R. c. Tse, 2012 CSC 16 (CanLII)
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[33] La croyance fondée sur des « motifs raisonnables » comporte à la fois un élément subjectif et un élément objectif. L’agent doit croire subjectivement en l’existence de motifs justifiant les mesures prises, et ces motifs doivent être objectivement raisonnables dans les circonstances. L’équilibre constitutionnel entre l’attente raisonnable en matière de vie privée et les besoins légitimes de l’État de déceler et de prévenir le crime appelle une norme objective — la probabilité fondée sur la crédibilité : Hunter c. Southam, p. 166‑168; R. c. Kang‑Brown, 2008 CSC 18 (CanLII), 2008 CSC 18, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 456, par. 75 à 79).
mercredi 18 avril 2012
La norme de de présomption de constitutionnalité qui s’applique aux fouilles, perquisitions et saisies en droit criminel est l’autorisation judiciaire préalable
R. c. Tse, 2012 CSC 16 (CanLII)
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[16] Notre Cour a décidé dans l’arrêt de principe Hunter c. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (CSC), [1984] 2 R.C.S. 145, qu’une fouille sans mandat est présumée abusive. La norme de de présomption de constitutionnalité qui s’applique aux fouilles, perquisitions et saisies en droit criminel est l’autorisation judiciaire préalable : un arbitre neutre et impartial agissant d’une manière judiciaire doit décider au préalable que la fouille, la perquisition ou la saisie est justifiée par des motifs raisonnables, établis sous serment (p. 160 à 162, 167 et 168). Voici ce que dit le juge Dickson à la p. 161 :
Je reconnais qu’il n’est peut‑être pas raisonnable dans tous les cas d’insister sur l’autorisation préalable aux fins de valider des atteintes du gouvernement aux expectatives des particuliers en matière de vie privée. Néanmoins, je suis d’avis de conclure qu’une telle autorisation, lorsqu’elle peut être obtenue, est une condition préalable de la validité d’une fouille, d’une perquisition et d’une saisie.
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[16] Notre Cour a décidé dans l’arrêt de principe Hunter c. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (CSC), [1984] 2 R.C.S. 145, qu’une fouille sans mandat est présumée abusive. La norme de de présomption de constitutionnalité qui s’applique aux fouilles, perquisitions et saisies en droit criminel est l’autorisation judiciaire préalable : un arbitre neutre et impartial agissant d’une manière judiciaire doit décider au préalable que la fouille, la perquisition ou la saisie est justifiée par des motifs raisonnables, établis sous serment (p. 160 à 162, 167 et 168). Voici ce que dit le juge Dickson à la p. 161 :
Je reconnais qu’il n’est peut‑être pas raisonnable dans tous les cas d’insister sur l’autorisation préalable aux fins de valider des atteintes du gouvernement aux expectatives des particuliers en matière de vie privée. Néanmoins, je suis d’avis de conclure qu’une telle autorisation, lorsqu’elle peut être obtenue, est une condition préalable de la validité d’une fouille, d’une perquisition et d’une saisie.
mardi 17 avril 2012
Le document en possession de l'accusé - revue exhaustive de la jurisprudence sur cette question
R. v. Cunsolo, 2011 ONSC 1349 (CanLII)
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[257] A person has possession of a thing, in fact and law, when he or she has it in his or her physical custody with a power of control over the thing, coupled with knowledge of the thing’s existence and nature: Criminal Code, s. 4(3)(a).
[258] It is common for the prosecution to prove possession by circumstantial evidence. Possession “is a question of fact capable of proof by inference”: R. v. Caccamo (1975), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (S.C.C.), at p. 273.
[259] The ‘documents in possession’ doctrine “is purely a creature of the common law” and “provides one of most frequently used methods of admitting documents into evidence”: J.D. Ewart, Documentary Evidence (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1984), at p. 232.
[260] The most widely accepted articulation of the documents in possession doctrine is found in Phipson on Evidence (15th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2000), at p. 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognized, adopted or acted upon them. [footnotes omitted; emphasis in original]
This passage, repeated from prior Phipson editions, has received wide-spread approval: (références omises)
[261] In British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch, 1995 CanLII 142 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47, the Supreme Court mentioned two aspects of the doctrine in the context of its discussion on compulsion and s. 7 of the Charter:
In some cases, the production of documents from the possession of a person may have communicative aspects. Possession of a document may permit an inference of knowledge of the contents of the document. See R. v. Container Materials Ltd., [1940] 4 D.L.R. 293 (Ont. S.C.). Furthermore, if the party in possession has recognized, adopted or acted on the document an admission of acceptance of its contents as true may be inferred. See R. v. Famous Players, [1932] O.R. 307 (S.C.).
[262] Once possession of a document is established, even in the absence of evidence of the accused possessor having recognized, adopted or acted on the document, a trier of fact may circumstantially infer from the possession itself that the accused had knowledge and involvement in the subject matter or transactions described therein. In R. v. Morris 1983 CanLII 28 (SCC), (1984), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), at p. 99, the court stated:
In my view, an inference could be drawn from the unexplained presence of the newspaper clipping among the possessions of the appellant, that he had an interest in and had informed himself on the question of sources of supply of heroin, necessarily a subject of vital interest to one concerned with the importing of the narcotic.
