S.J. c. R., 2024 QCCA 253
[82] Dans un texte intitulé Proof and Progress: Coping with the Law of Evidence in a Technological Age, le juge Paciocco fait une ébauche des distinctions qui existent entre le débat concernant l’authenticité d’une preuve à l’étape de l’admissibilité et celui sur l’évaluation finale de la culpabilité de l’accusé :
[T]he law prefers to see disputes about authenticity resolved at the end of a case, not at the admissibility stage. Disputes over authenticity tend to turn on credibility, and credibility is best judged at the end of the case in the context of all of the evidence. “Authentication” for the purposes of admissibility is therefore nothing more than a threshold test requiring that there be some basis for leaving the evidence to the fact-finder for ultimate evaluation[25].
[83] Dans l’arrêt C.B.[26], le juge Watt résume de manière complète les principes de droit applicables à l’admissibilité des documents électroniques :
[63] To determine this ground of appeal requires consideration of what is involved in the process of authentication; how it may be established, especially with respect to the subject-matter in issue here; and the roles of the trier of law and the trier of fact in the authentication process.
[64] The requirement of authentication applies to various kinds of real evidence. Authentication involves a showing by the proponent of the evidence that the thing or item proffered really is what its proponent claims it to be: Kenneth S. Broun, ed., McCormick on Evidence, 7th ed., vol. 2 (Thomson Reuters, 2013), at § 212, pp. 4-5.
[65] Authentication is the process of convincing a court that a thing matches the claim made about it. In other words, it is what its proponent claims it to be. Authentication is intertwined with relevance: in the absence of authentication, the thing lacks relevance unless it is tendered as bogus. Thus, authentication becomes necessary where the item is tendered as real or documentary evidence.
[66] At common law, authentication requires the introduction of some evidence that the item is what it purports to be: R. v. Donald (1958), 1958 CanLII 470 (NB CA), 121 C.C.C. 304 (N.B. C.A., at p. 306; R. v. Staniforth (1979), 1979 CanLII 4477 (ON CA), 11 C.R. (3d) 84 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 89; R. v. Hirsch, 2017 SKCA 14, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 230, at para. 18. The requirement is not onerous and may be established by either or both direct and circumstantial evidence.
[67] For electronic documents, s. 31.1 of the CEA assigns a party who seeks to admit an electronic document as evidence the burden of proving its authenticity. To meet this burden, the party must adduce evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is what it purports to be. Section 31.8 provides an expansive definition of “electronic document”, a term which encompasses devices by or in which data is recorded or stored. Under s. 31.1, as at common law, the threshold to be met is low. When that threshold is satisfied, the electronic document is admissible, and thus available for use by the trier of fact.
[68] To satisfy this modest threshold for authentication, whether at common law or under s. 31.1 of the CEA, the proponent may adduce and rely upon direct and circumstantial evidence. Section 31.1 does not limit how or by what means the threshold may be met. Its only requirement is that the evidence be capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document “is that which it is purported to be.” That circumstantial evidence may be relied upon is well established: Hirsch, at para. 18; R. v. Colosie, 2016 ONSC 1708, at para. 25; R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, 326 C.C.C (3d) 385, at para. 35; see also R. v. Evans, 1993 CanLII 86 (CSC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, at p. 663. This accords with general principles about proof of facts in criminal proceedings, whether the facts sought to be established are preliminary facts on an admissibility inquiry or ultimate facts necessary to prove guilt.
[69] At common law, correspondence could be authenticated by the “reply letter” doctrine: to authenticate correspondence as having been sent by one individual to another, evidence is adduced to show it is a reply to a letter sent to that person. As a matter of logic, the same should hold true for text messages and emails. Evidence that A sent a text or email to B whom A believed was linked to a specific address, and evidence of a response purportedly from B affords some evidence of authenticity: David Paciocco, “Proof and Progress: Coping with the Law of Evidence in a Technological Age” (2013) 11 C.J.L.T. 181, at pp. 197-8 (Paciocco).
[70] In a similar way, text messages may be linked to particular phones by examining the recorded number of the sender and receiving evidence linking that number to a specific individual, as for example, by admission: Paciocco, at p. 198.
[71] But what of the prospect of tampering? Does it have to be negated before digital evidence can be properly authenticated?
[72] As a matter of principle, it seems reasonable to infer that the sender has authored a message sent from his or her phone number. This inference is available and should be drawn in the absence of evidence that gives an air of reality to a claim that this may not be so. Rank speculation is not sufficient: R. v. Ambrose, 2015 ONCJ 813, at para. 52. And even if there were an air of reality to such a claim, the low threshold for authentication, whether at common law or under s. 31.1 of the CEA, would seem to assign such a prospect to an assessment of weight.
[84] Comme on peut le constater, le fardeau en matière d’authentification d’un document électronique est relativement bas, essentiellement une preuve qui permet d’établir « que le document est bien ce qu’il paraît être »[27]. La partie qui souhaite satisfaire cette exigence peut le faire par des éléments de preuve directe et circonstancielle. L’authentification peut être prouvée par le témoignage d’un témoin qui reconnaît le document, et ce, même s’il n’en est pas le créateur[28].
[85] En général, une preuve d’expert n’est pas requise[29]. De plus, comme le note ma collègue la juge Hogue dans l’arrêt Faivre, il existe une importante distinction entre le témoignage d’opinion et le témoignage technique[30] :
[45] Il est important de distinguer, comme il l’a fait d’ailleurs, le témoignage d’opinion du témoignage technique, mais factuel. Le premier implique l’expression d’une opinion, qui, généralement, peut être contestée, alors que le second ne fait que rapporter des faits relevant de connaissances spécialisées, scientifiques ou techniques. Comme l’a écrit le regretté juge Lamer « les experts aident le juge des faits à arriver à une conclusion en appliquant à un ensemble de faits des connaissances scientifiques particulières, que ne possèdent ni le juge ni le jury, et en exprimant alors une opinion sur les conclusions que l’on peut en tirer ». Ainsi, il est de l’essence même d’un témoignage d’expert qu’une opinion y soit exprimée.
[46] Quoique cette distinction existe depuis fort longtemps, le développement de la technologie, l’acquisition de connaissances en lien avec celle-ci et son utilisation dans le cadre d’enquêtes criminelles ont parfois rendu difficile de tracer la ligne entre le témoignage d’opinion, qui ne peut être rendu que par un expert, et le témoignage technique, mais malgré tout factuel.
[86] Les auteurs de l’ouvrage Modern Criminal Evidence abondent dans le même sens :
Generally speaking, the party seeking to tender electronic evidence will not require an expert witness. While there may be appropriate cases where either Crown or defence counsel should consider retaining an expert, it should never be viewed as an automatic requirement simply because modern technology is involved in the case before the Court[31].
[…]
However, the Crown does not always require an expert witness to introduce evidence of digital forensic analysis. In many cases, the Crown produces a police witness trained in computer forensics and/or with extensive experience in social media technology and investigations. An officer’s forensic review of a computer is often presented as fact rather than opinion evidence. The precise line where this testimony may veer into expert opinion evidence may seem unclear and is often contested. Defence counsel should be alert to this issue and object where there is a genuine concern that the officer’s testimony has entered into opinion evidence without the Crown having sought to have the officer qualified as an expert witness[32].
[…]
Expert evidence may be required where digital evidence is presented through an app that could be manipulated to distort the accuracy of its contents. An expert familiar with the functioning of the app and the reliability of the data it produces should be called by the party tendering the evidence. Failure to call expert evidence may result in an insufficient basis for the trial court to properly assess the authenticity of the digital evidence[33].
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