Les règles entourant la preuve documentaire en présence d'un document électronique lorsque celui-ci consiste en des données générées automatiquement par un instrument technologique

Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales c. Leblanc, 2022 QCCS 4444

Lien vers la décision

[24]        Il importe de distinguer l’admissibilité d’un élément de preuve, à titre de question de droit, de sa valeur probante, à titre de question de fait. L’admissibilité d’un élément de preuve concerne sa recevabilité légale au procès. Comme le rappelle la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’arrêt R. c. Schneider, 2022 CSC 34, l’admissibilité d’un élément de preuve est déterminée par le juge du droit selon une analyse en trois points :

•         Premièrement, la preuve proposée doit être pertinente. Il s’agit d’une condition nécessaire et indispensable. Une preuve est pertinente si elle tend, selon la logique et l’expérience humaine, à accroitre ou à diminuer la probabilité de l’existence d’un fait en litige. La pertinence concerne essentiellement la signification de la preuve, et non sa force probante ni même sa véracité.

•         Deuxièmement, il faut appliquer les règles d’exceptions visant la preuve proposée. En principe, une preuve pertinente est admissible. Cependant, le droit prévoit diverses exceptions ou règles spécifiques qui peuvent entrainer l’exclusion d’une preuve pertinente qui serait autrement admissible.

•         Troisièmement, le juge peut, en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire résiduel, exclure une preuve qui comporte un effet préjudiciable qui surpasse sa valeur probante.

[25]        Ensuite, les principes et les règles de preuve du droit criminel s’appliquent au droit pénal québécois, avec quelques réserves incluant l’application de la Loi concernant le cadre juridique des technologies de l'information, RLRQ c C-1.1. L’art. 61 du Code de procédure pénale stipule ce qui suit :

61. Les règles de preuve en matière criminelle, dont la Loi sur la preuve au Canada (Lois révisées du Canada (1985), chapitre C-5), s’appliquent en matière pénale, compte tenu des adaptations nécessaires et sous réserve des règles prévues dans le présent code ou dans une autre loi à l’égard des infractions visées par cette loi et de l’article 283 du Code de procédure civile (chapitre C-25.01) ainsi que de la Loi concernant le cadre juridique des technologies de l’information (chapitre C-1.1).

Les dispositions du Code criminel (Lois révisées du Canada (1985), chapitre C-46) relatives aux dépositions à distance des témoins s’appliquent, compte tenu des ressources mises à la disposition du tribunal, à l’instruction des poursuites intentées conformément au présent code.

[26]        Une règle spécifique s’applique à la preuve documentaire. Pour être admissible, un document doit minimalement être appuyé par une preuve étayant son authenticité, c’est-à-dire une preuve pouvant établir que le document est véritablement ce que l’on prétend qu’il est. Au stade de l’admissibilité, il s’agit seulement pour le juge du droit de vérifier l’existence d’une preuve pouvant fonder l’authenticité du document, car l’appréciation de la valeur probante du document doit être laissée au juge des faits. Le plus souvent, l’authenticité d’un document repose sur les explications d’un témoin, son auteur ou une personne autrement capable de le reconnaitre. Toutefois, l’authenticité peut être démontrée d’une autre façon, par exemple au moyen d’une admission, d’un témoignage d’expert ou même d’une preuve circonstancielle. La règle est essentiellement la même dans le cas d’un document technologique ou généré par un instrument technologique, quoique la question de l’intégrité informatique du document s’ajoute à la question de l’authenticité au sens classique. La notion d’intégrité informatique signifie que les données enregistrées ou produites par un système informatique doivent être intactes (art. 6, 12 à 14 de la La Loi concernant le cadre juridique des technologies de l’information, précitée; art. 31.1 à 31.8 de la Loi sur la preuve au Canada, LRC 1985, c C-5; D. M. Paciocco, P. Paciocco et L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 8e éd., Toronto, Irwin Law, 2020, pp. 561-567; S. N. Lederman, M. K. Fuerst et H. C. Stewart, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada, 6e éd., 2022, pp. 1433-1435; G. Chan et S. Magotiaux, Digital Evidence, 2e éd.,Toronto, Emond Montgomery Publications, 2022, pp. 214-230; M. Gourlay, B. Jones, J. Makepeace, G. Crisp et R. Pomerance, Modern Criminal Evidence, Toronto, Emond Publishing, 2021, pp. 538-550; V. Gautrais, La preuve technologique, 2^e éd., Montréal, LexisNexis Canada inc., 2018; par. 227; M. Phillips, La preuve électronique au Québec, Montréal, LexisNexis Canada inc., 2010; Benisty c. Kloda, 2018 QCCA 608, para. 85-105; R. c. Major, 2022 SKCA 80; R. c. Durocher, 2019 SKCA 97, para. 74-96; R. c. Richardson, 2020 NBCA 35; R. c. Ball, 2019 BCCA 32; R. c. Hirsch, 2017 SKCA 14).

