Comment apprécier la fouille accessoire à l'arrestation d'une clé USB?

R. v. Balendra, 2019 ONCA 68

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[35]      I agree with the appellant that it is clear, since the decision of this Court in R. v. Tuduce, 2014 ONCA 547, 314 C.C.C. (3d) 429, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the USB key found in his pocket.

[37]      In Tuduce, at paras. 71-75, Gillese J.A. considered the privacy interests implicated in USB keys found in a person’s possession:

First, a USB key can store a significant amount of data. USB keys commonly hold anywhere from one to ten gigabytes of data, and USB keys with a storage capacity of over one terabyte exist. It seems likely that their storage capacities will only increase over time.

Second, data can be left on a USB key without a user’s knowledge. This data includes information about the date and time a file was created or modified and information about the user who created or modified that file.

Third, a user does not have complete control over which files an investigator will be able to find on a USB key. Data can be salvaged from a USB key through forensic analysis even after a user has deleted or “saved over” it.

It is true that a USB key is not a home computer or a cell phone. Thus, it may not always contain personal information, like a list of contacts, the contents of past communications, and information about an individual’s web searching habits.

On the other hand, however, a person’s personal USB key arguably engages more serious privacy interests than a work computer. The two key reasons why individuals have a somewhat diminished reasonable expectation of privacy in a work computer are that a work computer is not actually owned by the employee who uses it, and the employee’s use of the work computer is often subject to terms and conditions imposed by the employer: R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at paras. 49-52 and 92. Neither of these considerations apply to personal digital storage devices like USB key.

[38]      Here, the USB key was found in the appellant’s pocket. That fact, combined with the potential personal contents of such a device, is sufficient to establish that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the USB key: R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 56. It is not necessary for the purposes of this appeal to define the level or intensity of that interest relative to other such devices with any further precision.

(2)         Was the search of the USB key reasonable?

[39]      Having found that the appellant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the USB key, I turn now to the question of whether Sgt. Humber’s search of the key on the evening of the appellant’s arrest was reasonable as a search incident to arrest.

[40]      The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the law applicable to the scope of searches incident to arrest in the context of cell phones in R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621. Cromwell J., writing for the majority, wrote of the need to recognize, on the one hand, the high potential invasion of privacy inherent in the search of a cell phone, and, on the other, the importance that cell phones may play with respect to law enforcement objectives. At para. 83, Cromwell J. set out four conditions with which a search of a cell phone incident to arrest should comply in order to be lawful:

1.            The arrest itself must be lawful;

2.            The search must be “truly” incidental to arrest, and have a valid law enforcement purpose in (a) protecting the police, the accused or the public; (b) preserving evidence; or (c) discovering evidence, including locating additional suspects, in situations in which the investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest;

3.            The nature and extent of the search must be tailored to the purpose of the search; and

4.            The police must take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device and how it was searched.

[41]      The three valid law enforcement purposes identified by Cromwell J. are drawn from the Supreme Court’s previous decisions in Cloutier v. Langlois, 1990 CanLII 122 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, and R. v. Caslake, 1998 CanLII 838 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51. In Caslake, the Court clarified, with respect to the “discovering evidence” purpose, that “if the justification for the search is to find evidence, there must be some reasonable prospect of securing evidence of the offence for which the accused is being arrested”: at para. 22 (emphasis in original).

[42]      This restrictive approach to the “discovering evidence” purpose was affirmed by Cromwell J. in Fearon, though he added three additional restrictions in the context of cell phone searches. First, where the purpose of the search is to discover evidence, it will only be lawful if the investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest. The rationale for this restriction is that it strikes the proper balance between law enforcement objectives and privacy interests, in light of the nature and vast range of personal information that a cell phone might hold. Second, where a search is conducted for any valid purpose, both the nature and extent of the search must be tailored to that purpose. Finally, officers must take detailed notes of what they have examined on a cell phone, in order to help them focus their search and to permit effective after-the-fact judicial review. See R. v. Tsekouras, 2017 ONCA 290, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 349, at paras. 89-94.

