Même si la poursuite ne connait pas tous les détails des témoignages qu'un témoin fournira, cela n’est pas un obstacle à son assignation, pourvu que son témoignage soit pertinent

Mazhari c. R., 2009 QCCA 1880

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[62]           If it is evident that if the person causing the subpoena to be issued does not know whether there is any material evidence which the witness can likely provide or if it is evident from the proof already adduced, or the circumstances of the case, that no material evidence can likely be obtained from the person subpoenaed, the requirement of s. 698 of the Criminal Code has not been met and the subpoena can be quashed.

[63]           Radio-Canada and Ms. Kovacs invoke s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter which guarantees freedom of expression and specifically mentions freedom of the press. This may properly be raised in a Motion to quash a subpoena when it is a journalist who is subpoenaed to give testimony with respect to activities carried out in the performance of his or her professional activities as a journalist and is to be decided according to principles which govern that issue. It is not, however necessary to deal with that issue because appellant was seeking testimony which was inadmissible.

[64]           Appellant invokes his right to make full answer and defence and his right to a fair trial. It appears that the sole purpose, for the subpoena, was the hope that the answers of the witness would provide material for attacking the credibility of one or more of the Crown witnesses with respect to whether they informed anybody of the anonymous letter sent to Ms. Roth. Those witnesses were all subject to cross-examination by appellant and whatever answers they gave regarding the letter were on a collateral matter. Evidence to impugn or attack the credibility of those witnesses on a collateral matter is not admissible. The Crown's position that the testimony sought is not of a nature to justify the issue of a subpoena is stated, in part, in the following terms:

Le premier juge était bien fondé d'empêcher le témoignage de la journaliste qui n'était pas «susceptible de fournir quelque preuve substantielle au procès» (art. 698(1)). Au mieux, le contenu de son témoignage anticipé n'était que du ouï-dire, des renseignements collectionnés dans le cadre de son travail de journaliste. La simple possibilité d'«un lien avec la crédibilité des témoins de la poursuite» ne lui conférait aucune pertinence additionnelle. Au contraire, la règle interdisant la preuve de faits collatéraux ne permettait pas de faire témoigner une personne (journaliste ou autre) afin de contredire un autre témoin sur des questions incidentes: R. c. Krause, [1986] 2 R.C.S. f466 et voir la revue de la jurisprudence sur le sujet par cette Cour dans R. c. Fortin, [2002] J.Q. no. 3561.

Tel que souligné par le premier juge, le contenu du témoignage de Mme Kovacks était inconnu de l'appelant et sans pouvoir indiquer comment ce témoignage pouvait être «substantiel» (en anglais "material"), sa convocation à la Cour devenait une expédition de pêche. Il n'était pas nécessaire de tenir un voir-dire pour décider de la question puisque le but recherché énoncé par l'appelant dénotait un manque total de pertinence à ce témoignage.

[65]           Appellant hoped that he would get answers from the person he subpoenaed with respect to a collateral matter which could serve to attack the credibility of one or more of the Crown's witnesses.

[66]           I agree with the Crown's submission that the evidence sought with respect to a collateral matter was inadmissible. In my view, this justified the quashing of the subpoena.

[67]           I wish to emphasize, however, that it is not because appellant does not know the answers which the witness would give in testimony which justifies the quashing of the subpoena, but rather because the evidence sought is inadmissible with respect to a collateral matter regarding credibility. A party may, with respect to material evidence, for instance regarding the res gestae, subpoena a witness and is entitled to have the evidence, even if the party does not know the answers to the questions asked. In that instance, the evidence regarding the commission of the offence is material, relevant and admissible.