[27]        Toutefois, l’authenticité d’un document (et son intégrité dans le cas d’un document technologique) n’est qu’un critère préliminaire d’admissibilité. Un document ne prouve pas d’emblée la véracité de l’information qu’il contient.

[28]        En effet, l’information que contient un document peut être assimilée à une déclaration extrajudiciaire écrite et constituer du ouï-dire, c’est le cas notamment de communications entre des personnes, de notes personnelles ou de données consignées dans un registre. Il s’agit alors de déterminer si l’information contenue au document peut être admise pour faire la preuve de sa véracité en vertu d’une règle d’exception au ouï-dire ou d’une règle spécifique en matière de preuve documentaire, notamment selon la Loi sur la preuve au Canada (M. Vauclair et T. Desjardins, Traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales, 29e éd., Montréal, Yvon Blais, 2022, para. 44.63-44.69). Il importe de rappeler, au passage, qu’une déclaration écrite est parfois produite non pas pour établir sa véracité, mais simplement pour établir son existence.

[29]        Par ailleurs, lorsque l’information contenue au document consiste en des données générées automatiquement par un instrument technologique, la preuve ne peut pas être aisément assimilée à une déclaration extrajudiciaire. Une machine ne fait pas de déclaration comme une personne humaine. Conséquemment, la règle du ouï-dire ne s’applique pas. Sur le plan conceptuel, une preuve de données produites automatiquement s’approche plutôt de la preuve matérielle. En définitive, il s’agit d’un « objet » soumis à l’appréciation du juge des faits. Le critère d’authenticité demeure, car ce critère s’applique à la preuve matérielle comme à la preuve documentaire (Lederman, M. K. Fuerst et H. C. Stewart, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada, 6e éd., 2022, pp. 1476-1477; M. Gourlay, B. Jones, J. Makepeace, G. Crisp et R. Pomerance, Modern Criminal Evidence, Toronto, Emond Publishing, 2021, p. 549; Saturley c. CIBC World Markets Inc., 2012 NSSC 226, para. 11-13).

[30]        Si les données générées automatiquement par un instrument technologique sont présentées au procès pour prouver leur véracité, l’admissibilité du document dépend de l’existence d’une preuve susceptible d’étayer la fiabilité des données comme étant véridiques. Cette exigence de fiabilité n’est pas toujours explicitement énoncée par la jurisprudence et la doctrine, mais elle découle du critère d’authenticité. Ici, une preuve que les données sont authentiques, soit qu’elles sont véritablement ce qu’on prétend qu’elles sont, doit pouvoir démontrer que ces données représentent la vérité. Rappelons qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un fardeau exigeant au stade de l’admissibilité. Le juge du droit doit simplement s’assurer que la fiabilité des données comme étant véridiques prend assise dans la preuve. La nature de cette preuve dépend des circonstances. Une preuve d’expert n’est pas toujours nécessaire, loin de là. Souvent, un témoin ordinaire qui connait bien l’instrument technologique concerné peut témoigner de la fiabilité des données produites par celui-ci, notamment en relatant son expérience d’utilisation de l’instrument ou en expliquant les vérifications qu’il a effectuées. Pour citer un exemple facile, un témoin peut affirmer que sa montre donne l’heure juste, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de faire entendre un expert en horlogerie (R. c. Ball, 2019 BCCA 32, para. 69; R. c. Martin, 2021 NLCA 1, para. 58; R c Major, 2022 SKCA 80; Québec (Procureur général) c. Robitaille, 1991 CanLII 3772 CAQ; G. Chan et S. Magotiaux, Digital Evidence, 2e éd.,Toronto, Emond Montgomery Publications, 2022, pp. 214-230).