. . .
Depending on the view of the trier of fact and the existence of other evidence, an inference could possibly have been drawn or could have been supported to the effect that preparatory steps in respect of importing narcotics had been taken or were contemplated.
The evidence of the newspaper clipping is similar in nature to the cheque forms of certain banks and the list of banks found in possession of the accused and admitted in evidence on a charge of fraudulently endorsing and cashing a cheque in R. v. Gaich (1956), 24 C.R. 196 (Ont. C.A.), or the list of burgled premises found upon one of the accused which was admitted in evidence on a charge of unlawful possession of house-breaking implements in R. v. Hannam, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 340 (N.B.C.A.) Other cases which have dealt with this issue are: (références omises).
[263] A Crown appeal succeeded in R. v. Turlon, supra, against an acquittal for possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. When Turlon was arrested, his briefcase was opened. The receptacle contained a sealed envelope (containing the “Palmer” letter) and a document written by Turlon. On appeal, the court stated at pp. 188-190:
When the envelope was opened, it was found to contain a letter addressed “Dear Maureen” and signed by “Wesley Stubbs”. In the letter the writer states:
So I give Loxley 2 lb weight of herb 1 lb is for you and the other lb is for me.
So I’m asking you kindly to take the list from Loxley with the things and set me up and set yourself also. I have seen for myself that Loxley had a very slow attempt, if you don’t push him he will not get along with the things. So I am asking you...and I ask him to get a delko plant and a T.V. and a power cut saw. The kind of herb that I give Loxley to give you is the best type and you can get $2,000 a lab weight for it.
In the briefcase there was also found a handwritten list prepared by the respondent. The items set out on that list were as follows:
1) 2 Honda 500 watt Delco 2) 2 Colour T.V. 20” 3) Tape Dec with Cassette 4) Set Up Camera 5) Sanda 6) Battry Charger 7) Moter Saw with blate for board and three
It will be seen that this list contains items referred to in the Miss Palmer letter.
. . .
Knowledge of the contents of the letter was not a condition precedent to evidentiary value of the letter. Possession of the letter was evidence of knowledge or complicity in the scheme of drug importation and distribution. On the other hand, the respondent’s denial that he knew the letter was in his briefcase was evidence to the contrary. The possession of the letter and the denial by the respondent were both part of the evidence as a whole to be considered by the jury.
It would also be open to the jury to accept the list prepared by the respondent as a form of adoption of the letter. In other words, the jury might conclude that the list prepared by the respondent reflected the items that were being sought in the letter. If the jury accepted this list as a recognition or adoption of the Miss Palmer letter, then the letter could be received as an admission to prove the truth of its contents.
The Miss Palmer letter and the list prepared by the respondent were important pieces of evidence.
[264] In R. v. Gaich (1956), 116 C.C.C. 34 (Ont. C.A.), a fraud prosecution, the Crown led evidence of the seizure of documents from Gaich’s truck at the time of his arrest including various cheque forms from the Royal Bank of Canada, a cheque with an endorsement, counter-cheques of the Bank of Nova Scotia, a cheque book on the Province of Ontario Savings office at Brantford, Ontario, and a sheet of paper on which was written a list of banks. The accused’s appeal against conviction was dismissed with the court stating, at p. 39:
Under the circumstances the Court cannot see that it was irrelevant to the issue that several of such documents necessary and essential to such an illegal enterprise were found on the person and property of the appellant.
[265] In a different case, in two searches of the home of an accused, the police seized items alleged to be instruments for house-breaking. The accused was convicted at trial. On appeal (R. v. Gilson, [1965] 2 O.R. 505 (C.A.), at pp. 506, 513) the court rejected the appellant’s submission that the prosecution ought not to have been allowed to lead certain documentary evidence also uncovered in the search:
In front of the house, between the road and sidewalk, an old Monarch car was parked on the boulevard. A search of the vehicle disclosed in the hub cap discs two separate sheets of paper and a single piece of paper which contained a list of motels in the Niagara Falls area indicating the kind of security devices each of the motels had.
. . .
As to the third point, the lists of motels would be some evidence, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the finding of the lists...
[266] In the Container Materials Ltd. case, a prosecution for conspiracy in restraint of trade, the Crown introduced a quantity of documentation including books of account, correspondence, official minutes, executed agreements and cheques. The trial judge stated at pp. 130, 131-2:
...documents in his possession are receivable against him...
. . .
...all of these documents are receivable in evidence as against the party from whose possession they come, as having been found in the possession of that particular accused and therefore it is presumed that that accused had a knowledge of the contents thereof.
. . .
These copies and letters having come from the possession of the accused parties, present, in my opinion, a very much more reliable type of evidence than if viva voce evidence of some witness who had been present by chance and had overheard conversations between the accused or their proper representative, had been produced by the Crown. Such latter type of evidence would undoubtedly be received, although subject to the frailties of human recollection and transmission. A fortiori, this correspondence which I consider to be fully and sufficiently authenticated, should be received.
[267] In a conspiracy to commit fraud case, the prosecution adduced evidence of documents seized from the business premises of the accused: R. v. Smart and Young (1931), 55 C.C.C. 310 (Ont. C.A.). At pp. 312-3, Latchord C.J. stated:
It was strongly urged that the books of account, records and other documents of the appellants did not constitute evidence against them. These documents were seized by the Crown on the business premises of the accused in January, 1930, when they were in use as formal records of the transactions of the businesses of the accused as they had been throughout 1928 and 1929, and, at the date of seizure carried on.
