate and distinct provisions dealing with the detention of items, including detention "for the purposes of any investigation." Specifically, Sections 489(1) and 490 of the Criminal Code of Canada together require that when things have been seized pursuant to a warrant, the police officer shall, as soon as practicable, either bring the seized items before a Justice or file a report identifying the thing being detained and the reason for detention. And the Justice shall order that the thing be released or detained, including for the purposes of investigation. In other words, the search warrant provision deals with the time required for the initial search for an item and with its seizure. The detention provisions address how long the item can be kept for forensic analysis after the search is made for the item and it is seized.[14]

Comment démontrer la propriété d'un ordinateur

R. v. Millard and Smich, 2016 ONSC 348 

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[98]       The Supreme Court’s remarks in Vu are helpful on this issue.  In that case the court observed that evidence of ownership and use is not easily predicted from the outside of a computer.  That is, until police look, they have no way of knowing precisely where and in what form evidence of ownership may be located.  

[99]      I agree with the Crown in that a computer with an account in, say, Millard’s name, is some evidence of ownership and of usage.  But it does not conclusively prove he used a device or computer a particular time or did a specific act.  The persuasive force of the contents of the computer, for example, emails or photos, provide more compelling evidence of user and ownership.  There is no legal basis to suggest police are to be limited to the worse evidence when better evidence is at their fingertips.  More to the point, it was open to the jurist to permit police to secure the best evidence. 

Il est impossible de voler des données informatiques

R v Maurer, 2014 SKPC 118

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1.  Can the “data” be the object of theft under the Criminal Code?

 

[18]                          The Crown is required to prove the offence particularized in the charge.^[2]  In the present case, the Crown alleges in both count one and count two that the accused stole data belonging to Christine Lee, and posted it online without her permission. It is the alleged theft of the data that gives rise to the charge of unauthorized use of a computer with intent to commit mischief in count one, and the charge of mischief in relation to data in count two.

 

[19]           The “data”, in this case, is the nude images quarantined onto the accused’s computer when he transferred the data from the complainant’s broken computer and completed the virus scan.

 

[20]           Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines the word “steal” as “to commit theft.” The offence of theft is set out in s. 322 (1) of the Criminal Code as follows:                      

 

322 (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything whether animate or inanimate, with intent,

 

(a)  to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it of the thing or of his property or interest in it;

…

(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted.

 

[21]           In Stewart, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether personal information of employees could be the object of theft under the Criminal Code.  It was agreed that no physical object would have been taken and that the information was confidential information per se, a pure intangible. Upon reviewing the wording of the theft provision in the Criminal Code, Lamer J., as he then was, concluded that the meaning of “anything” is restricted in two ways.  First, whether tangible or intangible, “anything” must be of such a nature that it can be the subject of a proprietary right. Second, the property must be capable of being taken or converted in a manner that results in the deprivation of the victim. He determined that confidential information is not property for the purposes of theft under the Criminal Code and stated further that:

 

To the extent that protection is warranted for confidential information it should be granted through legislative enactment and not through judicial extension of the concept of property or of the scope of the theft provision under the Criminal Code.

 

[22]                          The case of R. v. Alexander^[3], involved a charge similar to the wording in count one of this case, alleging that the accused did:

fraudulently and without colour of right obtain, directly or indirectly a computer service to wit: the Royal Bank Financial Group computer system with intent to commit the offence of mischief contrary to s. 430 of the Criminal Code by willfully stealing client data from the band data base, contrary to the Criminal Code.

 

[23]           The “data” in Alexander involved information about credit cards that were not received by the cardholder and were fraudulently activated or used.  The accused was committed to stand trial on a charge of unauthorized use of a computer with the intent to commit mischief, contrary to s. 342.1 of the Criminal Code, resulting in an application for certiorari to quash her committal.

[24]           The hearing judge noted that, although stealing is not an essential element of the offence created by s. 342.1 (c) or by s. 430 (1.1), the Crown is required to prove the charge as alleged. Since the Crown alleged theft, the Court found that the Crown is required to prove it.  Granting the application for certiorari, the judge concluded that:  “the mere accessing and sharing of such data cannot constitute “stealing” given that s.2 of the Criminal Code defines the word steal as “to commit theft” and R. v. Stewart (1988), 41 C.C.C (3d0 481 (S.C.C.) makes it clear that accessing confidential information does not constitute theft.”

 

[25]                          Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Stewart, and considering its application in Alexander, I find that the “data” in this case does not fall within the meaning of “anything” as that word is used in s. 322(1) of the Criminal Code. The data is not capable of being taken or converted in a manner that results in the deprivation of the victim.

 

[26]         If, for the sake of argument, the data was considered property capable of theft, section 322(1) dictates that a theft is committed when a person “converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything whether animate or inanimate, with intent” (a) to deprive temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it or (d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted”.  The accused did not intend to deprive the complainant  of her property interest in the data, nor did he intend  to deal with the data  in a manner that it could not be restored to the condition it was in at the time it was taken or converted.  By posting the data on the Internet, the accused intended to put the data in the public realm, and thereby humiliate and  embarrass the complainant and punish her for perceived bad behaviour.

 

[27]                          As the particulars in both counts stipulate that it is the act of theft that gives rise to the substantive charge, I must find the accused not guilty of both counts.

 

[28]           In Stewart , the Court observed that there should be specific legislative enactment to deal with the sharing of confidential information, rather than a judicial overextension of the Criminal Code’s definition of theft.

[29]           Bill C-13 has been drafted by Parliament to address a gap in the legislation concerning the non-consensual distribution of intimate images.  Bill C-13 proposes to amend the Criminal Code by creating the following new offence:

 

162.1 (1) Everyone who knowingly publishes, distributes, transmits, sells, makes available or advertises an intimate image of a person knowing that the person depicted in the image did not give their consent to that conduct, or being reckless as to whether or not that person gave their consent to that conduct, is guilty:

 

(a)                 of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or

(b)             of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

 

[30]           However, this provision has not yet been enacted and the charge as drafted is an inappropriate substitute based on the above jurisprudence.

 

[31]           The accused’s conduct in this case is despicable; however, for the reasons stated above, it  does not establish the charges set out in the Information.