[31]        De plus, toujours pour étayer la fiabilité des données produites automatiquement par un instrument technologique, la partie qui présente la preuve peut, lorsque la situation s’y prête, demander au juge de prendre connaissance d’office de faits notoires et non contestés relatifs à la technologie ou à la science en cause. C’est ainsi que la jurisprudence a reconnu que la mesure de vitesse captée par un radar ou un cinémomètre laser est admissible pour prouver sa véracité, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de présenter une preuve d’expert. Ces appareils de localisation sont d’usage répandu et leur fonctionnement est bien connu. Il en est de même du calcul de la vitesse en physique élémentaire. Chacun sait que la vitesse est calculée en divisant la distance parcourue par le temps de parcours. Toutefois, la connaissance d’office ayant une portée générale, elle ne suffit habituellement pas à étayer la fiabilité de données produites par un instrument technologique précis dans un cas spécifique (Joliette (Ville) c. Delangis, 1999 CanLII 13438 (CAQ); Baie-Comeau (Ville) c. D'Astous, 1992 CanLII 2956 (CAQ); Brochu c. R., 2018 QCCA 2205; M. Gourlay, B. Jones, J. Makepeace, G. Crisp et R. Pomerance, Modern Criminal Evidence, Toronto, Emond Publishing, 2021, pp. 554-555).

Le dépôt en preuve d'un courriel

Nadeau c. R., 2017 QCCS 4215

Lien vers la décision

3.1  Le contexte

[20]        Peu après le début du témoignage de la plaignante, l’avocate de la poursuite lui exhibe six courriels. Dès lors, elle les dépose en preuve[6], avec le consentement de l’avocat de la défense :

Me Emilie Desjardins-Bertrand

(…) Alors, je vous coterais tous les courriels sous P-1 en liasse et on va les passer un à un. Ça vous va, collègue?

Me Olivier Cusson

Ça me va[7]

(Notre soulignement)

[21]        L’avocate de la poursuite questionne ensuite la plaignante sur chacun de ces courriels[8]. Notamment, elle la questionne sur :

▪   l’adresse courriel de l’expéditeur;

▪   ses propres adresses courriel;

▪   le fait que la copie déposée de ces courriels correspond à ceux qu’elle a reçus dans sa propre boîte courriel[9];

▪   le contenu de chacun;

▪   les raisons pour lesquelles elle les attribue à l’accusé; et

▪   les sentiments qu’ils provoquent chez elle.

[22]        Jamais l’avocat de la défense ne formule quelque objection à leur égard, bien au contraire[10]. Il ne réagit pas lorsque la plaignante témoigne ne pas avoir imprimé elle‑même les copies déposées[11]. Il ne plaide pas leur inadmissibilité en preuve. Cet argument n’apparaît qu’en appel.

3.2  Le droit et la discussion

[23]        Bien que le juge d’instance possède le pouvoir d’écarter une preuve inadmissible[12], il est de jurisprudence constante que, normalement, une partie doit formuler son objection à l’admissibilité d’une preuve au moment où l’autre partie la présente au Tribunal.

[24]        Ainsi, dans une décision de 2008, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario qualifie ce principe de banal (« trite law »)[13]. Elle l’exprime d’ailleurs dès 1992 dans R v Kutynec[14]. Elle y écrit qu’avant l’avènement de la Charte, aucune personne au courant des règles sur la conduite d’un procès criminel n’aurait suggéré qu’un accusé puisse s’objecter de façon routinière à l’admissibilité d’une preuve soumise par la poursuite après que celle‑ci ait déclaré sa preuve close. Elle ajoute qu’il s’avère évident que l’accusé doit formuler de telles objections avant ou au moment où la preuve est présentée. Elle conclut que cette proposition sensée s’applique même aux demandes d’exclusion de la preuve en vertu de la Charte[15].

[25]        Si tant est que ce soit nécessaire, la Cour explique qu’une conduite ordonnée et juste des procès criminels exige que la poursuite sache si la preuve qu’elle soumet sera reçue et considérée avant de déclarer sa preuve close :

14 Litigants, including the Crown, are entitled to know when they tender evidence whether the other side takes objection to the reception of that evidence. The orderly and fair operation of the criminal trial process requires that the Crown know before it completes its case whether the evidence it has tendered will be received and considered in determining the guilt of an accused. The ex post facto exclusion of evidence, during the trial, would render the trial process unwieldy at a minimum. In jury trials it could render the process inoperative.

(Notre soulignement)

[26]        Plus récemment, la Cour d’appel du Québec rappelait ce principe[16], qu’elle avait déjà souligné plusieurs années auparavant[17].