. . .
What was relied on was that the books and papers being in the custody of the accused, and made use of by them for their own purposes and in the conduct of their businesses, are prima facie evidence as against the accused of the methods, systems and devices of which they continuously availed themselves in their own speculations, and in their transactions with their customers and with other brokers.
"All papers found in the possession of a man are, prima facie , evidence against him, if the contents of them have application to the subject under consideration:" per Eyre, L.C.J., in Rex v. Horne Tooke , 25 How. St. Tr. 120.
[268] In R. v. Russell (1920), 33 C.C.C. 1 (Man. C.A.), at p. 6, the court observed:
Writings found in a man's hands are prima facie evidence against him. It will be inferred that he knows their contents and has acted upon them.
[269] In her reasons for judgment in the Drakes fraud trial, Epstein J. (as she then was) observed at paras. 78-80:
Are the documents admissible for the truth of their contents on the basis that the applicants recognized, adopted them or acted on them?
Since this third element requires an assessment of whether the document has been recognized in some fashion, the documents found at Dean Park must be examined separately to determine whether they are admissible for the truth of their contents.
In his text on Documentary Evidence in Canada (Carswell: 1984), J. Douglas Ewart gives in depth consideration to the uses to which documents in evidence can be put irrespective of whether they have been adopted. He concludes that documents in possession are admissible to prove such things as knowledge of their contents, involvement in a conspiracy, connection with the transactions to which they relate, membership in an organization, design in the sense of intention, and interest in activities described in the document.
[270] It is, or course, not possible to exhaustively delineate the type of circumstances which will amount to recognition, adoption or acting on documents.
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[257] A person has possession of a thing, in fact and law, when he or she has it in his or her physical custody with a power of control over the thing, coupled with knowledge of the thing’s existence and nature: Criminal Code, s. 4(3)(a).
[258] It is common for the prosecution to prove possession by circumstantial evidence. Possession “is a question of fact capable of proof by inference”: R. v. Caccamo (1975), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (S.C.C.), at p. 273.
[259] The ‘documents in possession’ doctrine “is purely a creature of the common law” and “provides one of most frequently used methods of admitting documents into evidence”: J.D. Ewart, Documentary Evidence (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1984), at p. 232.
[260] The most widely accepted articulation of the documents in possession doctrine is found in Phipson on Evidence (15th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2000), at p. 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognized, adopted or acted upon them. [footnotes omitted; emphasis in original]
This passage, repeated from prior Phipson editions, has received wide-spread approval: (références omises)
[261] In British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch, 1995 CanLII 142 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47, the Supreme Court mentioned two aspects of the doctrine in the context of its discussion on compulsion and s. 7 of the Charter:
In some cases, the production of documents from the possession of a person may have communicative aspects. Possession of a document may permit an inference of knowledge of the contents of the document. See R. v. Container Materials Ltd., [1940] 4 D.L.R. 293 (Ont. S.C.). Furthermore, if the party in possession has recognized, adopted or acted on the document an admission of acceptance of its contents as true may be inferred. See R. v. Famous Players, [1932] O.R. 307 (S.C.).
[262] Once possession of a document is established, even in the absence of evidence of the accused possessor having recognized, adopted or acted on the document, a trier of fact may circumstantially infer from the possession itself that the accused had knowledge and involvement in the subject matter or transactions described therein. In R. v. Morris 1983 CanLII 28 (SCC), (1984), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), at p. 99, the court stated:
In my view, an inference could be drawn from the unexplained presence of the newspaper clipping among the possessions of the appellant, that he had an interest in and had informed himself on the question of sources of supply of heroin, necessarily a subject of vital interest to one concerned with the importing of the narcotic.
. . .
Depending on the view of the trier of fact and the existence of other evidence, an inference could possibly have been drawn or could have been supported to the effect that preparatory steps in respect of importing narcotics had been taken or were contemplated.
The evidence of the newspaper clipping is similar in nature to the cheque forms of certain banks and the list of banks found in possession of the accused and admitted in evidence on a charge of fraudulently endorsing and cashing a cheque in R. v. Gaich (1956), 24 C.R. 196 (Ont. C.A.), or the list of burgled premises found upon one of the accused which was admitted in evidence on a charge of unlawful possession of house-breaking implements in R. v. Hannam, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 340 (N.B.C.A.) Other cases which have dealt with this issue are: (références omises).
[263] A Crown appeal succeeded in R. v. Turlon, supra, against an acquittal for possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. When Turlon was arrested, his briefcase was opened. The receptacle contained a sealed envelope (containing the “Palmer” letter) and a document written by Turlon. On appeal, the court stated at pp. 188-190:
When the envelope was opened, it was found to contain a letter addressed “Dear Maureen” and signed by “Wesley Stubbs”. In the letter the writer states:
So I give Loxley 2 lb weight of herb 1 lb is for you and the other lb is for me.