Les facteurs à considérer afin de déterminer s’il y a lieu ou non d’accorder une demande de remise découlant de l’absence d’un témoin

R. c. Geloso, 2025 QCCS 1282

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[35]      Reprenant les principes énoncés dans l’affaire R. v. Darville, le juge Dalphond, pour la majorité dans R. v. M.V., expose ainsi les facteurs qu’un juge d’instance doit considérer afin de déterminer s’il y a lieu ou non d’accorder une demande de remise découlant de l’absence d’un témoin[20] :

[10]      It is undisputed that whether an adjournment or a postponement should be granted or not is a discretionary matter for the trial judge (Manhas v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 172 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 591; R. v. Barrette, 1976 CanLII 180 (SCC), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 121; R. v. Darville, (1956) 1956 CanLII 463 (SCC), 116 C.C.C. 113 (S.C.C.); R. v. MacDonald, 1998 CanLII 18016 (NL CA), [1998] N.J. No. 340 (NFDL C.A.)).

[11]      Such judicial discretion can however be reviewed on appeal if it has not been exercised judicially (R. v. Darville, supra; R. v. Ash, 1993 NSCA 190 (CanLII), [1993] N.S.J. No. 395 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. C. G., supra). The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations (Reza v. Canada, 1994 CanLII 91 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394). Of course, if the judgment is based on reasons that are not well founded in law, a court of appeal may intervene.

[12]      On the elements to be considered by a judge when asked to grant an adjournment of a criminal trial due to the absence of a witness, the Supreme Court of Canada provided some guidelines in 1956 in R. v. Darville, supra. They can be summarized as follows:

(a) That the absent witness is a material witness in the case;

(b) That the party applying for an adjournment has been guilty of no laches or neglect in omitting to endeavour to procure the attendance of this witness; and

(c) That there is a reasonable expectation that the witness can be procured at the future time to which it is sought to put off the trial.

[13]      Moreover, as pointed out by Cartwright, J. in his concurring opinion in Darville, a trial judge errs in law by refusing a request for an adjournment without having given the party seeking it an opportunity to demonstrate that the conditions described above are met. I agree with this principle of law, which has been applied by numerous courts of appeal (see for examples: Regina v. A.T. (1991), 1991 CanLII 6104 (AB KB), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 107 (Alb. Q.B.); R. v. Ash, 1993 NSCA 190 (CanLII), [1993] N.S.J. No. 395 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Casey, [1987] N.S.J. No. 340 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Fahey, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2331 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. MacDonald, 1998 CanLII 18016 (NL CA), [1998] N.J. No. 340 (Nfld. C.A.)). In other words, before concluding that a party has been negligent, the trial judge must give that party an opportunity to establish all the relevant facts.

[14]      Finally, I believe that it is proper for a trial judge when asked for a postponement to consider other relevant circumstances such as the gravity of the charges, the number of previous postponements and the consequences of a postponement for the accused.

[15]      Briefly stated, the decision whether or not to grant an adjournment must be made in the light of the realities of each case and must be consistent with the interests of justice.

[Nos soulignements]

[36]      En somme, il incombe à la partie qui sollicite la remise de démontrer qu’elle satisfait les trois critères suivants de l’arrêt Darville :

a)            que la personne absente pourrait rendre un témoignage pertinent;

b)            qu’elle a pris des moyens raisonnables pour s’assurer de la présence du témoin; et

c)            qu’on peut raisonnablement penser que le témoin absent se présentera ultérieurement devant le tribunal.

[37]      Par ailleurs, comme l’indique le juge Vauclair, alors à la Cour supérieure, dans l’affaire Lefebvre, le juge doit, en exerçant sa discrétion, considérer l’intérêt de la justice.

[38]      Lorsque le refus d’accorder une remise mène à un acquittement, l’intérêt de la justice s’évalue en appréciant notamment « si l'acquittement, comme conséquence possible du refus d'accorder la remise, est approprié dans les circonstances compte tenu de la gravité des accusations, de l'absence de remise antérieure et du préjudice démontré par l'accusé »[21].

L'assignation par courrier ordinaire est permise, mais elle comporte l'obligation d'instaurer des mesures de suivi pour s'assurer que les témoins ont bel et bien été avisés que leur présence à la cour était requise

R. c. Globensky, 2009 QCCA 2300

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[3]         L'assignation par courrier ordinaire permet au ministère public de réaliser d'importantes économies, mais elle comporte aussi l'obligation d'instaurer des mesures de suivi pour s'assurer que les témoins ont bel et bien été avisés que leur présence à la cour était requise – Voir R. c. M.V., J.E. 2004-1867, une décision du 13 septembre 2004 et particulièrement le paragraphe 29.