[27]        En l’espèce, la poursuite produit les courriels litigieux sans objection de l’accusé, voire avec son consentement. Celui-ci ne peut s’en plaindre en appel. L’autoriser à le faire serait injuste. En effet, si l’accusé s’en était plaint en temps opportun, la poursuite aurait facilement pu pallier à la carence qu’il invoque maintenant[18].

3.3  L’admissibilité des courriels

[28]        L’accusé soulève une série d’éléments dont la poursuite n’a pas fait la preuve et qui rendrait le dépôt en preuve des courriels inadmissibles. En l’espèce, il a tort.

[29]        Le fardeau de démontrer l’authenticité d’un courriel ne s’avère pas lourd[19]. Il s’agit simplement de soumettre certains éléments de preuve qui permettent de conclure que le document est bien ce qu’il paraît être[20]. Or, à l’audience de première instance, la plaignante reconnaît l’impression des courriels qui lui sont présentés comme étant une copie de ceux qu’elle a reçus dans sa boîte courriel, sans modifications[21].

[30]        En l’espèce, cela suffisait compte tenu de la nature des documents. Dans les circonstances, il ne s’avère pas utile d’élaborer davantage sur cette question.

Le mandat de perquisition ciblant un ordinateur / revue du droit à ce sujet

R. v Townsend, 2017 ONSC 3435

Lien vers la décision

[53]           Prior to examining computer searches, a brief discussion of warrants is of benefit.  The face of the warrant is the document that empowers police to search a particular location for particular evidence:  Re Times Square Book Store and the Queen, 1985 CanLII 170 (ON CA), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 503; R. v. Parent, 1989 CanLII 217 (YK CA), 47 C.C.C. (3d) 385; R. v. Ricciardi, 2017 ONSC 2788; R. v. Merritt, 2017 ONSC 80.  The section of the warrant document known as the “Information to Obtain” provides an issuing justice the grounds to either grant or deny the police the right to search the location described on the face of the warrant for certain evidence.  However, the ITO is not part of the warrant that a searching officer is expected to examine.  Instead, the searching officer is only required to familiarize themselves with the face of the warrant in order to understand the parameters of the search.[4]  As a result of this interplay between the face of the warrant and the ITO, the face of the warrant is expected to satisfy what is known as the “fellow officer” test – that is, would a fellow officer be able to understand the items sought and the location to be searched as a result of reviewing the face of the warrant: R. v. Raferty, 2012 ONSC 703 at para 103.

[54]           In Ricciardi, Di Luca J. reviewed the guiding principles dealing with search warrants, searches pursuant thereto, and judicial review thereof. At paragraphs 12 to 17, Di Luca J. reviewed the law regarding the issuing of search warrants. At paragraphs 18 to 20, he then reviewed the law as it applies to the role of the reviewing judge:

                                    On a review, the role of reviewing judge is not substitute his or her view for that of the issuing justice. Rather, the role is to assess whether, on the basis of the material before the issuing justice as amplified and excised on review, the authorizing or issuing justice could have issued the warrant; see R. v. Sadikov, supra, at paras. 83-89, R. v. Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851, R. v. Lao, 2013 ONCS 285 and R. v. Morelli, supra, at para. 40-41. As Watt J.A. explains in R. v. Mahmood, 2011 ONCA 693 at para 99:

      A reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view for that of the justice who issues the warrant. Rather, the reviewing judge considers the record before the issuing justice, but amplified by evidence adduced on the hearing to correct minor technical errors in drafting the ITO, to determine whether there remains sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit the justice to issue the warrant.

                        The review is conducted based on the whole of the ITO using a common sense approach to all the circumstances. The review is not an exercise in picking apart the drafting of the ITO looking for minor imperfections, misstatements or omissions. While the police are required to draft an ITO as precisely and clearly as possible, they are not expected to spell things out as clearly as counsel. They are also not required to include every detail, no matter how minute, of the police investigation. The question is ultimately whether the core substance of the ITO could support issuance of the warrant; see R. v. Morelli at para 167, R.v. Lubell and the Queen (1973), 1983 CanLII 3587 (ON SC), 6 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (Ont. H.C.) at p. 190, Re Chapman and the Queen (1983), 6 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (Ont. H.C.) at p. 297, R. v. Ngyuen, supra, at para. 58, R v. Araujo (2000. 2000 SCC 65 (CanLII), 149 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) and R.v. Persaud, 2016 ONSC 6815 at para. 64.