So I’m asking you kindly to take the list from Loxley with the things and set me up and set yourself also. I have seen for myself that Loxley had a very slow attempt, if you don’t push him he will not get along with the things. So I am asking you...and I ask him to get a delko plant and a T.V. and a power cut saw. The kind of herb that I give Loxley to give you is the best type and you can get $2,000 a lab weight for it.
In the briefcase there was also found a handwritten list prepared by the respondent. The items set out on that list were as follows:
1) 2 Honda 500 watt Delco 2) 2 Colour T.V. 20” 3) Tape Dec with Cassette 4) Set Up Camera 5) Sanda 6) Battry Charger 7) Moter Saw with blate for board and three
It will be seen that this list contains items referred to in the Miss Palmer letter.
. . .
Knowledge of the contents of the letter was not a condition precedent to evidentiary value of the letter. Possession of the letter was evidence of knowledge or complicity in the scheme of drug importation and distribution. On the other hand, the respondent’s denial that he knew the letter was in his briefcase was evidence to the contrary. The possession of the letter and the denial by the respondent were both part of the evidence as a whole to be considered by the jury.
It would also be open to the jury to accept the list prepared by the respondent as a form of adoption of the letter. In other words, the jury might conclude that the list prepared by the respondent reflected the items that were being sought in the letter. If the jury accepted this list as a recognition or adoption of the Miss Palmer letter, then the letter could be received as an admission to prove the truth of its contents.
The Miss Palmer letter and the list prepared by the respondent were important pieces of evidence.
[264] In R. v. Gaich (1956), 116 C.C.C. 34 (Ont. C.A.), a fraud prosecution, the Crown led evidence of the seizure of documents from Gaich’s truck at the time of his arrest including various cheque forms from the Royal Bank of Canada, a cheque with an endorsement, counter-cheques of the Bank of Nova Scotia, a cheque book on the Province of Ontario Savings office at Brantford, Ontario, and a sheet of paper on which was written a list of banks. The accused’s appeal against conviction was dismissed with the court stating, at p. 39:
Under the circumstances the Court cannot see that it was irrelevant to the issue that several of such documents necessary and essential to such an illegal enterprise were found on the person and property of the appellant.
[265] In a different case, in two searches of the home of an accused, the police seized items alleged to be instruments for house-breaking. The accused was convicted at trial. On appeal (R. v. Gilson, [1965] 2 O.R. 505 (C.A.), at pp. 506, 513) the court rejected the appellant’s submission that the prosecution ought not to have been allowed to lead certain documentary evidence also uncovered in the search:
In front of the house, between the road and sidewalk, an old Monarch car was parked on the boulevard. A search of the vehicle disclosed in the hub cap discs two separate sheets of paper and a single piece of paper which contained a list of motels in the Niagara Falls area indicating the kind of security devices each of the motels had.
. . .
As to the third point, the lists of motels would be some evidence, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the finding of the lists...
[266] In the Container Materials Ltd. case, a prosecution for conspiracy in restraint of trade, the Crown introduced a quantity of documentation including books of account, correspondence, official minutes, executed agreements and cheques. The trial judge stated at pp. 130, 131-2:
...documents in his possession are receivable against him...
. . .
...all of these documents are receivable in evidence as against the party from whose possession they come, as having been found in the possession of that particular accused and therefore it is presumed that that accused had a knowledge of the contents thereof.
. . .
These copies and letters having come from the possession of the accused parties, present, in my opinion, a very much more reliable type of evidence than if viva voce evidence of some witness who had been present by chance and had overheard conversations between the accused or their proper representative, had been produced by the Crown. Such latter type of evidence would undoubtedly be received, although subject to the frailties of human recollection and transmission. A fortiori, this correspondence which I consider to be fully and sufficiently authenticated, should be received.
[267] In a conspiracy to commit fraud case, the prosecution adduced evidence of documents seized from the business premises of the accused: R. v. Smart and Young (1931), 55 C.C.C. 310 (Ont. C.A.). At pp. 312-3, Latchord C.J. stated:
It was strongly urged that the books of account, records and other documents of the appellants did not constitute evidence against them. These documents were seized by the Crown on the business premises of the accused in January, 1930, when they were in use as formal records of the transactions of the businesses of the accused as they had been throughout 1928 and 1929, and, at the date of seizure carried on.
. . .
What was relied on was that the books and papers being in the custody of the accused, and made use of by them for their own purposes and in the conduct of their businesses, are prima facie evidence as against the accused of the methods, systems and devices of which they continuously availed themselves in their own speculations, and in their transactions with their customers and with other brokers.
"All papers found in the possession of a man are, prima facie , evidence against him, if the contents of them have application to the subject under consideration:" per Eyre, L.C.J., in Rex v. Horne Tooke , 25 How. St. Tr. 120.
[268] In R. v. Russell (1920), 33 C.C.C. 1 (Man. C.A.), at p. 6, the court observed:
Writings found in a man's hands are prima facie evidence against him. It will be inferred that he knows their contents and has acted upon them.
[269] In her reasons for judgment in the Drakes fraud trial, Epstein J. (as she then was) observed at paras. 78-80:
Are the documents admissible for the truth of their contents on the basis that the applicants recognized, adopted them or acted on them?
Since this third element requires an assessment of whether the document has been recognized in some fashion, the documents found at Dean Park must be examined separately to determine whether they are admissible for the truth of their contents.
