Le plain view

R. v. Jones, 2011 ONCA 632 (CanLII)

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[56] The "plain view" doctrine operates when a police or peace officer is in the process of executing a warrant or an otherwise lawfully authorized search with respect to one crime and evidence of another crime falls into plain view. Resort to this common law power is subject to the following restraints, however:
(i) The officer must be lawfully in the place where the search is being conducted ("lawfully positioned", in the language of the authorities); [page258] (ii) the nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent as constituting a criminal offence; (iii) the evidence must have been discovered inadvertently; (iv) the plain view doctrine confers a seizure power not a search power; it is limited to those items that are visible and does not permit an exploratory search to find other evidence of other crimes. See, generally, R. v. Spindloe, 2001 SKCA 58 (CanLII), [2001] S.J. No. 266, 154 C.C.C. (3d) 8 (C.A.), at pp. 29-37 C.C.C.; R. v. F. (L.), 2002 CanLII 45004 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 2604, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (C.A.), at paras. 28-34; Law, supra, at para. 27, and the authorities cited therein.

La grande variété et le nombre important de facteurs pouvant être pris en considération pour évaluer les attentes raisonnables en matière de respect de la vie privée se regroupent en quatre grandes catégories

R. c. Spencer, [2014] 2 RCS 212, 2014 CSC 43 (CanLII)

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[18]                          La grande variété et le nombre important de facteurs pouvant être pris en considération pour évaluer les attentes raisonnables en matière de respect de la vie privée peuvent être regroupés, par souci de commodité, en quatre grandes catégories : (1) l’objet de la fouille ou de la perquisition contestée; (2) le droit du demandeur à l’égard de l’objet; (3) l’attente subjective du demandeur en matière de respect de sa vie privée relativement à l’objet; et (4) la question de savoir si cette attente subjective en matière de respect de la vie privée était objectivement raisonnable, eu égard à l’ensemble des circonstances : Tessling, par. 32; R. c. Patrick, 2009 CSC 17 (CanLII), [2009] 1 R.C.S. 579, par. 27; R. c. Cole, 2012 CSC 53 (CanLII), [2012] 3 R.C.S. 34, par. 40. Il ne s’agit toutefois pas d’un examen purement factuel. L’attente raisonnable en matière de vie privée est de nature normative et non simplement descriptive : Tessling, par. 42. Ainsi, même si l’analyse du droit au respect de la vie privée tient compte du contexte factuel, elle « abonde [inévitablement] en jugements de valeur énoncés du point de vue indépendant de la personne raisonnable et bien informée, qui se soucie des conséquences à long terme des actions gouvernementales sur la protection du droit au respect de la vie privée privée » : Patrick, par. 14; voir aussi R. c. Gomboc, 2010 CSC 55 (CanLII),[2010] 3 R.C.S. 211, par. 34, et Ward, par. 81-85.

SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

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Tiré de :
Texas Association of Counties 2013 FALL JUDICIAL EDUCATION SESSION November 20-22, 2013 Galveston, TX
Texte de : EMILY MISKEL
http://www.neaifi.org/_media/file/SOCIAL-MEDIA-EVIDENTIARY-ISSUES.pdf

Procédure d'admissibilité d'une photographie

R. v. Andalib-Goortani, 2014 ONSC 4690 (CanLII),

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(c)               Authentication

[28]           The leading Canadian case on authenticating images is R. v. Creemer and Cormier, [1968] 1 C.C.C. 14 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.). McKinnon J.A. noted the following requirements for authentication at p. 22:

All the cases dealing with the admissibility of photographs go to show that such admissibility depends upon (1) their accuracy in truly representing the facts; (2) their fairness and absence of any intention to mislead; and (3) their verification on oath by a person capable of doing so.