                        The excision exercise requires that any unlawfully obtained evidence be removed from consideration in assessing the sufficiency of grounds in an ITO, see R. v. Grant (1993), 1993 CanLII 68 (SCC), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 173 (S.C.C.), R. v. Plant (1993), 1993 CanLII 70 (SCC), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203 (SCC) and R. v. Wiley 91993), 1993 CanLII 69 (SCC), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (SCC). While the continued validity of the automatic exclusion approach has been criticized, it remains the law; see R. v. Jasser, 2014 ONSC 6052 at paras. 26-34.

Computer Searches and Warrants

[55]           Special interests are at play when the Courts examine the searches of computers.  Computers carry immense vaults of personal and biographical information.  The search of this information is, by definition, highly invasive.  As Fish J. stated in R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para 105:

As I mentioned at the outset, it is difficult to imagine a more intrusive invasion of privacy than the search of one's home and personal computer. Computers often contain our most intimate correspondence. They contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal situations. They even reveal our specific interests, likes, and propensities, recording in the browsing history and cache files the information we seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the Internet.

[56]           Typically, the right to search a location also provides the police with the right to search the receptacles within that location.  Unsurprisingly, given the heightened importance associated with the search of computers, the Supreme Court of Canada in Vu held that computers are different than other receptacles.  The Court stated at paras 40 to 45:

It is difficult to imagine a more intrusive invasion of privacy than the search of a personal or home computer: Morelli, at para. 105; R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at para. 3. Computers are "a multi-faceted instrumentality without precedent in our society": A. D. Gold, "Applying Section 8 in the Digital World: Seizures and Searches", prepared for the 7th Annual Six-Minute Criminal Defence Lawyer (June 9, 2007), at para. 3 (emphasis added). Consider some of the distinctions between computers and other receptacles.

First, computers store immense amounts of information, some of which, in the case of personal computers, will touch the "biographical core of personal information" referred to by this Court in R. v. Plant, 1993 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, at p. 293. The scale and variety of this material makes comparison with traditional storage receptacles unrealistic. We are told that, as of April 2009, the highest capacity commercial hard drives were capable of storing two terabytes of data. A single terabyte can hold roughly 1,000,000 books of 500 pages each, 1,000 hours of video, or 250,000 four-minute songs. Even an 80-gigabyte desktop drive can store the equivalent of 40 million pages of text: L. R. Robinton, "Courting Chaos: Conflicting Guidance from Courts Highlights the Need for Clearer Rules to Govern the Search and Seizure of Digital Evidence" (2010), 12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 311 at pp. 321-22. In light of this massive storage capacity, the Ontario Court of Appeal was surely right to find that there is a significant distinction between the search of a computer and the search of a briefcase found in the same location. As the court put it, a computer "can be a repository for an almost unlimited universe of information": R. v. Mohamad (2004), 2004 CanLII 9378 (ON CA), 69 O.R. (3d) 481, at para. 43.

Second, as the appellant and the intervener the Criminal Lawyers' Association (Ontario) point out, computers contain information that is automatically generated, often unbeknownst to the user. A computer is, as A.D. Gold put it, a "fastidious record keeper" (para. 6). Word-processing programs will often automatically generate temporary files that permit analysts to reconstruct the development of a file and access information about who created and worked on it. Similarly, most browsers used to surf the Internet are programmed to automatically retain information about the websites the user has visited in recent weeks and the search terms that were employed to access those websites. Ordinarily, this information can help a user retrace his or her cybernetic steps. In the context of a criminal investigation, however, it can also enable investigators to access intimate details about a user's interests, habits, and identity, drawing on a record that the user created unwittingly: O. S. Kerr, "Searches and Seizures in a Digital World" (2005), 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531, at pp. 542-43. This kind of information has no analogue in the physical world in which other types of receptacles are found.

Third, and related to this second point, a computer retains files and data even after users think that they have destroyed them.

                        …

Computers thus compromise the ability of users to control the information that is available about them in two ways: they create information without the users' knowledge and they retain information that users have tried to erase. These features make computers fundamentally different from the receptacles that search and seizure law has had to respond to in the past.