Le ministère public a-t-il compétence pour demander l'annulation d'un subpoena ?

R. c. Poulin Laurin, 2013 QCCQ 16378

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[7]           Les accusés invoquent deux décisions[1] selon lesquelles une requête visant l'annulation ("to quash") de l'assignation d'une personne doit être présentée par la personne en question. Les accusés soutiennent que le ministère public n'a pas  compétence pour demander l'annulation des assignations des personnes mises en cause puisqu'il ne les représente pas. En effet, le ministère public invoque, dans le cadre de la requête en communication de la preuve, que les entités pour lesquelles ces personnes travaillent constituent des tierces parties à son égard au sens de l'arrêt R. c. O'Connor[2] de la Cour suprême du Canada.

[8]           Les accusés sont d'avis qu'il importe peu de distinguer si le Tribunal est saisi d'une demande visant l'annulation d'une assignation parce qu'elle ne rencontre pas les exigences du paragraphe 698(1) C. cr. ou d'une demande en vue d'excuser les témoins au sens du paragraphe 700(2) C. cr.. Ces deux moyens sont invoqués par le ministère public au soutien de sa requête en annulation d'assignation.

[9]           Avec respect, le Tribunal est d'avis que cette distinction est importante. Dans les deux décisions citées par les accusés, une cour de juridiction supérieure était saisie d'une requête en annulation d'assignation. Les pouvoirs du paragraphe 700(2) C.cr. n'étaient pas invoqués.

[10]        Le droit commun confère aux tribunaux, y compris les cours provinciales, un pouvoir discrétionnaire inhérent de contrôler leur propre procédure et d'empêcher qu'on en abuse[3]. Les tribunaux ont statué que ce pouvoir comporte celui d'excuser un témoin en vertu du paragraphe 700(2) C. cr.:

" My power to excuse witnesses under 700(2) of the Criminal Code relates to my duty to make determinations about the admissibility of evidence, and also my power to protect and control the processes of the court.[4]"

[11]        Le pouvoir des tribunaux de contrôler leur propre procédure est essentiel à la bonne administration de la justice. Ce pouvoir peut être invoqué par une partie, comme en l'espèce, ou peut être soulevé d'office par le tribunal.

[12]        L'argument des accusés n'est donc pas retenu. Le Tribunal peut, et doit, contrôler sa propre procédure et éviter qu'on en abuse.  Il peut excuser un témoin en vertu du paragraphe 700(2) C. cr., et ce même si le ministère public, et non le témoin lui-même, soulève cette question.

[13]        Étant donné que le Tribunal a compétence pour excuser un témoin à la demande du ministère public, en vertu du paragraphe 700(2) du C. cr., il n'est pas nécessaire de se pencher sur sa compétence à l'égard de la requête en annulation d'assignation.

2. Les accusés ont-ils fait la démonstration que les personnes assignées sont susceptibles de fournir quelque preuve substantielle ?

[14]        Lorsque l'assignation d'une personne est contestée, la partie qui a procédé à cette assignation doit faire la démonstration qu'il est raisonnablement probable que la preuve amenée par le témoin aidera à résoudre les questions en litige[5]. Le paragraphe 698(1) C.cr. qualifie cette preuve de « substantielle ».

[15]        Au voir-dire sur la communication de la preuve, les accusés ont le fardeau de démontrer que les éléments de preuve dont ils demandent divulgation leur seront d'une certaine utilité, c'est-à-dire qu'ils ne sont pas manifestement sans pertinence. Dans les cas d'un élément dont l'existence est mise en doute par le ministère public, les accusés doivent également établir un fondement par lequel le Tribunal pourrait conclure qu'il y a des motifs de croire que l'élément existe[6]. 