[44]       With respect, I agree with the appellant that the trial judge erred on this point. It is clear from Caslake and Fearon that the requirement that the search be “truly incidental” to the charge for which an accused has been arrested is to be strictly interpreted. At para. 76 of Fearon, Cromwell J., having stated that the requirement that the search of a cell phone be truly incidental to arrest should be “strictly applied”, continued:

…it is not enough that a cell phone search in general terms is truly incidental to the arrest. Both the nature and the extent of the search performed on the cell phone must be truly incidental to the particular arrest for the particular offence. [Emphasis added.]

[46]      The test for determining whether a search is incidental to arrest has both a subjective and an objective component. While Sgt. Humber subjectively believed his look at the USB key was incident to the appellant’s arrest, this belief was not objectively reasonable because the officer was not looking for information relating to the stolen van charge but rather to the investigation that was superseding it with respect to which no charges had yet been laid. Put another way, he was not (subjectively) aware that the initial arrest did not (objectively) authorize him to look at the USB key in order to find evidence of impersonation or fraud.

[47]      This is very similar to the facts in Caslake. In that case, the officer would objectively have had a lawful basis for a search incident to arrest that led to the discovery of a nine-pound bag of marijuana in the appellant’s car. However, subjectively, the officer had not been searching for evidence incident to the arrest, but rather was doing so in compliance with an RCMP policy requiring that the contents of an impounded car be inventoried. As a result, the Supreme Court found that the search did not fall within the bounds of a search incident to arrest, although it admitted the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.

[49]      In short, I find that the first search of the USB key was not objectively reasonable because it was not conducted to find evidence of the particular offences for which the appellant had been arrested. Had it been related to those offences, the search would still not be justified because the investigation would not have been stymied or significantly hampered absent the search incident to arrest. 

[50]      The fact that the search was not objectively incidental to arrest is sufficient to address its reasonableness on those grounds. However, I disagree with the appellant’s argument that the search could not have been valid because it was conducted a number of hours after his arrest. While there are temporal limits to a search incident to arrest, there is no “firm deadline” that defines this limit. Rather, as Lamer C.J. stated in Caslake, at para. 24:

As a general rule, searches that are truly incidental to arrest will usually occur within a reasonable period of time after that arrest. A substantial delay does not mean that the search is automatically unlawful, but it may cause the court to draw an inference that the search is not sufficiently connected to the arrest.

[51]      Here, Sgt. Humber inserted the USB key into a computer later during the same day, and during the same shift. This was within a reasonable period of time after the arrest. There was no problem with the temporal nexus to the arrest in itself in the circumstances of this case.

[52]      I would also not attach great weight in the circumstances of this case to Sgt. Humber’s failure to take detailed notes when he first looked at the contents of the USB key on March 13. He spent about 10-30 minutes looking at it and determined that it contained a long list of credit card numbers, a driver’s licence template, and the image of a driver’s license with a photograph of an unidentified person. In these circumstances, the need for detailed notes does not appear to be as strong as was the case of the cell phone at issue in Fearon. Cell phones frequently have many apps and icons, and one may see a great deal of categories of information whose contents range across a wide number of subjects. In this case, the USB key contents were narrower in range and it is clear that while Sgt. Humber did not take notes, he remembered the nature of what he saw.

Il n'y a aucune distinction entre une clé USB et d’autres dispositifs informatiques qui stockent des données dans l'appréciation de l'expectative de vie privée

Croisetière c. R., 2022 QCCA 980

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[78]      À mon avis, et avec égards, il est déraisonnable de conclure que la bonne foi de la policière pouvait, dans les circonstances, écarter la règle énoncée dans l’arrêt R. c. Fearon, 2014 CSC 77 (CanLII), [2014] 3 R.C.S. 621, rendue plus de 30 mois auparavant. La juge a eu tort de faire reposer la conduite de la policière sur la bonne foi. En l’espèce, l’erreur est déraisonnable et révèle une méconnaissance de l’étendue de ses pouvoirs et du droit : R. c. Grant, 2009 CSC 32 (CanLII), [2009] 2 R.C.S. 353, par. 75, 133 ; R. c. Tim, 2022 CSC 12, par. 85.