Fourth, limiting the location of a search to "a building, receptacle or place" (s. 487(1) of the Code) is not a meaningful limitation with respect to computer searches. As I have discussed earlier, search warrants authorize the search for and seizure of things in a "building, receptacle or place" and "permit the search of receptacles such as a filing cabinets, within that place…. The physical presence of the receptacle upon the premises permits the search": Fontana and Keeshan, at p. 1181 (italics in original; underling added). Ordinarily, then, police will not have access to items that are not physically present in the building, receptacle or place for which a search has been authorized. While documents accessible in a filing cabinet are always at the same location as the filing cabinet, the same is not true of information that can be accessed through a computer. The intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association notes that, when connected to the Internet, computers serve as portals to an almost infinite amount of information that is shared between different users and is stored almost anywhere in the world. Similarly, a computer that is connected to a network will allow police to access information on other devices. Thus, a search of a computer connected to the Internet or a network gives access to information and documents that are not in any meaningful sense at the location for which the search is authorized.

These numerous and striking differences between computers and traditional "receptacles" call for distinctive treatment under s. 8 of the Charter. The animating assumption of the traditional rule -- that if the search of a place is justified, so is the search of receptacles found within it -- simply cannot apply with respect to computer searches.

[57]           The Supreme Court of Canada then considered whether or not a properly authorized warrant to search required search parameters. In holding that search parameters were not constitutionally required, the Court stated at paras 53 and 54 of Vu:

The intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (“B.C.C.L.A.”) submits that, in addition to a requirement that searches of computers be specifically authorized by a warrant, this Court should also find that these warrants must, as a rule, set out detailed conditions, sometimes called "ex ante conditions" or "search protocols", under which the search may be carried out. According to the B.C.C.L.A., search protocols are necessary because they allow authorizing justices to limit the way in which police carry out their searches, protecting certain areas of a computer from the eyes of the investigators. The Crown and intervening Attorneys General oppose this sort of requirement, arguing that it is contrary to principle and impractical. While I am not convinced that these sorts of special directions should be rejected as a matter of principle, my view is that they are not, as a general rule, constitutionally required and that they would not have been required in this case.

While I propose, in effect, to treat computers in some respects as if they were a separate place of search necessitating distinct prior authorization, I am not convinced that s. 8 of the Charter requires, in addition, that the manner of searching a computer must always be spelled out in advance. That would be a considerable extension of the prior authorization requirement and one that in my view will not, in every case, be necessary to properly strike the balance between privacy and effective law enforcement….

[58]           However, the Court did indicate at paras 61 and 62 that parameters may be preferable in certain situations:

By now it should be clear that my finding that a search protocol was not constitutionally required in this case does not mean that once police had the warrant in hand, they had a licence to scour the devices indiscriminately. They were bound, in their search, to adhere to the rule that the manner of the search must be reasonable. Thus, if, in the course of their search, the officers realized that there was in fact no reason to search a particular program or file on the device, the law of search and seizure would require them not to do so.

Although I do not find that a search protocol was required on the particular facts of this case, authorizing justices must assure themselves that the warrants they issue fulfil the objectives of prior authorization as established in Hunter. They also have the discretion to impose conditions to ensure that they do. If, for example, an authorizing justice were faced with confidential intellectual property or potentially privileged information, he or she might find it necessary and practical to impose limits on the manner in which a computer could be searched. In some cases, authorizing justices may find it practical to impose conditions when police first request authorization to search. In others, they might prefer a two-stage approach where they would first issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of a computer and then have police return for an additional authorization to search the seized device. This second authorization might include directions concerning the manner of search. Moreover, I would not foreclose the possibility that our developing understanding of computer searches and changes in technology may make it appropriate to impose search protocols in a broader range of cases in the future. Without expressing any firm opinion on these points, it is conceivable that proceeding in this way may be appropriate in some circumstances.

[59]           The Ontario Court of Appeal had considered the “license to scour” a computer described in Vu, in R. v. Jones, 2011 ONCA 632, 107 O.R. (3d) 241.  In Jones, the police seized a computer and searched pursuant to a broadly worded warrant.  In searching the computer, the police analyst discovered child pornography.  The police relied upon the initial warrant to conduct a further search.  The Crown argued on appeal that a computer was an indivisible item and that once police had authority to search the computer, the police could search the entire computer. 

[60]           Blair J.A., writing for the Court, rejected this argument and stated at paragraph 50: 

The police have available to them the necessary software, technology and expertise to enable them to tailor their searches in a fashion that will generate the information they seek, if it exists, while at the same time minimizing the intrusion on the computer user's privacy rights in other information stored on the computer. Sergeant Rumnyak testified that the EnCase software used in this case permits the police to view all data and all files contained on the computer but that the police do not normally look at all files in the course of an investigation; they focus on those they think will generate the evidence they are looking for. That is as it should be.