In his text on Documentary Evidence in Canada (Carswell: 1984), J. Douglas Ewart gives in depth consideration to the uses to which documents in evidence can be put irrespective of whether they have been adopted. He concludes that documents in possession are admissible to prove such things as knowledge of their contents, involvement in a conspiracy, connection with the transactions to which they relate, membership in an organization, design in the sense of intention, and interest in activities described in the document.
[270] It is, or course, not possible to exhaustively delineate the type of circumstances which will amount to recognition, adoption or acting on documents.
Le document trouvé en possession de l'accusé VS son admissibilité
R. v. Wood, 2001 NSCA 38 (CanLII)
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[32] A frequently cited description of this doctrine is from M.N. Howard et al. (eds.) Phipson on Evidence (15th, 2000) at § 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognised, adopted or acted upon them. So, as we have seen, documents which a party has caused to be made or knowingly used as true in a judicial proceeding to prove a particular fact, are admissible against him in subsequent proceedings to prove the same fact, even on behalf of strangers. Documents furnished by persons specifically referred to for information are evidence against the referrer; though a mere general reference will not have this effect. (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original)
[33] There are three elements of the doctrine. First, it must be shown that the document was actually or constructively in the possession of the accused. Second, if such possession is established, the document will be admissible to show the accused’s knowledge of its contents, his connection with and state of mind with respect to the transaction to which it relates. Third, if it is established that the accused has recognized, adopted or acted on the document, it becomes admissible for the truth of its contents under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. The first and third of these elements are most relevant for the purposes of this appeal.
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[32] A frequently cited description of this doctrine is from M.N. Howard et al. (eds.) Phipson on Evidence (15th, 2000) at § 30-10:
Documents which are, or have been, in the possession of a party will, as we have seen, generally be admissible against him as original (circumstantial) evidence to show his knowledge of their contents, his connection with, or complicity in, the transactions to which they relate, or his state of mind with reference thereto. They will further be receivable against him as admissions (i.e. exceptions to the hearsay rule) to prove the truth of their contents if he has in any way recognised, adopted or acted upon them. So, as we have seen, documents which a party has caused to be made or knowingly used as true in a judicial proceeding to prove a particular fact, are admissible against him in subsequent proceedings to prove the same fact, even on behalf of strangers. Documents furnished by persons specifically referred to for information are evidence against the referrer; though a mere general reference will not have this effect. (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original)
[33] There are three elements of the doctrine. First, it must be shown that the document was actually or constructively in the possession of the accused. Second, if such possession is established, the document will be admissible to show the accused’s knowledge of its contents, his connection with and state of mind with respect to the transaction to which it relates. Third, if it is established that the accused has recognized, adopted or acted on the document, it becomes admissible for the truth of its contents under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. The first and third of these elements are most relevant for the purposes of this appeal.
La jurisprudence reconnaît la possibilité qu'un remède nécessite une directive spéciale au jury pour pallier à la violation d'un droit
R. v. Bero, 2000 CanLII 16956 (ON CA)
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[18] The trial judge should not have ruled on the motion at the outset of the trial. This Court has repeatedly indicated that except where the appropriateness of a stay is manifest at the outset of proceedings, a trial judge should reserve on motions such as the motion brought in this case until after the evidence has been heard. The trial judge can more effectively assess issues such as the degree of prejudice caused to an accused by the destruction of evidence at the end of the trial: R. v. B.(D.J.) reflex, (1993), 16 C.R.R. (2d) 381 at 382 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. A.(S.) reflex, (1992), 60 O.A.C. 324 at 325 (C.A.). The approach favoured by this Court was approved in R. v. La 1997 CanLII 309 (SCC), (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 107-108 (S.C.C.). In keeping with that approach, I will consider the appellant’s claim that a stay should have been granted in the light of the evidence which was adduced at the trial.
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[18] The trial judge should not have ruled on the motion at the outset of the trial. This Court has repeatedly indicated that except where the appropriateness of a stay is manifest at the outset of proceedings, a trial judge should reserve on motions such as the motion brought in this case until after the evidence has been heard. The trial judge can more effectively assess issues such as the degree of prejudice caused to an accused by the destruction of evidence at the end of the trial: R. v. B.(D.J.) reflex, (1993), 16 C.R.R. (2d) 381 at 382 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. A.(S.) reflex, (1992), 60 O.A.C. 324 at 325 (C.A.). The approach favoured by this Court was approved in R. v. La 1997 CanLII 309 (SCC), (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 107-108 (S.C.C.). In keeping with that approach, I will consider the appellant’s claim that a stay should have been granted in the light of the evidence which was adduced at the trial.
Comment gérer le potentiel crédit d'un jour et demi pour chaque jour de détention préventive
R. c. Bérubé, 2012 QCCS 1379 (CanLII)
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[48] Avant les amendements entrés en vigueur le 22 février 2010, les tribunaux considéraient, la plupart du temps, une journée de détention provisoire comme valant deux jours de peine.
[49] La défense me demande d'accorder le crédit maximal prévu à 719 (3.1), alors que la poursuite s'y oppose avec vigueur.