This formulation has been widely accepted in many subsequent decisions and by numerous commentators: see, for example, R. v. Maloney (No. 2) (1976),29 C.C.C. (2d) 431 (Ont. Co. Ct.), R. v. Penney, supra, R. v. Schaffner (1988), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 507 (N.S.C.A.), at pp. 509-511, R. v. J.S.C., 2013 ABCA 157 (CanLII), [2013] A.J. No. 455 (C.A.), R. v. Adams (2011), 2011 NSCA 54 (CanLII), 274 C.C.C. (3d) 502 (N.S.C.A.), Sydney N. Lederman, Alan W. Bryant and Michelle K. Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4^th edition (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2014), at pp. 44-45 and pp. 1294-1296, David Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence, 2013 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2014), at p. 88 and David Paciocco, The Law of Evidence, 6^th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011), at p. 462.

L'admissibilité d'un élément de preuve ne s'apprécie pas selon le fardeau de preuve "hors de tout doute raisonnable"

R. v. Murphy, 2011 NSCA 54 (CanLII)

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[41]         The trial judge’s treatment of the standard of proof for admissibility essentially required the photographs to be proven as if they were an essential element of the offence.  In R. v. Jeffrey, [1993] A.J. 639 (Q.L.), the Alberta Court of Appeal held:

18     The appellant argues that the Crown must prove irreconcilable separation beyond a reasonable doubt. Because s. 7 of the Charterguarantees every accused a trial according to the principles of fundamental justice, no lesser standard of proof can obtain.

19     A very basic principle of fundamental justice is that the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is only applicable to the elements of the offence and the ultimate issue. It is not applicable to each and every piece of evidence R. v. Morin (1988) 1988 CanLII 8 (SCC), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). If each and every piece of evidence does not have to answer to the criminal burden of proof, it is illogical to assert that the admissibility of such evidence must be proven by that standard.

20     One instance in which admissibility does require proof of an issue beyond a reasonable doubt said by the appellant to support his position is the threshold test of the voluntary nature of a confession: Park v. The Queen (1981) 1981 CanLII 56 (SCC), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 385 (S.C.C.) R. v. Pickett (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 297 (Ont. C.A.). However, a confession is substantively different from other kinds of evidence, since it goes directly to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence, and, historically, by its very nature is suspect because of the form in which it comes to the court.

[42]         The trial judge was in error in treating the photographs as if they were an element of the offence.  To borrow from the words of the court in R. v. Jeffrey, supra, it is illogical to assert that the admissibility of such evidence would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[43]         Indeed, this error is also acknowledged by the respondent, however, again, the respondent submits that even though the trial judge was in error, there was some merit to the trial judge having excluded the evidence and argues:

The court’s findings reveal that even if the cd had been admitted into evidence the weight attached to it would have been diminished.

La poursuite doit démontrer hors de tout raisonnable les éléments constitutifs de l'infraction et non chaque élément de preuve présenté indivivuellement

R. v. Jeffrey, 1993 ABCA 245 (CanLII)

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[18]                       The appellant argues that the Crown must prove irreconcilable separation beyond a reasonable doubt. Because s.7 of the Charterguarantees every accused a trial according to the principles of fundamental justice, no lesser standard of proof can obtain.

[19]                       A very basic principle of fundamental justice is that the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is proof beyond a reasonable doubt However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is only applicable to the elements of the offence and the ultimate issue. It is not applicable to each and every piece of evidence R. v. Morin (1988) 1988 CanLII 8 (SCC), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). If each and every piece of evidence does not have to answer to the criminal burden of proof, it is illogical to assert that the admissibility of such evidence must be proven by that standard.

[20]                       One instance in which admissibility does require proof of an issue beyond a reasonable doubt said by the appellant to support his position is the threshold test of the voluntary nature of a confession: Park v. The Queen (1981) 1981 CanLII 56 (SCC), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 385 (S.C.C.) R. v. Pickett (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 297 (Ont. C.A.). However, a confession is substantively different from other kinds of evidence, since it goes directly to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence, and, historically, by its very nature is suspect because of the form in which it comes to the court.

[21]                       In The Law of Evidence in Canada supra at 358 and 359 the authors discuss the possibility that the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the voluntariness of a confession is an aberration when considered in the context of the standards applied for admissibility of other kinds of evidence.

