La possession innocente (aussi appellé la possession d’une « patate chaude »)

Spencer c. R., 2014 QCCA 2062 (CanLII)

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[4]         La juge était justifiée de conclure que l’appelant avait la possession personnelle de l’arme, quelle qu’en soit l’origine, puisqu’il exerçait le contrôle sur cette arme dont il connaissait la nature. Par ailleurs, elle pouvait aussi rejeter son argument de la possession innocente (qu’elle appelle la possession d’une « patate chaude »), une forme d’excuse ainsi décrite dans R. v. Chalk, 2007 ONCA 815 (CanLII) :

24     The "innocent possession" line of authorities was helpfully examined by Green J. in R. v. Loukas, 2006 ONCJ 219 (CanLII), [2006] O.J. No. 2405 (Ont. C.J.). Green J. points out that some of the "innocent possession" cases recognize a public duty defence as for example where an accused takes possession of contraband to deliver it to the authorities. In other cases, "innocent possession" is said to arise from the absence of an intention to exercise control beyond that needed to destroy the contraband or otherwise put it permanently beyond one's control. Green J. observes that in all of these cases there is, despite the existence of possession in the strict sense, an absence of a blameworthy state of mind or blameworthy conduct. Convictions for criminal possession by a technical application of the concepts of knowledge and control in these circumstances would overreach the purpose underlying the criminal prohibition against possession.

25     I agree with the analysis described above. There are cases where an individual has the requisite control and knowledge, but cannot be said to be in possession for the purpose of imposing criminal liability. These cases will include cases in which a person takes control of contraband exclusively for the purpose of immediately destroying the contraband or otherwise placing it permanently beyond that person's ability to exercise any control over the contraband. In such cases, the intention is solely to divest oneself of control rather than to possess. Like the other appellate courts whose discussions are referred to above, I do not think that criminal liability should attach to that kind of brief, "innocent" possession: see e.g. R. v. Glushek, supra; R. v. York, supra.