[23]        À cet égard, le Tribunal rappelle que l'assignation d'un témoin relativement à la requête en communication a pour objectif limité de démontrer l'existence d'un élément de preuve et le fait que celui-ci n'est pas manifestement sans pertinence. Les tribunaux supérieurs ont rappelé à maintes occasions que l'assignation d'un témoin ne doit pas servir de prétexte pour une recherche à l'aveuglette ou  pour vérifier si la divulgation est complète:

 « La requête (en arrêt des procédures au motif d'une divulgation de preuve incomplète) ne peut pas devenir un prétexte, pour la défense, d'interroger des témoins dans l'espoir que ceux-ci fourniront des témoignages permettant d'établir la violation alléguée. Accepter une telle pratique équivaudrait à permettre sous l'enseigne d'une requête en vertu de la Charte, de vastes enquêtes à partir d'allégations hypothétiques fondées sur des postulats erronées. De la même façon, l'assignation de témoins ne saurait être accordée pour vérifier si la divulgation est complète. »[7] (La parenthèse est de nous.)

Des questions quant à la validité de l'émission d'un subpoena ne permettent pas au justiciable de se soustraire de la justice de son propre chef

R. v. Hussein, 2019 ONCA 230

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[7]         We do not agree with Mr. Abdul-Hussein. Mr. Abdul-Hussein’s wilful act of evading a subpoena and failing to appear as a witness at a murder trial where he had material evidence to give had a tendency to obstruct the course of justice: R. v. Houle, 2016 MBCA 121 at para. 6. The actus reus of the offence is made out without the inquiry into the validity of the subpoena.

[8]         Such inquiry would violate the general rule that collateral attacks – being attacks on an order “made in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation or nullification of the order” – are impermissible: R. v. Bird, 2019 SCC 7, at para. 21. As Moldaver J. observed in Bird, at para. 22,

[T]he rule against collateral attacks on court orders has been consistently applied in criminal proceedings where the charge involves an alleged breach of a court order…. The citizens’ safeguard is in seeking to have illegal orders set aside through the legal process, not in disobeying them.

As Moldaver J. explained at para. 24, it violates the rule of law and the repute of the administration of justice to permit those presented with court orders to disobey them rather than to bring a challenge to their validity.

[9]         The decisions relied upon by Mr. Abdul-Hussein, R. v. Oliveira, 2009 ONCA 219, 243 C.C.C. (3d) 217, and R. v. Molina, 2008 ONCA 212, 231 C.C.C. (3d) 193, do not assist him. He asserts that those cases stand for the proposition that when the validity of a court order is an element of the offence, the collateral challenge bar does not apply. That is incorrect. Instead, those cases hold that it is not a collateral attack to defend against a charge of failing to comply with an order by relying on the failure of authorities to comply with statutory procedural protections associated with the order. Oliveira involved non-compliance with the requirement in Criminal Code, s. 505, that after issuing a promise to appear, authorities must lay the related information “as soon as practicable”. Molina involved non-compliance with the requirement in Criminal Code, s. 260(1)(c), that an offender subject to a driving prohibition must be notified of the offence of failing to comply with that prohibition. Neither case involved challenges to the validity of the underlying orders themselves.

[10]      Nor, in our view, is this a case where an exception to the general rule should be recognized. If Mr. Abdul-Hussein had concerns about the validity of the subpoena, he had an effective means to challenge the court order by applying to quash the subpoena.

[11]      Indeed, as the Crown pointed out, it is not contested that Mr. Abdul-Hussein had material evidence to give. Had he successfully challenged the subpoena before trial in this case, a new subpoena would have issued. In our view, it would turn the rationale for the rule against collateral attacks on its head to recognize an exception that would leave those who disobey orders in a better position than those who bring proper challenges.

La juridiction pour casser un subpoena est la Cour supérieure & le pouvoir d'un juge d'instance sur le subpoena en fonction de sa pertinence

R. c. Ben Aïssa, 2016 QCCQ 2830

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Jurisdiction to quash a subpoena

[23]        On the matter of jurisdiction, the case law is unanimous: only a judge of the Superior Court has the power to quash a subpoena.