[50] Me Kling porte à l'attention du Tribunal l'article 38 de la Loi sur le système correctionnel du Québec, L.R.Q., chapitre S-40.1, qui se lit comme suit :
Par le respect qu'elle témoigne à l'égard du personnel et des autres personnes incarcérées, une personne contrevenante peut mériter une réduction de peine.
Cette réduction de peine est également conditionnelle au fait que la personne se conforme aux règlements et directives de l'établissement de détention, qu'elle respecte les conditions d'une permission de sortir et qu'elle participe aux programmes et aux activités prévus à son projet de réinsertion sociale.
La réduction de peine est calculée à raison d'un jour de réduction de peine pour deux jours d'emprisonnement pendant lesquels la personne se conforme aux conditions prévues au présent article, jusqu'à concurrence du tiers de la peine.
[51] Prenons l'exemple de deux coaccusés d'un même crime, A aurait bénéficié d'une remise en liberté provisoire, alors que B aurait été détenu de façon préventive pendant un an.
[52] Tenant pour acquis qu'ils méritent une peine identique, soit deux années d'emprisonnement, et qu'ils soient condamnés le même jour, A sera condamné à 12 mois, vu sa détention provisoire, et B à 24 mois.
[53] Si les deux condamnés ont une bonne conduite pendant leur incarcération, A purgera 8 mois avant d'être remis en liberté et B 16 mois. A aura purgé une période 20 mois avant de recouvrer sa liberté alors que B n'en aura purgé que 16, même s'ils méritent la même peine.
[54] Pourtant, l'article 718.2 du Code criminel impose l'obligation suivante :
Le tribunal détermine la peine à infliger compte tenu également des principes suivants :
[…]
b) l'harmonisation des peines, c'est‑à‑dire l'infliction de peines semblables à celles infligées à des délinquants pour des infractions semblables commises dans des circonstances semblables.
[55] Dans R. c Hason, 2010 ONJ 735, le juge Bourque, de l'Ontario Court of Justice, condamne l'accusé en lui donnant un crédit d'un jour et demi pour chaque jour de détention préventive :
First of all, I am not precluded from considering 1.5 as there is no specific endorsement made by any Justice of the peace in any bail hearing which would preclude me from considering 1.5.
I do take judicial notice of what is more severe conditions in holding facilities, in contrast to the conditions in a provincial reformatory;
I do take judicial notice that in holding facility there are no significant programs available to assist in the rehabilitation of any defendant ; and
I take judicial notice of the fact that parole provisions for this offense do not give credit or the time served before sentence and thus, the statutory remission does not apply to the pretrial custody.
[56] Cette décision a été portée en appel, par la défense, mais il apparaît utile de souligner que la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario n'a fait aucun commentaire sur le dernier motif, se contentant de dire :
However, the sentencing judge also recognized the importance of the principle of totality, finding that it was appropriate to give the appellant credit for his pre-trial custody on an enhanced basis of 1.5 to 1. The sentence was fit and there was no error in principle.
[57] Ce raisonnement, quant à la valeur à accorder à la détention provisoire, a été appliqué dans plusieurs décisions : R. c. Dann, 2011 NSPC 22 (CanLII), 2011 NSPC 22, R. c. Clunies-Ross, 2011 YKTC 80 (CanLII), 2011 YKTC 80, R. c. Vittrekwa, 2011 YKTC 64 (CanLII), 2011 YKTC 64, R. c. Mullins, 2011 SKQ 478, R. c. J., 2011 CPC 0158, R. c. Billard, 2011 NSPC 31 (CanLII), 2011 NSPC 31.
[58] Au surcroît, le ministère public a, à l'origine, accusé monsieur Bérubé dans les districts de Longueuil et de Rimouski alors que tout cela aurait pu se faire dans le même district.
[59] Pendant un an et demi, on l'a transporté de Rimouski à Longueuil en passant par Québec et Trois-Rivières.
[60] À chaque occasion, il a dû interrompre ses activités intra-muros, être reclassé dans un nouveau secteur et subir différents préjudices qu'il a relatés dans son témoignage.
[61] Après le transfert à Rimouski du dossier de Longueuil et l'enregistrement d'un plaidoyer de culpabilité, le Tribunal a dû, à deux occasions, rendre des ordonnances, pour empêcher le transport de l'accusé à Longueuil, parce que la poursuite s'entêtait à ne pas faire rayer le dossier du rôle.
[62] Le comportement de l'accusé en détention provisoire a été excellent et si une remise de peine existait pour ce type de détention, il en aurait sûrement bénéficié.
[63] Le Tribunal conclut que l'ensemble des circonstances justifie l'exception prévue à l'article 719 (3.1) du Code criminel. Chaque journée de détention préventive que l'accusé a purgée sera considérée, aux fins du calcul de sa peine, comme équivalant à une journée et demie.
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[48] Avant les amendements entrés en vigueur le 22 février 2010, les tribunaux considéraient, la plupart du temps, une journée de détention provisoire comme valant deux jours de peine.
[49] La défense me demande d'accorder le crédit maximal prévu à 719 (3.1), alors que la poursuite s'y oppose avec vigueur.
[50] Me Kling porte à l'attention du Tribunal l'article 38 de la Loi sur le système correctionnel du Québec, L.R.Q., chapitre S-40.1, qui se lit comme suit :
Par le respect qu'elle témoigne à l'égard du personnel et des autres personnes incarcérées, une personne contrevenante peut mériter une réduction de peine.
