Le droit à l'avocat peut impliquer le droit de contacter un tiers en vue de favoriser l'exercice de ce droit constitutionnel

R. v. Blake, 2015 ONCA 684

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[14]      The purpose of the right to counsel is to provide the accused with legal advice and to ensure that the accused understands his or her right to silence: see R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310, at paras. 24-26; R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 429, at para. 38. Police have a duty to facilitate access to a lawyer immediately and that includes the right to contact counsel of choice as well as the right to contact a third party to facilitate access to counsel: see R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 495, at para. 24; R. v. K.W.J., 2012 NWTCA 3, at paras. 32-33.

Le juge d’instance peut tenir compte du comportement d’un témoin, entre autres, sur sa façon de témoigner

Girard c. R., 2017 QCCS 5378

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[42]        Il est établi en droit criminel que le juge d’instance peut tenir compte du comportement d’un témoin, entre autres, sur sa façon de témoigner[28]. D’ailleurs, compte tenu de sa position privilégiée quant à l’analyse de la preuve présentée devant lui, le juge d’instance peut prendre en considération le comportement des témoins afin d’évaluer leur crédibilité[29].

Comment apprécier si l'essence de la communication de la preuve a été divulguée (considérants procéduraux et tactiques)

R. v. Black, 1998 CanLII 5042 (NS SC)

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In coming to a decision respecting the election and plea any accused will be mindful of the mode of trial whether (in this jurisdiction) by judge and jury in the Supreme Court or by judge alone in the Supreme or Provincial Courts. Weighing those choices will implicate both substantive and tactical considerations, among them: the essential elements of the crime(s) charged; the extent to which the Crown's case is capable of proof; how will it likely be proved, by viva voce evidence or documentary evidence or both; is it the kind of case where credibility will be an important issue; if so, who best to make that assessment, judge or jury; would a preliminary hearing be useful to the defence or would such a step likely be waived; will the defence asserted by an accused be a technical one; if so, might the chances of success be better before a judge alone; how does the accused intend to negate the essential elements of the offense(s) including whatever general or ulterior intents are applicable; how likely is it that expert evidence will be called? Such considerations and countless others would be weighed by counsel and the accused, both before and after an election is made. All of that is part of the dynamic of any trial and essential to pre-trial preparation. While at this stage a reviewing judge would never know the theory of the defence or the tactics being considered, the features I have mentioned must be kept in mind when assessing the usefulness of the sought after information to the accused. I have considered all of these things in assessing Mr. Black's application.

Un accusé ne peut pas être forcé d'exercer son option ou de fixer son dossier à procès tant qu'il ne reçoit pas l'essence de la communication de la preuve

R. v. Girimonte, 1997 CanLII 1866 (ON CA)

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The Crown's obligation to disclose is triggered by a request for disclosure from counsel for an accused. Initial disclosure must occur sufficiently before the accused is called upon to elect or plead so as to permit the accused to make an informed decision as to the mode of trial and the appropriate plea. In a perfect world, initial disclosure would also be complete disclosure. However, as is recognized in Stinchcombe, supra, at p. 343 S.C.R., p. 221 C.R.R., p. 14 C.C.C., the Crown will often be unable to make complete disclosure at the initial stage of the disclosure process. There will also be rare cases in which the Crown can properly delay disclosure until an investigation is completed. If full disclosure cannot be made when initial disclosure is provided, the Crown's obligation to disclose is an ongoing one and requires that disclosure be made as it becomes available and be completed as soon as is reasonably possible. In any event, an accused will not be compelled to elect or plead if the accused has not received sufficient disclosure to allow the accused to make an informed decision.

Il n’est pas suffisant d’invoquer la communication tardive de la preuve comme motif de remise sans que l’importance de la preuve attendue le justifie

Gabriel c. R., 2023 QCCQ 10698

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[54]      On pourrait croire que cette décision est contraire à la décision de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario dans R. c. Kovacs-Tatar[62], une décision rendue en 2004, bien avant l’arrêt Jordan. Or, il est utile de rappeler que dans Kovacs-Tatar - où la Cour a reproché à l’accusé d’avoir attendu de recevoir un rapport d’expert dans un dossier de nature sexuelle - une preuve avait été faite que l’accusé obtiendrait le rapport plusieurs mois avant le procès et qu’il aurait donc le temps nécessaire pour obtenir une contre-expertise. Ainsi, l’affirmation de la Cour selon laquelle « the Crown is not obliged to disclose every last bit of evidence before a trial date is set », doit être replacée dans le contexte de cette affaire en tenant compte de l’importance de la preuve, du fait que l’accusé avait l’assurance d’obtenir celle-ci en temps opportun et qu’il n’avait pas à faire de choix s’agissant d’une procédure sommaire[63].