Locker Warrants

[61]           With this appellate authority as a backdrop, two issues arise pertaining to the computer searches. First, there appears to be no appellate authority governing the issuance of and reliance upon Locker Warrants. Second, there appear to be two diverging methodologies pertaining to when the search of the contents of the computer must occur.

Issuance of and reliance upon Locker Warrants

[62]           The first issue addresses whether the face of a Locker Warrant must specify that the contents of the computer are also to be searched, or whether such a search is necessarily included in the authorization to search the exhibit locker.

[63]           Some Courts have found that a warrant simply authorizing the police to search their exhibit locker is sufficient to pass Charter scrutiny.  In R. v. Eddy, 2016 ABQB 42, 2016 D.T.C. 5032, Rooke A.C.J.Q.B. of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench relied upon Coroza J.’s decision in R. v. Nurse and Plummer, 2014 ONSC 1779 to state:

The Crown argued that, read together, the ITO and warrant make it very clear that the CRA investigators were looking for documentary evidence of Ms. Eddy's alleged PEG misconduct, in both 'hardcopy' and electronic forms, and cite R v Varty, 2015 SKQB 51 at paras 51-62 for the proposition that no second warrant is needed to search the contents of electronic storage devices when the ITO makes plain that forensic investigation of those resources for relevant data is part of the planned procedure. Similarly, the Crown noted that, in R v Nurse, 2014 ONSC 1779, Coroza J concluded, at paras 58, that a search warrant that authorizes search for sources that contain data implicitly and logically includes a search of the data stored as well. This means that an investigation of detained data sources is not a warrantless search: para 61.

Bluntly, Ms. Eddy's argument is entirely spurious. Unlike R v Vu, the CRA investigators entered into Ms. Eddy's residence fully prepared to look for electronic data relevant to her alleged illegal PEG activities. I agree with the analysis in R v Nurse that a search warrant that authorizes seizure of electronic data sources also necessarily permits investigation of their contents.

[64]           It should be noted, however, that in Nurse, the face of the warrant had an attached schedule that outlined the electronic data to be sought by the police: para. 17.

[65]           Contrarily, in Merritt, Dawson J. held that the police cannot simply rely upon a Locker Warrant enabling the police to take a computer out of an exhibit shed as lawful authority to then search the contents of said computer: paras. 208-217. In Ricciardi, DiLuca J. made a similar finding. 

[66]           It is important to note the recency of the decisions dealing with Locker Warrants.  This is not a settled area of the law.  There are no appellate decisions on point.  As will be seen below, R. v. Barwell, [2013] O.J. No. 3743 (C.J.) can be interpreted as authority for the proposition that a Locker Warrant may provide some legal foundation for conducting a data search on a computer.

Timing of the Search

[67]           The second issue addresses what actions must take place during the time period specified on the face of a warrant.

[68]           In Little, Fuerst J. was confronted with a situation whereby the police searched a computer for its contents.  The warrant authorizing the search specified that the computer was the place to be searched.  The warrant also indicated that the search was to occur within a certain time period.  The police took the computer from their exhibit shed and failed to undertake the search during the time specified on the face of the warrant. 

[69]           Fuerst J. found that this failure to comply with the time periods specified constituted a Charter breach at paragraphs 160 to 162 of her decision:

Other officers either did not see the warrant, or failed to take note of the time frame specified in it.

I appreciate that the review of the contents of a computer can take days, weeks and even months to complete. In this case, it carried on with Detective Slade's examination into May 2007. It is within the ability of the applicant for a search warrant to specify in the Information to Obtain the time that will be needed to complete the search of a computer, and to seek a warrant that is valid for that period. In this case, the applicant did not do so and the justice of the peace imposed a time limitation without the benefit of that information. Nonetheless, the police were bound by the time frame specified by the justice of the peace.

The police obtained lawful possession of the computer by way of the consent of its owner, Mr. Luong. He specifically did not consent to examination of its contents without a search warrant. The only authorization for the search was the warrant. Once it expired, the police were not authorized by law to search the computer's contents.

[70]           I pause to note that the accused in Little was convicted of murder. The conviction was upheld on appeal: R. v. Little, 2014 ONCA 339. The argument at the appellate level appeared to centre on Fuerst J.’s s. 24(2) Charter analysis, as opposed to her actual Charter ruling.