[79]      Il est aussi douteux que la policière aurait découvert les photographies. La juge ne s’en explique pas et la preuve démontre plutôt que la possession de pédopornographie n’était pas une préoccupation des policiers avant la découverte d’images sur la clé. L’intérêt pour les ordinateurs et autres supports numériques n’avait jamais effleuré l’esprit de la policière qui n’avait jamais demandé à saisir autre chose que le téléphone cellulaire en lien avec les photographies concernant le plaignant. Dans un second temps, le mandat pour les obtenir était tout aussi vicié par la fouille illégale de la clé USB et ne pouvait autrement, dans les circonstances, se justifier. Les faits ne permettent pas d’établir avec certitude que les éléments de preuve auraient été découverts sans violation de la Charte : R. c. Grant, 2009 CSC 32 (CanLII), [2009] 2 R.C.S. 353, par. 122 ; R. c. Tim, 2022 CSC 12, par. 94.

[80]      L’arrêt Fearon précise qu’une fouille sans mandat d’une clé USB est possible si elle est strictement accessoire à l’arrestation et que les policiers conservent des notes détaillées de la fouille et des raisons pour le faire : R. c. Fearon, 2014 CSC 77 (CanLII), [2014] 3 R.C.S. 621, par. 4, 82. Toutefois, l’État doit expliquer pourquoi la fouille ne pouvait pas être effectuée après l’obtention d’un mandat : R. c. Fearon, [2014] 3 R.C.S. 621, par. 80. La Cour suprême rappelle que, sauf lorsque l’enquête en serait paralysée ou sérieusement entravée, un mandat est nécessaire. Autrement, l’atteinte importante à la vie privée l’emporte sur l’objectif de la découverte d’éléments de preuve : R. c. Fearon, [2014] 3 R.C.S. 621, par. 80.  L’absence d’urgence sera, en principe, fatale : R. c. Fearon, [2014] 3 R.C.S. 621, par. 81.

[81]      Comme la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, je ne crois pas utile de faire des distinctions entre une clé USB et d’autres dispositifs informatiques qui stockent des données : R. v. Tuduce, 2014 ONCA 547; R. v. Balendra, 2019 ONCA 68.

[82]      Je suis d’avis que la violation elle-même était grave tout comme son incidence sur les droits de l’appelant. Ce dernier a raison de souligner les préoccupations particulières en matière de respect de la vie privée que soulèvent la saisie et la fouille des appareils qui stockent des données : R. c. Vu, 2013 CSC 60 (CanLII), [2013] 3 R.C.S. 657; R. c. Fearon, 2014 CSC 77 (CanLII), [2014] 3 R.C.S. 621; R. c. Morelli, 2010 CSC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 R.C.S. 253. 

[83]      Rien dans la preuve n’indique qu’avant la fouille illégale, les policiers avaient l’intention de fouiller la clé et les ordinateurs de l’appelant. Négliger d’obtenir un mandat pour fouiller une clé USB dans ses circonstances est de nature à miner à long terme l’intégrité du système de justice et de la confiance du public à son égard. La preuve des photographies devait être exclue : R. c. Reilly, 2021 CSC 38; R. c. Stairs, 2022 CSC 11, par. 158; R. c. Tim, 2022 CSC 12, par. 75 et 98; R. c. Le, 2019 CSC 34 (CanLII), [2019] 2 R.C.S. 692, par. 141-142 ; R. c. McGuffie, 2016 ONCA 365, par. 62-63 ; R. c. Stevens, 2016 QCCA 1707, par. 89 ; R. c. Cormier, 2021 QCCA 620, par. 24.

Une modification qui rehausse la qualité d’une preuve audiovisuelle, tout en préservant son exactitude et sa fidélité, est permise, car la Couronne n’a pas à faire la preuve que la vidéo n’a pas été altérée, les règles d’admissibilité n’exigeant pas que la vidéo soit exempte d’altérations

R v Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251

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  (1) Must the Crown prove that the video recording has not been altered or changed?

[26]           As already noted, the appellants say that Nikolovski creates a two-part test which must be met before admitting video evidence, requiring the Crown to show not only that the video recording accurately depicts the facts, but also that it has not been altered or changed. This is incorrect.

