Comment une infraction peut elle être incluse à une autre & l'amendement d'un acte d'accusation en appel

R. v. Pelletier, 2012 ONCA 566

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[105]   One offence may be included in another in any of three ways:

i.            by description in the enactment creating the offence[1];

ii.            by description in the indictment or count in which the accused is charged[2]; or

iii.           by specific statutory provision[3].

See, R. v. Simpson (No. 2), (1981), 1981 CanLII 3284 (ON CA), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 122 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 133; Luckett v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 185 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1140, at p. 1141.

[106]   An “included offence” is part of the main (principal) offence. The offence charged as described in the enactment that creates it, or in the count that charges it, must contain the essential elements of the included offence: Simpson, at p. 133; R. v. Fergusson, 1961 CanLII 97 (SCC), [1962] S.C.R. 229, at p. 233.

[107]   Section 239(1) of the Criminal Code creates the offence of attempted murder: Simpson, at p. 134. However, the subsection, in particular its phrase “by any means”, does not “describe” the ways in which the offence of attempted murder may be committed: Simpson, at p. 140. The offence of attempted murder may be committed without committing an assault or causing any bodily harm whatsoever: Simpson, at p. 142. It follows that, “as described in the enactment creating it”, attempted murder does not include any crime of assault or unlawfully causing bodily harm: Simpson, at pp. 142-143.

[108]   Sections 662(2)-(6) permit conviction of certain offences on indictments for other crimes.[4] The effect of these provisions is to declare certain offences to be included in other offences. Nothing in these provisions permits a court to convict an accused of aggravated assault on an unparticularized count of attempted murder.

[109]   One offence may be included in another where the commission of the offence charged, as described in the count, includes the commission of another offence: Criminal Code, section 662(1). In other words, apt words of description in the charging count may import as included offences crimes that fall outside those included in the enactment creating the offence or the specific provisions of sections 662(2)-(6).  

[110]   Attempted murder is one of several offences in the Criminal Code that attracts a minimum punishment when firearms are used in its commission. The inclusion of the words “while using a firearm” in a count that charges attempted murder puts an accused on notice that, if a conviction of attempted murder is entered, he or she will be subject to a minimum punishment in accordance with the scheme put in place by sections 239(1)-(3): R. v. Manley, 2011 ONCA 128, (2011), 269 C.C.C. (3d) 40, at paras. 54-61; R. v. D.(A.) (2003), 2003 BCCA 106 (CanLII), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 177 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 29-31. The addition of the phrase “while using a firearm”, does not amount to a particularization of the means by which the offence was committed, thus cannot serve to expand the offences included in the description of the enactment creating the principal offence.

[111]   Counts of attempted murder that do not specify the means used to commit the offence and do not contain other apt words of description include the offence of unlawfully attempting to cause bodily harm: Simpson, at p. 143; R. v. Colburne (1991), 1991 CanLII 3701 (QC CA), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 235 (Que. C.A.), at p. 247.   

[112]   Section 683(1)(g) of the Criminal Code permits a court of appeal, where it considers it in the interests of justice, to amend an indictment, unless the court concludes that the accused has been misled or prejudiced in his or her defence or appeal. The scope of the amendment authority matches that of a trial judge under section 601 and reaches variations between the evidence and the charge: R. v. Irwin (1998), 1998 CanLII 2957 (ON CA), 123 C.C.C. (3d) 316 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 8 and 31.

[113]   In R. v. St. Clair (1994), 1994 CanLII 8719 (ON CA), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 402 (Ont. C.A.), a jury convicted the appellant of an offence that had been erroneously left to them as an included offence on a count that did not specify the means by which the offence charged had been committed. This court amended the indictment on appeal by adding to the count words that described the means by which the principal offence was committed and upheld the conviction of the included offence: St. Clair, at p. 410. In determining whether to make the amendment, the court considered several factors including:

i.            the original indictment;

ii.            the evidence adduced at trial;

iii.         the positions of the parties at trial; and

iv.         the real issues on appeal.

St. Clair, at p. 408.

L'avocat visé par une allégation de représentation inadéquate en première instance ne peut pas contre-interroger son ancien client

Ratt c. R., 2023 QCCA 650

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[21]      Enfin, il va sans dire que le mis en cause sera autorisé à déposer sa déclaration sous serment. L’appelant et l’intimé pourront le contre-interroger sur le contenu de celle‑ci.

[22]      Il n’y aura cependant pas lieu de permettre au mis en cause de contre-interroger les signataires des déclarations sous serment que produira l’appelant. Comme le rappelle en effet l’arrêt Delisle c. R.[7], sous la plume du juge Proulx, il est certes nécessaire que l’avocat dont on allègue l’assistance inadéquate « ait l’opportunité de s’expliquer »[8] devant la Cour. Le juge Proulx en énonce d’ailleurs clairement les raisons[9]. Cependant, le processus qui permet à l’avocat ou l’avocate de faire connaître son point de vue, processus aujourd’hui régi par l’art. 61 R.C.a.Q.m.c., n’accorde pas « pour autant un droit formel d’intervention à l’avocat, qui ne peut donc plaider sa cause et citer des témoins à sa décharge dans le cadre de la procédure d’appel »[10]. Qui plus est, l’avocat ou l’avocate dont l’assistance inadéquate est soulevée ne peut pas non plus être autorisée à faire double emploi avec le ministère public. Comme le rappelle la Cour dans l’arrêt Zamiara c. R.[11], on ne peut « imposer un second poursuivant à l’appelant, ce qui n’est pas opportun, aucune question d’intérêt public n’étant ici en cause »[12]. Or, en l’espèce, ce serait le cas si on permettait au mis en cause, à l’instar de l’intimé, de contre-interroger les signataires des déclarations sous serment que l’appelant déposera.