[55]      En effet, plusieurs décisions qui ont suivi l’affaire Kovacs-Tatar, ont réitéré qu’il est essentiel de déterminer l’importance de l’élément de preuve qui n’est pas encore communiqué, dans le contexte du dossier.[64] D’ailleurs, dans Regan[65], la Cour d’appel d’Alberta écrit ce qui suit :

[65]   While the accused did not have an election as to the mode of trial, he was entitled to his lawyer’s considered professional opinion about the strength of the Crown’s case before making other important decisions, such as considering a guilty plea or pursuing resolution discussions. In addition, s 536.3 of the Criminal Code requires the accused to prepare a “statement of issues and witnesses” in the hopes of streamlining the preliminary inquiry. In Alberta, this document is referred to as the “Form A”: R v Stinert, 2015 ABPC 4 at para 17, 604 AR 151. Complying with this procedural requirement requires a somewhat probing review of the Crown’s case.[2] The accused cannot hold out for every last shred of disclosure before setting hearing dates: R v Kovacs-Tatar (2004), 2004 CanLII 42923 (ON CA), 73 OR (3d) 161 at para 47, 192 CCC (3d) 91 (CA); R v NNM (2006), 2006 CanLII 14957 (ON CA), 209 OAC 331 at para 37, 209 CCC (3d) 436 (CA); JEK at para 66. In some cases it is reasonable to expect defence counsel to book a trial or preliminary inquiry before they have had an opportunity to review all of the Crown’s disclosure. But defence counsel should not be expected to set a hearing date before they have a reasonable opportunity to review the essential aspects of the Crown’s case.

(Soulignement du Tribunal)

[56]      Au risque de redite, au Québec, Cour d’appel dans l’arrêt Rice a elle aussi considéré l’importance de qualifier l’élément de preuve en vue de déterminer si la remise est légitime. En outre, à titre de preuve « plus substantielle », elle donne l’exemple de l’expertise[66].

[57]      En somme, comme elle l’écrit, la Cour d’appel rappelle qu’« [I]l n’est plus suffisant d’invoquer la communication tardive de la preuve comme motif de remise sans que l’importance de la preuve attendue le justifie. Le juge doit s’en préoccuper. Une remise accordée sans que la situation l’exige sera à la charge de la défense »[67].

La défense est justifiée de ne pas faire son option uniquement si un élément crucial de communication de la preuve ne lui a pas été divulguée

R. v. Lahiry, 2011 ONSC 6780

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[114] In any event, as I read the above line of binding authority, outstanding disclosure can often be significant and it still cannot be used to hold up the setting of dates for trial or preliminary inquiry. Sophisticated forensic testing and ongoing investigative steps often take time and they cannot be allowed to hold the process hostage by preventing the setting of timely trial dates. It is only when the missing disclosure is truly material to "crucial steps" in the process, like election and plea, that it will justify delay at these early stages. This is simply common sense. Lawyers can generally adapt and adjust their trial strategy to ongoing disclosure, received from the Crown while awaiting trial. If the Crown is not being diligent in providing disclosure sufficiently in advance of the trial date, then setting confirmation dates and target dates for trial will solve the problem. By bringing the case back to court, a month or two before the target trial date, defence counsel can create a check to prevent dilatory Crown disclosure practices. If the Crown has not completed all important disclosure by the confirmation date, the defence can then adjourn the target trial date and the Crown's actions will have caused the delay.

La communication de la preuve n'a pas à être entièrement complétée pour que la défense doive procéder à son option

R. v. N.N.M., 2006 CanLII 14957 (ON CA)

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[37]         I disagree.  Where outstanding disclosure is alleged to explain a defence request for an adjournment, it is necessary to consider what documents were outstanding, when and in what circumstances they were requested, and if their disclosure is mandated by the Crown’s constitutional duty of disclosure.  Where the defence has made a late request for material with no potential relevance, any delay that results should not be attributed to the Crown.  A person charged with an offence should not be able to generate a basis for a s. 11(b) application by making a continuous stream of requests for materials that have no potential relevance, even if the Crown agrees to provide them.  Even when the Crown has clearly failed to make mandated disclosure, the defence is not necessarily entitled to refuse to proceed to the next step or to set a date for trial.  As this court stated in R. v. Kovacs-Tator (2004), 2004 CanLII 42923 (ON CA), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 91 at para. 47 (Ont. C.A.): “the Crown is not obliged to disclose every last bit of evidence before a trial date is set.”