Cette réduction de peine est également conditionnelle au fait que la personne se conforme aux règlements et directives de l'établissement de détention, qu'elle respecte les conditions d'une permission de sortir et qu'elle participe aux programmes et aux activités prévus à son projet de réinsertion sociale.
La réduction de peine est calculée à raison d'un jour de réduction de peine pour deux jours d'emprisonnement pendant lesquels la personne se conforme aux conditions prévues au présent article, jusqu'à concurrence du tiers de la peine.
[51] Prenons l'exemple de deux coaccusés d'un même crime, A aurait bénéficié d'une remise en liberté provisoire, alors que B aurait été détenu de façon préventive pendant un an.
[52] Tenant pour acquis qu'ils méritent une peine identique, soit deux années d'emprisonnement, et qu'ils soient condamnés le même jour, A sera condamné à 12 mois, vu sa détention provisoire, et B à 24 mois.
[53] Si les deux condamnés ont une bonne conduite pendant leur incarcération, A purgera 8 mois avant d'être remis en liberté et B 16 mois. A aura purgé une période 20 mois avant de recouvrer sa liberté alors que B n'en aura purgé que 16, même s'ils méritent la même peine.
[54] Pourtant, l'article 718.2 du Code criminel impose l'obligation suivante :
Le tribunal détermine la peine à infliger compte tenu également des principes suivants :
[…]
b) l'harmonisation des peines, c'est‑à‑dire l'infliction de peines semblables à celles infligées à des délinquants pour des infractions semblables commises dans des circonstances semblables.
[55] Dans R. c Hason, 2010 ONJ 735, le juge Bourque, de l'Ontario Court of Justice, condamne l'accusé en lui donnant un crédit d'un jour et demi pour chaque jour de détention préventive :
First of all, I am not precluded from considering 1.5 as there is no specific endorsement made by any Justice of the peace in any bail hearing which would preclude me from considering 1.5.
I do take judicial notice of what is more severe conditions in holding facilities, in contrast to the conditions in a provincial reformatory;
I do take judicial notice that in holding facility there are no significant programs available to assist in the rehabilitation of any defendant ; and
I take judicial notice of the fact that parole provisions for this offense do not give credit or the time served before sentence and thus, the statutory remission does not apply to the pretrial custody.
[56] Cette décision a été portée en appel, par la défense, mais il apparaît utile de souligner que la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario n'a fait aucun commentaire sur le dernier motif, se contentant de dire :
However, the sentencing judge also recognized the importance of the principle of totality, finding that it was appropriate to give the appellant credit for his pre-trial custody on an enhanced basis of 1.5 to 1. The sentence was fit and there was no error in principle.
[57] Ce raisonnement, quant à la valeur à accorder à la détention provisoire, a été appliqué dans plusieurs décisions : R. c. Dann, 2011 NSPC 22 (CanLII), 2011 NSPC 22, R. c. Clunies-Ross, 2011 YKTC 80 (CanLII), 2011 YKTC 80, R. c. Vittrekwa, 2011 YKTC 64 (CanLII), 2011 YKTC 64, R. c. Mullins, 2011 SKQ 478, R. c. J., 2011 CPC 0158, R. c. Billard, 2011 NSPC 31 (CanLII), 2011 NSPC 31.
[58] Au surcroît, le ministère public a, à l'origine, accusé monsieur Bérubé dans les districts de Longueuil et de Rimouski alors que tout cela aurait pu se faire dans le même district.
[59] Pendant un an et demi, on l'a transporté de Rimouski à Longueuil en passant par Québec et Trois-Rivières.
[60] À chaque occasion, il a dû interrompre ses activités intra-muros, être reclassé dans un nouveau secteur et subir différents préjudices qu'il a relatés dans son témoignage.
[61] Après le transfert à Rimouski du dossier de Longueuil et l'enregistrement d'un plaidoyer de culpabilité, le Tribunal a dû, à deux occasions, rendre des ordonnances, pour empêcher le transport de l'accusé à Longueuil, parce que la poursuite s'entêtait à ne pas faire rayer le dossier du rôle.
[62] Le comportement de l'accusé en détention provisoire a été excellent et si une remise de peine existait pour ce type de détention, il en aurait sûrement bénéficié.
[63] Le Tribunal conclut que l'ensemble des circonstances justifie l'exception prévue à l'article 719 (3.1) du Code criminel. Chaque journée de détention préventive que l'accusé a purgée sera considérée, aux fins du calcul de sa peine, comme équivalant à une journée et demie.
lundi 16 avril 2012
Toute preuve crédible et digne de foi peut être admise dans le cadre d'une audience relative à la sentence, indépendamment de la règle du ouï‑dire
R. c. Albright, [1987] 2 RCS 383
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17. À défaut de disposition expresse prévoyant un seul et unique mode de preuve des déclarations de culpabilité antérieures dans des procédures engagées en vertu du Code criminel, c'est la règle de common law qui s'applique. La common law en matière de preuve joue soit en raison du par. 7(2) du Code, soit simplement parce que le législateur ne l'a jamais remplacée.