[27]           It must first be borne in mind that Nikolovski was not a case about the admissibility of a video recording (which had been conceded), but rather about identity (specifically, whether a trier of fact could identify the accused beyond a reasonable doubt as the offender by relying solely upon that video recording). The critical passage from Nikolovski, para 28 upon which the appellants rely, is found under a heading discussing “Use That Can Be Made of Photographs or Videotapes”, which clearly presupposes admissibility.

[28]           Further, the passage itself fails to support the appellants’ contention. It reads as follows: 

“Once it is established that a videotape has not been altered or changed, and that it depicts the scene of a crime, then it becomes admissible and relevant evidence.”

This statement does not state a necessary condition for admission, but rather a sufficient condition. It does not, even implicitly, preclude admission of video recordings under other circumstances. Indeed, where an alteration enhances a video recording, its accuracy might well be served by such an alteration: R v Jamieson, [2004] OTC 369 at paras 36-37, [2004] OJ No 1780 (QL) (SCJ).

[29]           We do agree with the appellants, however, that in some cases Nikolovski has been taken as requiring the tendering party to show an absence of alteration or change: Penney; R c MacNeil, 2008 QCCS 915 at para 11, [2008] QJ No 1784 (QL); R v Chevannes, 2011 ONCJ 754 at para 16, [2011] OJ No 5937; R v Ellard, 2004 BCSC 780 at para 11, [2004] BCJ No 2914. In Penney, for example, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal (at para 17) cited Nikolovski as authority for the statement that “[e]vidence establishing that the video has not been altered or changed is a precondition to its admission as evidence.” With respect, we do not read Nikolovski as stating so broad a proposition, and we see no principled reason to support it. Indeed, taken to its extreme, it could render almost any DVD left unattended next to a computer inadmissible. And, in any event, Penny is distinguishable, since exclusion of the video in that case was grounded in its lack of probative value and in its potential inaccuracy (the video was selectively shot and did not include a time stamp, which was vital since the charge was that the accused did not kill a seal “quickly”).

[30]           Other courts have taken a different view of Nikolovski, to the effect that a video recording may be admitted into evidence, even if it has been altered in some way, so long as it is shown to be a substantially accurate depiction of the event in question. In R v Brown, [1999] OTC 213, [1999] OJ No 4865 (CJ), where the Crown sought to tender at trial a security surveillance videotape and enhanced copies, the court stated (at para 3) that, when a videotape has been altered, the test for admissibility is:

“one of substantial accuracy. … [T[he Crown must … prove on a balance of probabilities the substantial accuracy of the original tape and the enhancements of it to obtain the permission of the court to tender them in accordance with [Nikolovski] ….”

(Emphasis added.) 

[31]           Similarly, in R v Crawford, 2013 BCSC 2402 at para 48, [2013] BCJ No 2879 (emphasis added), the court said that Nikolovski should be interpreted in a “purposive” manner, such that a video recording’s admissibility is not precluded, even if “complete accuracy” no longer subsists, so long as “the alteration of the recorded event is not so substantial as to be misleading” or “if the image is distorted or otherwise changed in a material way.” What matters, said the court in Crawford, is that the video recording “accurately and fairly presents he information that it is to convey”. Other courts, including this Court, said much the same thing prior to Nikolovski: R v Leaney, 1987 ABCA 206 at para 45, 81 AR 247 (per Harradence JA, dissenting on other grounds; R v Maloney (No 2) (1976), 1976 CanLII 1372 (ON CJ), 29 CCC (2d) 431, [1976] OJ No. 2446 (QL) (Co Ct); R v Taylor, [1983] OJ No 3354 at paras 17-18 (QL) (Prov Ct); and R v Creemer and Cormier (1968), 1967 CanLII 711 (NS CA), 1 CCC 14, [1967] NSJ No 3 (QL) (SC) (dealing with photographs).