[71]           Paciocco J. (as he then was), however, may have taken a different view of the issue.  At paragraphs 17 and 18 of Barwell, Paciocco J. effectively held that the face of the warrant empowering the police to search a computer referred to the time where the police take possession of the computer for the purpose of said search.[5]  He found that the timing of the data search was potentially governed by other sections of the Criminal Code of Canada, namely the mandates of section 490 wherein police are to provide a Report to Justice upon seizing and retaining items:

The hard drives that were the subject of the search warrant had already been seized and were being retained as contraband at the police lock-up on Swansea Road, having been seized on the 5th of April, 2011, by Constable O'Connor. Detective Pelletier knew enough not to assume that this authorized the search of the computers themselves. He appropriately sought a search warrant before proceeding further. On April the 18th, 2011, he obtained a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of the computer hard drives from the Swansea Road lock-up. While the police possessed the hard drives already, this judicial authorization would serve to convert their holding from a simple seizure of alleged contraband to an authorized power to seize the hard drives and search them for evidence. This search warrant authorized Detective Michael Pelletier to, "Between the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., to enter and search for" the computer hard drives "and to bring them before me or some other Justice to be dealt with according to law." On that day, Constable Pelletier removed the computer from the secure facility and delivered it to Detective Thompson for analysis. Detective Thompson recorded the serial number "information, thereby commencing his forensic examination within the time period set out in the warrant. Detective Thompson was occupied that day with other matters and did not get around to creating and examining the cloned, versions of the hard drive, until the next day, April the 19th, 2011. Mr. Reesink therefore argues that the search of the computer continued outside the search period provided for in the warrant. His position is that this examination had to be completed within the 15 hour window set out in the warrant, and therein lies the breach. In my view, the search and seizure authorized by this warrant occurred properly when Detective Pelletier assumed control over the computer hard drives from the Ottawa Police Service's Evidence Control lock-up at 2799 Swansea Road within the period specified for that search and seizure. It was not required by the warrant that the forensic examination would take place during that same brief window. The time limits under the search warrant were not, therefore, dishonoured by Detective Thompson when he commenced the forensic search the next day. First, consider the implications of the argument that a forensic search of a seized chattel must be undertaken within the search period specified on the face of the warrant. Imagine, for the sake of the exercise, that the computer had been at Mr. Barwell's home, and that the warrant authorized the search and seizure to occur there. In order to minimize the intrusion Mr. Barwell's private dwelling, the warrant period would necessarily have been brief, to minimize the control the police could exercise over Mr. Barwell's home. The law would have required it, and so the search period on the face of the warrant would have been brief. Would the law, nonetheless require, in such circumstances, that any forensic examination of the computer would have to occur within that same brief search window on the face of the warrant? This would be unrealistic. Forensic examinations take time, and it would be counter-productive to the privacy interest to extend search and seizure periods for long periods of time in order to accommodate forensic examinations.

The flaw in this Charter challenge is that it fails to recognize that the law treats the initial search and seizure and subsequent forensic examinations separately. There are provisions authorizing the initial search and seizure of the item, such as Section 487 of the Criminal Code of Canada, relied upon to secure the warrant in this case. There are other separate and distinct provisions dealing with the detention of items, including detention "for the purposes of any investigation." Specifically, Sections 489(1) and 490 of the Criminal Code of Canada together require that when things have been seized pursuant to a warrant, the police officer shall, as soon as practicable, either bring the seized items before a Justice or file a report identifying the thing being detained and the reason for detention. And the Justice shall order that the thing be released or detained, including for the purposes of investigation. In other words, the search warrant provision deals with the time required for the initial search for an item and with its seizure. The detention provisions address how long the item can be kept for forensic analysis after the search is made for the item and it is seized. In my view, if there's a relevant breach that occurred here, it would have occurred if Detective Pelletier had failed to bring the items seized or a report before a Justice to be dealt with according to law and secure authority to detain the hard drives for forensic examination. This is not the challenge that was brought by Mr. Barwell, and I have no evidence before me, one way or another, on whether a proper seizure return was filed. The onus, of course,' is on the Charter applicant to allege and then prove a relevant Charter violation. This has not happened relating to the improper detention and subsequent search of the item secured by warrant. No violation arising out of the next day forensic examination by Detective Pelletier has therefore been established before me and this Charter challenge is rejected. [emphasis added]

[72]           Thus, Paciocco J.’s logic supports the view that Locker Warrant gives the police adequate authority to search a computer’s data provided that the Report to Justice enables the reviewing justice to adequately gauge the appropriateness of the forensic data analysis as well as the time needed therefor.