18. À mon avis, le certificat constitue du ouï‑dire et est inadmissible au procès, sauf si l'une des exceptions est applicable. En l'espèce, on a beaucoup débattu de la portée de l'exception à l'égard des "documents publics". Selon moi, il n'est pas nécessaire que nous nous penchions sur cette question. Le certificat est admissible en common law parce que, indépendamment de la règle du ouï‑dire, toute preuve crédible et digne de foi peut être admise à l'audience relative à la sentence. Dans l'arrêt R. v. Gardiner, 1982 CanLII 30 (CSC), [1982] 2 R.C.S. 368, le juge Dickson, alors juge puîné, a écrit ce qui suit au nom de cette Cour à la majorité, à la p. 414:
Tout le monde sait que les règles strictes qui régissent le procès ne s'appliquent pas à l'audience relative à la sentence et il n'est pas souhaitable d'imposer la rigueur et le formalisme qui caractérisent normalement notre système de procédures contradictoires. La règle interdisant le ouï‑dire ne s'applique pas aux audiences relatives aux sentences. On peut recevoir des éléments de preuve par ouï‑dire s'ils sont crédibles et fiables. Jusqu'ici, le juge a joui d'une grande latitude pour choisir les sources et le genre de preuves sur lesquelles il peut fonder sa sentence. Il doit disposer des renseignements les plus complets possibles sur les antécédents de l'accusé pour déterminer la sentence en fonction de l'accusé plutôt qu'en fonction de l'infraction.
19. On trouve dans Cross on Evidence (6th ed. 1985), aux pp. 8 et 9, une déclaration qui va dans le même sens:
[TRADUCTION] Il existe également des différences importantes en ce qui concerne l'ensemble de règles applicables aux questions de fait qui se posent après la clôture de l'instruction. Dans les affaires criminelles, ces questions de fait se rapportent souvent au fondement soit de la peine imposée à l'accusé, soit d'une autre ordonnance qui a pu être rendue. Dans les affaires où l'on procède par voie de mise en accusation et où l'accusé possède un casier judiciaire, la police dresse un état de ses condamnations antérieures et de ses antécédents, sous la forme d'une attestation de preuve. Cet état est destiné à être utilisé au stade de la détermination de la peine, bien qu'il soit évident qu'un bon nombre des allégations qu'il contient constitueront du ouï‑dire. Il semble que cela n'a aucune importance tant que les faits ne sont pas contestés mais, en cas de contestation, il faut les établir par une preuve admissible selon les règles applicables au procès.
Lien vers la décision
17. À défaut de disposition expresse prévoyant un seul et unique mode de preuve des déclarations de culpabilité antérieures dans des procédures engagées en vertu du Code criminel, c'est la règle de common law qui s'applique. La common law en matière de preuve joue soit en raison du par. 7(2) du Code, soit simplement parce que le législateur ne l'a jamais remplacée.
18. À mon avis, le certificat constitue du ouï‑dire et est inadmissible au procès, sauf si l'une des exceptions est applicable. En l'espèce, on a beaucoup débattu de la portée de l'exception à l'égard des "documents publics". Selon moi, il n'est pas nécessaire que nous nous penchions sur cette question. Le certificat est admissible en common law parce que, indépendamment de la règle du ouï‑dire, toute preuve crédible et digne de foi peut être admise à l'audience relative à la sentence. Dans l'arrêt R. v. Gardiner, 1982 CanLII 30 (CSC), [1982] 2 R.C.S. 368, le juge Dickson, alors juge puîné, a écrit ce qui suit au nom de cette Cour à la majorité, à la p. 414:
Tout le monde sait que les règles strictes qui régissent le procès ne s'appliquent pas à l'audience relative à la sentence et il n'est pas souhaitable d'imposer la rigueur et le formalisme qui caractérisent normalement notre système de procédures contradictoires. La règle interdisant le ouï‑dire ne s'applique pas aux audiences relatives aux sentences. On peut recevoir des éléments de preuve par ouï‑dire s'ils sont crédibles et fiables. Jusqu'ici, le juge a joui d'une grande latitude pour choisir les sources et le genre de preuves sur lesquelles il peut fonder sa sentence. Il doit disposer des renseignements les plus complets possibles sur les antécédents de l'accusé pour déterminer la sentence en fonction de l'accusé plutôt qu'en fonction de l'infraction.
19. On trouve dans Cross on Evidence (6th ed. 1985), aux pp. 8 et 9, une déclaration qui va dans le même sens:
[TRADUCTION] Il existe également des différences importantes en ce qui concerne l'ensemble de règles applicables aux questions de fait qui se posent après la clôture de l'instruction. Dans les affaires criminelles, ces questions de fait se rapportent souvent au fondement soit de la peine imposée à l'accusé, soit d'une autre ordonnance qui a pu être rendue. Dans les affaires où l'on procède par voie de mise en accusation et où l'accusé possède un casier judiciaire, la police dresse un état de ses condamnations antérieures et de ses antécédents, sous la forme d'une attestation de preuve. Cet état est destiné à être utilisé au stade de la détermination de la peine, bien qu'il soit évident qu'un bon nombre des allégations qu'il contient constitueront du ouï‑dire. Il semble que cela n'a aucune importance tant que les faits ne sont pas contestés mais, en cas de contestation, il faut les établir par une preuve admissible selon les règles applicables au procès.
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