[32]           There is an important distinction between recordings (video or audio) and other forms of real evidence (such as a pistol or an article of clothing found at a crime scene) which supports a test of “substantial” accuracy over the appellants’ preferred test of “not altered”. It will be recalled that “authentication” simply requires that the party tendering evidence establish (to the requisite standard of proof, which we discuss below) the claim(s) made about it. What authentication requires in any given instance therefore depends upon the claim(s) which the tendering party is making about the evidence. In the case of most real evidence, the claim is that the evidence is something – the pistol is a murder weapon, or the article of clothing is the victim’s shirt. Chain of custody, and absence of alteration will be important to establish in such cases. In the case of recordings, however, the claim will typically be not that it is something, but that it accurately represents something (a particular event). What matters with a recording, then, is not whether it was altered, but rather the degree of accuracy of its representation. So long as there is other evidence which satisfies the trier of fact of the requisite degree of accuracy, no evidence regarding the presence or absence of any change or alteration is necessary to sustain a finding of authentication.

[33]           Put simply, the mere fact of alteration does not automatically render a video recording inadmissible. It follows that the Crown’s failure to establish that this video recording was not altered should not be fatal, so long as the Crown proves that it is a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purports to show. All this is, of course, subject to the standard framework for admission, under which a video recording may be excluded on the basis of irrelevance (Penney), where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value (R v Veinot, 2011 NSCA 120 at paras 24-27, 311 NSR (2d) 267), or where there is reasonable doubt that the video identifying the accused is a fabrication.

La preuve de l’authenticité d'un vidéo peut être directe et/ou circonstancielle

R v Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251

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(2) Can video evidence only be authenticated by an eyewitness or a member of one of the other classes which the appellant posits?

[34]           It will be recalled that the appellants say that, because Reddick does not fit into any of the four categories identified by Goldstein as persons capable of authenticating video evidence, it follows that the Crown could not authenticate the video recording. We assume that the appellants also maintain that none of the other Crown witnesses would fit into those categories, although we observe that Hodge would have fallen into Goldstein’s second category as an eyewitness, had he viewed the video in court and testified that it accurately depicted what he saw. In any event, these categories are not exhaustive in the sense that, if the Crown does not call one of these four kinds of witnesses, the video recording is inadmissible. Rather, other kinds of evidence or different combinations of witnesses may be employed to satisfy a court of the video recording’s substantial accuracy and fairness.

[35]           In particular, circumstantial evidence may be used to authenticate real evidence: David M Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 6^th ed (Irwin Law, 2011) at 466; Graham Underwood & Jonathan Penner, Electronic Evidence in Canada (Carswell, 2010) at 11-34; David M Paciocco, “Proof and Progress: Coping with the Law of Evidence in a Technological Age”, 11:2 CJLT 181 at 197-98; EG Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings & Practice in Canada, 2d ed (Carwright, 2010) at 16:104-105; R v Evans, 1993 CanLII 86 (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 653 at 663, 108 DLR (4th) 32; R v Lempen, 2008 NBCA 86 at para 24, 338 NBR (2d) 377; Liang; R v Schertzer, 2011 ONSC 579 at para 12, [2011] OJ No 6524 (QL).

[36]           For example, in Evans, the Supreme Court quoted with approval this passage from a US textbook on evidence law: “authentication may be accomplished by circumstantial evidence pointing to X’s identity as the caller, such as if the communication reveals that the speaker had knowledge of facts that only X would be likely to know”. In Liang, this Court upheld a trial judge’s decision to admit into evidence an audio recording of a 911 call because its contents were consistent with the trial evidence of other witnesses, and because the trial judge found as a fact that the voice on the tape belonged to the complainant. In Lempen (at para 26), the New Brunswick Court of Appeal overturned a trial judge’s decision not to admit a letter when a witness stated the signature looked like his but that he did not recall writing it because it was possible to “authenticate the letter by other means, including but not limited to, inviting comparisons with the signature on the previously admitted letter …, evidence of the letter to which the author was allegedly responding, and other circumstantial evidence surrounding the alleged execution of the letter”. And, in Schertzer, the trial judge found that a variety of evidence including handwriting comparisons and drug squad document-keeping practices were sufficient to authenticate the contents of certain drug squad case files.

[37]           While none of these authorities are specifically about video recorded evidence, we see no principled reason why it should be treated differently. A trial judge is entitled to authenticate a video recording by using circumstantial evidence of one or more witnesses, provided such evidence establishes to the requisite standard of proof that the video in question is a substantially accurate and fair depiction of what it purports to depict. We now turn to consider whether the trial judge in this matter had sufficient evidence upon which to admit the video recording.