[24]        In R. v. Rashwan, 2001 CarswellOnt 5641, 56 W.C.B. (2d) 286, the Crown prosecutor applied for a motion to quash a subpoena issued at the behest of a self-represented accused. Justice Fernandes of the Ontario Court of justice ruled that he did not have the power to quash subpoenas issued by a Justice of the Peace, a judicial officer of the same court.[6]

[25]        The decision in Rashwan, was based on two precedents: R. v. Boissonneault (1993) O.J. 2485, a decision of Salhany J. of the Ontario Court (Gen. Div.) and R. v. Morissette (1990) O.J. 2487, a decision of Fontana J. of the Ontario Court, Provincial Division.  Both these cases support the proposition that the jurisdiction to quash a subpoena can only be exercised by a judge of the Superior of Court.[7]

[26]        Authority for the view that a subpoena can only be quashed by a court of superior jurisdiction can also be found in R. v. Primeau, 1995 CanLII 143 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 60, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. In that case, the central issue concerned the compellability of a witness subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary hearing of two individuals charged with murder. As the accused also faced a murder charge for the same crime (he was charged separately), he filed a motion seeking relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter to prevent him from being called as a witness and a writ of prohibition to prevent the Provincial Court judge from compelling his presence and testimony at the preliminary inquiry.

[27]        None of the parties took issue with the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to hear the challenge to the subpoena. In fact, the Superior Court’s authority on the matter was taken for granted. The only procedural issue concerned the remedial powers of certiorari to include the Charter remedies sought through s. 24(1) of the Charter. However, the manner in which the Court framed and decided the procedural issue left no doubt that the Superior Court alone had the power to hear a third party challenge to a subpoena:

XIII. As a result of these two differences, the procedural route to follow for a third party is determined by the level of court issuing the order.  A provincial court order is to be challenged through an application to a superior court judge for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.  However, given that this remedy is limited to the quashing of an order, the Court decided that it was necessary, for specific circumstances, to enlarge the remedial scope of certiorari (at p. 866)[8] : (underlining added)

it is open to this Court to enlarge the remedial powers of certiorari and I do so now for limited circumstances.  Given that the common law rule authorizing publication bans must be consistent with Charter principles, I am of the view that the remedies available where a judge errs in applying this rule should be consistent with the remedial powers under the Charter.  Therefore, the remedial powers of certiorari should be expanded to include the remedies that are available through s. 24(1) of the Charter.  [Emphasis in original.]

XVI. As the order in question has been issued by the Provincial Court, the appellant must challenge it by seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari from a superior court judge.  Technically, of course, the appellant has not followed the correct procedure as he sought relief in the form of a s. 24(1) Charter remedy and by means of prohibition.  However, neither the appellant nor the superior court judge had the benefit of the reasons of this Court in Dagenais to guide them.  If one examines the nature of the application made by the appellant, there is considerable resemblance between prohibition and the s. 24(1) remedy sought, and the expanded notion of certiorari developed in Dagenais.  (emphasis added)

[28]        Not without consideration is the fact that my authority as a judge presiding a preliminary inquiry is strictly governed by statute (part XVIII of the Criminal Code). Thus, I have no inherent powers outside those that are specifically set out in the Criminal Code. As no statutory provision entitles me to quash a subpoena, I can only conclude that such an order is beyond the scope of my modest jurisdiction.

[29]        In short, both the weight of judicial authority and the limited powers of a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, lend themselves to the conclusion that I cannot rule on an order to quash a subpoena.

-Power to adjudicate the subpoena on the basis of relevance

[30]        The want of jurisdiction with regards to quashing a subpoena does not mean that I do not have the authority to call upon the accused (Mr. Ben Aïssa) to explain how the object of the subpoena (the written defence) is likely to be relevant in the present proceeding. As Justice Fernandes explained at paras. 4 and 6 of his decision in Rashwan, supra,  such an inquiry is fundamental to the Court process:

Having ruled that it does not have jurisdiction to quash subpoenas issued by a justice of the peace, a member of this court, this court is of the view, however, that in the appropriate circumstances it has the authority to inquire of the party that has caused a subpoena to issue by a justice of the peace, to demonstrate how that particular witness under subpoena is likely to give material evidence in the proceedings. This is an appropriate function of the trial court.