"On a preliminary hearing and at trial, the Crown has the burden of proof to establish the voluntariness of a statement beyond a reasonable doubt However, it is debatable if this standard was always required. The standard of proof has been examined by the Task Force on Evidence, the English Criminal Law Revision Committee, and the Law Reform Commission of Canada, and also by superior courts in the many English speaking jurisdictions. The present law in Canada and the U.K. is that the prosecution must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt…This view is based on the reasoning that since a confession is potentially determinative of the issue of guilt or innocence, the criminal standard of proof should be maintained. The Task Force suggested that, in practice, this requirement did not appear to present an insurmountable burden on the Crown and also it had the salutary effect of protecting the rights of accused person.

The contrary position is that the standard for admissibility of a confession is out of step with the rules governing admissibility for other evidence. Because the test for admissibility of other factual matters is whether there is some evidence to go before the jury, the reasonable doubt standard for confessions is higher than the admissibility standard for other contested evidence. (Emphasis Supplied)

[22]                       In any case, the appellant's argument is directed to the issue of admissibility of evidence whereas the issue in this case is the competence of a witness.

La preuve d'un document diffère selon qu'elle soit électronique ou papier

R. v. Schertzer, 2011 ONSC 579 (CanLII)

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[12]           Ewaschuk discusses the meaning of authenticity of documents and the different approaches to documentary evidence and recordings in Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada,2^d  ed. (Aurora;Thompson Reuters, 2010) at 16:104.1-105,

16:2657 Authentication (identification) of exhibits

A party tendering real evidence, generally, must attempt to authenticate (i.e., to identify) where the item was located or seized (its source) and may attempt also to identify the author, owner or possessor of the item, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence.  Generally, the party tendering real evidence is required to lead further evidence that tends to prove that the real evidence is genuine, i.e., that it is authentic in the sense that it actually is what it purports to be.  The opposite is the case where the party tendering the real evidence wishes to establish that it is false, i.e., that it is not authentic. Authentication may also involve testimony as to the time, date, location and circumstances of the making of the real evidence and testimony as to its accuracy or its fair representation of what actually occurred.  Formerly, the party tendering a document had to offer some evidence as to its authenticity (i.e., its authorship and genuineness) before it could be received in evidence and made an exhibit.  Documents, generally, cannot “speak for themselves”.  Now, mere possession of the document by a party litigant or someone related to the party may suffice. (Citations omitted)

Authentication is to a document what competency is to a witness.  “Without authentication of a document”, evidence may not be put before a decision maker.

R. v. Lempen, 2008 NBCA 86 (CanLII), 81 W.C.B. (2d) 379 [008/345/014 - 13 pp.], at para. 19 (at para. 20 -- documents may be authenticated in a variety of ways: calling the writer, calling a witness who saw the document signed, calling a witness who is familiar with the writer's handwriting, by comparison of the writing in dispute with a writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be genuine, by calling of experts, or through an admission by the opposing party; “circumstantial evidence” may also point to the genuineness of the document -- e.g., letters received in reply to an earlier correspondence are accepted as being made by the sender)

Before any document can be admitted into evidence there are “two obstacles” it must pass.  First, it must be authenticated in some way by the party who wishes to rely on it. This authentication requires testimony by some witness; a document cannot simply be placed on the bench in front of the judge.  Even real evidence, which exists independently of any statement by any witness, cannot be considered by the court unless a “witnessidentifies it and establishes its connection to the events under consideration”. Unlike other legal systems, the common law does not usually provide for self-authenticating documentary evidence.  Second, if the document is to be admitted as evidence of the truth of the statements it contains, it must be shown to fall within one of the “exceptions to the hearsay rule”.

R. v. Schwartz (1988), 1988 CanLII 11 (SCC), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 97, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443, 66 C.R. (3d) 251, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [1989] 1 W.W.R. 289, 56 Man. R. (2d) 92, 39 C.R.R. 260, 88 N.R. 90 (S.C.C.) at p. 122.

However, a party tendering certain items of real evidence, e.g., a tape from an automatic video camera, need not authenticate them inasmuch as some real evidence is “self-authenticating” and speaks for itself as a silent witness without the necessity of confirmatory oral testimony.

R. v. Nikolovski, 1996 CanLII 158 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 403, 141 D.L.R. (4^th) 647, 33 W.C.B. (2d) 2 (re “videotape of the crime scene” depicting the perpetrator of the crime).