Just because a subpoena has been issued by a justice of the peace does not mean that the trial judge is then stopped from inquiring in appropriate circumstances whether or not a witness has material evidence to give at that trial. This court invited Mr. Rashwan, no less than five times, to demonstrate how Mr. Ronald Oswald is a material witness likely to give material evidence at this trial, at this trial involving a charge of criminal harassment in which Mr. Rashwan stands as the accused.

[31]        In R. v. Maleki, 2006 ONCJ 401 (CanLII), Justice Lane of the Ontario Court of Justice remanded applications to quash a subpoena to the Superior Court. At para. 4 of his judgement, he summarized the Superior Court’s decision holding that a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice (provincial court)—though powerless to decide an application to quash—was entitled by virtue of s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code to hear submissions as to whether or not the evidence was receivable at the trial :

On May 15, 2006, Ducharme J. found that a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice clearly has jurisdiction to hear an application under s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code, and directed that I hear the submissions of the applicants and determine whether the witnesses should be excused. Ducharme J. applied Re. Chase and the Queen (1982) 1982 CanLII 304 (BC SC), 1 C.C.C. (3d) 188 (B.C.S.C.) where MacKay J. found that, while it was quite true that only the superior court has jurisdiction to quash subpoenas, such an order was not necessary, and that it was for the trial judge to make a determination of whether or not the evidence of the applicant is receivable on the trial.  “If the trial judge concluded that the evidence was not receivable then he has the power, under s. 628(2) (now s. 700(2)) of the Criminal Code, to excuse the witness from attending.”  In the words of MacKay J., “the question is really one going to the admissibility of evidence….”

[32]        At para. 7 in Maleki, Justice Lane expanded on the case law authorizing a judge to inquire on the relevance of a witness’ testimony and to excuse them if the testimony was immaterial to the proceedings :

The power of a justice of the Ontario Court of Justice to excuse witnesses under s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code has been upheld in other situations: R. v. Rashwan [2004] O.J. No. 4747 (Spiegel J. of the Ont. S.C.) agreeing with similar rulings by Trafford J. (at para. 12) and by Dambrot J. (at para. 13); R. v. Sunoco Inc. [1986] O.J. No. 2319 (Rosenberg J. of the Ont. S.C.).  In a recent application to quash subpoenas in the Superior Court by the C.B.C., O’Driscoll J. held that the matter should properly be argued before the trial judge, and remitted the case back to the Ontario Court of Justice: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada 2006 ONCJ 54 (CanLII), [2006] O.J. No. 722 (Cole J. O.C.J.).  In light of this jurisprudence, it appears that  the finding of my brother Knazen J. in R. v. E. (R.) [1991] O.J. No. 841 (Ont. C. Prov. Div.) restricting the use of section 700(2) of the Criminal Code to physical attendance, as opposed to a discretion to excuse, and the decision of my brother Fontana J. in R. v. Morissette [1990] O.J. No. 2487 (Ont. C. Prov. Div.) declining all jurisdiction to excuse witnesses, have been bypassed. Further to the direction of Justice Ducharme, I find that I do have jurisdiction to deal with the applications before me.

[33]        The said decisions are consistent with the powers of a preliminary inquiry judge to make all evidentiary rulings, with admissibility determined by relevance, a concept which is not governed solely by the narrow test for committal.[9] As explained by Justice Arthur W.D. Pickup in R. v. Ellis, 2012 NSSC 329 (CanLII), para. 17 : 

It is important to note that a preliminary inquiry judge has jurisdiction to make all evidentiary rulings, and the issue of whether these witnesses are relevant to the inquiry can be put squarely before the preliminary inquiry judge to resolve. The preliminary inquiry judge can determine the nature and scope of the examination of witnesses, and rule on any objections.